


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






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VOLUME I



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The *Harvard Theological Review* has been partially endowed by a bequest of the late Miss Mildred Everett, "for the establishment and maintenance of an undenominational theological review, to be edited under the direction of the Faculty of the Divinity School of Harvard University. . . . I make this provision in order to carry out a plan suggested by my late father, the Rev. Charles Carroll Everett." During the continuance of *The New World*, Dr. Everett was on its editorial board, and many of his essays, now collected in the volume entitled *Essays, Theological and Literary*, appeared first in its pages. Sharing his belief in the value of such a theological review, and in devotion to his honored memory, the Faculty of the Harvard Divinity School, of which he was a member from 1869, and its Dean from 1878 until his death in 1900, has accepted the trust, and will strive to make the *Review* a worthy memorial of his comprehensive thought and catholic spirit.

The *Review* is edited by a Committee of the Faculty of the Harvard Divinity School consisting of Professors G. F. Moore, W. W. Fenn, and J. H. Ropes.

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# HARVARD THEOLOGICAL REVIEW

VOLUME I.

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NUMBER 1.

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## *THE CALL TO THEOLOGY*

FRANCIS GREENWOOD PEABODY

HARVARD UNIVERSITY.

The time may appear to many persons inopportune for the launching of a Journal of Theology. The tide of theological interest may seem to have ebbed so low as to leave no channel for such a venture; the profession of the ministry fails to win recruits; the queen of the sciences is deposed from her throne; critics are announcing the rout of the theological schools. The machinery of the churches, it is true, revolves with energy, but it does not seem to be geared into the wheels of the working world; and the deliberations of the theologians are frankly regarded by great numbers of people with indifference, if not with contempt. A distinguished railway president, on being informed that a promising youth had undertaken the study of theology, remarked, "Why does not so gifted a man devote himself to something that is real?"

This apparent turn of the tide is illustrated by the movement of higher education in the United States. Universities and colleges, whether maintained by the State or endowed by private means, have become detached, not only from theological supervision, but even from theological instruction. Faculties of theology are the exception rather than the rule in American universities. It is felt that theology is not only a difficult and divisive subject, but that it is not essential to the complete equipment of an institution of learning. "Let those who care for theology," it is said, "establish their denominational schools where they may have the advantage of an academic environment; the univer-

sity itself needs no school of theology to complete its circle of the sciences." The same reaction from theology is to be observed even among those who have been professionally trained as theologians. Education in medicine, law, and natural science, has been within one generation fundamentally revised to meet the new expansion of knowledge, but education for the ministry has for the most part remained unadjusted to the new world of learning. The requirement of the Hebrew language, for example, as a condition of ordination—or rather the requirement of so meagre a knowledge of the Hebrew language that not one student in ten can utilize it—still extorts from many students of theology in the United States from one-fourth to one-third of their years of professional education. As a consequence of this and similar survivals in the theological curriculum, many ministers of religion have found themselves trained in subjects which they cannot use, and ignorant of much which they need to know, and as they take up their work in the world are inclined to lay down their theology. They become administrators of congregations, organizers of ecclesiastical industries, philanthropists, pastors, but not theologians. Theology has presented itself to their minds as a record of controversies which were once living fires but are now extinct volcanoes, and they turn with a sense of relief to the fertile fields of modern life. The call of the time seems to them a call away from theology. They may even acquire a habit of mind quite distinct from that which characterizes a learned calling. Practitioners of law, medicine, or the natural sciences, are primarily and continuously students, unremittingly concerned to maintain the pace of intellectual progress, open-minded to each fresh discovery of truth. Practitioners of theology, on the other hand, often reserve little time for study, and may easily become disinclined to severe or logical thinking. Thus they may become faithful custodians of the oracles of God or skilful operatives in the work of the Church, and in either function may be workmen that need not be ashamed, but their attitude toward truth tends to detach them from the spirit of the modern world. A distinguished man of science, addressing, in 1906, the graduates of a technical school, said to them, "We old fellows have hard work to keep up with the advances of this generation in scientific theory and technical

practice, and we strain every nerve to maintain our place as *learners*." Then, as though contrasting this habit of mind with another, he proceeded to remark: "Authors, clergymen, women, and charitable workers, whose ideals of duty are in some respects unquestionably higher than those of the world, are in general strangely blind to the obligations of debt and contract. . . . Bankers do not like to deal with ladies or ministers or literary men." The scientific habit of mind, that is to say, according to this scholar, has its moral effect, and ministers, being less devoted to the method of science, become correspondingly less trustworthy in the ethics of daily life. However exaggerated such an indictment may be, it is not altogether without support in the habit and disposition of some ministers. It can hardly be maintained that the traits of intellectual honesty—precision, reserve of statement, the weighing of words—are as conspicuous in ministers as in men of science or men of affairs. At a convocation lately held of students from many theological schools the problems and ideals of the ministry were set forth for three days by selected advisers, and discussed by selected young men. The programme was rich in suggestions, both for the conduct of the devout life and for the direction of practical service, but throughout the session not one word was spoken either by old or young which concerned the minister as a thinker, or the duties of theological students as students of theology. Feeling and action had crowded out of the foreground of interest the function of thought. Piety and efficiency seemed sufficient substitutes for intellectual power. The passion for service had supplanted the passion for truth. A very competent critic of preaching, addressing an assemblage of preachers in Boston, is said to have told them with characteristic candor that their work was marked by "intellectual frugality." The same indictment has been brought by a distinguished representative of the Church of England against his own communion. "The real security of the Church," said the Bishop of Birmingham, "lies in giving full scope to the scholar's gift, and the reason why many thoughtful people do not find spiritual advantage in listening to preachers is that the preaching gives them little to think about." A supply of priests, in other words, cannot make good a lack of prophets. The church as altar or workshop cannot supplant the



church as interpreter and preacher. A time when people in an unprecedented degree are thinking can be guided by those only who can think straight and can report their thought with power. At such a time the words of Phillips Brooks, which to many readers once seemed exaggerated, become words of sober warning, "In many respects an ignorant clergy, however pious it may be, is worse than none at all."

If, then, these signs of a reaction from theology are unmistakable, what is the dilemma which confronts the Christian Church? Either it must frankly retreat from the pretence of leadership under the conditions of the present age, or it must become a more efficient organ of rational and candid thought. Not less of religious fervor and not less of practical activity are demanded of the representatives of religion, but a new accession of intellectual power, the capacity to translate the message of the Timeless into the dialect of the present age. The specialization of knowledge has prescribed to the minister of religion a definite sphere, and no amount of hastily acquired information about politics or economics or social reform can atone for the abandonment of his own province. On other subjects others are better trained than he, and may listen to his counsel with compassion, if not with contempt. If he gives up thinking about religion, he gives up his place in a learned profession. He may continue to be a devoted priest, an efficient administrator, a devout soul, but the direction of the mind of the age is transferred to other hands. In 1729, William Law, the English mystic, published his *Serious Call to a Devout and Holy Life*, a summons to piety which touched experiences as remote from each other as those of Samuel Johnson and John Wesley. The same call of the mystic to the practice of the presence of God should be heard by the present age, and in the whirlwind and fire and earthquake of the time many a heart listens for this still small voice of the spirit. Under the new conditions of the modern world, however, its resistless movement of inquiry, its universal cultivation of the scientific method, its complete abandonment of obscurantism and ambiguity, a new and not less serious call is heard to devout and holy thinking. The future of organized religion will depend, not alone on new expressions of piety and new enlistments for service, but — in an unprecedented

degree—on a revival, among those who represent religion, of intellectual authority and leadership.

There are several further considerations which reinforce this call of the time and add to its imperativeness. In the first place, it must be remembered that any one who thinks about religion theologizes, whether he will or no. Theology may appear to him a dreary record of profitless controversies, from which he turns to a self-originated, contemporary, up-to-date religion, with its material in the events of the day or the witness of personal experience. "Yourself," said Emerson, "a new-born bard of the Holy Ghost, cast behind you all conformity, and acquaint men at first-hand with Deity." It is a natural reaction in the rhythm of progress. Dogmatism begets mysticism; literalism swings over into transcendentalism. In neither case, however, is there an escape from theology. The theology of supernaturalism is simply supplanted by the theology of naturalism. "When me they fly," theology may say with Emerson, "I am the wings." Tauler, Madame Guyon, and Schleiermacher are as legitimately to be reckoned among the theologians as Cyprian and Thomas Aquinas. The only refuge from theology is to stop thinking about religion, and that is impossible except to one who stops thinking altogether. The only alternatives are those of a molluscos theology and a vertebrated theology; a theology which is all foreground, like a Chinese plate where the man is larger than the house from which he comes, and a theology which has perspective, background, and relations.

In the second place, there should be recalled the coincidence which has occurred at many points in history of a revival of theology with a revival of religion. It has indeed not infrequently happened that a wave of religious feeling has been set in motion by unlearned preachers like Bunyan or Moody; but it cannot be inferred from such stirrings of the spirit that religious zeal is naturally repressed by learning or fostered by ignorance. The epochs of Christian history which have most indelibly marked its religious life have been at the same time epochs in the history of theology. The Confessions of Augustine, the Meditations of Anselm, the Simple Method how to Pray, of Luther, the *Monologen* of Schleiermacher—these manuals of the devout life are the

by-products of theologians. None but theologians could have created these epochs in the history of piety, and none but pious souls could have created the coincident epochs in the history of theology. Protestantism, Methodism, and Tractarianism were movements of religious vitality, but they began within the precincts of universities. It is suicidal to anticipate a revival of religion which shall be dissociated from a revival of theology. The only practicable choice is between a theology which gives chains and a theology which gives wings.

The call to theology is, further, heard in more personal experiences. Many a minister of religion would gladly testify to the tonic effect upon his spiritual power of intimacy with the mind of a master; the chastening discipline of acquaintance with great teachers or great thoughts. It is not essential to this exhilaration that the teaching should be accepted; it is the intellectual friction which sustains the momentum of his own thought. Not tolerance only, but the expansion of one's own convictions, comes of ascending with a trained guide to the heights of thought where one surveys the broad horizon of truth. No preacher is safe from spiritual atrophy who does not habitually exercise himself in these intellectual athletics of his profession. I have known a Protestant rationalist whose thought and style were enriched by the study of Cardinal Newman; another who prepared himself for worship by companionship with the mediæval mystics; and still another who sharpened his mind each week on the whetstone of Calvin. One of the most impressive facts in the biography of James Martineau is his determination, at the age of forty, to withdraw from his distinguished career as preacher and, even thus tardily, betake himself to Germany, where he might establish first-hand relations with the masters of philosophical idealism. From this point a new note of authority and a new sweep of insight are at his command, and the lyric strain of his earlier teaching is steadied and broadened by new companionships. No disclosure in the biography of Phillips Brooks is more instructive than the intellectual momentum which this prophet of modern life acquired through a study of the ante-Nicene Fathers of the Church. Historical research, far from diminishing his passionate devotion to contemporary religion, broadened and clarified his

view; and his gift of sympathy with types of thought and worship remote from his own was, if not acquired, at least confirmed, by his intimacy with Tertullian and Origen.

A further aspect of the call to theology is its promotion of co-operation between the teachers and the preachers of religion. The Devil, it has been said, laughs at a divided Church. It must be not less amusing to him to see the skirmish-line of theology advancing to new attacks of inquiry while the commanders of ecclesiasticism retreat to the breastworks of the past. This alienation between the conduct of pastoral life and the teaching of theological science may be observed in all countries. New sources of knowledge, new methods of criticism, new material for investigation, have given new vitality and fascination to the study of theology; but if free inquiry is to be met by anything less than appreciation and confidence, then religion cannot expect to hold the loyalty of educated men. If professional preferment or popularity be reserved for those whose minds are closed and denied to those whose minds are open, there must follow the decadence of the ministry and the paralysis of the Church. If industry and candor are less available as passports to eminence than conformity and reticence, then the Church is doomed to obscurantism and provincialism. Nothing repels the best minds from the service of religion more sternly than this sense of a schism between its science and its art. What Samuel Adams said of the American colonies is true of the ministers of religion in their relation to the teachers of theology: if they do not hang together, they will hang separately. The only permanent cure for wrong thinking is right thinking. The only way out of bad theology is through good theology. Either the theologians must lead the Church, or the Church must cease to lead the world. Religion must either hear the call to theology: or must content itself with becoming a function of the State, or a refuge for sick souls.

Finally, as one thus reviews the signs of the times which call to theology, he observes that it is a call which in many countries and many forms is being heard and obeyed. The first impression which one receives of a prevailing indifference to theology is not a just impression. On the contrary, the signs of a new concern for

the rational interpretation of religion are so many that they appear to be the premonitions of a genuine renaissance. The Roman Catholic Church is at this moment stirred by an agitation of free inquiry whose consequences may be as momentous as those of the Protestant Reformation; and this theological movement, represented by the Abbé Loisy, Senator Fogazzaro, and Father Tyrrell, is not likely to be checked by the reproach of Modernism. A great Church, as one critic has remarked, cannot maintain itself on the principle that there is no such thing as history. Either within the Catholic Church, or—in the language of the last Encyclical—“as the synthesis of all heresies,” a revision of Catholic theology seems destined to occur. A similar call to serious thinking is heard, among the noises of ecclesiastical politics, both in France and Great Britain. The collisions of State with Church, by the very violence of their friction, are striking out new conceptions of the nature and province of religion, and giving new momentum to theological progress. The “New Theology” of the English nonconformists, even if it be neither wholly new nor wholly theological, is at least a brave and candid search for a rational basis of religious experience. The scientific temper, long alienated from theology, is returning to the perennially absorbing problems of faith, as in the suggestive catechism of Sir Oliver Lodge. In every communion of churches the younger clergy are eagerly reconsidering the foundations of belief, testing the flexibility of creeds, and extending the radius of intellectual liberty. It is a propitious time to begin a *Journal of Theology*. The period of indifference seems approaching its close, and an era of promise for theology seems to be at hand. In one of the most notable of modern German books on the beginnings of Christianity, Professor Wernle remarks, with playful exaggeration, that among other characteristics of the work of Jesus Christ he came to save men from the theologians. It is a just discrimination of his teaching from the theological method of the scribes; but it is a most inadequate definition of the purpose of Jesus. He came, in fact, not to destroy theology, but to fulfil it. He gave new scope and significance to the thought of God, to the nature of man, and to the destiny of the soul and of the world. He would have been reckoned among the world's great theologians if other endowments had not given



him a higher title. He came not to save men from the theologians, but to save the theologians themselves. It is the same today. The traditional, external, and formal theology of the scribes speaks in a language which the present age does not understand, but the theology of Jesus Christ has the perennial authority of spiritual insight and habitual communion with the Eternal. The message of the gospel is not one of salvation from the theologians, nor even one of salvation for the theologians, but a message which, in its interpretation of the nature of God and of man, must be delivered by the theologians to the mind of the modern world.

*MODERN IDEAS OF GOD*

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Modern ideas of God are many and various, but all of them, so far as they are not mere reproductions of traditional views handed down from the past, are dominated by one or the other of two independent tendencies, which took their rise respectively from Spinoza and from Kant. In this article it is impossible to follow the various ramifications of these tendencies. They are often found together in the same theologian in curious and even inconsistent combinations. I desire to distinguish them sharply the one from the other, and to study them separately as they appear in a few of their most notable and consistent representatives. The former tendency, as I have said, took its rise from Spinoza. Despised and neglected by the leaders of European thought for nearly a hundred years after his death, he finally came to his rights, and was speedily a dominant force in Germany, which was about to assume again the intellectual leadership of Europe held in the eighteenth century successively by England and France. The time was ripe for Spinoza's philosophy. Reaction against the extreme individualism and superficial rationalism of the period was growing rapidly, and the profound and massive monism of the great Jewish sage was fitted to appeal to the imagination of the new age. The first important utterance was Herder's little work entitled *Gott*, which appeared in 1787 and had wide influence. In this book Herder interprets Spinoza in the light of Leibnitz's dynamic conception of the universe, and so supplements his unity of substance with an all-pervasive unity of force. God he represents as the infinite force which constitutes the essence of all existence, spiritual and material, and individualizes itself in the phenomenal world both of man and of nature. We are differentiations of this one all-embracing force, and have reality as individuals in proportion as we give ourselves to

the preservation of the whole, which we feel belongs to us and to which we belong. Our individuality consists in our consciousness of oneness with the all and our devotion to it. In coming to a knowledge of God, of whom we are a part, we come to self-consciousness, and in coming to self-consciousness we come to a knowledge of God.

Thus, with a monism as thoroughgoing as Spinoza's, Herder is enabled, as he thinks, to make room for individual religious feeling and activity, and so prepares the way for the various combinations of monism and Christian theism which are among the most characteristic features of nineteenth century religious thought.<sup>1</sup>

In line with the same general tendency, stress began to be laid toward the close of the eighteenth century, again under the influence of Leibnitz's dynamic philosophy, upon a unity of process controlling all nature and human history, or in other words upon the doctrine of evolution. Herder's elaborate *Ideen zur Philosophie der Geschichte der Menschheit* (1790 f.) is an important document in this connection. The effect of the growing theory of evolution, which rapidly made its way both in philosophy and in science, was identical with that of Herder's interpretation of Spinoza, promoting as it did the idea that all force is immanent rather than extraneous, and so tending to undermine the idea of a transcendent creator and governor of the world, and ultimately to promote the doctrine of divine immanence.

Closely related to Herder's monism, though worked out more carefully and formulated in a more philosophical way, is Schleiermacher's idea of God. He felt, as Herder did, the influence of Spinoza, but not to the same extent the influence of Leibnitz; and he was controlled much more than Herder by the growing romanticism of the age. Two things about romanticism are of particular interest in this connection, its emphasis upon the emotional side of man's nature, and its recognition of him as part of a larger whole, in oneness with which and in openness to whose influence he finds his true life. Culture consists in learning to appreciate the beauty and harmony of the universe of which one

<sup>1</sup> For a fuller description of Herder's book, reference may be made to my article in the *Hibbert Journal* for July, 1905.

is a part, in coming into more intimate sympathy with it, and in acquiring a sensitiveness to the whole world of nature and of man. The common tendency among the romanticists was to reproduce the conditions of earlier ages before the modern spirit of enlightenment had taken possession of the world, when every one believed in immediate intercourse between man and the universe about him, in apparitions and fairies and fables, and when the fancy had free play and was not yet destroyed by the ruthless hand of reason. The effect upon religion was diverse. Some of the romanticists felt the religious impulse strongly; but with their hostility to the dominance of reason, which they believed began with the Reformation, and with their distaste for the prevalent coldness and barrenness of Protestantism, they found Catholicism more to their liking. Others revolted against religion altogether, which they knew only in its rationalistic form, and regarded it as unworthy the notice of the man of genuine culture. It was for romanticists of the latter class that Schleiermacher wrote in 1799 his famous *Reden über die Religion an die Gebildeten unter ihren Verächtern*.<sup>2</sup> The most important of the discourses is the second, on the nature of religion. The general thesis is that religion has its seat, not in the intellect, nor in the will, but in the feelings, and consists in a sense of the universal or infinite. "Piety," Schleiermacher says, "must take its place alongside of science and practice as a third of equal dignity and importance." To be religious is to be immediately conscious of the universal, that is of the divine, in and through all its manifestations in the world of sense and thought. Schleiermacher's religious sense was simply a translation into other terms of the artistic sense of the romanticists. What they called openness to the universe he called openness to God. What they regarded as an apprehension of its beauty and harmony was to him an apprehension of the divine. So he claimed that the highest culture, of which the romanticists made so much, includes religion; and to be without religion is to content oneself with a partial and one-sided development. Religion raises a man above his individual limitations into converse with the infinite, and the religious man recognizes in every event a manifestation of the divine.

<sup>2</sup> English translation by John Oman, "On Religion," etc., 1893.

Everything is a miracle, a sign of the presence and activity of God. Revelation is every communication of the universe to the human spirit, every vision which the individual has of the All. Grace is merely the efficient influence of man's consciousness of the infinite upon his own living. Ego and non-ego are simply differentiations of the Absolute, or God. In the Absolute the two exist in perfect unity, in the world they are separated. But they become one again in every impression of the world upon us. The universal manifests itself only through the individual, and the individual comes to its true life only in the universal, and to be aware of this life is to be religious. In a later work, *Der Christliche Glaube*, Schleiermacher defines religion as the sense of dependence upon the infinite. But this was due to the growing sway of traditional theology, and indicates no essential change of view.

Under the influence of Kant's epistemology, Schleiermacher says that we become conscious of our oneness with the absolute, not through immediate vision of it, but only through our relation to the phenomenal universe, and as a result of the impression of the world upon us. And, equally under Kant's influence, he denies that we apprehend the absolute intellectually. All knowledge of it is impossible; it is given us only in feeling. He thus saves himself from mysticism in the historic Neoplatonic sense. But this does not affect the controlling tendency of his thought. He belongs in the group which owed its existence to Spinoza. He is a monist as truly as Herder, who was not at all in sympathy with the new critical epistemology and rejected it completely.

Closely related to both Herder and Schleiermacher is Hegel with his logical monism. In his *Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion* (published posthumously in 1832) he says, "God is the unity of the natural and spiritual."<sup>3</sup> "God is the absolute substance, the only true reality. Everything else which is real is not real in itself; it has no existence in itself. The only absolute reality is God alone, and so he is the absolute substance."<sup>4</sup> The absolute, to be sure, is dynamic, not static as with Spinoza. "Only God is; God, however, only through the mediation of himself

<sup>3</sup> *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion*, 2d ed., Berlin, 1840, I, 202.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.* I, 90.



with himself. He wills the finite, he sets it before himself as another, and thereby is made another to himself, is made a finite, for he has another over against himself." "This existence of the finite must not continue, but must be put an end to. God is the movement toward finiteness, and also the removing of it in himself. In the ego, as that which exists finitely, God returns to himself, and is only God in that he thus returns. Without the world God is not God."<sup>6</sup> In the dynamic character of the absolute is found the basis of Hegel's doctrine of evolution, which is one of the secrets of the influence of Hegelianism.

"Religion," Hegel says, "is knowledge of God, which, since we are but moments in the self-expression of God, may be called also God's self-knowledge." "Religion is the knowledge which the finite spirit has of the infinite, and it is the knowledge which the divine spirit has of itself through the medium of the finite, and so religion may be called God's self-consciousness."<sup>6</sup>

The difference between Hegel and Schleiermacher, in spite of their hostility to each other, is for our purpose not vital. It is true that Schleiermacher approaches the absolute from the side of the finite, while Hegel proceeds in the opposite direction, so that the one is experimental where the other is speculative; but God is as truly absolute being, and spirit and nature as truly differentiations of the absolute, to the one as to the other. Moreover, it is of minor consequence that the one lays the emphasis on feeling and the other on knowledge. Indeed, Hegel himself recognizes feeling as the primary organ of religion, but he puts content into it, which he thinks is lacking in Schleiermacher's view. "Feeling," he says, "may have the most various content." "Feeling is the form in which the content is entirely accidental." To put content into religious feeling is the work of philosophy, but "philosophy is distinguished from religion only in form, not in content." "Philosophy thinks what the person as such feels, . . . and so feeling is not repudiated by philosophy, but is given its true content by it."<sup>7</sup>

The characteristic thing about Hegel, as well as Herder and Schleiermacher, is the notion of God as the absolute, of which

<sup>6</sup> *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion*, I, 193.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.* I, 202.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.* I, 126.

spirit and nature are only differentiations or manifestations—a thoroughgoing monism, in which oneness is the controlling fact. God so conceived may be given a moral character; both Schleiermacher and Hegel emphasize the fact that he is love. But this is not of the essence of the matter in either case, and for our immediate purpose is not important. The one essential thing about the general type of theism I have been describing is that God is the all-embracing whole, in the consciousness of his unity with which man finds his highest life.

The tendency represented by these men makes its influence felt everywhere. It is in line with the nineteenth century spirit of collectivism; and in spite of ethical difficulties and stubborn facts of experience, it makes a tremendous appeal to thoughtful minds. Many may not go as far as the thinkers described; the tendency may not always express itself in the form of a thoroughgoing and consistent monism; but the emphasis upon divine immanence in contrast with the common eighteenth century emphasis upon divine transcendence, the insistence that God is in the universe of nature and man, and that it is essentially one with him—this is characteristic of most modern religious thought. Today God is not sought in strange and abnormal phenomena, in so-called miraculous events, as he once was, but in the common and orderly processes of nature. The whole world is permeated by the divine, and man himself is one with God. Not by shutting our eyes to the universe in which we live, and not by denying the attributes of humanity, do we form a just conception of God, as was once believed; but to be in closest touch with nature is to be in closest touch with God, and to be most human is to be most divine. The doctrine of divine immanence has been called the characteristic religious doctrine of the nineteenth century, and certainly none has had wider acceptance among men of modern sympathies. Vague and inconsistent as the belief commonly is; thoroughly monistic, or shrinking from monism in its fear of pantheism; ready to repudiate the personality of God, as Herder was, or jealously insistent upon it, as most theists are—whatever form it takes, the tendency I have been describing is widely dominant today, and it is in the philosophy of Spinoza that it has its roots.

The other general tendency to which I have referred took its rise with Kant. He was at one with the rationalists of the eighteenth century in regarding morality as the essence of religion. In his work on *Religion within the Limits of Mere Reason* he is very emphatic on this point. Subjectively considered, religion is the recognition of our duties as commands of God. When we do our duty, we are virtuous; when we recognize it as commanded by God, we are religious. The notion that there is anything one can do to please God except to live rightly is superstition. Moreover, to think that we can distinguish works of grace from works of nature, or that we can detect the activity of heavenly influences, is superstition. All such supernaturalism lies beyond our ken. There are three common forms of superstition, all promoted by positive religion: the belief in miracles, the belief in mysteries, and the belief in means of grace.

The genuine rationalism of all this is evident. But Kant's religious contribution does not lie here. This is simply the reproduction of the common thought of the eighteenth century. Nor does it lie, as is frequently said, in his vindication of moral freedom; for freedom was not generally denied by the rationalists of the eighteenth century, and Kant's vigorous assertion of it was made necessary only by his own critical philosophy, which seemed to destroy it altogether. His real religious contribution was a double one. In the first place, he took God out of the physical and put him into the moral sphere. In his theology as well as in his epistemology he felt the influence of Hume, but in the one as in the other he went beyond Hume's negations to a positive reconstruction of his own. We do not reach God by arguing back from the universe to a first cause, from the multiplicity of phenomena to a principle of unity, from contingent to necessary being. The iron chain of cause and effect which binds our phenomenal universe together knows no God and has no place for God. God is not a phenomenon, a being presented to us. God is an idea, a belief, which gives meaning to our ethical life and so is a postulate of our moral will.

In the second place, Kant's religious contribution lies in the fact that he interpreted God, thus transferred to the moral sphere, in terms of purpose. The necessity which leads me to postulate

God is not that I must account for the origin of my moral nature and so need a moral creator; nor that I must have a moral law-giver, or standard, or motive, as the rationalists in general said. The law of my practical reason, the categorical imperative, demands that I shall labor for the accomplishment of the highest good, shall bring my life under the control of this as a dominating purpose; and God is the purposeful being whom I assume in order to make the highest good realizable and so rational. God is thus read in terms of purpose. He exists, so far as I am concerned, simply in order to the realization—which means the rationalization—of the highest good, the Kingdom of God. We do not get God from the universe, we give him to the universe. We read meaning, worth, moral purpose, into it. We assume God, not to account for the world, but in order to realize the highest good; and we live as moral beings by the support of the meaning and worth thus attaching to the world. In his *Critique of the Practical Reason* Kant says, "Granted that the pure moral law absolutely binds everyone, not as a prudential rule but as a command, then the right-minded man may well say: I will that there be a God; that my existence in this world be also an existence outside the chain of nature, in a pure world of the understanding; finally, that my existence be endless. I insist on this, and will not permit this belief to be taken from me."<sup>8</sup> In another work he says, "Out of the moral law which our own reason prescribes to us with authority, and not out of the theory of the nature of things in themselves, does the conception of God arise which the practical pure reason compels us ourselves to make."<sup>9</sup> Again, "Theoretically we do not, by the strongest efforts of reason, come at all nearer to the conviction of the existence of God, the reality of the highest good, and the prospect of a future life; for we possess no insight into the nature of supersensuous objects. Practically, however, we make these objects for ourselves as we regard the idea of them helpful to our reason's ultimate aim," etc.<sup>10</sup> God, the Kingdom of God, and immortality are "ideas made by ourselves with a practical purpose, which must not be given theoretical value, or they will turn theology into

<sup>8</sup> Hartenstein's edition of Kant's Works, IV, 287.

<sup>9</sup> Von einen neuerdings vornehmen Ton in der Philosophie, I, 188.

<sup>10</sup> Ueber die Fortschritte der Metaphysik seit Leibnitz und Wolff, III, 463.

theosophy, moral teleology into mysticism, and psychology into pneumatology, and so put things a knowledge of which we make use of in practical matters over into a transcendent sphere where they are entirely inaccessible to our reason."<sup>11</sup>

We are evidently moving here in a realm of thoroughgoing pragmatism. (If one says we have no evidence for the existence of God, no proof of divine purpose in the world, we may say in the spirit of Kant: We will put purpose there; we will give the world meaning which we cannot discover in it. This is to be religious. Faith in God is an heroic deed, not simply a passive acquiescence. We make a moral purpose supreme, and we read this moral purpose into the universe, and thus we find God for ourselves. Religion is a creative act of the moral will, as knowledge, according to Kant, is a creative act of the understanding. Only as we stamp purpose on the world and give it ethical meaning can we live our highest life and be true to ourselves.) This is Kant's great religious message.

The validity of the particular way in which he reaches God as a postulate of the moral will may be seriously questioned. He says of it himself that, quite independently of the presuppositions of God, freedom, and immortality, one's duty grounds itself on the moral law, and needs no support from theories touching the inner nature of things, or the secret purpose of the world order, or the reality of a world ruler.<sup>12</sup> His method of reaching God is familiar. We see inevitably by the law of our practical reason that virtue should lead to happiness. The combination of virtue and happiness we recognize as the highest good by the very necessity of our nature. But this leads us to postulate God, for only a supreme moral being can make virtue lead to happiness; that is, only such a being can supply the second element of the highest good. This highest good is the Kingdom of God and the supreme end of creation. The moral law requires that I shall make it the aim of all my efforts. My own happiness as a moral being is included in this Kingdom, but must not be the motive of my conduct. My only motive should be virtue. No one is moral who obeys the law for

<sup>11</sup> Ueber die Fortschritte der Metaphysik seit Leibnitz und Wolff, III, 476.

<sup>12</sup> Kritik der praktischen Vernunft, IV, 267.

any ulterior purpose. Religion does not supply motive for virtue, but it meets the need of our practical reason, which demands the ultimate realization of the highest good. As I have said, there may be doubt as to the validity of this method of reaching God. As a matter of fact, it has little influence today. It is not here indeed that Kant's contribution lies, but, as already shown, in the fact that he interpreted God wholly in terms of moral purpose.

Closely connected with Kant was Johann Gottlieb Fichte. With Fichte's subjective idealism I am not here concerned; but the conception of religion which appears in some of his earlier writings is important, for it represents a more complete ethicizing of Kant's theory, that is, a more consistent carrying out of Kant's own ethical principles. In his beautiful little essay entitled "Ueber den Grund unseres Glaubens an eine Göttliche Weltregierung," which appeared in the *Philosophisches Journal* for 1798, Fichte shows that we cannot argue from the world to a rational creator or to a world ruler, but can reach God only through our moral nature. I find myself free from the control of the world of sense and raised above it. As a free being, I possess a purpose to which I give myself. I cannot doubt my freedom and I cannot doubt my purpose without denying myself. The conviction that I am free and am called to accomplish a purpose is faith, and hence the element of moral certainty is faith. To set myself an object is the same as to set it before me as actually accomplished in some future time. If I will not deny myself, I must assume the possibility of its accomplishment. If I ought, I can. The ought is given immediately, and necessarily involves the can. This is a categorical imperative, and is based on nothing else. If one says he must know whether he can before he knows whether he ought, he turns the thing around and makes the moral law conditional instead of imperative, and so entirely destroys it. The world, including my existence and that of others, is the common theatre of morality. It constitutes a scene for the exercise of freedom, but itself has not the slightest influence on freedom. The free moral will is above all nature. "That the rational object shall be realized," he says, "can be brought about only through the activity of a free being. But it will surely be realized in accordance with a higher law.

Right doing is possible, and every circumstance contributes to it through that higher law." This moral order, he goes on to say, is divine. "This is the true faith; this moral order is the divine which we assume. It is built through right doing. This is the only possible confession of faith, joyfully and without restraint to do what each one ought to do, without doubting and troubling oneself about the consequences. In this way the divine becomes living and actual to us." And again, "It is therefore a misunderstanding to say that it is doubtful whether there is a God or not. It is not at all doubtful, indeed, it is the most certain thing in the world, the ground of all other certainties, the only absolute objective certainty, that there is a moral order of the world; that every rational individual has his fixed place in this order and his own work; . . . that without it not a hair falls from his head; . . . that every truly good deed succeeds, every bad deed fails infallibly; and that to those who love the good all things work for good. On the other hand, to one who thinks upon this for a moment and acknowledges frankly the result of his thought, it cannot remain doubtful that the conception of God as a special substance is impossible and contradictory."

In his *Appellation an das Publicum gegen die Anklage des Atheismus*, which was published the following year and is simply an elaboration and defense of the briefer essay, he says: "Their object [that is, the object of his opponents] is always enjoyment, whether of a higher or lower sort; enjoyment in this life, and if they picture to themselves immortality, enjoyment in the life beyond the grave. They know nothing else than enjoyment. They cannot conceal from themselves that the success of their striving after enjoyment depends upon something unknown which they call fortune. This fortune they personify, and this is their God. Their God is the giver of all enjoyment, of all happiness and unhappiness to moral beings. This is his fundamental character." "The central point of the strife between me and my opponents is this, that we stand in two different worlds and talk about two different worlds, they about the world of sense, I about the supersensuous world; that they think wholly of enjoyment, whatever form they may give it, while I think wholly of mere duty."

Thus Fichte follows Kant in making God a postulate of the

practical reason. But he is more consistently ethical even than Kant in neglecting altogether the latter's conception of the highest good as the combination of virtue and happiness, and seeing it solely in virtue. To Fichte God is necessary, not, as to Kant, in order to effect the ultimate union of virtue and happiness, but in order to secure the victory of virtue. The good deed succeeds infallibly, the bad deed fails infallibly, because there is a moral order of the universe, or, in other words, because there is a God. And so we may call Fichte's religion ethical optimism. To be virtuous is to do one's duty without regard to consequences. To be religious is to have the faith that goodness will prevail, that there is a moral order of the universe which makes for the final victory of the right. One may be moral and a pessimist. One can be religious only if one is an optimist.

Closely related to the position of Kant and Fichte, and yet fundamentally at variance with it, is the theistic philosophy of Jacobi, who repudiated the monism of Spinoza,<sup>13</sup> and followed Kant in his sharp distinction between the physical and moral spheres, while at the same time he felt the influence of romanticism, whose emphasis on feeling and on direct vision of things unseen by the common herd dominated his whole system.<sup>14</sup> By the *Verstand*, or Understanding, he affirms, we cannot apprehend God or supersensible realities. We can reach only the phenomenal universe, which is under the control of mechanical law. All philosophy of the understanding, that is, all demonstrative philosophy, of which Spinozism is the most consistent example, is therefore atheistical. We can never discover God or supersensuous reality by means of it. Is there then no God, and are there no spiritual realities, and is there no way by which to reach them? Jacobi answers, Yes; but they are attainable only by another faculty, a faculty of direct vision, which in his earlier works he calls *Glaube*, or Faith, in his later *Vernunft*, or Reason, and which he distinguishes sharply from the understanding. Faith, or Reason, is a perceptive faculty. By it we perceive the supersensible as immediately as sensible objects

<sup>13</sup> See his *Ueber die Lehre des Spinoza*, 1785.

<sup>14</sup> See especially his *Von den göttlichen Dingen und ihrer Offenbarung*, 1811, and the introduction to his philosophical writings prefixed to his treatise on Hume in the collected edition of his Works.



through the senses, and the former no more than the latter needs proof or admits of it. We are reminded here of the Evangelicals, who also assumed the existence of such a faculty, but confined it to the regenerate, making it a gift of the Holy Spirit instead of a natural endowment shared by the whole race. It is this higher spiritual faculty which distinguishes man from the brute, and it is by virtue of belonging to the higher world that he is possessed of freedom and so is a moral being. The immediate consciousness of freedom is fundamental. We are directly aware of our freedom, and so of belonging to a higher world than that of sense and of being able to control and dominate the latter. Jacobi agrees with Kant that a man would not be free, and so not moral, if he were only a part of the phenomenal universe; but he belongs to a higher world, and by virtue of his faith-faculty, of which Kant knows nothing, he becomes aware not only of freedom but also of God and other spiritual realities, becomes a religious as well as a moral being. It is through a knowledge of ourselves that we come to the knowledge of freedom and of God. Nature only conceals God. It is our own souls that reveal him, and we discover him only through self-consciousness. We find God because we can find ourselves only together with him. Revelation is wholly internal. God cannot reveal himself by visible signs and wonders, but only within man's soul. Jacobi thus followed Kant in taking God out of the phenomenal universe and putting him wholly into the moral sphere, but he failed to interpret God as Kant did in terms of purpose, and his notion of the possibility of the immediate vision of supersensible realities is of an altogether different type. His emphasis upon faith, or reason, as a higher faculty than the understanding, giving immediate perception of divine things, is mystical in its tendency, and this sufficiently marks the fundamental contrast between him and Kant, despite the kinship of the two men. As a matter of fact, though Jacobi was radically opposed to the idea of the immanence of God in nature which took its rise from Spinoza's monism, he promoted a modified form of immanence, involving God's presence in humanity, which became very popular in England under the influence of Coleridge, who emphasized Jacobi's distinction between the reason and the understanding, and in America under the influence of Bushnell, who made so much of the

supernatural character of personality. It is, in part at least, due to men of this stamp that the many current combinations of Spinozistic monism and Kantian ethicism have arisen—combinations of varying degrees of clearness and consistency.

Jacobi held an intermediate position, representing exclusively neither of the two tendencies with which we are concerned. But it is unequivocally in the group to which Kant and Fichte belonged that we are to place the most influential theologian of the later nineteenth century, Albrecht Ritschl. Ritschl started as a Hegelian, then broke away and joined the neo-Kantian movement; and his theory of knowledge, which is an important element in his system, is Kantian in origin. We can know only phenomena. We cannot penetrate beneath them to any supposed substratum or *Ding-an-sich*. But this does not mean that in knowing phenomena we do not know reality, for Ritschl adopts the Lotzian modification of the Kantian epistemology, and asserts that in phenomena reality is given, the distinction which Kant draws between phenomenon and noumenon being invalid. The reality of a thing lies in its activities, not in a quiescent something behind them, and when we know it in all its activities we know it through and through. This theory of knowledge Ritschl applies in the religious sphere. In that sphere, too, we can know only phenomena, and we cannot press back either by way of feeling or of knowledge to an unexpressed absolute or infinite. Thus Ritschl repudiates mysticism, for, as he claims, it always involves the assumption of an unseen something back of phenomena to which one can penetrate and into immediate relation with which one can come. That is, he interprets mysticism by its classic Neoplatonic type, in which just this transcendence of phenomena and immediacy of contact with a non-phenomenal noumenon is the essential thing. That he thus interpreted mysticism too narrowly may well be, but this need not concern us here. The point is that such mysticism he repudiated completely, as on his own principle he must.

Similarly, the application of his theory of knowledge to the religious sphere leads him to break away from traditional theology so far as it has to do with supra-phenomenal matters, the being of God, the creation of the universe, the nature of the soul, the future life. All such transcendental subjects, with which theology has so

largely concerned itself, he rules out of religion. We can know nothing about them, and if we could, they would not fall within the religious realm, for religion moves wholly in the sphere of value judgments. No theoretical judgment whatever, whether it concerns God, or the world, or the soul, can have any religious significance. And so no universal objective validity can be claimed for religious truths, and the effort to establish them by demonstration is vain.

Another important element in Ritschl's system is his theory of religion. Religion arises as a result of one's relation to the world. Man is conscious of impulses and aspirations which raise him above the world, and yet he is aware at the same time that he is a part of it, and the great problem in life is to be actually superior to it, to realize his higher ideals, to rule his environment, not be ruled by it. Out of the difficulty which he finds in thus winning the victory religion is born; for he looks without himself for some higher power that shall help him, in other words he looks for a God, that is, not a being who is himself the world, or who is the absolute lying back of it, whose manifestation the world is, or from whom it comes, but a God who stands over against it, asserting a spiritual principle higher than it, so that in oneness with that principle and under the control of the purpose which embodies it one may become superior to the world and a victor over it. Thus he says, "The religious view of the world is in all its forms based upon the fact that man distinguishes himself in some degree in value from the phenomena which surround him and the activities of nature which press upon him."<sup>15</sup> And again: "In all religion the effort is made, with the help of the exalted spiritual power which man worships, to overcome the contradiction in which he finds himself as a part of the world of nature and as a spiritual personality which makes the claim to rule nature. For on the one hand man is a part of nature, helpless over against it, dependent upon and limited by external things. But on the other hand, as spirit, he feels himself driven to assert his independence over against such things. In this situation religion arises as the belief in exalted spiritual powers, through whose help the power which resides in the man himself is in some way supplemented, or raised to a complete whole

<sup>15</sup> *Rechtfertigung und Versöhnung*, III, 17.

of its kind, which is sufficient to withstand the pressure of the natural world."<sup>16</sup>

This is, of course, the exact opposite of the idea of God (shared by Herder, Schleiermacher, and Hegel) as the great All, or Absolute, which expresses itself at the same time in nature and in man. It is God over against nature whom Ritschl seeks. He is in consequence often called a dualist, but the name is misleading. He does not think at all in terms of substance, and so is not a dualist in the traditional sense. Our superiority to the world consists in living for ideal aims which do not depend upon it and cannot be destroyed by it, living freely, courageously, patiently, and righteously. To the man living thus the world may become a means for the realization of his higher ends. It is not an end in itself, nor need it be a permanently hostile force which is to be destroyed—Ritschl was not an ascetic. The world is the sphere for the accomplishment of spiritual purposes, and it may be a means thereto or an insurmountable obstacle. In the former case we are victors and free men; in the latter, the world wins the victory over us. Thus in one sense Ritschl may be called a monist, since for the man who is truly a victor over the world all is brought under one control. But this kind of ethical monism is a very different thing from the monism of Spinoza, Herder, Schleiermacher, Hegel, and the rest; and to call it monism at all would give rise to misunderstanding, though perhaps it would be no more misleading than to call Ritschl a dualist. Either is an unfortunate term, for he moves in a different sphere altogether from that in which the words monist and dualist have had their place in the past.

Ritschl's sharp distinction between man and the world reminds us of Jacobi, but it is not the same thing; and the nature of the difference appears clearly in the fact that he repudiates anything like a special spiritual faculty, such as Jacobi assumed, by which we directly perceive spiritual realities. Religion involves no such faculty. It is due to the need in which we find ourselves over against the world, and is simply the assertion of our confidence that we are superior to it and of our conviction that we shall win the victory over it. It is an expression again, as in the case of Fichte, of our ethical optimism.

<sup>16</sup> *Rechtfertigung und Versöhnung*, III, 189.

It is clear that Ritschl reproduced the twofold religious contribution of Kant, who interpreted God wholly in terms of moral purpose. In the fact that he followed Kant in this matter, and reread the entire Christian system in the light of the conception of God as moral purpose, lies his great significance as a Christian theologian. It is true that he did not reach God by the Kantian method, making him a postulate of the practical reason needed to effect the combination of virtue and happiness; he based his theistic faith upon the historic revelation of Jesus Christ. In him we see a man who actually won the victory over the world, which we are striving after, by faith in a God whom he called his Father, a faith which made him absolutely fearless, and by devotion to that Father's will, a will which required unfailing and self-forgetful service of his fellows. The victory won by such faith and devotion—a victory which we too may win—is the strongest possible guarantee of the existence of the divine purpose which we make our own when we thus live. That purpose is the establishment of the Kingdom of God on earth; not a combination of virtue and happiness lying beyond our temporal existence, but the reign of righteousness and service in this world of ours. For the promotion of this it is the duty of every man to labor. We win the completest victory over the world, not by asserting ourselves against it, but by promoting the Kingdom of God within it. Devotion to that purpose raises us above the world as nothing else can. We conquer it by serving it. This is Ritschl's combination of ethics and religion, and this, he claims, is the message of Jesus Christ. God is moral purpose, and the purpose of the God whom Christ reveals is the highest we know or can conceive, and so we recognize the supremacy of the Christian God and of the Christian religion. Religion at its best means the winning of a victory over the world by fulfilling the divine purpose in serving the world, and Christianity is religion at its best.

In agreement with Schleiermacher and Hegel, with the rationalists in general, and with Kant, Ritschl interpreted God as love. In this he followed the common tendency of the modern age. But while, according to the rationalistic view, the divine love expressed itself in promoting human happiness; according to Kant in bringing about the co-ordination of virtue and happiness; according to

Schleiermacher in fostering man's consciousness of God; according to Hegel in effecting the reunion of the human and divine; according to Ritschl the fact that God is love means that he gives himself to the establishment of his kingdom interpreted as the reign of love among men—a fellowship of mutual sympathy and helpfulness. The divine love eventuates, not in anything passive, but in active social service. It is interesting to notice in this connection that the old schism between the divine justice and the divine love disappears in Ritschl's theology. The divine justice manifests itself, not in retribution, but in the persistency of God's eternal purpose of love and in the self-consistency with which He realizes that purpose. Ritschl's idea of God was, without doubt, his greatest contribution to Christian thought; and it is clear that it resulted simply from reading into Kant's conception of God as moral purpose a genuinely Christian content.

The two tendencies described in this article are often combined, and there is no reason why they should not be. But it should be noticed that they represent totally different points of view. To the theologian whose interest is solely ethical it makes no difference whether God be thought of as immanent or transcendent. To the one whose interest is metaphysical it makes all the difference in the world. Most Christian theologians have both interests, and combine the two things apparently without realizing the disparate elements involved. It could make only for theological lucidity if the diversity of the two points of view were everywhere recognized, as Ritschl so clearly recognized it, and the need of metaphysical unity were not confounded with the desire for ethical efficiency.

*IS OUR PROTESTANTISM STILL PROTESTANT?*

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UNION THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY

There are two classes of people who have an interest in the question which we have proposed for discussion. It may be asked by those who believe that in historic Protestantism we have the true and final form of religion, and who therefore view with alarm any radical departure from the position of the earlier Reformers. In this case the question whether our Protestantism is still Protestant will mean the inquiry whether our modern liberal Christianity has so far departed from the fundamental principles of the Reformation that its title to the name of evangelical Christianity may rightly be called in question. On the other hand, the inquiry may be made by those who believe that historic Protestantism represents a stage of religious development which the world is destined to outgrow. In the latter case the meaning of the question will be whether the process of theological reconstruction has gone so far that the new type of religious thought and life which is expected to supersede the old can at last be clearly differentiated from its predecessor.

And as there are two senses in which the question may be asked, so also there are two ways in which it may be answered. One may be persuaded that, in spite of all changes in detail, modern Protestantism is still true to the principles of the Reformation, so that, great as is the revolution which thought has undergone during the century that has closed, it has introduced "no new phase in the history of the Christian religion." Or, one may conclude that, whatever flashes of insight the Reformers may have had, the religion which was the final outgrowth of their protest was essentially a child of the past, and is to be classed with Catholicism as a religion of authority, over against the new religion of the spirit toward which the modern world is more or less consciously striving. The former is the position taken by Har-

nack in his recent lectures on the essence of Christianity.<sup>1</sup> The latter is the view which Sabatier has expressed in his suggestive book entitled, *The Religions of Authority and the Religion of the Spirit*.<sup>2</sup>

It is evident that the contrast thus indicated is of momentous importance both for thought and life. It affects our attitude toward all the important problems of scientific theology. If we give Harnack's answer, we shall distinguish, as he does, three great types of historic Christianity, the Greek, the Roman, and the Protestant; and modern Protestant Christianity, however important its differences from the older form of Protestantism may seem to us to be, will still represent "no new phase in the history of the Christian religion." If, on the other hand, we agree with Sabatier, we shall still distinguish three types of historic Christianity, but in this case the line will be drawn between the older and the newer Protestantism. We shall have two great examples of the religion of authority, the religion of the church and the religion of the book; and over against these, as a third, the religion of the spirit, which is the ideal not only of modern Protestantism but of all true men, whether Catholic or Protestant, who have felt the influences of the new age in which we live.

No less important are the practical bearings of the question. If the former view be taken, then there is a real kinship between our modern religious life and the past of which it is the outgrowth, and the effort to bring out this community of spirit and to illustrate in detail the points of agreement between our present ideals and those of our fathers becomes legitimate and necessary. If, on the other hand, we believe that we have entered upon a new stage of religious development, then the attempt to gloss over by smooth words the differences which obtain is dangerous and misleading, and the true duty of the religious teacher is to emphasize the contrast by every means at his command.

Such, then, are some of the issues involved in the question proposed for our discussion. We shall endeavor to determine

<sup>1</sup> *Das Wesen des Christentums*, Leipzig, 1900 (English translation, *What is Christianity?* London, 1901, p. 299).

<sup>2</sup> *Les religions d'autorité et la religion de l'esprit*, Paris, 1904 (English translation, New York, 1904).



whether Harnack or Sabatier is in the right, or whether some third position is possible, from which the truth for which both alike contend may find due recognition.

On the face of it there is much to be said on either side. In support of Harnack's contention it may be urged that the Reformation began as a protest against ecclesiastical authority. It was the assertion of the right of the individual to think his own thoughts, realize his own life, and find his way to God in his own manner. Liberty of conscience has ever been a fundamental tenet of Protestantism, and the equality of all believers in rights and duties is its article of the standing or falling church. Judged by this test, modern Protestantism stands for no new ideal. It is only the clearer expression and more consistent use of principles already accepted. It is the application to traditional Protestantism itself of a method, the right of which the Reformers clearly recognized, but which the conditions of their time did not permit them adequately to employ.

Yet, on the other hand, there is much also to be said for Sabatier's position. Judged historically, and not simply in its ideal, Protestantism has too often deserved the French theologian's description. To be sure, it has substituted the Bible for the Church as the only infallible rule of faith and practice, but the attributes which it has assigned to the book have not differed in kind from those which Catholicism has ascribed to the church. To Protestant, as to Catholic, unquestioning obedience to an infallible authority once for all given has been the one sure test of true religion. No doubt, in pressing back of the Church to the Bible, Protestantism was a means of reforming many flagrant abuses and so preparing the way for the better insight which we now possess. But it may be argued with no little plausibility that the means by which this reformation was brought about is the clearest proof of the gulf which separates the older from the newer faith. For, in turning back to the Bible and finding in a historic revelation, given once for all, the sole norm and final test of truth, historic Protestantism contradicts the fundamental assumption of modern life, which is that God is a God of progress, and therefore that his final word to man is to be sought in the present and in the future rather than in the past.

It is clear that before we can rightly determine the issues thus raised we must face the prior question as to the nature of Protestantism. In order to tell whether modern Protestantism is Protestant, we must first understand what it means to be Protestant, and especially what is the distinctive mark by which Protestantism is separated from the type of religion we call Catholic. We shall be helped in this discrimination by a brief review of some answers which on closer inspection prove to be inadequate.<sup>3</sup>

One of the most familiar of these is that which makes the difference between Protestantism and Catholicism synonymous with that between experimental and traditional religion. According to this view Protestantism is the religion of freedom and immediacy. It passes over all that is external and secondary in its effort to gain direct access to God in the personal religious experience. It needs no mediator between God and man, because it has learned to know God at first hand. Its faith is not grounded on the testimony of any man or church, but upon the witness of God himself speaking directly through his spirit to the heart of each believer. This fresh and vital aspect of Protestantism has been strikingly emphasized by Mr. Santayana in his recent book, *Reason in Religion*. Protestantism, he tells us, is "the religion of pure spontaneity, of emotional freedom."<sup>4</sup> It is instinctively trustful and self-assertive, "more primitive than reason, and even than man."<sup>5</sup> In contrast with this young and virile faith,

<sup>3</sup> Under Protestantism, in the sense in which the term is used in the present discussion, we include all the different phases of religious life and thought which were the outcome of the general movement we call the Reformation. Professor Troeltsch, in his recent suggestive essay entitled *Die Bedeutung des Protestantismus für die Entstehung der modernen Welt* (1906), uses the term in a narrower sense, to describe the type of thought represented by the more conservative Reformers, Zwingli, Luther and Calvin, as distinct from that of the more extreme independents, who carried their individualism to greater lengths. Such a restriction of the term, however useful for the purposes of scientific discussion, I believe to be unjustified by historic usage, and to lead to an undue minimizing of the novel elements inherent in the new faith. The genius of a new type is best disclosed by a study of its more advanced representatives, and the nature of Protestantism cannot be justly estimated till we have given full weight to the evidence afforded by the history of the Baptist and other early independent movements, whose break with the older Christian tradition was more radical than that of the Lutheran and Calvinistic bodies.

<sup>4</sup> Page 115.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.* p. 122.

Catholicism represents a later and less confident form of religion. It is religion grown cautious through the experience of repeated failures, timorous, self-distrustful, content to take God at second-hand because it has lost faith in its ability to find God for itself.

No doubt there is truth in this contrast. It is true that the Catholicism of the sixteenth century had become largely traditional, and that Protestantism represented a genuine revival of vital religion; but as an expression of the fundamental difference between the two types this distinction is clearly inadequate. The contrast between vital and traditional religion is not confined to any age or any type of faith. Protestantism has had its full share of traditionalists, and Catholicism, in its finer expressions, is not without acquaintance with the freedom and spontaneity of the Christian life. The Westminster doctrine of the *Testimonium Spiritus Sancti*<sup>6</sup> may be paralleled in almost so many words in the language of the Vatican Council.<sup>7</sup> Nor is the similarity in doctrine alone. The great saints of the Catholic Church, men like Bernard and women like St. Theresa, were conscious of no less direct communion with God than Luther and Wesley among the Protestants. And surely if a spirit of virility and of youth trusting in its own instincts and gladly reaching out into the unknown world in simple trust that it would answer to the claim of the spirit within be sufficient to stamp a man a Protestant as distinct from a Catholic, then the gentle saint of Assisi from

<sup>6</sup> Confession of Faith, i, 5: "We may be moved and induced by the testimony of the Church to an high and reverent esteem of the Holy Scripture; and the heavenliness of the matter, the efficacy of the doctrine, the majesty of the style, the consent of all the parts, the scope of the whole (which is to give all glory to God), the full discovery it makes of the only way of man's salvation, the many other incomparable excellencies, and the entire perfection thereof, are arguments whereby it doth abundantly evidence itself to be the Word of God; yet, notwithstanding, our full persuasion and assurance of the infallible truth, and divine authority thereof, is from the inward work of the Holy Spirit, bearing witness by and with the Word in our hearts."

<sup>7</sup> Chapter iii, quoted by Schaff, *Creeds of Christendom*, II, 243: "And the Catholic Church teaches that this faith, which is the beginning of man's salvation, is a supernatural virtue, whereby, inspired and assisted by the grace of God, we believe that the things which he has revealed are true; not because of the intrinsic truth of the things, viewed by the natural light of reason, but because of the authority of God himself, who reveals them, and who can neither be deceived nor deceive."

whom the Franciscans claim their descent must hold the foremost place among the heroes of Protestantism.

Nor is the difference between Protestantism and Catholicism synonymous with the difference between an individualistic and a social religion. This too has often been affirmed. Catholicism, we are told, stands for the principle of churchly mediation, which Protestantism rejects. So great a name as Schleiermacher may be quoted as authority for this method of stating the contrast. In his *Glaubenslehre*<sup>8</sup> he tells us that the difference between Catholicism and Protestantism may be expressed by saying that in Catholicism the relation of the believer to Christ is made dependent upon his relation to the Church, whereas in Protestantism the believer's relation to the Church is made dependent upon his relation to Christ.

Here too, no doubt, there is a truth which needs to find expression in our definition. Protestantism began as a protest against the abuse of ecclesiastical authority, and ever since it has stood for the liberty of the individual. It has been the religion of free men, willing, if necessary, to break with existing forms of social life when constrained to do so by their conscience. Yet we may easily be tempted to carry the contrast too far. It was not against the Church as such that Protestantism protested, but against a church which had grown unchristlike and corrupt. The last thing that was in the mind of Luther and the other Reformers was the substitution of an individualistic for a social religion. What they wished to do was to replace a false church by a church that was true. The Bible is not to be understood as the substitute for the churchly principle, but as its clearer definition. It is the book which shows us what kind of a church God requires and what kind of mediation really leads to him. This is not the mediation of priests, who prescribe works of penance through which a store of merit may be heaped up to the credit of the performer, but of living men, who through the communion of their own souls with God have learned his message of redemption and peace, and pass on the good news to their brother men that they too may find salvation. The typical individualist is not the Protestant who goes out among his fellows to preach the

<sup>8</sup> § 24.

good news of salvation through Christ and establish his Kingdom among men, but the mystic who in his concern for his own soul's salvation withdraws into a hermitage or a monastery that he may commune with God in peace. Protestantism has had its hermits, its men of narrow and self-centred life. But it has been Catholicism rather than Protestantism which has been the home of the individualistic ideal as such.

What then is the real difference between Protestantism and Catholicism? We have already anticipated it in what has just been said. It is in the nature of the mediation which is admitted. The Protestant affirms that this mediation must be rational,<sup>9</sup> while the Catholic denies that this must necessarily be the case. What distinguishes the Protestant from the Catholic is not that the one is more earnest and devout in his religious life than the other, nor that the one accepts while the other rejects an external standard, but that the standard which the Protestant accepts wins assent because of its own inherent nature, whereas in Catholicism it is received on grounds which are independent of its content.

This does not mean, of course, that Catholic theologians deny that reason has its use in religion, or regard with disfavor the attempt to give a rational proof of Christian doctrine. Nowhere has speculation been carried to bolder heights than in the Church which produced an Anselm and an Aquinas. But it is meant that the rational insight for which the Catholic longs is a consequence rather than a condition of his faith. *Credo ut intelligam* is the Catholic formula; and faith for the ordinary Christian does not necessarily involve an inner assent to the content of the message, but only reverent submission to the authority which promulgates it. When the Vatican Council would add rational evidence of the authority of the Scripture to the inner witness of the

<sup>9</sup> The word "rational" is not used here in the narrow sense in which it is sometimes employed in philosophical discussion to denote the processes of the logical understanding as distinct from the emotions and the will (e.g. by our modern pragmatists in their attack upon intellectualism), but as a comprehensive term to include all the processes by which man, as a reasonable being, reacts upon his moral and intellectual environment. From the point of view of our present discussion the questions in dispute between the pragmatists and the intellectualists have to do with the interpretations of the word "rational," and the contrast here made would retain its validity, whichever of the rival interpretations should ultimately prevail.

Holy Spirit, upon which, in common with the Westminster divines, it makes saving faith depend, it is not upon the inherent evidence of the majesty and beauty of its content so graphically set forth in the Confession that it relies, but upon the miracle and prophecy by which the divine commission of its authors was attested and sealed.<sup>10</sup> The change is significant. In the one case the assent, when it comes, is to the content of the message; in the other it is to the authority of the messenger.

We see now why mysticism has found so congenial a home in the Catholic Church. For mysticism is that type of religion in which thought is transcended, and man communes with the Eternal in the immediacy of feeling. It is the religion of mystery, of awe, of ecstasy, touching the intangible, hearing the inaudible, seeing the invisible, possessing the incommunicable. For the God of the mystic no rational proof can be given, since he cannot be described in words. It was such a God as this that Newman found, when, after his years of wandering, he sought refuge at last in the bosom of Mother Church. The joy which sings in the closing chapter of his *Apologia* is not the satisfaction which comes from insight into truth, but the peace which follows the relinquishment of a hopeless quest.

We perceive, also, why the sacraments should hold so prominent a place among the means of grace of Catholicism. For by the sacrament a way is found through which divine influence may be communicated without the necessity of the conscious participation of the recipient. When the priest sprinkles the water and repeats the trinitarian formula over the dying child, regeneration follows, whether the child or his parents have any understanding of the meaning of what has been done or not. When the priest himself is set apart by ordination to the sacerdotal office, he receives the power to transmit the divine grace to others, however unworthy he may prove to be himself. In each case the sacrament

<sup>10</sup> Chapter iii, quoted by Schaff, *Creeds of Christendom*, III, 243: "Nevertheless, in order that the obedience of our faith might be in harmony with reason, God willed that to the interior help of the Holy Spirit there should be joined exterior proofs of his revelation; to wit, divine facts, and especially miracles and prophecies, which, as they manifestly display the omnipotence and infinite knowledge of God, are most certain proofs of his divine revelation, adapted to the intelligence of all men."

works *ex opere operato*, that is, by virtue of the mere fact that it has been performed. Faith may be a result of its performance; it is not a condition of its effect.

The separation between the means used and the effect produced appears most clearly in the Catholic view of doctrine. To the Catholic, doctrine is dogma, that is to say, truth promulgated by authority and having the force of law. If it commend itself to the reason, so much the better; but it is not upon this fact that its claim to be received is based. That depends solely upon the endorsement of the properly constituted ecclesiastical authorities. Like the Trinity in Newman's famous example,<sup>11</sup> it may lie in a realm where neither logic nor experience can follow it, and contain propositions which to the unaided human reason seem to involve a contradiction. None the less, if the Church declares it to be true, it is the duty of the Catholic to believe it. For the soul's salvation, an implicit faith is just as effective as one which is intelligent and reasonable.

To the Protestant, on the other hand, such a conception of faith seems destructive of all that is most precious in religion. The faith for which Luther contended is not mere belief. Still less is it willingness to receive upon testimony matters incapable of experimental verification. It is the response of the whole man to an object inherently worthy. It is the assent of the will to an ideal presented to the mind by a person deserving of confidence. As such, it is at once ethical and rational, involving both trust and obedience. It requires, on the one hand, insight into the character and the purpose of the person claiming allegiance, and, on the other, willingness to follow that insight wherever it may lead.

Such being the conception of faith, it is easy to see why it should hold the central place in the theology of Protestantism. Where faith is understood in the Catholic sense as belief upon testimony, it is manifestly inadequate unless supplemented by works. Indeed, it is itself of the nature of a work; since it is one among other conditions that the Church prescribes, upon the fulfilment of which a man's salvation depends. But if faith means trust in a person worthy to be trusted, carrying with it the inner response

<sup>11</sup> *Apologia*, chap. v, p. 240 (London, 1890).

of the whole being to the ideals and purposes which he reveals, then it is clear that it must be the all-comprehending Christian virtue, including within itself all else, and of itself alone sufficient for salvation.

This explains the central place which the Word holds among the means of grace of Protestantism. The word stands for the rational element in religion. Through the word the Gospel is presented to the mind and the conscience of men in such a form that each is able to apprehend its truth for himself and put it to the test of his own experience. When Luther translated the Bible into the language of the common people, that the printing press might scatter it broadcast through all the homes of Germany, he put an end, once and for all, so far as Protestantism is concerned, to the old notion of an implicit faith, and substituted for the magical salvation of the older sacramentarianism a salvation that was at once ethical and rational.

No doubt it is true that the full consequences of this principle were not at first drawn. The Reformers did not always distinguish clearly between the Gospel and the book in which it was enshrined. The old Catholic ideal of an unchanging dogma still lived on in the new environment. The very clearness and intensity of the new conviction made it difficult for those who held it to recognize the possibility of any difference of interpretation. The authority of the Scripture was insensibly extended from the plain and self-evidencing truths which admit of experimental verification to the more recondite matters which seemed to follow therefrom "by good and necessary consequence."<sup>12</sup> So, in due time, there grew up in Protestantism a religion of tradition, dealing with matters inaccessible to human reason, and received, like the dogmas of the Catholic Church, on grounds extrinsic to their content. Looking at the scholastic Protestantism of the seventeenth century, with its elaborate doctrinal systems and its *jure divino* ecclesiasticism, it is easy to see in it, with Sabatier, only a new form of Catholicism, without the venerable antiquity or the æsthetic charm which give dignity to the old.

And yet such an identification would be mistaken. For all

<sup>12</sup> Confession of Faith, i, 6.



its outward points of similarity with Catholicism, historic Protestantism, even in its most scholastic form, is separated from the older religion by a difference so significant as to constitute it a distinct type. This difference is found, as we have seen, in its view of the nature and grounds of faith. To Protestantism in all its forms faith is a personal act involving the whole man—reason, as well as feeling and will. To Catholicism this need not be the case. In Catholicism rational insight into truth, if attained, is the result of a previous act of blind submission. In Protestantism the duty of accepting mysteries (in the Catholic sense) is inferred—illegitimately, as we now see—from their connection with truths already verified in experience. In Catholicism we have a rational system erected upon a foundation which is non-rational. In Protestantism credence is asked for dogmas surpassing reason in the name of a rational faith.

As between Harnack and Sabatier, then, we must hold with the former. If our analysis of historic Protestantism is correct, our modern religion is still true to its essential spirit, and the question with which our discussion began must be answered in the affirmative.

But because we refuse to deny our kinship with the older Protestantism and overlook the differences which separate it from Catholicism, it does not follow that the changes which have been introduced by modern thought are few or unimportant. Modern Protestantism may be Protestant, but it is modern also. It remains to consider what is meant by this ambiguous word, and what is its bearing upon the problems which now engage us. We may find, before we are through, that Harnack passes too easily over the difficulties which Sabatier raises, and feel obliged to question the accuracy of his statement that since the Reformation "no new phase in the history of the Christian religion has appeared."

What then is the distinguishing characteristic of the thought which we call modern? Stated in a single phrase, may we not say that it is the extent to which it recognizes, and the consistency with which it attempts to apply, the principle of development? Where earlier thinkers regarded reality as something fixed and unchanging, and found in immutability the surest test of truth, we see all things in a state of flux, and classify objects in an ascend-

ing series according to their capacity for progress.<sup>12</sup> Where the old theology placed God outside the world in some distant heaven, finding his revelation in those exceptional events in which alone it was believed that the infinite and absolute could enter our world of the finite and the relative, we find God everywhere at work in his world, and see in all life the revelation of a spiritual personality which is its immanent ground. Finally, where our fathers looked back upon the past as the golden age, and regarded that institution or doctrine as most pure which could be proved to have altered least from the time of its origin or its promulgation, we look forward to the future for the clearest manifestation of truth, and put our absolute at the end of the world-process rather than at the beginning.

It is difficult to exaggerate the greatness of this change. It affects every department of our thought and life. It has reconstituted our science, rewritten our history, and is transforming our social, our economic, and our political ideals. It would be strange indeed if it did not leave its traces on our theology. Comparing the view of even so advanced a man as Luther, who held that Christian doctrine had existed unchanged from the beginning of the world, and that the Trinity and the Incarnation were the subjects of discussion for our first parents in Paradise, with that of our modern scientific theology, which believes in the gradual ascent of man from a primitive state of savagery and barbarism, and conceives of Christ as limited both in knowledge and in power by the conditions of his environment, it is hard, in spite of Harnack's great authority, to resist the conviction that the change through which theological thought is passing in our day is so momentous that the historian of the future, if not of the present, will feel constrained to date from it "a new phase in the history of Christianity."

If, then, we object to Sabatier's classification, it is not because

<sup>12</sup> No doubt it is true that the belief in progress, like every other characteristic idea of modern life, has its antecedents in the past. The notion of development plays an important rôle in the philosophy of Aristotle, and it recurs now and again in later Christian thought. What it is here intended to assert is simply that the systematic employment of the idea of development for the definition of reality and the explanation of life is of comparatively recent date, and constitutes the distinguishing mark of the type of thought which we call modern.

it exaggerates the contrast between the older and the newer Protestantism, but because it fails to show clearly wherein the true nature of their difference is to be found. This does not consist in the introduction of a new principle, but in the application of an old principle to a new environment. In the last analysis there are but two attitudes in which one may approach the ultimate problems of life. One may believe that the reason is the most trustworthy guide of life, and that the satisfaction of one's longings and the impulse to one's activities must be sought in objects and ideals which commend themselves to the mind and approve themselves to the conscience as inherently worthy. Or one may be persuaded that the ultimate reality is beyond the reach of reason (whether *infra-* or *supra-*rational, as the case may be), and be content to find in external authority a substitute for rational faith. The former we have called the Protestant, the latter the Catholic attitude. What differentiates modern Protestantism from its predecessor is not the fact that it has abandoned the earlier faith in a rational revelation of universal authority, in order to take refuge in some vague religion of the spirit without definite content, but that, whereas the older Protestantism found that revelation in an unchanging system once for all communicated, modern Protestantism finds it in living principles, incarnated in a personal, and therefore a free and expanding, life, and progressively applied and verified in the course of an enlarging experience.

This insistence on the progressive apprehension of truth does not mean that modern Protestantism undervalues, still less that it can dispense with, the revelation of the past. No generation has turned back more eagerly to the sources of the Christian religion than the present, or done more to bring to clear recognition the abiding contribution of Jesus to the religious life of mankind and the unique place held by the book which tells of him among the literatures of the world. But it is meant that the principles which are brought to the interpretation of the book are those which have proved themselves fruitful in the investigations of modern life, and that the proof of the supremacy of the Christ is found in the fact that the ideals which he reveals still maintain their authority in the life of today. It is charac-

teristic of a rational faith that it owns the truth wherever found, and binds together past and present in a unity not otherwise to be attained. Such a unifying world-view the recognition of progress makes possible.

It will help us to understand the true significance of this change in the point of view if we realize that it is not confined to Protestantism. The influences which have forced the recognition of progress in Protestantism have not been without their effect upon the Catholic Church as well. Catholicism also has two varieties, one of which turns its face to the past, and makes the measure of Catholic doctrine and practice the fidelity with which it holds fast an unchanging tradition, and another which faces the future, and founds its claim for the authority of the Church upon the ease with which it can deal with new questions and adapt itself to new conditions. The former of these is illustrated by the Greek, the latter by the modern Roman Church. Greek Catholicism is the Catholicism of the past, priding itself upon its unchangeableness, and measuring its orthodoxy by its inertia. Roman Catholicism is the Catholicism of the present and of the future, alert, adaptable, fertile in resources, quick to learn, ready to apply what it has learned. Greek Catholicism is the religion of Russia and of the East; Roman Catholicism is at home in London and in Berlin, and is nowhere more active and vigorous than in America, the country of freedom and of change. If anything were needed to make us question whether the principle of development were really the exclusive possession of the newer Protestantism, it would be the spectacle of modern Catholic theologians like Loisy<sup>14</sup> invoking this principle against Protestants like Harnack in support of the claims of the Catholic Church. Yet this is what we are seeing today.

One reason why the significance of this change of position is so seldom recognized is the tenacity with which in theory modern Catholicism holds fast to the principle of tradition. The Roman Church today still professes to be what it was in the beginning, and carries back its latest developments both in doctrine and practice to the days of the Apostles. But here, as so often, words

<sup>14</sup> *L'évangile et l'église*, Paris, 1902, p. xxiii. See also Newman's well-known essay on the development of Christian doctrine.

are misleading. The identity of the name covers a radical change in the thing signified. Under the guise of the power to interpret dogma, the Roman church has asserted her power to change it; and, in the act of defining, has dethroned the tradition she professes to venerate. The final authority of modern Catholicism is not the tradition of the past, but the living Church speaking through its living representatives to the issues and the needs of the present, and in this fact lies its strength.

This is the real significance of the dogma of Papal infallibility. It is the public declaration of the emancipation of the Church from the tyranny of the past. It is the affirmation of the right and the power of the Church to deal with the new questions which the new age has brought, without being fettered by the decisions of the ages that are gone. It is the consummation of the process, long ago begun, by which the seat of religious authority has been shifted from Augustine and Aquinas and the fathers of Trent to Leo and Pius and the bishops and cardinals who are their present advisers. The fact that this power may be used, as we see it being used today, in the interest of a reactionary policy, does not lessen the significance of the change which its presence implies. The policy which the present pontiff has inaugurated may be reversed by his successor; and it is upon this possibility that modern liberal Catholics base their hope of the ultimate triumph of their ideals.

The radical difference in point of view thus described has already found theoretical recognition in our text-books in the distinction of two types of Catholicism, the Greek and the Roman. What is needed is a like discrimination between the different types of Protestantism; between the Protestantism which turns its face to the past, and finds God's revelation in an unchanging system contained in an infallible book, and the Protestantism which looks towards the future, finding God's revelation in living principles, incarnated in a person, and hence needing ever new application to the changing conditions of a changing world.

We propose, then, to distinguish four main types of historic Christianity, the Greek, the Roman, the earlier, and the later Protestant; the two former being differentiated from the two latter as Catholic from Protestant by their different conception

of authority, the first and third from the second and fourth as ancient from modern by their attitude to the idea of development.

Such a fourfold division avoids the difficulties to which those of Harnack and Sabatier are alike exposed, while at the same time conserving the truth for which each contends. It has at least three practical advantages over the older classifications. In the first place, it leads to a more adequate appreciation of the causes which give modern Roman Catholicism its strength. Secondly, it gives a truer insight into the actual relation between modern Protestantism and its antecedents. Thirdly, it discriminates more justly between what is distinctive of Christianity as a historical religion and the changing forms in which this distinctive principle has found expression. A word in conclusion as to each of these.

•First, as to the true significance of modern Catholicism. The charges which the older Protestant polemic brought against Rome were, first, that it introduced the Church as a mediator between God and the individual, and hence robbed him of his freedom; secondly, that it added to the original message of God in the Scripture the tradition of later ages, and hence obscured the simplicity of the Gospel; thirdly, that in this addition it not only confused but corrupted the truth of God by substituting new, man-made, and often immoral teaching for the original divine revelation. The Rome against which the Reformers fought was a Rome which put between the individual and God an institution tied to a complex, and in part unchristian, tradition, and required of him, on peril of his salvation, a blind submission to her authority. The remedy they proposed was the rejection of the mediatorial function of the Church and a return from the changing tradition of man to the unchanging truth of God in the Scripture.

No doubt it is true that against the more corrupt forms of Roman Catholicism this answer is still effective; but against the Catholicism of our modern age in its best representatives, the Catholicism of a Newman or a Loisy, it is inadequate. The strength of Catholicism lies in the fact that through its living organs it brings God close to the individual, speaking directly to his present need by the lips of living men. Granting that there have been corruptions and mistakes in the past, modern Catholic

theologians tell us that the living Spirit who abides in the Church is able to lift the faithful above them by an interpretation adapted to the present, and so to make the errors of the past serve as guides to larger achievement in the future. And not a few among the more earnest and devout spirits of our day have been found to listen to their appeal. In other words, the strength of modern Catholicism lies precisely in the two points in which the older Protestant polemic found its weakness; first, in its exaltation of the Church, and, secondly, in its power to adapt itself to a changing environment. The weakness of the older Protestantism, on the other hand, lay in its inadequate recognition of the function of the living church and in its attempt to guard against the abuses of change by denying the possibility of progress. In both these points modern Protestantism is learning lessons from the failures of its own past, and in its new social spirit and its larger recognition of progress it is making place in its own way for the truth which gives Rome its strength.

It is only when these admissions have been made and we have heartily made place for the truth for which the Catholic contends that we are in a position to see clearly what is the real difference which separates modern Protestantism from Catholicism in all its forms. This is the fundamental difference in the conception of religious authority. Not in the fact of churchly mediation (for, as we have seen, from one point of view, the Bible itself is but a form of the churchly principle), but in the nature of the church which mediates; not in the recognition of a revelation which requires constant re-interpretation, but in the nature of the revelation accepted, lies the difference between Catholicism and Protestantism. The revelation which the Protestant accepts commends itself as inherently true through its adaptation to man's permanent needs, and hence is one to which, when presented, the individual may be safely trusted to make his own response. The revelation on which the Catholic relies, on the other hand, is designed to supplant the incapacity of human nature, and consequently requires for its guarantee some sponsor from without. Rome offers the Church as a substitute because the individual may not be trusted; Protestantism requires the Church as a helper because he may. Rome adds to the original

revelation new interpretations because its meaning is not clear; Protestantism is constantly revising earlier utterances because it is. This fact once clearly seen, the issue is joined at the right place, and the danger which comes from bringing in irrelevancies is avoided.

In the second place, this classification gives us a truer insight into the real relation of modern Protestantism to its antecedents, and hence makes possible a more intelligent and less artificial treatment of its present problems. What unites the earlier Protestantism with the later is its clear recognition of this fundamental antithesis—its insistence upon the direct relationship between the Father God and the individual soul; upon the capacity of man's spirit to apprehend and to respond to divine truth, and hence its substitution for the external constraint of Rome of a more spiritual conception of religious authority. In all this, modern Protestantism is a true child of the Reformation, bone of its bone and flesh of its flesh. What differentiates modern Protestant theologians from even the greatest of their predecessors is the failure of the latter consistently to apply to the object of their faith the same principles which characterized their view of its ground. We have an example of this failure in Melancthon's acceptance<sup>15</sup> of two kinds of doctrines, the former characterized by their immediate adaptation to experience and to be tested thereby, the latter consisting of mysteries to be received on authority because found in the Bible, though incapable of experimental verification. It is further illustrated in the uncertainties of the Westminster doctrine of Scripture, which recognizes the sufficiency of the religious (i.e. experimental) standard for the plain man, while at the same time it insists upon the necessity of an appeal to the original texts for the theologian. It appears most clearly in the prominence of the legal conception in the theology of Protestantism, in spite of its insistence upon the fundamental importance of justification by faith. In all these cases we see the new religious insight struggling in vain with an evil philosophical tradition; the old notion, I mean, of an inaccessible God, which was the worst inheritance of Christianity from Greece. For a time it seemed as if Luther might succeed in breaking away from the hampering

<sup>15</sup> In the second edition of his *Loci Communes*.



tradition, but it was not to be. The old inheritance was too strong, and traditional Protestantism became the bundle of inconsistencies it is to-day, enshrining in its heart a great principle, hampered in its expression by the swaddling clothes of the past. These swaddling clothes modern Protestantism is throwing off. To try to shut our eyes to the fact is to introduce into our modern religious life an element of unreality. To carry our protest so far as to be blind to our own paternity is to be equally untrue.

Finally, this classification opens the way for a juster discrimination between what is distinctive of Christianity as a historic religion and the many changing forms in which this distinctive principle has from time to time found expression. The divisions which we have sought to distinguish are, we repeat again, not arbitrary, but the expression within Christianity of permanent types of the religious life, found to a greater or less extent in all religions, and grounded in deep-seated differences in human nature. All religions have their Catholics and their Protestants, their scribes and their prophets, their traditionalists and their men of independent insight, their mystics and their men of rational faith. Each is the scene of the unending strife of the forces of stagnation and of progress, the static and dynamic of the religious life. In all, these different influences combine in various ways and present us with types analogous to those we have distinguished. They are in Christianity because they are in life; but Christianity itself is something different from these. It is the new impulse imparted to the life of humanity by the life of Jesus of Nazareth, the new insight he brought, the new stream of tendency which, beginning from him, has entered into the strife of human forces, playing upon and being played upon by them all. This impulse, this insight, this influence, are not confined to any one of the four types of historic Christianity; they are found in greater or less degree in them all. Christianity is greater than Protestantism even at its best, and no treatment of the historic Christian types is adequate which does not make this clear.

But because Christ may be found in all the historic forms, it does not follow that he is found in all with equal clearness and adequacy. Without falling into the Hegelian error of identifying the order of logic with the order of history, it is possible to believe

that each of the great types of historic Christianity which has appeared in the course of the historic development represents a step in advance. The Roman religion of progress is truer than the Greek religion of stagnation, and the Protestantism which insists upon bringing all so-called progress to the test of reason represents a step beyond both. We should belie our spiritual ancestry if we did not recognize the great contribution of the Reformation to human progress and jealously guard the truth which the Reformers won; but there is a work still to do, and that is to present the Christ whom all Christians own as Lord, and whom the earlier Protestants recognized as their individual Saviour by his direct appeal to each man's heart and conscience—to present this living, spiritual Christ in his larger social relations as the inspiration and the goal of progress. This is the task of the theology of the future.

*A TURNING POINT IN SYNOPTIC CRITICISM*

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Christianity as not only a world-religion, but pre-eminently *the* world-religion, can be rationally appreciated only in the light of its origins. The nineteenth century, therefore, to which nothing was understood that had not been understood genetically, devoted its newly won methods of historical criticism to a comparison of the contemporary documents, the Pauline Epistles, with Acts, the earliest embodiment of the tradition, that it might learn the facts of the great evolution of the Church from the Synagogue. But inquiry into the story of the second founder of our faith was, from the nature of the case, a mere preliminary to the deeper inquiry into the story of its first Founder.

Here also the elements of the problem were providentially presented in the same two categories of subjective and objective. Acts and Epistles had as their counterparts, blended together in the Synoptic Gospels, a traditional story of Jesus' career and a report of his sayings. For the latter had been so reverently guarded as almost to take the place of a contemporary document beside the tradition of his career.

Critical comparison was as imperative in the case of Jesus as in that of Paul. But if in the remoter problem the prize was loftier, the obstacles were also greater and the path more intricate.

Textual criticism having given the Synoptic Evangelists' work in the nearest attainable approach to its authentic form, it became the primary task of the higher criticism to extricate the ultimate sources, freeing them, as far as possible, from reciprocal, as well as from external, admixture. With the completion of this task would begin the final process of historical criticism, in the intrinsic valuation of these ultimate sources and the reconstruction from them of a history as complete, self-consistent, and rationally conceivable as the available data would permit. Such, in general

tendency, though not always with clear prescience of the issue, has been the course of criticism for a hundred years past. The source-criticism of the first third of the nineteenth century was chiefly a war of independence from the domination of churchly tradition, desultory, and largely negative in its results. It issued in the great attempt of Baur and Strauss to strike their trial balance in a critical history of Christian origins. The verdict was recommitment of the problem. Another half-century of patient, toilsome analysis of the documents intervened. The turning point, so far as the criticism of the Synoptic Gospels is concerned, almost exactly coincides with the beginning of the twentieth century. The year 1899 witnessed the appearance in Germany of Wernle's *Synoptisches Problem*, in England of Hawkins's *Horae Synopticae*, concentrating in purely scientific, classified form the phenomena of these, the fundamental documents of evangelic tradition. The year 1901 begins, on the other hand, a series of brilliant attempts at critical valuation and interpretation of these sources. Wrede's *Messiasgeheimnis* is recognized as marking "the epoch of 1901" by critics as diverse in point of view as Schweitzer<sup>1</sup> and Jülicher;<sup>2</sup> while the entrance into the field of such authorities in Old Testament criticism as Wellhausen<sup>3</sup> and such Church historians as Harnack<sup>4</sup> indicates that it is "white already to the harvest."

Meantime a practical consensus has been reached on the authenticity of the greater Pauline Epistles, and on the date and the relatively unhistorical character of the Fourth Gospel. No wonder the pendulum of criticism begins to swing again from the analytical to the constructive side. The Synoptic problem, many tell us, has been solved, at least to the extent that it admits of solution. It is time to scrutinize results and to draw the ultimate inferences. Schweitzer is ready for the task, and to trace the

<sup>1</sup> Von Reimarus zu Wrede. Eine Geschichte der Leben-Jesu-Forschung, Tübingen, 1906.

<sup>2</sup> Neue Linien in der Kritik der evangelischen Ueberlieferung, Giessen, 1906.

<sup>3</sup> Das Evangelium Marci, 1903; Matthaei, 1904; Lucae, 1904; Einleitung in die drei ersten Evangelien, 1905.

<sup>4</sup> Lukas der Arzt, der Verfasser des dritten Evangeliums und der Apostelgeschichte, 1906; Sprüche und Reden Jesu: die zweite Quelle des Matthäus und Lukas, 1907.

history of the study of the life of Jesus from Reimarus to Wrede, finding that it issues, through the "consistent scepticism" of Wrede, in his own "consistent eschatological theory." Scholars of a less impressionist type, with somewhat larger claim to speak as representatives of the half-century of patient analysis, H. J. Holtzmann, whose *Synoptische Evangelien* (1863) laid the foundation of the now-accepted two-document theory, and Jülicher, whose *Introduction to the New Testament*<sup>5</sup> ranks next to Holtzmann's as the representative liberal survey of the results of documentary criticism, have given us a very emphatically different answer.<sup>6</sup>

It seems thus to be possible, from practically identical results in the field of documentary criticism, to draw inferences varying all the way from the portraiture of Jesus as an obscure messianistic agitator, of whom we know practically nothing save that he preached a fanatical apocalyptic eschatology with himself as central figure, and was disappointed by the disastrous event, to a conception of him as the real, though not altogether conscious, founder of the new world-religion, a historical figure whose teaching may be definitely known in its substance, and, in outline, even his career and personality. Under such circumstances, the framing of an independent view of the real outcome of this common basis of admitted results in the analysis of the Synoptic sources, and the drawing of independent inferences as to their significance, are for every man of intelligence matters of necessity rather than of mere inclination.

The veteran Holtzmann may well be pardoned if he views with some satisfaction the present attitude of leading scholars toward the two propositions in behalf of which he entered the lists nearly a half-century ago. Weisse<sup>7</sup> and Wilke<sup>8</sup> had then but

<sup>5</sup> English translation, from the second German edition, 1904.

<sup>6</sup> See H. J. Holtzmann, "Die Marcus-Kontroverse in ihrer heutigen Gestalt," in *Archiv für Religionswissenschaft*, X (1907), pp. 18-40 and 161-200; further, "Der gegenwärtige Stand der Leben-Jesu-Forschung," in *Deutsche Literaturzeitung*, XXVII (1906), col. 2357-2364, 2413-2422, 2477-2483, 2541-2546.

<sup>7</sup> *Die evangelische Geschichte, kritisch und philosophisch bearbeitet*, 1838.

<sup>8</sup> *Der Urevangelist, oder exegetisch-kritische Untersuchung über das Verwandtschaftsverhältniss der drei ersten Evangelien*, 1838.

recently broken from the prevailing Tübingen theory of Mark as a conciliatory combination of Matthew and Luke, asserting the dependence of these two upon Mark. Weisse applied the contention of Lachmann regarding the Marcan order to Matthew, showing it to be a combination of the narrative of Mark with a mass of discourse material which he identified with the Logia attributed by Papias to the Apostle. Wilke declared that a systematic, scholarly, and dispassionate application of recognized principles of literary criticism, in place of the premature and undisciplined theorizing indulged in by the Tübingen school on the one side and by Ewald on the other, could establish the facts by documentary proof. In coincidence with Weisse, he predicted as the outcome a recognition of Mark as the true *Grund-schrift* of Synoptic tradition. Holtzmann's championship of the theory was of the type that Wilke would have chosen; not by eloquence or imagination, but by systematic application of rigidly scientific method. Thus he formulated in definite terms the second proposition which, together with the Mark-theory of Lachmann, constitutes the basis of the now dominant two-document theory: the coincident material of Matthew and Luke not derived from Mark, which is principally of the nature of discourse, can be accounted for neither by a relation of direct dependence between the two nor by independent use of oral tradition, but is drawn from "a second source common to Matthew and Luke, but employed by the two in completely different ways."<sup>9</sup>

A half-century of controversy, of aberration, of experiment with every form of hypothesis, of relentless insistence upon every feature of the problem wherein the two-document theory admittedly falls short of a complete explanation of the facts, ends with the declaration from Wellhausen<sup>10</sup> in Germany, re-echoed by Burkitt<sup>11</sup> in England, that the one decisive, unalterable certainty achieved in the long conflict is "that Mark furnished the framework for Matthew and Luke"; and that to Lachmann, in 1835, belongs the credit of the essential element in the demonstration, namely, the invariable failure of either Evangelist to

<sup>9</sup> Die synoptischen Evangelien, p. 126.

<sup>10</sup> Einleitung in die drei ersten Evangelien, p. 43.

<sup>11</sup> The Gospel History and its Transmission, 1906, p. 37.

support the other in any divergence from the order of Mark. Holtzmann himself, surveying in 1907 the whole field of scholarly opinion, is able to descry but two remaining irreconcilables. Hilgenfeld, of Jena, still defended a remnant of the old Tübingen theory in his doctrine of the priority of Matthew,<sup>12</sup> though even this is not our Matthew, but a precanonical form of that gospel; and Merx, the learned critic of the Sinaitic Syriac text, finds evidence in some peculiar readings of that ancient, but not uniformly trustworthy, version for a similar conclusion. With these exceptions, the world of New Testament scholars is unanimous<sup>13</sup> in acceptance of the first great result of the two-document theory, namely, that Mark is the *Grundschrift* of the Synoptic tradition. The fact is not merely that this Gospel contains the narrative content of the evangelic material, but that this particular composition in something very near its present Greek form, with its present disposition and order of material, has been made the basis, and practically the only narrative basis, by each of the other Synoptists for his Gospel. Mere inspection of the general contents of the Synoptic Gospels shows that there was but one such narrative used in common by these writers. The proof in detail that this common story was the story of our Gospel of Mark is of immense significance, once the character and history of this writing are understood.

Since the still lingering opposition to the Mark-theory all centres upon Matthew, or at least a proto-Matthew, there is a special timeliness in the recent systematic analysis of W. C. Allen,<sup>14</sup>

<sup>12</sup> See his *Markus-Evangelium*, 1850; his *Einleitung in das Neue Testament*, 1875; and a continuous series of articles and reviews in the *Zeitschrift für wissenschaftliche Theologie*, especially against Holtzmann (1902, pp. 144-146); M. Schultze and Wrede (1903, pp. 4-19); Wellhausen (1904, pp. 182-228, 289-332, 462-524); and R. A. Hoffmann (1905, pp. 309-311).

<sup>13</sup> Zahn, "the prince of conservative scholars," in his commentary, *Das Evangelium des Matthäus*, 1903, refers the reader to his *Einleitung*, II, § 57, for the question of the relation of Matthew to Mark." His answer is, Mark is not dependent on our Matthew, but on the Aramaic original Matthew, which in content and order was identical with ours. Badham's *St. Mark's Indebtedness to St. Matthew*, 1897, is mentioned by Holtzmann, but not as having independent significance.

<sup>14</sup> *Commentary on the Gospel according to S. Matthew* (International Critical Commentary), 1907.

where the statistics of Hawkins and Wernle are applied to the specific question of Mark as the principal source of Matthew with a cumulative force that is irresistible. As a result, the proto-Matthew which might have been the basis of Mark appears in its real intangibility; a ghost flitting from the light toward the limbo of the "inerrant original text."

But as regards the complementary pillar of the two-document theory, Allen himself is one of the unconverted. Other theories than that of a single principal common source seem to him to be required to account for the non-Marcian element of discourse material common to Matthew and Luke, if not for their numerous minute coincident variations in their Marcan material. He will not "force the oral tradition theory to cover all the facts presented by the agreement of Matthew and Luke, because there is reason to think that both writers used written sources." How can he, when their agreement in this material is to a notable degree closer than in the material borrowed from Mark? Oral tradition, when carried to this degree of stereotyped invariability, becomes indistinguishable in practical application from a document. Allen inclines rather to "a view at present very much out of favor among critical writers," the theory that "S. Luke was acquainted with the first Gospel." Holtzmann himself, in earlier days,<sup>15</sup> was not unwilling to concede to E. Simons<sup>16</sup> reminiscences of Matthew, to account for minor elements of the coincident non-Marcian material. But the great reciprocal omissions and unreconciled contradictions, which must be admitted to exist on any theory of real literary dependence, compelled its limitation to the vague form of a mental echo; the third Evangelist might have heard the reading of Matthew at the Lord's day service and carried away impressions which unconsciously reproduced themselves in his own composition.

There has been progress since 1892. We owe much to Wernle and Hawkins for their strict application of scientific method to the identification of the synoptic *Grundschrift*; with what decisive results we have already seen. But Wernle has rendered a greater service still in the laying of this second ghost of a literary relation

<sup>15</sup> Einleitung, 3 ed., 1892, p. 356 f.

<sup>16</sup> Hat der dritte Evangelist den kanonischen Matthäus benutzt? 1880.



between Matthew and Luke. The systematic working through of pages 40-80 of Wernle's *Synoptische Frage*, as every student of the Synoptic problem should work it through, is not the task of a few spare half-hours; but the result will fully explain why the view that Luke was acquainted with Matthew is "at present very much out of favor among critical writers." Wernle expresses it thus: "Comparison of Luke with Matthew in regard to content, sequence, and text (verbal form), gives as result that Matthew cannot be among the sources of Luke. Luke has no acquaintance with a part of the Matthean narratives; he never follows their sequence; and nowhere in his text (verbal form), whether in the Marcan narrative or the discourses, has he been affected by Matthew. The discourses which he has in common with Matthew he did not take from Matthew, but, coincidentally with him, from a collection of discourses lost to us. Although not strictly demonstrable, it is nevertheless probable that Matthew was entirely unknown to Luke."

The theory of a partial and reminiscent employment of Matthew by Luke is indeed difficult to reconcile with the systematic method professed by the latter (Luke 1 1-4). How is it conceivable that a writer of this type should be aware of the existence of this recent and most comprehensive, if not already most popular and most authoritative, of all works in the line of his own labors, and should remain so indifferent to its contributions?

Subordinating the still unsettled questions of detail, such as the numerous minute coincident variations of Matthew and Luke from Mark in their Marcan material, and the failure of repeated attempts to reconstruct a self-consistent composition from the non-Markan remainder, we may set it down as a second result of the last half-century of documentary criticism, a result whose general acceptance lingers but slightly behind that of the Mark-theory, that it has confirmed and definitely established the twin pillar of the Holtzmann-Weisse two-document theory in the certainty that our "Matthew was not among the sources of Luke," nor conversely. The inference is unavoidable and conclusive that "the discourses which he has in common with Matthew . . . are taken coincidentally with him from a collection of discourses lost to us."

It is imperative that these great and definitely established results of pure documentary analysis be differentiated from, and considered in proper perspective with, that remainder of subordinate phenomena whose significance is still in debate. This remainder may require us to qualify our description of either or both the two main factors of Synoptic tradition. We may be compelled to recognize modifications in the form of Mark extending beyond even such notable textual phenomena as the suppression of its original ending. The concession may conceivably reach a point justifying in some degree the once popular theory of a proto-Mark. Further research must be carried on. Ewald's theory of diegeses may be defunct, but its demise has not done away with the fact that such groups of anecdotes were actually known to Luke (Luke 11), nor with the sure evidences still apparent in the text of Mark of the use of such pre-existing agglutinated material, some of it certainly related to that of the other source. All this will not annul the first great achievement: Mark is the narrative basis of our Gospels.

No less important are the modifications sure to come in the theory of the "teaching" source. The indications are very strong that we shall be compelled to recede from the tempting identification of it with the reported Logia of the Apostle Matthew. This identification was indeed a sally beyond the domain of strict source-analysis. We must substitute the more strictly algebraic symbol Q (*Quelle*)<sup>17</sup> of Wellhausen and Harnack for the question-begging  $\Delta$  ( $\Delta\acute{o}\gamma\mu\alpha$ ) of Holtzmann's *Synoptische Evangelien* and the older school. In our attempts at reconstruction, the simple formula of Wendt,<sup>18</sup> namely, superimpose Matthew and Luke and subtract Mark, will no longer serve. Resch<sup>19</sup> did not improve the condition of the "heap of interesting ruins," which, as he rightly said, had been left by his predecessor, by sifting the soil of the second and third century for possible traces of Logian

<sup>17</sup> In the German the symbol is not strictly algebraic; it assumes a single document. In English it may be used to designate the strictly definable entity, the non-Markan common element of Matthew and Luke whencesoever derived. See Salmon, *Human Element in the Gospels*, 1907, p. 24.

<sup>18</sup> *Die Lehre Jesu*, I, 1886. This analytical portion of the work was omitted from the English translation.

<sup>19</sup> *Die Logia Jesu*, 1898.

gold. The value of his results is negative. They show how little else but Q there was. Harnack paves the way for really systematic reconstruction;<sup>20</sup> but his main result is to show how completely, in its substance, the work confined itself to the teaching of Jesus, not even relating the story of his passion and resurrection. His effort to explain how such a work could begin with a formal introduction of the *dramatis personae*, recounting the Baptist's preaching of repentance and the baptism of Jesus, and including the significant story of the centurion's faith, is conspicuously unsuccessful. How could the principal actor be brought thus formally to the centre of the stage, and then simply left standing there? Even to Wernle the difficulty was not new. Holtzmann<sup>21</sup> had sought to meet the scruples of Weisse on this score by connecting the preaching of John with the discourse of Jesus on the Baptist, as forming together an opening sermon on the beginning of the gospel. Wernle<sup>22</sup> went further, and frankly distinguished the narrative introduction and the story of the centurion of Capernaum as the additions of a later hand. But few will consider that a solution of the problem has yet been reached. We have still to determine the nature and order of the grouping of material in Q, the leading ideas of its compiler, his purpose, standpoint, and method; and until this is done the vital question of its relation to Mark can hardly be answered. On the one side there doubtless lurks a fallacy of method in the process of eliminating from consideration as possible elements of Q all material also found in Mark. Take for example the story of the barren fig-tree. Matthew has preferred to give it to us in the narrative version of Mark; must we then conclude that Luke drew his parable version of it from some other source than that which he elsewhere shares with Matthew? Or, take an instance where the primary dependence of both Matthew and Luke is on Mark. Both thus relate the transfiguration, though with some striking coincident variations. But in Mark itself 9 2-10 is a doublet, as regards doctrinal content, of 8 27-9 1 11-13, and it has close intrinsic affinities in both thought and language

<sup>20</sup> *Sprüche und Reden Jesu*, 1907.

<sup>21</sup> *Synoptische Evangelien*, p. 142.

<sup>22</sup> *Synoptische Frage*, p. 226.

with the story of Jesus' baptism and temptation. Must we disregard these because the Marcan form was more acceptable to Matthew and Luke? The contention of the elder <sup>23</sup> and younger <sup>24</sup> Weiss for a larger narrative content of Q, and a dependence of all three Evangelists on it, is not so easily met, when this weak point of method and the unsolved problem of the coincident variations of Matthew and Luke are fairly considered. Moreover, Wellhausen has introduced an almost startling novelty into the field of debate by his emphatic declaration in favor of the priority of Mark to Q; and Wernle already concedes that we must distinguish between Sayings (*Sprüche*) and Discourses (*Reden*),<sup>25</sup> and that the agglutinated discourses of Q give just as much evidence of their secondary and artificial composition as the artificially connected narratives of Mark.

The third Gospel, with its second treatise, Acts, is also brought again into the field. Harnack's *Luke the Physician* <sup>26</sup> renews the argument of Hobart's *Medical Language of St. Luke* to prove linguistically the traditional authorship, though, as an ally of Ramsay,<sup>27</sup> he will hardly be welcome for his valuation of Luke as a historian.

Thus the problems that still remain to be solved by the patient, dispassionate methods of literary analysis are as full of interest and as burning as ever. But from these it is possible—and not only possible but imperative—to distinguish the achieved results,<sup>28</sup> and to bring them into comparison with the ancient tradition of gospel origins.

<sup>23</sup> B. Weiss, *Das Markusevangelium*, 1872; *Die Evangelien des Markus und Lukas*, 9 ed., 1901; *Die Geschichtlichkeit des Markusevangeliums*, 1905.

<sup>24</sup> J. Weiss, *Das älteste Evangelium*, 1903; *Die Schriften des Neuen Testaments*, I, 2 ed., 1907.

<sup>25</sup> *Quellen des Lebens Jesu*, 1906, p. 71.

<sup>26</sup> English translation by Wilkinson, 1907.

<sup>27</sup> *St. Paul the Traveller and the Roman Citizen*, 1895.

<sup>28</sup> Wernle, *Quellen des Lebens Jesu*, 1906, p. 35, formulates these results as follows:

1. The short Gospel is the source of the two longer.
2. Besides it, the two long Gospels are based in common on a Greek discourse-source.
3. Finally, Matthew and Luke have each their share of peculiar tradition.

The most striking result of such comparison is the correspondence of the two in broad outline. It is true that the Gospel of Mark does not seem to us to be so lacking in order as the other Gospels, for it alone supplies what outline still remains of historical perspective in the story of Jesus; a beginning, in the great Sabbath of preaching and mighty works at Capernaum after the imprisonment of John, where Peter's house is headquarters; a middle, in the declaration of the messianic programme at Cæsarea Philippi, where Peter's confession is the nucleus; an end, in the tragedy in Jerusalem, where Peter's denial and restoration form the pivot—or would, if the original ending of the Gospel had not been suppressed. And yet it becomes more and more conspicuously clear, even to such conservative critics as the elder Weiss,<sup>20</sup> that the ancient description of Mark's order as not a historical or chronological sequence, but a sequence adapted to the requirements of practical edification, is justified to the letter. Even the great pivotal points are not appreciated as such by the Evangelist. The "beginning of miracles" at Capernaum, with the following vigil of prayer by Jesus, has scarcely to him its historical significance. The confession of Peter is to him anything but epoch-making. The story of the women at the tomb has (at least in subsequent development) eclipsed the all-important "turning again" of Peter. Notoriously, his subordinate groups are topical and not chronological, the geography inconceivable,<sup>21</sup> and the relation of events almost regardless of before and after.<sup>22</sup> All that is certain is that somewhere, very far behind this agglomeration of anecdotes, there looms up dimly the figure of the Galilean fisherman as ultimate narrator, and that Mark, like Paul, reverts to "what Peter could relate"<sup>23</sup> when the evangelic story is in question. And documentary criticism adds the abundant, decisive evidence that in the days even of Matthew and Luke there was already practically nothing else but Mark to represent the story of Jesus. For some remarkable reason all else had been eclipsed.

• It is also true that Q is very far from meeting Papias's descrip-

<sup>20</sup> B. Weiss, *Geschichtlichkeit des Markusevangeliums*, 1905.

<sup>21</sup> Mark 5 1 14 20 6 45 53 7 31, etc.

<sup>22</sup> Mark 3 6 22 7 1 8 34 9 14.

<sup>23</sup> ἀντὶ τοῦ ἱστορήσαι Κηφᾶν, Gal. 1 18; cf. 1 Cor. 15 1-5, ὡφθῇ Κηφᾶ.

tion of the *Matthæan Logia*. It was not Semitic in language, but Greek. Even if apostolic in origin, it certainly was not primitive; and even if its text be often more authentically reflected in Matthew than in Luke, it is not Matthew, the Palestinian gospel which from its origin, circulation, and authorship should be expected to correspond most nearly with the *Logia*, that actually stands nearest in order, arrangement, and spirit to Q. No; our first evangelist shows decided preference for the Marcan disposition, contents, and language, wherever choice was open. It is our third gospel, traditionally of Antiochian derivation,<sup>33</sup> which reverses this preference, and shows closer spiritual affinity with Q, although always freer than Matthew in verbal transcription. Again, there is little *prima facie* agreement between the tradition and the results of criticism. But deep down there is much. Q, as we know it, is a Greek composition, more Pauline in theology than Petrine, closer in affinity to Luke than to Matthew, secondary in its elaboration of the sayings into discourses. But there remain embedded in it some few decisive evidences of translation from a Semitic original;<sup>34</sup> its conception of the evangelic message is, in distinction from Paul's, the teaching rather than the personality and career of Jesus; and, finally and most significantly, it includes practically all. Matthew's few parables not shared by Luke are not enough to alter the force of this far-reaching general phenomenon. His antitheses of the higher righteousness (*Matt.* 5 21-42) and other material bearing on the special issue with Mosaism can hardly be counted as derived from some other source, because Luke's systematic omission of kindred material in Mark (for example, *Mark* 7 1-23 10 1-10 12 28-34) makes it practically certain that he would have omitted this from Q.

The second fact revealed to us by documentary analysis, namely,

<sup>33</sup> The tradition of the Antiochian parentage of Luke, reported by Eusebius (*HE.* iii, 4, 7), finds strong support, if applied not to the man, but to the writings, in the phenomena of Acts, some of which are lightly touched upon by Harnack (*Lukas der Arzt*, p. 15; cf. Bacon, "Acts versus Galatians," in *American Journal of Theology*, July, 1907), and in the singular choice of this gospel by Marcion, disciple of Cerdo of Antioch.

<sup>34</sup> E.g. *Matt.* 24 51 = *Luke* 12 46; cf. *Isa.* 53 12, "divide him his portion with the great."

that there was, when our first and third Gospels were compiled, practically but one great source besides Mark; that this source comprised the teaching of Jesus in the form of elaborated discourses—and probably very little else—with strong indications of a remoter period when the sayings circulated unagglutinated into discourses and in a Semitic tongue, is a phenomenon to be placed alongside that of the Petrine narrative in our attempt to interpret the ancient tradition in the light of critical results. Why does all the available material fall into these two groups, Roman narrative and Syrian teaching? Why does the comparison of our two later gospels of the things which Jesus “began both to do and to teach” with their two sources, Mark and Q, give a result so analogous to that obtained by comparison of the extra-canonical with the canonical, a sense of the relative poverty and worthlessness of all they were able to add? Only the explanation which applies to the extra-canonical gospels will meet the case: Mark and Q had exhausted the field. In their respective regions, Rome, headquarters of the Gentile mission field, Pauline in its whole constitution and by the very necessity of the case, however it might cling to the name of Peter, and Syria, with its two great seats of Christianity, Jerusalem and Antioch, had between them taken up the whole available substance of evangelic tradition. Jerusalem gloried in the apostolic tradition of the teaching “compiled by Matthew in the Hebrew tongue.” Antioch (if we may be allowed an inference from Gal. 2 11-13) combined, as Rome did, the names of Peter and Paul, though reversing the proportionate influence of each on real doctrinal attitude. Here something more of Petrine narrative was added to Matthæan teaching before the combination with Mark; while even Jerusalem, in substituting Greek for Aramaic, was content to adopt also the more literary Antiochian (?) recast of its Logia.

The lesson of the comparison between tradition and sources is that both have a long history behind them. Neither Mark nor Q is a primitive composition, but the distinction in their type is primitive. It is not only witnessed to by the ancient tradition, with its echoes of rivalry between the home-made apostolic and the Roman gospel, but it reflects the most vital distinction between the gospel of Paul and that of those who were apostles

before him. To "the apostles and elders in Jerusalem" the teaching was its essence. To Paul, the story, the drama of the self-humiliated, divinely exalted Son of God, had been, since he himself first learned it from the lips of Peter, the objective background of his message of the Christ manifested in him as the Son of God by the resurrection.

"The elder" of Papias is our witness how long the teaching of Jesus was preserved independently of the story of his life, death, and resurrection. Only at a comparatively late period in the history of evangelic composition did it become the practice to combine "all that Jesus began both to do and to teach."<sup>35</sup> Tradition tells first of a body of "sound words, even the words of our Lord Jesus Christ,"<sup>36</sup> as the norm of doctrine. Later we hear of a compilation of "the oracles of the Lord" by the Apostle Matthew "in the Hebrew tongue." True, our informant, Papias, as well as his contemporary Polycarp, who uses the same term, "oracles of the Lord," as his standard,<sup>37</sup> may employ it in the comprehensive sense in which his contemporaries apply it to the general teaching of the Old Testament;<sup>38</sup> or, indeed, the term may be simply a Greek rendering of the title *Dibre Yeshua*, which might mean either "Sayings of Jesus" or "Matters Concerning Jesus." So far, then, as this part of the tradition reported by Papias is concerned, there is little to indicate the nature of the apostolic document referred to. We can only say that Papias himself, who gave to his own work the title, "Expositions of the Lord's Oracles," was in search of "the commandments delivered by the Lord to the faith," and that this represents the need which would be first felt in the Aramaic-speaking churches. But besides the anonymous tradition which Papias reports concerning Matthew, he gives another regarding Mark, this latter explicitly from "the elder," and the two seem to stand in an antithetic relation. Matthew's commandments of the Lord<sup>39</sup> is the admitted standard by comparison with which Mark is judged and defended. The description of Mark as containing "both the things said and the things done"<sup>40</sup> by the Lord, may therefore fairly be brought into

<sup>35</sup> Acts 1 1.    <sup>36</sup> 1 Tim. 6 3.    <sup>37</sup> Ep. Polyc. 7 1.    <sup>38</sup> E.g. 1 Clem. 62 3.

<sup>39</sup> Cf. Matt. 28 20 with Papias, ἐντολὰς . . . παρὰ τοῦ Κυρίου τῷ πιστεῖ δεδομένας.

<sup>40</sup> ἡ λεχθέντα ἡ πραχθέντα.



comparison with the simpler phrase regarding Matthew. The significant point of agreement between source-analysis and ancient tradition is that both lead us back to that remote past when the Church knew but two fundamental types of gospel composition. To the one of these might be applied the terms "teaching," "commandments," "sound words, even the words of our Lord Jesus Christ," "oracles of the Lord"; to the other, "sayings and doings," "doings and teachings." Or it might be more fully described as the "report concerning Jesus of Nazareth, how that God anointed him with the Holy Ghost and with power: who went about doing good and healing all that were oppressed of the devil . . . whom also they slew, hanging him on a tree, but God raised him up the third day."<sup>41</sup> For the missionary of the Pauline school, making converts among the Gentiles, the latter diegesis would be the outline of the gospel. To judge from the Pauline epistles, it would require but very slight supplementation from the commandments of the Lord. The Pauline object was a committal of the life to Jesus as the living heavenly Lord, in order to become animated by his spirit of filial devotion to the divine will. For this purpose, knowledge of Jesus' teaching as a scribe of the kingdom in the interpretation of that will in detail was wholly subordinate. Hearers or readers must be convinced of his real Lordship as glorified Redeemer, and made acquainted from the story of his career with the quality of "the mind which was in Christ Jesus." By way of commandment, the law of love, superseding all others, would suffice.<sup>42</sup> For the representative of the Aramaic-speaking church the vital element of the tradition lay necessarily elsewhere. To him Christianity was simply the flower of Judaism; Jesus was the second Moses,<sup>43</sup> the prophet raised up from among his brethren to give the ideal and authoritative interpretation of the law, who after securing the obedience of a repentant people to this higher law would reappear from heaven as the Christ.<sup>44</sup> In the churches of Syria, accordingly, or at least of Palestine, the all-important element was the teaching. The condition of entrance into life was to keep the commandments. Were the question asked, Which?

<sup>41</sup> Acts 10 37-40.      <sup>42</sup> Rom. 13 8-10; Gal. 5 14 6 15; Mark 12 28-34.

<sup>43</sup> So uniformly in the Ebionite Clementine writings.

<sup>44</sup> Acts 3 18-26.

the answer was, 'Those of the decalogue, as supplemented and interpreted by Jesus' law of love.'<sup>45</sup>

The deepest cleavage of the evangelic tradition, both in the character of the documents as they come down to us and in the most ancient testimony of the Church, is precisely along this line of the subjective and objective view. The second and fourth Gospels are fundamentally Pauline, because the starting point in their line of development is to convey the knowledge of Christ as the ascended Lord, and the fellowship of his sufferings and the power of his resurrection. Mark's is the Paulinism of a layman, stripped of the theological element; John's, the Paulinism of the theologian, interested in Paul's christology rather than in the practical issues. Both centre upon the doctrine of the spirit of adoption, incarnate and victorious in Jesus. They are written that men "may believe that Jesus is the Christ, the Son of God, and by believing may have life in his name."<sup>46</sup> That which the other two Gospels add to this has a different character and a different motive. The contrast is obscured by the later tendency to combine, harmonize, assimilate; but the common remainder obtained after the subtraction of Mark appears in the Lucan, and still more strongly in the Matthæan, form as the product of the Jewish Christian rather than the Gentile or Pauline conception of the essence of the gospel. It centres upon the doctrine of the heavenly reward. It seems almost to presuppose faith in Christ, rather than aim to produce it; and this faith is of value only as it prepares the soul to accept and do the commandment. The essential content of the evangelic tradition is conceived as "the Way," "the Teaching"; and its content corresponds.

In sketching the great results of documentary criticism we have to some extent unavoidably anticipated those of that historical criticism whose advent seems to be impending. As a first attempt to sum up results, Schweitzer's *Von Reimarus zu Wrede* is a great and epoch-marking book. "Consistent scepticism" is his inference from the establishment of the Mark-theory. Weisse, its founder, was far from sharing the complacent optimism

<sup>45</sup> Matt. 19 17-19; contrast the parallel in Mark.

<sup>46</sup> John 20 31; cf. Mark 1 1 11 9 7 15 39.

of a school of followers who accommodate it to traditional views by the easy logic, "first, therefore primitive and authentic." Contrariwise, Bruno Bauer<sup>47</sup> represents the logical outcome. The wholly secondary, unhistorical character of the Fourth Gospel once admitted, and Mark recognized as the basis of Matthew and Luke if not of Q as well, internal analysis of Mark leads inevitably, in his judgment, to a verdict differing only in degree from that pronounced against John. Brandt<sup>48</sup> and Wrede<sup>49</sup> mark the logical steps along this road, negatively establishing through the inconsistencies of the narrator the untrustworthiness of his story, and positively accounting for its distinctive features by coincidences of adaptation to a later-constructed ecclesiastical theory of the origin of the doctrine of the messiahship. To Schweitzer the determination of the other factor of evangelic tradition, the teaching of Jesus, as a parallel phenomenon, brings only the confirmation of the eschatological theory of Johannes Weiss,<sup>50</sup> and makes it, in spite of Paul, the supreme interest of Jesus to proclaim himself the Son of Man in the crudely apocalyptic sense.

It is to be regretted that a volume so truly great in its knowledge and appreciation of the bearing of the work of critics should show so little first-hand acquaintance with the ultimate sources which by common acknowledgment must now be recognized as the documentary basis for the critical history of Jesus. Schweitzer<sup>51</sup> thinks Matt. 19 12 good enough evidence to disprove von Soden's characterization of the teaching of Jesus as wholesome, just as if the admitted distinction between Q and the redactional additions to Matthew had never been drawn. Over and over he reverts to the inappropriate conclusion of the instructions to the apostles, Matt. 10 16-42, just as if there were no reasons but the arbitrary choice of the critics for distinguishing the Marcan

<sup>47</sup> *Kritik der evangelischen Geschichte der Synoptiker, 1841-1842; Kritik der Evangelien, 1850-1852.*

<sup>48</sup> *Die evangelische Geschichte und der Ursprung des Christenthums, 1893.*

<sup>49</sup> *Das Messiasgeheimnis, 1901.*

<sup>50</sup> *Die Predigt Jesu vom Reiche Gottes, 2 ed., 1900. See also Das älteste Evangelium, 1903.*

<sup>51</sup> Von Reimarus zu Wrede, p. 306, n. 1.

nucleus forming the substance of 10 1-15 from the Matthæan agglutinated supplement in verses 16-42. Schweitzer has no more apprehension of the history, substance, and significance of Q, in distinction from later amplifications, than he thinks his opponents have of the fact that the canonical Gospels are the products of their age. Equally so as respects Mark. Over and over Mark 4 11-12 must serve to fasten upon Jesus himself, or at least our ultimate knowledge of him, the artificial, *ex post facto* theory that the preaching in parables was an intentional hiding of the light. He not only can see no contrast between these two interjected verses and the adjoining material which they so badly misinterpret, but is afflicted with the blindness of those who will not see toward the connection of this Marcan theory with the Pauline apologetic of Rom. 9-11. No wonder it strikes Holtzmann as little less than cool effrontery when Schweitzer replies to this explanation of Mark 4 10 ff., "It really is about time to point out these Pauline influences on Mark, instead of constantly asserting them. How would Mark look if it had got into the hands of a Paulinist?"<sup>83</sup> Schweitzer's work marks an epoch, because it issues so well the summons to another trial balance on the work of the documentary critics, and itself responds to it so badly.

In its results, particularly in the field of Synoptic criticism, the old trial balance of the Tübingen school has been rejected once for all. The essence of Baur's method, however, remains established with equal permanence and definiteness: First, the Gospels are ecclesiastical formulations of the tradition, and must be interpreted as the products of their time. Second, the issues of that time must be defined by independent scrutiny of the great Pauline Epistles. Comparison of the results of documentary analysis with the ancient account of gospel origins yields, indeed, some negative results, which simply go to show that the tradition is more ancient than the canonical Gospels to which Papias and later investigators vainly seek to apply it; but these are outweighed by the great positive result that we are carried back to a period which knows but two streams of evangelic tradition, attaching respectively to the names of Matthew and Peter. For in the

<sup>83</sup> *Op. cit.* p. 303; cf. Holtzmann, *Archiv für Religionswissenschaft*, X, 37-40.

ultimate comparison, geographical distribution, internal characteristics, and ancient tradition will be found at one in connecting this Syrian-Roman division of the evangelic tradition with the transition of the gospel from Semitic to Aryan soil; from particularism to universalism; from a centre of gravity with James and "the apostles and elders" at Jerusalem<sup>53</sup> to a centre of gravity at Rome with an idealized Peter and Paul.

The school of criticism that has already struck out the true lines of valuation for the evangelic tradition, unknown to Schweitzer, we may designate the aetiological,<sup>54</sup> from its recognition that the starting point is the existing belief or practice of the Church, which is to be explained or justified by means of the tradition of its origin. In Mark we have a stringing together of groups of anecdotes from the story of Jesus, illustrative of (1) baptism and the gifts of the Spirit. So Jesus was baptized and endowed. (2) The ministry in its two functions of teaching and healing. So the apostles received "the mystery of the kingdom," and witnessed the wonder-working of faith. (3) The *agapé*, and its symbolism of the bread of life. So Jesus fed the multitudes and predicted his death for the world. (4) The institution of the Church. So Jesus and the Twelve went forth leaving all. (5) The eucharist, with its lesson of death and resurrection. The general arrangement is dominated by a conspicuously Pauline motive. Of course we do not expect to find in Mark the Pauline mysticism. That was reserved for the Fourth Gospel. Our Evangelist is a Paulinist of the type of those who in Corinth appealed to the Apostle for advice which should confirm their own radicalism, and got instead a rebuke of their disposition to rate the gifts of miracles above the inward gifts of the Spirit; of their inconsiderate use of the principle "all things are lawful," without regard for the weak brother; of their war-cry, "I am of Paul," against the equal intolerance of those who claimed special authority for Peter. To

<sup>53</sup> Acts 21 18; Gal. 2 1-10.

<sup>54</sup> The term is applied by Menzies, *The Earliest Gospel*, 1901, p. 15, with rather inadequate application of the principle. Wrede's *Messiasgeheimnis*, 1901, in its positive contributions, which greatly outweigh the negative, marks the new development in this direction. Note the citations from Jülicher, Wernle, Pfeiderer, B. and J. Weiss, Harnack, Bousset, Frommel, and Zimmermann, made by Holtzmann, l. c., pp. 26-28, as typical of the aetiological tendency.

the Roman evangelist, Peter is a witness, as he had been to Paul (Gal. 1 18; 1 Cor. 15 1-5); with James and John he has the reward of the "witness" faithful unto death (Mark 10 28-31 35-45). But that reward is not to "exercise authority over" the Church (10 42-44). For the rest, Mark knows scarcely more of Peter than the sharp rebukes he received (8 33 9 5-6), his conspicuous disloyalty (14 29-31 66-72), and the self-seeking (10 28) and incapacity to receive the truth which he had shared with all "the disciples" (6 52 7 18 9 28 32). Of James and John he has just one anecdote besides that of their request for the places of honor (10 35-45). It is Jesus' rebuke of their narrow intolerance (9 38-41).<sup>55</sup> Of the brethren of the Lord he has also one, "They went out to lay hold on him, for they said, He is beside himself." Of Peter's share in the "turning again" and "stablishing his brethren," to which the Apostle owed his best title to the name of Rock-Foundation of the Church, as Mark related the story, we can only judge by the fact that that portion of the Gospel in which it appeared has been suppressed by the Church, while the allusion to this rallying of the scattered flock in 14 28 makes Jesus personally, and not Peter, the agent.

There is a Petrine element in Mark, but it lies very far back indeed, and shows itself in spite of the Evangelist rather than by his intention. It is not the Petrinism of Luke, whose solution of the whole problem of "distinctions of meats" and "the pollutions of idols" is the mediating position of Peter so sharply rebuked by Paul in Galatians 2 11-16,<sup>56</sup> and who makes Peter the Apostle to the Gentiles (Acts 15 7). Mark 7 1-23 solves this whole question by a radical repudiation of Judaism as a "vain worship," "commandments of men" (cf. Col. 2 22), invoking the principle, "there is nothing which goeth into a man that can defile him," as "making all meats clean" (7 19). On the subject of the law, he supersedes Mosaism by clear enunciation of the principle of the higher law of God in creation (10 1-9). Goodness is not

<sup>55</sup> The omission of this passage by Matthew should be studied in the light of Matt. 7 21-23, which inverts the sub-Pauline principle that acknowledgment of Jesus as Lord and exercise of the gifts of the Spirit is proof of discipleship.

<sup>56</sup> See Bacon, "Acts versus Galatians: the Crux of Apostolic History," in *American Journal of Theology*, XI (1907), pp. 454-474.

won by keeping the commandments, but by the utter self-renunciation of Jesus (10 17-22). Its law is not that of "whole burnt-offering and sacrifice," but the love of God and man (12 28-34).<sup>57</sup> But we are not endeavoring to prove the Paulinism of Mark, which is amply sustained by the critics to whom Holtzmann directs Schweitzer's attention;<sup>58</sup> we are merely pointing to the beginnings of a historico-critical school which finds the key to the formulation of gospel material in the aetiological motive. And the first result of its application is to find that the great epistles to the Galatians, Romans, and Corinthians lay bare to us the institutions, the problems, the live issues which the groups of anecdotes in Mark are adapted to explain, determine, and justify. The issues of Mark are the real and practical problems of Gentile church life between 70 and 90 A.D.

Historico-critical interpretation and valuation of Q is, from the nature of the case, far less advanced; but the work of reconstruction, as it appears, e.g., in Harnack's *Sprüche und Reden Jesu*, permits already a similar application of the aetiological method. Here, too, we have agglutination of the sayings into discourses, whose principle of aggregation is again practical ecclesiastical use, but with the Jewish Christian conception of the Gospel as a "royal law," a glorified *Torah*, as the motive. What was the interaction of the two factors in the accumulation and transmission of the evangelic tradition; whether Q was known to Mark or conversely, or whether only factors of each were reciprocally known—these are questions still in the hands of the documentary critics.<sup>59</sup> The established fact is the process, which went on in the Aramaic-speaking church, from the time of the Apostle Matthew to that of our own Greek Gospel of Matthew, under the same dominant idea of "teaching to observe all things whatsoever Jesus had commanded." The principle was, "If thou wouldest enter into life, keep the commandments," viz.,

<sup>57</sup> In all cases the parallels in Matthew and Luke must be compared. In nearly every case of Pauline radicalism in Mark it will be found that Luke omits the passage, while Matthew inverts its sense by verbal changes.

<sup>58</sup> See the authorities cited in *Archiv für Religionswissenschaft*, X, pp. 38-40.

<sup>59</sup> On the influence of Q or some factor of it on Mark 1 1-13, see Bacon, "The Prologue of Mark," in *Journal of Biblical Literature*, XXVI (1907), pp. 84-106.

those of Moses as interpreted and supplemented by Jesus.<sup>60</sup> The true exponent was the "scribe of the kingdom," who, with the Twelve, had learned to "bring forth from his treasure the new and the old"; the false exponent, he who propagated "lawlessness" under cover of confession of the Lordship and exercise of the charismata.<sup>61</sup> How long the process continued before the ultimate combination of the Palestinian type with the Roman appears not merely from such internal evidence as Matt. 7 22 13 41 16 18-19 22 6-7 23 19, and similar references, but from the completeness with which the Roman gospel had monopolized the field of narrative, even in Syria, when our Matthew began his harmonistic work. Moreover, it is not Jerusalem, but Antioch, which supplied him the form and principal contents of even the Oriental factor. Even this now survives not as an Aramaic, but a Greek teaching of Jesus; not as an anti-Pauline, but a catholic form of the tradition; not as a Gospel according to the Hebrews, with James as the dominant figure, but in the group of apostolic "scribes of the kingdom of heaven" (13 51-52), the chief scribe, entrusted with the keys and the authority to bind and loose, is Peter. Our first and third Gospels present a parallel phenomenon at a period which their mutual independence compels us to regard as almost the same. It is the phenomenon of the adjustment of the apostolic gospel of the teaching to the Pauline gospel of the personality. Antioch is the centre; and the name to conjure with is that of Peter, with the Apostles and Matthew in the dim background.

The vista of research which opens before the twentieth century gives a long perspective, whether in the field of documentary analysis or historical interpretation. But the elements of the problem, and the method, are more surely in hand than ever; and the results are far from indicating the negative conclusions Schweitzer would have us believe. We can bring into relation the documents and the ancient tradition, interpreting both in the light of the great Pauline Epistles. Ultimately we shall make the teaching of Jesus and the story about him interpret each other.

<sup>60</sup> Matt. 23 30 19 17-19.

<sup>61</sup> Matt. 5 17-20 7 22-23 13 39-41 24 11-12.



*RECENT EXCAVATIONS IN PALESTINE*

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While recent discovery in Palestine has added much to our knowledge of the peoples who lived there, it must be admitted that the results are, in comparison with those obtained in Egypt, Assyria, and Babylonia, disappointingly meagre. Some of the reasons for this are clear. Palestine was not, like the countries named, the seat of a great empire, with splendid palaces temples and tombs, with boundless wealth and luxury built on the tribute of the nations, with flourishing centres of art and literature. Much of the best that was produced in Palestine has been destroyed by the wars which have so often devastated the country. Still further, the sites where most might be expected, at least for the Hebrew period, yet await investigation—Jerusalem and Samaria. The former, being almost entirely built over, is likely to remain a sealed book. The latter, owing to its great size, would be an expensive undertaking, but not otherwise difficult. The whole mound might be explored, save the eastern end with its village and cemetery.

But though Jerusalem and Samaria, the centres of ancient Hebrew life, still keep their secrets, other sites have given much information, especially about the times before the Hebrew occupation of the land. We are, indeed, not a little surprised to find that where a Canaanite site was later occupied by the Hebrews, it is the earlier people who have left the ampler evidence of themselves. The fine specimens of pottery and bronze, revealing a taste for objects of artistic value, and the many articles of Babylonian, Egyptian, and Cypriote origin, showing active intercourse with foreign peoples, give a new idea of the state of culture attained by the early inhabitants of Canaan. Many a narrative or intimation in the Old Testament finds its confirmation or illustration in these discoveries.

The chief excavations have been carried on by Professor W. M.

Flinders Petrie and Doctor Frederick J. Bliss and his associates between 1890 and 1901, and by Mr. R. A. Stewart Macalister, Professor Ernst Sellin, and Doctor Gottlieb Schumacher, subsequently to the latter date.<sup>1</sup> The results of the earlier series have been set forth in book form, while those of the later series are to be found mainly in technical journals, not so easily accessible. One must also add, not so easily intelligible, owing in some cases to lack of plan or illustration, in others to the fact that the reports made during the progress of the work are liable to correction by subsequent reports. It is with the later series, therefore, that this paper chiefly deals. But the former, owing to their importance, call for a brief survey, because the principles deduced by the earlier explorers have guided the work of their successors.

A word of explanation is necessary regarding 'tells' and the methods of exploring them. *Tell*, 'hillock,' is the name applied by the natives to the mounds which mark the sites of ancient settlements. The mounds represent the accumulated débris and rubbish, which varies in depth from a few feet to sixty or more, according to the nature of the building material, the length of occupation, and the change of inhabitants. Such tells, of varying dimensions, abound in all parts of the country, but especially in the plains and on the edges of the plains. Underneath them is usually a slight elevation, at times the native rock. Their rounded shape and evenness of outline distinguish them from natural hills, and slight experience is sufficient to recognize them. The deposits of débris are arranged in strata, corresponding to the number of rebuildings and new occupations of the site. These strata, when undisturbed by later digging, are easily distinguishable. The successive strata contain the remains of the period to which they belong, objects in stone, metal, pottery, bone, or glass.

For a variety of reasons the exploration of such a tell by what might appear the natural method, the removal of an entire stratum before proceeding to the next lower, is not feasible. In view of the practical difficulties of doing this, the best method is to cut away the tell by sections down to the rock or virgin soil. Neither method

<sup>1</sup>The work of Doctor Bliss and Mr. Archibald Dickie, 1894-1897, outside the walls of Jerusalem (described in their *Excavations at Jerusalem*, London, 1898), is mainly a local topographical study, and is not included in this review.

has been applied to a whole tell, though Doctor Bliss applied the first to one-third of Tell el-Hesi. Mr. Macalister, while working at Gezer by sections, has not been able to follow the consecutive order. Elsewhere, explorers have had to content themselves with the very unsatisfactory method of trenches and shafts, enlarging these as indications might suggest.

A new era in Palestinian exploration was opened by the work of Professor Petrie at Tell el-Hesi in 1890.<sup>2</sup> Prepared by long experience in Egypt, Petrie's achievement was the discovery of the various strata at Lachish, the recognition of the successive types of pottery, and the assignment of relative dates to both. The mound had been so eaten away by the stream at its base and the wash of the rains that not much actual digging was necessary for the studies made by Petrie.

Tell el-Hesi lies on the edge of the Philistine plain about thirty miles southwest of Jerusalem. Its height of 120 feet, over half of which is artificial accumulation, makes it a conspicuous object from afar. The plateau is of irregular shape, with an average length of about 200 feet each way, and the slope on the steepest side, next the stream, is about forty-five degrees.

The latest objects found on the tell were fragments of Greek pottery of the fifth century B.C., whence Petrie concludes that the history of the tell closed in that century, say about 450 B.C. How many centuries are represented by the 60 feet of débris? No Egyptian objects being found to give a fixed point, recourse is had to the so-called "Phoenician" pottery, which occurs in the ruin from 20 to 45 feet below the top. The middle of this "Phoenician" ware is thus  $32\frac{1}{2}$  feet below the top. In Egypt the same ware occurs from 1400 to 800 B.C., the middle of the period being thus 1100. Assuming the same range of dates for Palestine, the upper  $32\frac{1}{2}$  feet of the mound will have grown between 1100 and 450 B.C., that is, in six centuries and a half. The rate is thus five feet to the century. If the rate for the whole tell were uniform, we should have twelve centuries for the accumulation, or 1650 B.C. for the first occupation. These results are, of course, given as approxi-

<sup>2</sup>W. M. Flinders Petrie, *Tell el-Hesi (Lachish)*, London, 1891.

mations only, working hypotheses awaiting correction or confirmation.

Does the tell contain other historical clues? Petrie sees such a clue in an extensive bed of ashes five feet thick, spread by the wind, beneath which is a stratum of rough building stones, indicating a time when huts were made of the rudest materials. These are at the level which ought to correspond to about 1200 B.C., and are believed by Petrie to represent the rude houses of the Hebrews in the time of the Judges. Below this stratum are massive city walls, designated by him "Amorite."

The earliest wall, of unburnt bricks resting on the native sand, would be of the seventeenth century B.C. It has been raised in height at several different times. On both sides of this wall were fragments of the earliest "Amorite" pottery. Above the stratum of rude stones likewise, at various depths, are stone walls, assigned by Petrie to the several rebuildings of Lachish which Hebrew kings are reported to have made.

The pottery as he describes it is as follows: At the lowest depths "Amorite" pottery, characterized by marks on the surface as if made by a comb ("comb facing"), spouts of peculiar shape, ledge handles, mouths made by a simple hole in the side of the vessel, bowls with thick brims, and polished facing. Above the "Amorite" level comes the "Phœnician" ware, distinguished by thin black-faced pottery, by *bilbils* (thin black vases with long necks), by soft, light drab pottery, by thin bowls, and by pottery painted on the outside with bistre. Then comes Jewish pottery, "styles which are neither Amorite nor Phœnician, but which consist of a mixture of characters. They are mostly red-brown with rough surface." Greek pottery begins to appear in the tell about 800 or 700 B.C. Of Seleucidan or Roman pottery there is none.

It will be seen that Petrie recognizes at Tell el-Hesi four types of pottery, which he calls Amorite, Phœnician, Jewish, and Greek. All his successors make the same distinctions, but with great differences as to the names which they employ. Having thus determined approximately the age of the tell, and noted the great divisions of Palestinian pottery, Petrie returned to his Egyptian explorations, leaving the details of the subject to be wrought out by other hands.

The identification of Tell el-Hesi with the important Canaanite and Jewish city Lachish, first proposed by C. R. Conder, while not strictly proved, is in a high degree probable. Petrie's reasons, in brief, for the identification are its commanding position, with the best water supply in the region; its approximate agreement with the distance of Lachish from Eleutheropolis (the modern Beit Jibrin) as stated in the Onomasticon; and the possibility of interpreting the successive cities in the light of the Biblical references to Lachish. There is no other tell in the vicinity whose appearance suggests such importance as we know that Lachish enjoyed. The cuneiform tablet found by Bliss in the third city adds to the probability of the identification. It mentions Zimrida, which was the name of a governor of Lachish in the el-Amarna correspondence, as we know from other tablets; but the tablet is very fragmentary, and the Zimrida referred to is not necessarily the governor.

In 1891-1892 Doctor Bliss cut away the northeast third of Tell el-Hesi down to the virgin soil at a depth of 65 feet.<sup>3</sup> In doing this he removed the remains of one city before proceeding to the next lower city. With larger material at hand he was able to distinguish more sharply than Petrie had done the several cities and the successive types of pottery, but did not fundamentally differ from Petrie's conclusions. He found evidence of eight occupations, three of which seem to represent two periods each. The depth of the foundations of these various settlements below the surface is 65, 53, 45, 37, 22, 18, 8, and 5 feet respectively. Between the third and fourth cities most of the surface is covered by the thick bed of ashes noted on the margin of the tell by Petrie. The part cut away by Bliss measured 100 by 120 feet at the top and 160 by 125 at the bottom. The first three or four settlements at Tell el-Hesi covered a much larger area than that of the tell, the accumulation over this larger space varying from a few feet to seventeen in depth. Later settlements were confined to the tell.

The most prominent object of the first city was the great city wall on the north, ten feet thick, and still about as high. The stream had cut away the eastern wall. House walls were so badly

<sup>3</sup>F. J. Bliss, *A Mound of Many Cities*, London, 1898.

preserved that it was hardly possible to recover the plans. The pottery shows the ledge handles, comb marking, peculiar spout, and other characteristics noted by Petrie. Bronze objects were wanting, but the year before at the same level in another part of the tell was found a chamber containing a battle-ax, spear heads, and adzes of this metal. In the second city were found two groups of chambers, and the lower portion of a circular blast furnace, seven feet in diameter, made of mud. The wall of the third city was partly worn away; what remained was 17 feet thick. From a rubbish heap beside some chambers came lance tips and fragments of pottery. In the same heap was found, on May 14, 1892, the cuneiform tablet already mentioned. The phraseology and the character of the script seem almost certainly to fix its date as that of the el-Amarna correspondence, in the fourteenth century. None of the objects associated with this tablet seem later than the time of the eighteenth Egyptian dynasty. It certainly antedates the great bed of ashes lying above the third city. The bad condition of the tablet makes it uncertain who was the sender and who the receiver, but the indications are that the tablet was sent from some other town to the Egyptian governor stationed at Lachish. The bronze objects from the second and third cities include a spear head, chisels, a borer set in a bone handle, and a variety of pins and needles. The pottery shows a marked change from that of the first city. It represents the transition to the "Phoenician" style, which became prevalent in the fourth city. A few painted fragments from the second city resemble the finest Egyptian ware of the el-Amarna period.

The ash bed between the third and fourth cities varies in thickness from three to seven feet. That the period represented by it was not a long one appears from the fact that the same styles of pottery are found in the two cities. In the fourth city was found a well-built house, 56 feet square, with a symmetrical plan. Underneath the walls was a layer of yellow sand half an inch deep. The outer walls were 5½ feet thick, the largest chamber 15 by 30 feet. At the same level, but in another part of the mound, 5 feet above the ash bed, Petrie came upon a building with decorative pilasters, the only ornamental stone work found in the tell. Among the remains of this city, in which two periods were recognized, were found

scarabs and seals, many objects in bronze, likewise stone objects such as dishes, pestles, and corn-grinders. This is the time when the "Phœnician" pottery is at its best, including pointed juglets, rough lamps and bowls, smooth bowls with peculiar handles, painted in bistre. Some of the bowls have strainer spouts. Bowls filled with sand and a lamp and covered by another bowl were found so often near foundations as to suggest some rite associated with house-building. Some of the best pottery of this date came from a spot outside the city limits. Bliss calls the spot a cemetery, though he found no human bones. There were many whole jars and vases filled with fine sand; a large jar frequently containing another of smaller size. The period yielded also a few specimens of rough painted ware, red and brown, and a fragment of a plate inscribed with three Phœnician letters. Iron objects occur for the first time at the top of the fourth city.

Around the fifth city there seems to be no wall. There is a series of extensive, complicated buildings, but whether barracks, bazaars, or something else does not appear. The sixth city had a massive northern wall. Both this and the house walls are ruined to the base. Bliss found a rude lamp-stand with seven Greek letters scratched across its base. Petrie found outside the wall a jar fragment with four Phœnician letters. Many bronze objects came from the fifth and sixth cities. The iron objects, beginning in the fourth city, included knives, chisels, spear and lance points. The seventh city was destroyed by fire, the marks of which are everywhere visible. Many granaries were found in the form of round pits in the earth, still common in Palestine. There were two houses in fairly good condition. One of the rooms contained a layer of burnt barley, five to eight inches deep. In another were many jars, mostly broken, containing seeds. The remains of the eighth city were almost entirely destroyed by moisture from the surface. "The characteristic pottery of cities V to VIII was the Jewish, i.e. coarse copies of the older Phœnician types." In cities VI to VIII types of Greek pottery were also found.

Reviewing the evidence of the inscribed materials, figured objects, metal tools and weapons, and pottery, Bliss reaches the following results as to the dates of the successive cities: Sub I, before 1700 B.C.; I, ca. 1600; Sub II, ca. 1550; II, ca. 1500; III, ca.

1450; Sub IV, ca. 1400; IV, ca. 1300; V, ca. 1000; VI, ca. 800; VII, ca. 500; VIII, ca. 400. These are of course meant for approximations only. Of the date 1450 for city III one may feel a good deal of confidence on account of the cuneiform tablet, when one recalls that from the following century we have many such tablets, sent to the Pharaohs by Egyptian officials stationed in Palestine, including several from the city of Lachish,<sup>4</sup> and others which make mention of the place.<sup>5</sup>

In the years 1898-1900 Doctor Bliss and Mr. Macalister excavated in four tells lying in the Shephelah a few miles to the northeast of Tell el-Hesi.<sup>6</sup> These tells are Zakariya, es-Safi, ej-Judeideh, and Sandahannah. This work put to the test the results obtained at Tell el-Hesi. Tell Zakariya, which rises 350 feet above a wady of the same name, is at the top about 1000 feet long, and half as wide at its widest point. The excavation consisted of trenches and pits at various points on the tell. The accumulation is of two kinds: an older, resting on the rock, from 2 to 10 feet thick, characterized by late pre-Israelite pottery; and an upper, from 4 to 9 feet thick, containing Jewish and Seleucidan ware. The main building was a large fortress belonging to the upper of the two strata. About it the débris varies from 13 to 24 feet thick. The fortress seems to be of Jewish origin.

Tell es-Safi, commonly identified with Gath, rises 300 feet above a wady lying near its foot. On it are a village, two cemeteries, and dense cactus hedges, which greatly limit the area of possible exploration. At its highest point, on the southern end, are the foundations of a Crusaders' castle built in 1144. The cliffs of the tell near this point rise precipitously from 100 to 150 feet. Along the slope at various points are seen portions of a ruin, perhaps the ancient city wall, enclosing a tract of irregular shape, about 400 by 200 yards. Pits dug at several points reached the rock at a depth of 41, 30, and 24½ feet respectively. The first 5 feet held Arab remains; the next 5, Jewish; thence to the rock, pre-Israelite, in an

<sup>4</sup> Hugo Winckler, *The Tell el-Amarna Letters*, New York, 1896, Nos. 217, 218.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.* No. 181.

<sup>6</sup> *Excavations in Palestine during the years 1898-1900*, by F. J. Bliss and R. A. S. Macalister, London, 1902.



earlier and a later stratum. The pottery testifies to a continuous history from about 1700 B.C. down to Seleucid times. The city wall noted above seems to be from Jewish times, and may be the work of Rehoboam, who is said to have fortified Gath.<sup>7</sup> On the northeast plateau, at a depth ranging from 18 to 20 feet below the surface, and enclosed by walls, were found three upright monoliths, varying in height from 5 feet 10 inches to 7 feet 1 inch. These seem to have belonged to an ancient high place, of which a fine example was found later by Macalister at Gezer.

At Tell ej-Judeideh the excavation revealed traces of a city wall pierced by four gates flanked by towers. Near the middle of the enclosure was a Roman villa. The pottery and other data suggest that the site "was occupied in very early times, deserted before the Hebrew conquest, reoccupied by the Jews during the later days of the monarchy, and finally fortified at a comparatively late period, perhaps in Roman times." Tell Sandahannah was the site of a Seleucid town about seven acres in area, surrounded by a double wall. The tops of the house walls were found as a rule less than a foot below the surface of the ground. The town is roughly divided into streets, several of which are paved. The houses are complex in plan, with small chambers lighted from the street and from central courts. The date of this Seleucid town seems to be the third and the second century B.C. Many fragmentary Greek inscriptions were found. The clearing of a small section down to the rock passed through strata with Jewish pottery, showing that a Jewish settlement preceded the Seleucid.

The pottery found in the four Shephelah towns was of types similar to those from Tell el-Hesy, and in the same order. The enlarged study made possible by them confirmed the conclusions reached by Bliss at Tell el-Hesy. The names applied by him to the four great periods of the pottery are early pre-Israelite, late pre-Israelite, Jewish, and Seleucid. The first ends about 1500 B.C., the second extends into the period of the Hebrew monarchy, the third extends till about 300 B.C., the last beginning then and ending in the Roman period. The elaborate discussion of this subject, accompanied by a large number of plates, makes the *Excavations in Palestine* a valuable thesaurus of Palestinian pottery.

<sup>7</sup> 2 Chron. 11 8.

The results given in this book and those reached by Petrie and Bliss at Tell el-Hesi have formed the starting-point for subsequent excavations in the tells of Palestine.

The work of Mr. Macalister at Gezer is distinguished from that of other explorers in Palestine by the attempt to make a complete excavation of the site. This work extended from June 14, 1902, to August 30, 1905, and was taken up afresh in March, 1907. Regular reports of the progress of the work are given in the Quarterly Statements of the Palestine Exploration Fund. In *Bible Side-Lights from the Mound of Gezer*, 1906, Mr. Macalister has presented some of the results in popular form.

The way in which Gezer is spoken of in the el-Amarna correspondence shows that it was a place of importance. According to Joshua it successfully resisted the Hebrew invaders (Josh. 16 10). It was apparently Philistine territory in the time of David. Though acquired by Solomon and rebuilt by him (1 Kings 9 16-17), it seems never to have been important as a Jewish town. It was fortified against the Maccabees by Bacchides (1 Macc. 9 52), but a few years later Simon the Maccabee captured it and built therein a palace (1 Macc. 13 45-48). During the Crusades it was known as Mont Gisart.

The identification of Gezer with the present Tell ej-Jezari, made by Clermont-Ganneau in 1873, is beyond dispute.<sup>8</sup> The tell is about midway between Jerusalem and Jaffa, a little south of the wagon road connecting the two cities, beside the modern village Abu Shusheh. It lies east and west, is about 1700 feet long, and 300 broad in its narrowest part. It consists of two hillocks, an eastern and a western, with a depression between. On the western is a Moslem cemetery and the weli, or shrine of the local saint, beneath which one cannot excavate.

The first digging was on the eastern hill, and brought to light a burial cave cut in the rock underneath the débris, a circle of stones which showed marks of fire and seem to have been connected with a sanctuary, and many small objects of primitive type. There is pottery with ledge handles, comb facing and burnishing, as at Lachish; also scarab seals and fragments of Ægean ware.

<sup>8</sup> Clermont-Ganneau, *Archæological Researches in Palestine*, II, 224-275.

Two city walls were found; an outer, 14 feet wide by 12 high, strengthened by buttresses, and an inner, evidently earlier, of about the same size.

The burial cave showed two modes of burial, the earlier by cremation, the later by inhumation. The bed of ashes from burnt bodies covered about half the floor, being a foot thick at its deepest point. The general coherence of the bones, and a blackened hole, or flue, at one end of the cave showed that the cremation had taken place on the spot. The pottery resembled that from the lower levels at Lachish and elsewhere. Such study of the skulls and bones as their fragmentary condition allowed, led Professor Alexander Macalister, of Cambridge, to the conclusion that the cremated bodies were those of a pre-Semitic people. The bodies of the later burials were placed on stone platforms along the sides of the cave, or on the floor, and overlay in part the bed of ashes. Professor Macalister finds them of a taller, stronger, larger-boned race than the others, and apparently of Semitic stock, perhaps from the first wave of Semitic immigration. The large amount of pottery throughout the cave was almost perfectly preserved; that associated with the burnt bodies being distinctly older and coarser in quality.

A trench on the western hill revealed seven strata of debris, the seventh and topmost being Seleucidan. The sixth stratum yielded jar handles with Hebrew stamps, and is the upper limit of the bowl and lamp deposits beneath foundations, which begin in the fifth. In the latter stratum, also, iron first appears, though bronze is the prevailing metal. The pottery is transitional from pre-Israelite to Jewish types. In the fourth and third layers occur scarabs of the Egyptian Middle Empire, and bronze is the only metal. The second stratum yielded rude pottery, but no metal was found; while the lowest stratum is represented by certain troglodyte dwellings, with rude implements of flint and bone, and very rough porous pottery. It is possible that what has been designated the second stratum was contemporaneous with these. Mr. Macalister's provisional dating is as follows: I and II, 3000-2000 B.C.; III-IV, 2000-1400; V, 1400-1000; VI, 1000-600; VII, 600-1.

A large cistern cut in the rock in the second period was used as a burial cave in the third. In it were fourteen male skeletons and

the upper half of a female, along with fine bronze weapons, spear heads, knives, and the like. A group of caves, entered by rock-cut steps, represents troglodyte dwellings. The pottery, in ware, form, and ornament resembles the earliest found elsewhere in Palestine. Objects of domestic use are of flint and stone. Two skeletons were found, an adult and an infant. One of the caves, communicating with another by a narrow curved passage, is thought by Mr. Macalister to have been used as an oracle chamber in connection with the sanctuary above it.

The most notable feature of this sanctuary, or high place, is a series of eight large monoliths, standing in a row north and south, and the stumps of two others. Two of these stones projected above the surface before the digging began. They stand on a platform of stone which has an average height of three feet above the native rock. Prostrate beneath this platform was a ninth column. There is much variety in the size of the stones. The tallest, 10 feet 9 inches high, is also the thickest (2 feet 3 inches); the broadest is 5 feet wide; the shortest and smallest is 5 feet 5 inches high. The intervals between the stones vary from 3 feet 2 inches to 17 feet 6 inches; but in the latter case a stone has been lost from the space. The resemblance to a phallus which Mr. Macalister sees in one of the stones cannot be called obtrusive. He notes on its western face a couple of shallow "cup marks and grooves." This stone is of a kind not occurring in the immediate vicinity of Gezer. The line of the stones varies but slightly from a straight line. About the middle of the row and close beside it on the west is a large rectangular block of stone with a rectangular hole cut in its upper surface. The hole is 2 feet 10 inches by 1 foot 11 inches, and 1 foot 4 inches deep. There is no sign of fire. Mr. Macalister thinks it may have been a socket to support an Asherah, or more probably a basin to contain water for ablutions.

The temple area, including these columns and the "oracle" cave, covered a space of uncertain extent. Its floor level was probably that of the stone platform about the columns. In the stratum below this level were many large jars with pointed bottoms containing what remained of the skeletons of infants. The jars were full of earth, and within or beside them were usually two or

three smaller vessels, especially a bowl and a jug. Mr. Macalister thinks that none of the infants can have been more than a week old. Two of them had been burnt, and he feels sure that all of them were sacrificed, probably as the first-born. He explains in the same way similar burials found at Ta'anach and at Lachish. The jars at the latter place were filled with fine white sand. In the rock surface below the floor were several cup holes. All the strata above it, except the topmost, contained "an enormous quantity of objects emblematic of nature worship." These are made of stone, brick, pottery, bone, horn, and marble. In all the strata were terra-cotta plaques with figures in low relief representing the "mother goddess." It would seem therefore that this spot remained sacred through successive occupations of the tell. Further discoveries in the temple precincts include the figure of a serpent in bronze, and two child burials with clear traces of fire. The children were about six years old. In a trench south of the temple, in the Jewish strata, were found bones of children under house walls or built into them, suggesting foundation sacrifices. An enormous pool, doubtless a reservoir for water, of Maccabæan date, cut over 50 feet deep into the rock, was cleared of its stones, débris, and silt. Of several caves one is noteworthy for a large number of cup holes in its floor, some 10 inches deep and 18 inches across. Outside the tell, on the slope of a hill to the south, some rock-cut Seleucid graves were examined, one of which was closed by a rolling stone.

Summing up the results of the work of the first two years, Mr. Macalister finds that the earliest inhabitants were troglodytes, who practiced cremation, knew the sheep, cow, pig, and goat, made pottery by hand, and at times ornamented it. The first Semitic invasion he would place at about 2500 B.C. These Semites, he thinks, had relations with Egypt as early as the twelfth dynasty. They made, or began, the great megalithic high place; practised sacrifice of the first born and foundation sacrifice; had many varieties of grain for food; made pottery of the so-called early pre-Israelite type; were strongly influenced by Egypt, but much less by Babylon. The late Semitic period comes with the settlement of the Hebrews in Canaan, but these seem never to have held undisputed possession of Gezer.

A new cut across the western hill is 38½ feet deep, and reveals eight strata of buildings. In this section was found a cuneiform tablet, and later a second near the same place. They are records of business transactions from the years 647 and 649 B.C., at a time when Judah was tributary to Assyria. The discovery suggests the presence of an Assyrian garrison or colony at Gezer. Although Gezer figures prominently in the el-Amarna correspondence, no tablets of that era have yet been found on the site.

Of the city walls there were really three; remains of a small earth wall built perhaps by the original inhabitants, and the two massive stone walls already mentioned. The relative age of these is shown by the fact that the inner wall crosses the earth wall at one point, and is in turn partly overlaid by the outer. The outer, it thus appears, is the later, built to replace the inner and give a larger surface to the city. Three strata of buildings overlie the inner wall. Within a chamber in the lowest of these was found a scarab of Amenhotep III and his queen. At another point was found a great gateway through this inner wall, flanked with brick towers. The houses above these towers yielded a large number of objects, scarabs, beads, pottery, among which "every datable object was contemporary with Amenhotep III," while "several of them bore his name." These facts seem to show that the inner wall was in ruins in the el-Amarna period. The outer wall was traced entirely around the tell, and is about 4500 feet long. Thirty of its buttress towers were examined. They are later additions to the wall, only two of them being bonded with it; and it is suggested that they may have been added at the time of Solomon's restoration of the city. Six of these towers are in turn strengthened by bastion-like additions, which may be a part of the work of rebuilding by Bacchides.

Outside the city on the northwest three shaft tombs were found, two circular, and one rectangular; all having a burial chamber on one side at the bottom of the shaft. They were empty of bones, but contained scarabs and early forms of pottery and bronze. So many of the objects in one of the tombs were Egyptian in character as to suggest that the grave may have belonged to an Egyptian. The scarabs seem to date from the twelfth or thirteenth dynasty. Many Maccabæan and Christian tombs were examined on the

northern and eastern slopes of the tell and on the slope of the hill south of the tell. All the unrifled Maccabæan tombs contained ossuaries. Along the line of the outer wall on the south lies a very large building of many chambers, completely looted, which seems to be Maccabæan. After this opinion had been formed on the basis of other evidence, a fragment of a building stone was found in the structure with a Greek inscription which may be translated: (says) "Pampras, may fire follow up the palace of Simon." The structure may therefore be the palace built at Gezer by Simon the Maccabee, and the imprecation may have been concealed in the wall by some enemy of his.

On the western hill was found a complicated series of connecting caves, believed to have been a troglodyte dwelling subsequently used for burial. There are ten chambers, one of which has its floor covered by circular cup marks, forty-six in number, with vertical sides and flat bottoms. Another chamber has beneath its floor a bell-shaped cistern, which seems to have been itself originally a lower chamber reached by a stairway. This chamber was deepened into a cistern, and the steps built over and concealed by masonry in order to make the mouth of the cistern circular. Two of the chambers in this series of caves had not been looted by robbers, being hidden by fallen rock. One of them contained several groups of pottery, one or two pieces of which were of unusual form. The other was rich in pottery and alabaster, and contained a number of gold-mounted scarabs, a fine bronze-gilt kohl-pencil, beads, etc. The scarabs from these various chambers of this series are all from the Egyptian Middle Empire.

In the eastern hill were unearthed two tombs of masonry, the first of this kind found in the tell, covered with great blocks of stone. The first is that of a man, and contained fine alabaster vessels, a glass vase, a scaraboid with engraving of Assyrian type, and a four-handed vessel of black pottery. The second is that of a woman, and contained beautiful vessels in silver and bronze, a bronze hand-mirror, an armlet, anklets, scarabs, and fragments of alabaster vessels. In each tomb was also an iron knife. Two similar graves were found later. One of these contained rare deposits in pottery, bronze, and silver. The object of greatest beauty was a cylindrical bar of polished jasper about an inch

and a half long. Around it are three ornamental gold bands, with a loop on one side, and a small disc of gold hanging from the opposite side of the band. For a variety of reasons Mr. Macalister believes these burials to be Philistine, an opinion with which J. L. Myres is disposed to agree.<sup>9</sup>

The report in the *Quarterly Statement* for October, 1907, records the discovery of cave sepulchres of the second Semitic period, with a new type of pottery; an unbaked clay tablet with seal impression, some of the figures on which suggest the signs of the zodiac; a fine seal in the Babylonian style; another row of columns similar to the great row already described; and, about a mile distant from the tell, the remains of a large Roman bath.

The work of Professor Sellin, in 1902-1905, at Ta'anach, on the southern edge of the Great Plain, may be more briefly described.<sup>10</sup> The history of Ta'anach antedates the Hebrew conquest. The place was captured by Thothmes III; seems to be mentioned in a fragmentary tablet of the el-Amarna correspondence; resisted the Hebrew invaders (Josh. 12 21), and was the scene of the battle celebrated in Deborah's Song (Judges 5 19). It seems not to have become really Israelite before the time of Solomon (1 Kings 4 12); but has little importance in later Hebrew history.

The tell lies north and south, and is triangular with rounded angles. The plateau at the top has an average length of 1100 feet, with an average breadth of 520, and rises between 130 and 160 feet above the plain. Except a central plateau, 490 by 360 feet in area, the tell is cultivated. On the north and northwest the slope descends by large terraces to the plain. Sellin's method was to sink pits at various points, and to run trenches from the edge of the tell toward the middle, widening these where indications demanded it. About one-sixth or one-seventh of the area was thus dug over. As at Lachish and Gezer, the débris at Ta'anach is deposited in strata. Sellin recognizes four periods, each of which is divisible into an earlier and a later half. The pottery of the first period is characterized by red ware with comb facing,

<sup>9</sup> *Quarterly Statement*, 1907, pp. 240-243.

<sup>10</sup> Ernst Sellin, *Tell Ta'annek*, Vienna, 1904; *Eine Nachlese auf dem Tell Ta'annek in Palästina*, Vienna, 1905.



and the vessels are mostly flat-bottomed; that of the second, by grayish or olive-colored ware with the brown ladder-pattern decoration, and by the pointed jug; the third period is that of Greek influence. There are no Seleucidan or Roman remains; the fourth period is Arabic.

Fifteen cisterns were found, and Sellin estimates that the tell contains a hundred. Basalt utensils came from all the periods. Flint knives and arrow heads were numerous. In the third period they were rare, iron having taken the place of flint. Bronze was confined mostly to the first two periods, and included knives, spear heads, arrow heads, chisels, and objects of personal use or adornment; among the latter were the gold bracelets and other jewelry of a Canaanite woman. Six houses of considerable size were found. The most important is a castle on the west side of the mound, belonging to the upper half of the first period. From the same stratum, but a little earlier, is a building in the north, where were found twelve cuneiform tablets and fragments of the el-Amarna period. Of a city wall only a small part was uncovered, apparently from the first period. The main city wall is no doubt to be sought on the slope of the tell as at Tell Mutesellim. There were several caves, cut in the rock, which may have been used as houses, or cisterns, or graves. Many earthen jars were found in which young children had been buried; Sellin thinks that in some cases, at least, the children had been offered in sacrifice.

The two discoveries of greatest significance are the cuneiform tablets and an altar of incense; the latter from one of the random pits dug in the southern half of the tell. Its discovery suggests what surprises may still be concealed at Ta'anach. The tablets had probably been preserved in the pottery chest beside which some of them were found. As late as Jeremiah's time important writings were kept in earthenware vessels (Jer. 32 14). Those tablets on which the receiver's name is preserved are addressed to one Ishtar-washur, and probably all were so directed. The house in which they were found may have been his residence; and it is conjectured that he was the local governor, subject to Egypt.

Guli-Addi, one of the writers, after greeting Ishtar-washur, offers to send him silver; and among other things calls on him to

give his daughter, when old enough, to the king (namely, of Egypt). Another correspondent, Ahi-yami, invokes on Ishtar-washur the blessing of "the lord of the gods," refers to some weapons which he had received, inquires whether certain cities have been recovered, and proposes to send a messenger to Ishtar-washur. Both these writers, judging from their names, are Canaanites, but no doubt vassals of Egypt.<sup>11</sup> A third writer, Aman-hashir by name, is more probably an Egyptian; perhaps a general or a commissioner. In one of his despatches he instructs Ishtar-washur to send to Megiddo, on the next day, his brothers with their chariots, a horse as tribute, presents, and all prisoners then in his hands. In a second letter Aman-hashir writes from Gaza, reproving Ishtar-washur for not coming to him and not sending him troops. Three other tablets, in a fragmentary condition, are lists of men, it may be subjects of Ishtar-washur. The remaining fragments are too small to tell any story at all.

From the el-Amarna correspondence found in Egypt in 1887 we learned that native princes in Palestine, in the fourteenth century B.C., regularly employed the Babylonian language and script in their communications with the Egyptian court; and it is natural to suppose that replies came back in the same language. What is new in these Ta'anach letters is that within Palestine itself Babylonian is the medium of epistolary intercourse. This, taken in connection with other evidence of Babylonian relations with the Mediterranean coast, would seem to imply long possession of the land by Babylon, during which the language gained such a hold that for communication by writing it continued in use after the country passed from Babylonian control.

The altar of incense, made of hard terra-cotta, comes from the lower stratum of the third period, and seems to date from between 800 and 500 B.C. The reliefs upon it suggest the period of the later Assyrian kings. It was found in thirty-six pieces, which when put together formed an almost complete hollow altar nearly 3 feet high; the sides of the base being about 18 inches long, and the walls from 1 to 2 inches thick. The upper part contracted

<sup>11</sup> Dr. Friedrich Hrozný, the translator of these tablets, suggests ('Tell Ta'anek, p. 116) that the name Ahi-yami is the same as the Hebrew Ahijah (Ahi-Yahu, Ahi-Yahweh), but Sellin justly remarks that this is only a possibility (ibid. p. 109).

gradually in size, and on the top was a shallow depression, 12 inches in diameter. In this, it is supposed, incense was put, and heated by a fire kindled beneath. The altar had no bottom; several holes in the walls may have been designed to admit air to the fire, in a manner well known in Palestine today. The rim of the dish is decorated with rings or eyes. Below the dish on the right side is a handle in the form of a decorative ram's horn. A corresponding handle on the left side had been broken off and could not be found. The side walls are decorated with figures in relief. On the right are three composite creatures, sphinxes or cherubim, with wings, the bodies of quadrupeds, and beardless human heads looking toward the front. The noses are sharp; the head-covering a three-cornered cap with decorated edges and with tassels. Above two of these figures are lions whose fore paws rest on the human heads. On the left side is a series of five similar monsters, and besides these a man strangling a serpent with his left hand, and apparently piercing it with a dagger held in the right hand. On the front wall near the bottom is a conventional sacred tree, on either side of which is a rampant ibex of a type familiar on Babylonian seals, Egyptian scarabs, and elsewhere. This altar, with its decorative motives derived from Egyptian and Assyrian or Babylonian art, was in all probability Israelite. From the story of the visit of Ahaz to Damascus (2 Kings 16) we know that there was in his time a fondness for imitation of foreign altars. Fragments of figures which had formed part of a second altar were also found five or six rods from the first; in neither place was there any evidence of the existence of a temple.

The earliest settlements on the tell may have been about 2000 B.C.; at least it was long before the date of the cuneiform tablets (fourteenth century). The earliest occupants do not seem to have been cave-dwellers, as they were at Gezer. The absence of Seleucid pottery indicates that Ta'anach had ceased to be inhabited before the Hellenistic period; Sellin surmises that it was destroyed in the time of Josiah by the Egyptians or the Scythians.

During three weeks in April, 1907, Sellin dug several trial pits in the tell of ancient Jericho.<sup>12</sup> The walls of several buildings

<sup>12</sup>Mittheilungen und Nachrichten des deutschen Palaestina-Vereins, 1907, pp. 65 ff.

were brought to light; also much pottery, all of which seems to antedate Hebrew times, and to show that there never was a Hebrew settlement on this mound. The work of exploration here is to be continued. The tell measures about 1200 feet by 585, with an average height of 33 feet above the plain. A Canaanite fortress of unburnt bricks on the northwest is the best preserved building of the kind yet discovered in Palestine. Among the potsherds in this building were some of great excellence, decorated with figures of animals in relief recalling Babylonian representations. Two bronze axes were found, and also twenty-two small clay tablets, just like those used for cuneiform writing, but uninscribed. A section of a wall about 10 feet thick and 10 high was uncovered, which is thought to be the city wall. In the ruins of private houses was found pottery covering a long period, from the most primitive to the most beautiful types. Oil and wine jars buried in the floors of the oldest city attest their high age by the coarse clay of which they are made, the flat bottoms, and the wavy ledge handles.

The important work done at Tell Mutesellim by Doctor Gottlieb Schumacher in 1903-1905 has been only briefly reported.<sup>13</sup> The tell lies about an hour northwest of Tell Ta'annek, and is part of the ancient Megiddo, now represented by the extensive ruins called Lejjūn. Its fine water supply, and its position at the point where the main road from the south crosses the mountains and enters the Great Plain, gave importance to Megiddo in early times. The place was captured by Thothmes III about 1500 B.C., and the rich booty there taken gives an idea of the wealth of the city.<sup>14</sup> It figures in the el-Amarna correspondence, and in the Old Testament is usually mentioned in connection with Ta'anach. It was fortified by Solomon, was the place where Ahaziah died, and where Josiah lost his life.<sup>15</sup> The tell rises about 120 feet above the plain by a slope of about thirty degrees. Its top is a plateau about 1020 feet by 750 in area, cultivated in grain, as are also the slopes. The surface pottery is at the latest as early as the fifth century B.C.

<sup>13</sup>In the *Mittheilungen und Nachrichten des deutschen Palaestina-Vereins*, 1903-1906.

<sup>14</sup>J. H. Breasted, *History of Egypt*, p. 292.

<sup>15</sup>1 Kings 9 15, 2 Kings 9 27 23 29.

This shows that there was no Seleucidan nor Roman occupation of this mound, though the lower fields of Lejjūn have yielded many Roman remains, including tiles with the stamp of the Sixth Legion. The method of exploring the tell was by trenches and pits, as at Ta'anach, and perhaps not more than a sixth of the area was turned over. The deposit seems much thicker than at Ta'anach; at one spot a pit sixty-five feet deep did not reach the rock.

Of the great mass of details in the reports only a few items can be given here. The types of pottery and bronze were much the same as at Gezer and Ta'anach. A shaft at the northern foot of the tell struck a cistern, and near it a large chamber with an airhole in the middle of the roof, beneath which was a mass of human bones. The pottery in the chamber was chiefly of the oldest types, but there were also some later forms. A massive city wall was found at various points by running trenches down the slopes. This wall is everywhere 16 to 20 feet below the present plateau. On the east the thickness of the wall was about 28 feet, much stronger, therefore, than the walls of Gezer. On the southern edge of the tell were uncovered the ruins of a city gate measuring 57 by 36 feet, estimated to date from the seventeenth or sixteenth century B.C.

Three great buildings were found. The first, in the southern part of the tell, at a depth of about 11 feet, was of the best masonry in the tell, and is believed by Schumacher to be of Solomonic origin. Above this building, only 40 inches below the surface, was found a jasper seal stone bearing a Hebrew inscription, which is considered the most important discovery thus far made on the tell. The stone is oval and polished. Its face is 3.7 by 2.7 centimetres, and is finely engraved with a figure of a lion in the Assyrian style. Below the lion, in a script closely resembling that of the Moabite stone, is an inscription in two lines reading, (belonging) "To Shema, servant of Jeroboam." Professor Emil Kautzsch, at the close of a long discussion of the seal,<sup>16</sup> concludes that the Jeroboam is one of the two Hebrew kings who bore that name, more likely the second. Another seal, with the name Asaph, was found near the same spot, but about five feet lower down.

At a depth of about 15 feet from the surface (lower, therefore,

<sup>16</sup> *Mittheilungen und Nachrichten*, 1904, pp. 1 ff.

than the "Solomonic" building) were found bronze objects, seemingly of a sacrificial character. Three or four rods resting on a ring of bronze converge to a point at the upper end, and support a column on which rests the sacrificial dish. There are other indications of the sacredness of the site, especially twelve stones, which, the explorer thinks, are from a high place intentionally overthrown.

A second building, near the middle of the tell, is of Canaanite origin. A large part of this was traced and cleared. A pit was dug therein, 28 feet deep, through seven strata of building, to the rock, of which 28 square yards were cleared. The rock was worn smooth, and its surface contained cup holes, large and small. It was covered with a mud floor without filling in the cup holes. In the two lowest strata (numbered respectively six and seven) were found fragments of pottery of primitive character, utensils of basalt and bronze, and part of a rhinoceros tooth. Some of the graves of the fifth stratum had at the eastern end a sharp stone marked by a hole cut in one side. Underneath the foundations of the Canaanite building were walls of the same construction as those of the Egyptian building to be next described, also a layer of ashes, suggesting that the Egyptian city was burnt before the Canaanite building was erected.

South of the Canaanite building, but one stratum deeper, was another large building, called by Schumacher the Egyptian building, because of the large number of Egyptian objects found therein. Very noteworthy were three chambers in masonry, two of which are certainly tombs; the other a tomb or a store chamber. One of these contained forty-two vessels of most varied form; and one of the five skeletons held in his hand four scarabs encased in gold. This chamber was entered by a narrow passage communicating with a circular walled shaft. This Egyptian building contains many chambers, mostly small, as well as store rooms with amphoras, round pits, oil cisterns, and numerous graves. One shaft was sunk to a depth of forty-two feet below the surface without reaching the rock. Of the numerous smaller objects from this building may be mentioned utensils made of flint, eighteenth dynasty beads, bright red pottery, and other pottery of primitive types. Between the Canaanite and Egyptian buildings was found what seems to have

been a place of worship, of which the main feature was three stones, once perpendicular, covered by a fourth stone, all now fallen down. These were in a shallow pit with plastered sides. There was also a large pointed stone and a basalt vessel in the pit. A yard or more distant was a second pit, containing ashes, coals, and burnt bones of animals. The pits were enclosed by a stone wall.

The excavation of a fine synagogue of the Roman period at Tell Hum (Capernaum?) in April and May, 1905, by the German Orient-Gesellschaft has been briefly reported.<sup>17</sup> At Tell Hum are extensive ruins but no considerable mound. The synagogue was covered by only a small accumulation of earth, and its site is about 250 feet from the northern end of the Sea of Galilee. In size the building is 58 by 80 feet. On the sides of the nave and at the rear end was a colonnade, which supported a loft or gallery. At the south end was a large central door and two side doors, and the roof was gable-shaped. About the doors, above the columns, and elsewhere, was much carving of fine execution, representing animals, eagles, garlands, fruits, flowers, and geometrical designs. In many cases this has been intentionally mutilated. The material of the building is nearly all on the site, making possible, when the digging is finished, a complete restoration of the plans. If this be the synagogue built for the nation by the centurion, the place where Jesus worshipped and taught, unusual interest attaches to the building.

In the winter of 1906-1907, two important Canaanite cemeteries at Samieh were extensively robbed by the fellahin. The site is about six hours north of Jerusalem by horse, and two hours east of the wagon road running north from that city. It is a fertile basin, irrigated by a fine spring, and surrounded by lofty mountains. The cemeteries are on the gentle slopes along the edge of the cultivated tract. There are three forms of graves; shallow sunken tombs with burial spaces hewn out on either side, and in some cases at one end; rectangular chambers cut in the face of the rock, with small receptacles, the so-called *kokim*, radiating from the chamber walls; and shaft tombs. The last named, of which more than a hundred were plundered, are circular wells,

<sup>17</sup> Mitteilungen der deutschen Orient-Gesellschaft zu Berlin, December, 1905, pp. 14 ff.

communicating at the bottom with one or more chambers hewn in the rock. These chambers are circular or oval, with roofs roughly dome-shaped, and are in some cases fifteen feet or more in diameter. They are of Canaanite origin, and only two such have hitherto been reported (at Gezer). The same plan is found in one of the Mutesellim tombs, but this is of masonry. A large mass of pottery and bronze objects has come from these tombs at Samieh, much of it of excellent quality. Comparison of it with similar material from the lower levels of the excavated tells leaves no doubt as to its Canaanite origin.

What, now, has been our gain from the very considerable amount of digging which has here been reviewed? The great direct gain, it must be confessed, pertains to the earlier history of the country, to communities and the culture in general, rather than to individuals or to specific historical events. Of the earlier populations we now know their massive city walls and the materials and plans of their houses, their weapons and household utensils, the foods which they ate and the animals which served them, their methods of burial, and something of their religious beliefs and practices, the stage of their advance in art, and their intercourse with the outside nations—Egypt, Babylon, and the islands of the Mediterranean. This must be considered a welcome enlargement of our knowledge.

Whether the early populations of Palestine were accustomed to make and preserve written records we cannot say positively, but the indications are that they were not, at least not in their native tongue. The only writings found are Egyptian and Babylonian. It is not unnatural to suppose that the latter tongue, which was used for official intercourse with Egypt and in Palestine itself, was also employed for local records, but this can at present be considered only a conjecture.

The direct gain for the Hebrew period is not nearly so great as for the earlier times. Some reasons were suggested at the beginning of this paper. Another, of perhaps greater importance, is that the Hebrew civilization in its material elements was not very different from that of the Canaanites. The Hebrews made their contribution to culture in less tangible form, in literature,



morals, and religion. In other particulars they fell below their predecessors, adding little that was either distinctive or that indicated an advance. The Hebrew immigration, as Mr. Macalister has recently remarked, "did not affect the progress of culture to the extent supposed," and it had, he thinks, no "obvious influence on the development of civilization in Gezer."<sup>18</sup> In the fusion of elements to which the Book of Judges bears witness we may be sure that the new-comers received more than they gave. But though the positive gain for the Hebrew period is relatively small, the indirect gain is great. For the more we know of conditions in Palestine before the Hebrew invasion, the better we shall understand how deeply the Hebrews were influenced by those conditions. The phase of the subject of which we hear most in the Old Testament is in regard to the Canaanite religion, whose attractions the Hebrews could not resist. What do the excavations tell us on this point?

The accounts of excavations often speak of high places, altars, standing columns, cup holes, sanctuaries, and sacrifice. In no direction have the explorers been more alert than in their search for objects of religious interest. It is therefore but natural that some of their identifications should awaken skepticism. Many of the standing stones thought to be *masseboth* (pillars connected with the cultus) seem to be only the lower parts of columns for supporting the roof. Phallic worship, the practice of which has been deduced from standing columns and from small objects found scattered through the strata, seems to require evidence of a more positive character. Many of the burials interpreted as human sacrifices need not be sacrifices at all. Particularly is this true of the infant burials. Other reasons besides sacrifice might be suggested for the burial of infants near a high place, as at Gezer. Even the marks of fire on the bones of two infants hardly constitute proof. That the Canaanites practised child sacrifice is not unlikely, when we recall the stories of Abraham and Isaac, of Jephthah's daughter, and of the practice of the later Hebrew kings. To argue from the tender age of the supposed victims that they represented sacrifices of the first born is, of course, still less convincing. The conclusion must be that the

<sup>18</sup> Quarterly Statement for July, 1907, p. 203.

theory of child sacrifice to account for the death of these young children is not made out.

The case for foundation sacrifices seems to rest on stronger evidence. In a house at Gezer was found the skeleton of an old woman "built into a space left vacant at the corner"; "the position of the skeleton relative to the walls left no doubt that they were placed there at the same time."<sup>19</sup> Both at Gezer and at Megiddo skeletons have so often been found immediately beneath house walls as to make the theory of foundation sacrifice seem not improbable. It is thought that the story of the rebuilding of Jericho by Hiel with the death of his first-born and his youngest son (1 Kings 16 34) may refer to this custom.<sup>20</sup>

Our knowledge of cup holes has been increased in two directions. First, we now know that their use begins in very early times, since they are found cut in the rock underneath the débris of the oldest occupations at some of the sites excavated. Secondly, that they had at times religious significance is made more probable by their occurrence and peculiar arrangement in the floors of some of the early caves at Gezer. The practice of cutting these holes must have continued for a very long time. One who travels through the country today comes across them constantly. Their great frequency in one of the cemeteries at Samieh seems to imply some connection with burial customs. At other places they doubtless served different ends. Other uses suggested by Doctor Schumacher are to support pointed jars and sacrificial columns, and to receive libations of water.<sup>21</sup>

Of the notable object ornamented with figures in relief found by Sellin at Ta'anach no interpretation seems so probable as that it is an altar for incense. Some of the bronze dishes on the top of rods rising from feet resting on rings may well have the same use. The great religious discovery of which we need feel no doubt is the high place at Gezer with its standing megaliths, the most imposing object found in any of the tells. Taken in connection with the similar but smaller series at Tell es-Safi and

<sup>19</sup> Macalister, *Bible Side-Lights*, p. 169.

<sup>20</sup> *Ibid.* p. 166; cf. Joshua 6 26.

<sup>21</sup> *Mittheilungen und Nachrichten*, 1906, p. 12. Schumacher compares the pouring out of water before Jehovah, 1 Samuel 7 6, 2 Samuel 23 16.

with some of the standing columns at Ta'anach and Megiddo, the Gezer stones aid us greatly in picturing to ourselves the *masseboth* which were so prominent a feature in Hebrew worship till a late period in the national life. In a pit near it was found a large quantity of bones, which were possibly the remains of sacrificial victims. A pit with bones was also found near what seems to have been an altar at Megiddo. Such pits, we may suppose, were found at Hebrew shrines as well. The bones in the Gezer pit were human as well as animal, a circumstance which ends additional weight to the theory of human sacrifice.

But I must repeat that thus far the value of the excavations for the Hebrew period has been indirect rather than direct. To some readers this paper may seem not to attach sufficient importance to interpretations offered by the explorers. But it is better to understate than to overstate the results. Those who wish to see a fuller treatment of the subject, may find it in the admirable book of Professor Hugues Vincent of the Dominican School at Jerusalem.<sup>22</sup> It is hoped that the permit to excavate Samaria just granted by the Turkish government to Harvard University may lead to discoveries of more direct bearing on Hebrew history and religion.

<sup>22</sup> *Canaan d'après l'exploration récente*, Paris, 1907.

*THE ECONOMIC BASIS OF THE PROBLEM OF EVIL*

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Whatever else it may mean in art or morals, there is no doubt whatever that in economics the word value means power in exchange and nothing more. It is the power which an article possesses of commanding other desirable things in peaceful and voluntary exchange. Why a thing has this power is the first problem in economic value.

Whether it be universally agreed to or not, it is none the less true that utility and scarcity, and these alone, are necessary to give value to a thing which is capable of being transferred. If it is *both* useful and scarce it will have value, and it will have value under no other conditions. By utility is meant the power to satisfy a want. Whether that want be fundamental or trivial, wholesome or pernicious, does not matter so far as value, or power in exchange, is concerned. The proposition that utility, or the power to satisfy a want, is essential to value becomes sufficiently obvious when it is translated into the proposition that nothing has value unless somebody wants it. By scarcity is meant insufficiency to satisfy wants. However abundant a thing may be, speaking absolutely, if there is not as much as is wanted in any time and place, it is scarce in that time and place; and however rare it may be, speaking absolutely, if there is as much as is wanted, or more, it is not scarce. The proposition that scarcity is essential to value becomes sufficiently obvious when it, in turn, is translated into the proposition that a thing has no value when everybody has as much as, or more than, he wants of it, as in the case of air. To sum up, whenever and wherever people want a thing, and want more of it than they have got, they will be willing to give something in exchange for it, and it will therefore possess value, or power in exchange, and it will possess value only under these conditions. So much by way of definition.

The question, Why do things have the power to satisfy wants? would lead us back through physiology and psychology quite to the borders of the unknowable. The question, Why are they scarce? would lead us also toward the unknowable, but by a somewhat different route. Into this philosophical hinterland of his science the economist has generally refrained from bursting lest he should be found poaching upon the preserves of the philosopher; but there are some things in this region which, when seen through the eyes of the economist, may come to have a new significance.

Of course the first and most obvious reason for the scarcity of goods is that nature has not provided them in sufficient abundance to satisfy all the people who want them. Of some things, it is true, she is bounteous in her supply; but of others she is niggardly. Things which are so bountifully supplied as to satisfy all who want them do not figure as wealth, or economic goods, because we do not need to economize in their use. But things which are scantily supplied must be meted out and made to go as far as possible. That is what it means to economize. Because we must practise economy with respect to them they are called economic goods or wealth. Toward other things our habitual attitude is a non-economic one, but toward this class of things it is distinctly economic. In fact the whole economic system of society, the whole system of production, of valuation, of exchange, of distribution, and of consumption, is concerned with this class of goods—toward increasing their supply and making the existing supply go as far as possible in the satisfaction of wants.

The fact that there are human wants for whose satisfaction nature does not provide in sufficient abundance—in other words, the fact of scarcity—signifies that man is, to that extent at least, out of harmony with nature. The desire for fuel, clothing, and shelter, grows out of the fact that the climate is more severe than our bodies are fitted to endure, and this alone argues a very considerable lack of harmony. The lack is only emphasized by the fact that it is necessary for us to labor and endure fatigue in order to provide ourselves with these means of protecting our bodies against the rigors of nature. That labor also which is expended in the production of food means nothing if not that there are more mouths to be fed, in certain regions at least, than

nature has herself provided for. She must therefore be subjugated, and compelled to yield larger returns than she is willing to do of her own accord. And that expanding multitude of desires, appetites, and passions which drive us as with whips; which send us to the ends of the earth after gewgaws with which to bedeck our bodies, and after new means of tickling the five senses; which make us strive to outshine our neighbors, or at least not to be outshone by them—these even more than our normal wants show how widely we have fallen out of any natural harmony which may supposedly have existed in the past.

That there is a deeper harmony lying hidden somewhere beneath these glaring disharmonies is quite possible. Certainly no one can positively assert that it is not so. It may be true, as some profoundly believe, that these natural discomforts, with the necessity for work which accompanies them, furnish a discipline which is necessary for our highest good. Being thus driven by a *vis a tergo* toward our own highest good, we may be in harmony with our surroundings in ways which do not appear to our immediate sense of self-interest. But this whole question lies within the field of philosophical conjecture, and nothing positive can be affirmed on either side.

Our leaning toward a theory of a deep-lying harmony is easy enough so long as we contemplate only the civilized races of the temperate zones. They are obviously better off than the tropical races, which are *apparently* less out of harmony with their environment. But our faith is likely to receive a shock when we contemplate the hyperboreans. They, if any, are under the chastening hand of nature; they, if any, are driven by hard necessity; if discipline is what men need, they have it; and yet they do not progress according to any standard which we can understand. Even the comparison of the races of the temperate zone with those of the tropics lends doubtful support to the theory, because it is by no means certain that there is any less conflict between man and nature in the tropics than elsewhere. The climate is milder, it is true, and nature is more profuse in her supply of food; but she is also more profuse in the supply of living enemies of man, and living enemies, especially the invisible ones, are quite as dangerous and as difficult to guard against

as inhospitable weather. Saying nothing of beasts of prey and venomous creatures, the hook worm, the mosquito, and the divers sorts of harmful bacteria all imperil the lives of the dwellers in the tropics quite as much as the east winds do the lives of our New Englanders. While these tropical enemies are as dangerous, they are even more difficult to guard against than those with which we have to contend. The amount of intelligence which is required to see the necessity of clothing and shelter in our climate is small as compared with that which was required to see the necessity of exterminating the mosquito, to take a single illustration, in the fever-haunted tropics. On the whole, therefore, it would be quite as easy to maintain the thesis that the civilized races are less out of harmony with their natural environment than the uncivilized races—in other words, that the most civilized races occupy those parts of the globe where the necessity for work is least—as it would be to maintain the opposite thesis. If that thesis be sound, the theory of a deep-lying harmony between man and nature could scarcely stand. The truth probably is that the more civilized races occupy those regions where the advantages to be gotten by work are most obvious to the average intelligence. This leaves us without any light whatever upon the question of an underlying harmony.

Whatever our belief upon that point may be, there is not the slightest doubt that men are sometimes cold and hungry and sick; and that these discomforts would be much more frequent than they now are, if men did not work to prevent them. But work causes fatigue. Obviously the individual cannot be expected to see in this situation any sign of a complete harmony between himself and his material environment. So far as the individual can see and understand, the lack of harmony between himself and nature is a very real one.

Viewed from this standpoint, the whole economic struggle becomes an effort to attain to a harmony which does not naturally exist. As is well known, the characteristic difference between the non-economizing animals, on the one hand, and man, the economizer, on the other, is that in the process of adaptation the animals are passively adapted to their environment, whereas man assumes the active rôle in attempting to adapt his environment

to himself. If the climate is cold, animals must develop fur or blubber; but man builds fires, constructs shelters, and manufactures clothing. If there are enemies to fight against, the animals must develop claws or fangs, horns or hoofs, whereas man makes bows and arrows, or guns and ammunition. The whole evolutionary process, both passive and active, both biological and economic, is a development away from less toward greater adaptation, from less toward greater harmony between the species and its environment.

That phase of the disharmony between man and nature which takes the form of scarcity gives rise also to a disharmony between man and man. Where there is scarcity there will be two men wanting the same thing; and where two men want the same thing there is an antagonism of interests. Where there is an antagonism of interests between man and man there will be questions to be settled, questions of right and wrong, of justice and injustice; and these questions could not arise under any other condition. The antagonism of interests is, in other words, what gives rise to a moral problem, and it is, therefore, about the most fundamental fact in sociology and moral philosophy.

This does not overlook the fact that there are many harmonies between man and man, as there are between man and nature. There may be innumerable cases where all human interests harmonize, but these give rise to no problem and therefore we do not need to concern ourselves with them. As already pointed out, there are many cases where man and nature are in complete harmony. There are things, for example, which nature furnishes in sufficient abundance to satisfy all our wants; but these also give rise to no problem. Toward these non-economic goods our habitual attitude is one of indifference or unconcern. Where the relations between man and nature are perfect, why should we concern ourselves about them? But the whole industrial world is bent on improving those relations where they are imperfect. Similarly with the relations between man and man; where they are perfect, that is, where interests are all harmonious, why should we concern ourselves about them? As a matter of fact we do not. But where they are imperfect, where interests are antagonistic and trouble is constantly arising, we are compelled



to concern ourselves whether we want to or not. As a matter of fact, we do concern ourselves in various ways; we work out systems of moral philosophy and theories of justice, after much disputation; we establish tribunals where, in the midst of much wrangling, some of these theories are applied to the settlement of actual conflicts; we talk and argue interminably about the proper adjustment of antagonistic interests of various kinds, all of which, it must be remembered, grow out of the initial fact of scarcity—that there are not as many things as people want.

That underneath all these disharmonies there is a deep underlying harmony of human interests is the profound belief of some. But this belief, like that in a harmony between man and nature, is not susceptible of a positive support. It rests upon philosophical conjecture—and faith. To be sure, it is undoubtedly true that most men, even the strongest, are better off in the long run under a just government, where all their conflicts are accurately and wisely adjudicated, than they would be in a state of anarchy, where every one who was able did what he pleased, and what he could, if he was not able to do what he pleased. This might possibly be construed to imply a harmony of interests, in that all alike, the strong as well as the weak, are interested in maintaining a just government. But the argument is violently paradoxical, because it literally means that interests are so very antagonistic that, in the absence of a government to hold them in check, there would be such a multiplicity of conflicts, wasting the energies of society, that in the end everybody would suffer, even the strongest. This is an excellent argument in favor of the necessity of government, but it is the poorest kind of an argument in favor of the universal harmony of human interests.

Fundamentally, therefore, there are only two practical problems imposed upon us. The one is industrial and the other moral; the one has to do with the improvement of the relations between man and nature, and the other with the improvement of the relations between man and man. But these two primary problems are so inextricably intermingled, and they deal with such infinitely varying factors, that the secondary and tertiary problems are more than we can count.

But whence arises that phase of the conflict with nature out of

which grows the conflict between man and man? Is man in any way responsible for it, or is it due wholly to the harshness or the niggardliness of nature? The fruitfulness of nature varies, of course, in different environments. But in any environment there are two conditions, for both of which man is in a measure responsible, and either of which will result in economic scarcity. One is the indefinite expansion of human wants, and the other is the multiplication of numbers.

The well-known expansive power of human wants, continually running beyond the power of nature to satisfy, has attracted the attention of moralists in all times and places. "When goods increase, they are increased that eat them: and what good is there to the owners thereof, saving the beholding of them with their eyes?" is the point of view of *The Preacher*. It was the same aspect of life, obviously throwing man out of harmony with nature, which gave point to the Stoic's principle of "living according to nature." To live according to nature would necessarily mean, among other things, to keep desires within such limits as nature could supply without too much coercion. Seeing that the best things in life cost nothing, and that the most ephemeral pleasures are the most expensive, there would appear to be much economic wisdom in the Stoic philosophy. But the pious Buddhist, in his quest of Nirvana, overlooking the real point—that the expansion of wants beyond nature's power to satisfy is what throws man inevitably out of harmony with nature and produces soul-killing conflicts—sees in desire itself the source of evil, and seeks release in the eradication of all desire.

Out of the view that the conflict of man with nature is a source of evil grow two widely different practical conclusions as to social conduct. If we assume that nature is beneficent and man at fault, the conclusion follows as a matter of course that desires must be curbed and brought into harmony with nature, which is closely akin to Stoicism, if it be not its very essence. But if, on the contrary, we assume that human nature is sound, then the only practical conclusion is that external nature must be coerced into harmony with man's desires and made to yield more and more for their satisfaction. This is the theory of the modern industrial spirit in its wild pursuit of wealth and luxury.

Even if the wants of the individual never expanded at all, it is quite obvious that an indefinite increase in the number of individuals in any locality would, sooner or later, result in scarcity and bring them into conflict with nature, and therefore into conflict with one another. That human populations are physiologically capable of indefinite increase, if time be allowed, is admitted, and must be admitted by any one who has given the slightest attention to the subject. Among the non-economizing animals and plants, it is not the limits of their procreative power, but the limits of subsistence, which determine their numbers. Neither is it lack of procreative power which limits numbers in the case of man, the economic animal. With him also it is a question of subsistence, but of subsistence according to some standard. Being gifted with economic foresight, he will not multiply beyond the point where he can maintain that standard of life which he considers decent. *But*—and this is to be especially noted—so powerful are his procreative and domestic instincts that he *will* multiply up to the point where it is *difficult* to maintain whatever standard he has. Whether his standard of living be high or low to begin with, the multiplication of numbers will be carried to the point where he is in danger of being forced down to a lower standard. In other words, it will always be hard for us to make as good a living as we think we ought to have. Unsatisfied desires, or economic scarcity, which means the same thing, are therefore inevitable. It is a condition from which there is no possible escape. The cause lies deeper than forms of social organization; it grows out of the relation of man to nature.

These considerations reveal a third form of conflict—perhaps it ought to be called the second—a conflict of interests within the individual himself. If the procreative and domestic instincts are freely gratified, there will inevitably result a scarcity of means of satisfying other desires, however modest those desires may be, through the multiplication of numbers. If an abundance of these things is to be assured, those instincts must be only partially satisfied. Either horn of the dilemma leaves us with unsatisfied desires of one kind or another. We are therefore pulled in two directions, and this also is a condition from which there is no

possible escape. But this is only one illustration of the internal strife which tears the individual. The very fact of scarcity means necessarily that if one desire is satisfied it is at the expense of some other. What I spend for luxuries I cannot spend for necessities; what I spend for clothing I cannot spend for food; and what I spend for one kind of food I cannot spend for some other. This is the situation which calls for economy, since to economize is merely to choose what desires shall be gratified, knowing that certain others must, on that account, remain ungratified. Economy always and everywhere means a threefold conflict; a conflict between man and nature, between man and man, and between the different interests of the same man.

This suggests the twofold nature of the problem of evil. Evil in the broadest sense, merely means disharmony, since any kind of disharmony is a source of pain to somebody. But that form of disharmony which arises between man and nature has, in itself, no moral qualities. It is an evil to be cold or hungry, to have a tree fall upon one, to be devoured by a wild beast or wasted by microbes. But to evils of this kind, unless they are in some way the fault of other men, we never ascribe any moral significance whatever. It is also an evil for one man to rob another, or to cheat him, or in any way to injure him through carelessness or malice, and we do ascribe a moral significance to evils of this kind—to any evil, in fact, which grows out of the relations of man with man. But, as already pointed out, this latter form of evil—in other words, moral evil—grows out of, or results from, the former which may be called non-moral evil. Any true account of the origin of moral evil must therefore begin with the disharmony between man and nature.

Let us imagine a limited number of individuals living in a very favorable environment, where all their wants could be freely and fully gratified, where there was no scarcity nor any need for economy. Under a harmony with nature so nearly perfect as this, there could arise none of those conflicts of interests within the individual, since the gratification of one desire would never be at the expense of some other; nor could there arise any conflict of interests among individuals, since the gratification of one individual's desire would never prevent the gratification of

another's. There being no conflict of interests either within the individual or among different individuals, there could never arise a moral problem. That would be paradise. But suppose that wants should expand, or new wants develop; or suppose that, through the gratification of an elemental impulse, numbers should increase beyond any provision which nature had made. Paradise would be lost. Not only would labor and fatigue be necessary, but an antagonism of interests and a moral problem would arise. Human ingenuity would have to be directed, not only toward the problem of increasing the productivity of the earth, but toward the problem of adjusting conflicting interests. Questions of justice and equity would begin to puzzle men's brains.

It would be difficult to find in this illustration any suggestion of original sin or hereditary taint of any kind. The act which made for increase of numbers, instead of being a sinful one, for which punishment was meted out as a matter of justice, would, on the contrary, be as innocent of moral guilt as any other. But *the inevitable consequence* of it would be the destruction of the pre-existing harmony, giving rise, in turn, to a conflict of human interests. Nor does the illustration suggest or imply any "fall" or change in human nature, but rather a change of conditions under which the same human qualities would produce different social results. Moreover, the illustration does not depend for its validity upon its historical character; that is to say, it is not necessary to show that there ever was a harmony between man and nature so nearly complete as the illustration assumes to begin with. The fundamental basis of conflict is clearly enough revealed by the illustration when it is shown to be inherent in the nature of man and of the material world about him.

This theory of the origin of evil is already embodied in a well-known story, which need not be interpreted as having a historical basis in order to have a profound meaning—more profound, probably, than its most reverent students have seen in it. Once upon a time there was a garden in which lived a man and a woman, all of whose wants were supplied by the spontaneous fruits of the earth. There was no struggle for existence, no antagonism of interests; in short that was paradise. But the gratification of a

certain desire brought increase of numbers, and increase of numbers brought scarcity, and paradise was lost. Thenceforward man was to eat his bread in the sweat of his brow. The struggle for existence had set in. Man had to contend against either natural or human rivals for the means of satisfying his wants, and every form of greed and rapacity had a potential existence. When his eyes were opened to these inherent antagonisms, that is, when he became a discernor of good and evil, of advantages and disadvantages, both near and remote, he became an economic being, an adapter of means to ends, a chooser between pleasures and pains. In short, the process of industrial civilization, of social evolution, had made its first faint beginning. The human race was caught in a network of forces from which it was never to extricate itself. It was adrift upon a current which set irresistibly outward—no man knew whither.<sup>1</sup>

In this antagonism of interests, growing out of scarcity, the institutions of property, of the family, and of the state, all have their common origin. No one, for example, thinks of claiming property in anything which exists in sufficient abundance for all. But when there is not enough to go around, each unit of the supply becomes a prize for somebody, and there would be a general scramble, did not society itself undertake to determine to whom each unit should belong. Possession, of course, is not property; but when society recognizes one's right to a thing, and undertakes to protect him in that right, that is property. Wherever society is sufficiently organized to recognize these rights and to afford them some measure of protection, there is a state; and there is a family wherever there is a small group within which the ties of blood and kinship are strong enough to overcome any natural rivalry and to create a unity of interests. This unity of economic interests within the group is sufficient to separate it from the rest of the world, or from other similar groups among which the natural rivalry of interests persists. Saying nothing of the barbaric notion that wives and children are themselves property, even in the higher types of society it is the desire to safeguard those to whom one is bound by ties of natural affection, by sharing

<sup>1</sup> Cf. the article by the writer on "The Economic Interpretation of the Fall of Man," in the *Bibliotheca Sacra* for July, 1900.

the advantages of property with them, which furnishes the basis for the legal definition of the family group.

Closely associated with the right of property—as parts of it in fact—is a group of rights such as that of contract, of transfer, of bequest, and a number of other things with which lawyers occupy themselves. It would be difficult to find any question in the whole science of jurisprudence, or of ethics, or politics, or any of the social sciences for that matter, which does not grow out of the initial fact of economic scarcity and the consequent antagonism of interests among men. This reveals, as nothing else can, the underlying unity of all the social sciences, that is, of all the sciences which have to do with the relations between man and man; and it shows very clearly that the unifying principle is an economic one. Even the so-called gregarious instinct may very probably be the product of the struggle for existence, which, in turn, is the product of scarcity—the advantage of acting in groups being the selective agency in the development of this instinct. But that question, like a great many others, lies beyond the field of positive knowledge. This does not necessarily constitute economics as the “master science,” with the other social sciences subordinate to it; but it does signify that, if there is such a thing as a master science, economics has the first claim to that position among the social sciences. The economic problem is the fundamental one, out of which all other social and moral problems have grown.

Though it lies somewhat beyond the scope of the present paper, it would be interesting, nevertheless, to follow up our conclusion with an examination of the possibilities of escape from the situation which is imposed upon us by economic scarcity. The method of stoicism, or the repression of desires, now going under the name of “the simple life,” and of industrialism or the multiplication of goods, have already been mentioned. Complete escape, by either of these methods, seems to be cut off, in the first place by the refusal of desires, especially the elementary ones, to be repressed, and, in the second place, by the utter impossibility of increasing goods to a point which will provide for every possible increase in population when population is unchecked by economic motives. If economic motives continue to operate as a check upon population, that is in itself an evidence of continued scarcity.

But if they do not operate, and the procreative instincts are given free play, there is absolutely no limit to the increase of population. Any one who has ever been initiated into the mysteries of geometrical progression will not entertain the slightest doubt on this point.

But even under the conditions of economic scarcity there would be no antagonism of interests between man and man if human nature were to undergo a change by which altruism were to replace egoism. If I could develop the capacity to enjoy food upon my neighbor's palate as well as upon my own, as I have already developed the capacity to enjoy it upon the palates of my children, and if my neighbor could develop a like regard for me, obviously there could be no antagonism of interests between us on the subject of food. Let this capacity become universal, and the moral problem would be solved. That would be the Christian's Millennium. Whether this way of escape lies open or not, in other words, whether such a change in human nature is possible or not, is a problem for the psychologist or the religionist. Support for the affirmative of that question comes from a somewhat unexpected quarter, namely from the writings of the late Mr. Herbert Spencer, who must be classed among the premillennarians. The closing words of his *Principles of Sociology*, which are, in fact, the final conclusion of his whole system of Synthetic Philosophy, are as follows: . . . "On the one hand, by continual repression of aggressive instincts and exercise of feelings which prompt ministration to public welfare, and on the other hand by the lapse of restraints, gradually becoming less necessary, there must be produced a kind of man so constituted that while fulfilling his own desires he fulfils also the social needs. . . . Long studies, showing among other things the need for certain qualifications above indicated, but also revealing facts like that just named, have not caused me to recede from the belief expressed nearly fifty years ago that—'The ultimate man will be one whose private requirements coincide with public ones. He will be that manner of man who, in spontaneously fulfilling his own nature, incidentally performs the functions of a social unit; and yet is only enabled so to fulfil his own nature by all others doing the like.'"



This conclusion differs from that of the ordinary premillenarian only in the method by which the end is to be reached. According to Mr. Spencer's argument, it is not to be by evangelization, but by the sterner process of exterminating the unsocial and preserving the social elements in the population, until the whole population is made over into a new type. The execution and imprisonment of criminals, thus preventing them from breeding more of their own kind, undoubtedly work in this direction, but they leave us a long way short of the goal. That we may approach it indefinitely seems reasonable, but that it is ever attainable, either by the method of biological evolution or of evangelization, or by both combined, is by no means a foregone conclusion. It is certainly a long way off. Meanwhile what are we to do?

We may escape from some of the worst features of the situation by working along several lines at the same time. Every improvement in the arts of production, whereby a given quantity of labor is enabled to produce a larger quantity of the means of satisfying wants, tends, of course, in some degree to alleviate scarcity. If this can be supplemented by the doctrine of the simple life, made effective especially in the lives of the wealthier classes, so much the better; for then there will be fewer wants to satisfy. If this result can be still further strengthened by a rising sense of the responsibilities of parenthood, whereby the reckless spawning of population can be checked, especially among those classes who can least afford to spawn, the discrepancy between numbers and provisions will be kept at a minimum. Again, a more widespread spirit of altruism, or even a milder and more enlightened egoism such as that which moves the farmer to take delight in the sleek appearance of his horses, or the English landlord to take pride in the comfortable appearance of his tenants and cotters, would go a long way toward softening the antagonism of interests among men.

In spite of all these methods, however, there will still be antagonistic interests to be adjudicated. The state must therefore continue to administer justice. But every improvement in our conceptions of justice, as well as in the machinery for the administration of justice, whereby a closer approximation to exact justice may be secured, will make for social peace; though the mere

adjudication of conflicting interests will not remove the conflicts themselves nor their cause. That lies deeper than legislatures or courts can probe.

These conclusions sound commonplace enough, and are doubtless disappointing to those who hope for a new earth through some engine of social regeneration. The old world is already pegging away, and has been for a very long time, upon all the plans which have been mentioned in this paper. But after all, the old world is wise—much wiser than any man, though there are some men who think otherwise.

*THE DIVINE PROVIDENCE*

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The belief in a doctrine of Providence, at least in some sense of the word, is inseparable from theism. Let a man once assume a good God or a righteous universe, and he thereby also assumes that all events must be directed, or at least overruled, for good. Perhaps, however, it is a little easier to declare what one means when he says, "there is a God," than to explain what one means by "the divine Providence." Do we believe in a special Providence, that enters into each particular act or moment, so that, for example, it is literally true that not a sparrow "shall fall to the ground without your Father"? Do we think that the infinite Power carries every individual life in its thought, and even plans, and cares what each man does, suffers, or enjoys? Or do we think of Providence as merely a general guiding agency, like the intelligence that steers a ship in safety without any special responsibility for the conduct or the pleasure of the passengers? Do we think that a man can interfere, by the exercise of his little will, with the working of divine Providence? Or does Providence also enter into and direct the motion of every individual will, as it may be conceived to enter into the motion of the sands on the beach?

In one view it might be as well not to ask any of these questions. It may be held that the idea of a good Providence goes with a very common and helpful religious sentiment. This is trust, or faith. It is expressed in the ancient words, "Shall not the judge of all the earth do right?" Or again, "Though he slay me, yet will I trust in him." It matters little, it may be said, whether such trust as this be required to justify and explain itself. It is better to cherish it, though ever so vague, or even without giving any reason for it, than not to have it at all. For without it life would hardly be bearable.

We are challenged, however, at times to ask, and to answer,

what we mean by this marvellous trust in a righteous or beneficent Providence. Some tremendous calamity occurs, like the eruption of Vesuvius or the earthquakes at San Francisco and Valparaiso. In the face of such a vast devastation, the whole world is set to thinking. Is this destruction and slaughter also a part of the divine Providence?

There are indeed minds that are forced early and often to raise this searching question, without waiting for colossal happenings. They are sensitive to the common daily facts of bruises, pain, disease, misfortune, death, crimes, wars. What can Providence mean in a world where such things color all life and characterize history? The faculty of reason in us will not leave us content to hide our heads in the sand like ostriches; we are obliged to ask what kind of a world is it that we live in, orderly or not, rational or not, good or bad, providential or moving at random? It is at least a tenable theory that we have minds and a sense of justice because we share the thought and the compelling righteousness of a good Power. In any case we do well to use our minds and to exercise our sense of justice. There are those of us who cannot help ourselves in this regard; we had rather die than be forbidden to ask the questions that the universe urges upon us.

Moreover, we who are parents, or teachers, or friends, are bound sometimes to define what we mean, or at least what we do not mean, by Providence, in order to set aside certain dreadful notions of God's doings which on occasion our children or our neighbors disclose. Thus, the letter of one of the narrators of the earthquake in California tells of a child who remarked, "Now I know there is a God, for no one else could shake the earth so awful." And the prayer appointed by one of our American bishops to be read in his diocese after the disaster uses the words, "When thou hast made the earth to tremble and the mountains thereof to shake." Here is something very like the old Greek conception of Poseidon, the earth-shaking God. We submit that it needs extremely wise teaching to relieve the minds of children, and grown people too, of the terror of this crude thought.

Again, while it is wonderfully suggestive that in the public comment upon great calamities very little of the old thought of them as a judgment upon men's sins appears, yet we know that this

idea survives and finds occasional utterance. "It was all on account of the terrible wickedness of the city," said a good Roman Catholic maid to her employer after the disaster at San Francisco, hardly conscious of the heavy ruin of the property of her own Church in that city. Here is a fearful load on men's minds, so often as they still think of God as dealing out vengeance and punishment like an angry oriental potentate. Almost better have no God at all, than a God whose Providence we could not respect—less godlike than the best men are. As against such a God of vengeance, we go over to the side of the defiant but noble Prometheus.

Hardly more tolerable is the notion of God's Providence as "sending," as it were arbitrarily, pain, death, and calamity, by way of discipline and chastening. The trouble with this conception is that God is set forth as over against mankind. He disciplines, and their part is to suffer. He does what he pleases, even when he pleases to chasten them for their good. But we do not easily love a God who does as he pleases or acts arbitrarily towards his creatures. Our ethical and spiritual demand is for a conception of a God of whom it may be said, "In all their affliction he was afflicted."

In fact, we believe it would be truer to say that God could not have helped the fact of the sorrow, the blow, the eruption, or the earthquake, than to say this bold and terrible word, "He sent it upon us." This brings us frankly to the question whether there is not a true sense in which we must deny the prevalent thought of the omnipotence of deity, and admit that as he may be conceived to suffer with men in their sorrows, so he may be thought of as being bound, or compelled, or limited (by self-limitation it may be), as men are doubtless bound and limited. We are reminded at once of the great name of John Stuart Mill, as one who was obliged to limit God's omnipotence in order to save his goodness.

There are several modes of philosophy which go to the limitation of the divine power, and lead thus to a changed idea of his Providence. We may try the method of dualism, and, like the Persians, admit a God of mischief as well as a God of righteousness. Even Professor William James appears to suggest diverse powers behind phenomena. But modern science is built upon the

conception of a universe. Every new fact that we observe, or trace to its nexus of relations, carries our minds up to a conviction of an underlying unity. The whirlwind and the storm are related to the sunshine, without which the air could not have been stirred. The earthquake itself is found to be an incident in an orderly process through which the world has become habitable. This idea of a universe, where all things play together, rules intentional mischief or hate out of the whole field of natural happenings.

Meanwhile, it is well-nigh impossible to conceive of a universe in which all outward nature, inclusive of blight, disease, and death, is bound together, and to admit at the same time a scheme of dualism or pluralism to account for the untoward events in human history or in the life of the individual. If this is a universe in any sense, it must be a universe throughout, inclusive of human suffering, crime, and unhappiness. In fact, the dualists generally expect eventual harmony and the triumph of good over evil. This is to confess faith in a universe, where good is the ruling principle, and evil only a phase or an incident. The old question therefore recurs, How does evil get into a good universe?

It seems childish to say that matter, with which the guiding and beneficent intelligence of the world has to work, is more or less inchoate and unmalleable in its nature. For where does matter come from? Is it another and independent power which the Almighty has to learn to handle? The truth is that the order, the beauty, and the correlation of the processes of nature are just as conspicuous in the things that hurt and sting us, and wreck our ships and overturn our palaces, as in the things that merely please us. The eye of the house-fly or the skin of the rattlesnake is as great a marvel of creation as the peach tree or the rose bush.

It used to be urged that God governed the world by second causes. It was as if he had set up a hierarchy of powers—gravitation, heat, electricity, and others—and left them, like the inferior gods of the Greek pantheon, to take care of the world while he rested. When anything mischievous happened, we had to lay it not to God, but to the wild or untamed power, as men once blamed Aeolus, or as Aeolus himself blamed his own winds. Everyone of course sees that whatever God's forces do (whatever "forces" may mean), God himself does, and must be accountable

for, so far at least as there is accountability at all. We gain nothing in the clearness of our thought by separating the powers of the world from the ruling intelligence, any more than by separating the realm of matter from the realm of the spirit.

Is it not possible, however, that there may be a general Providence, guiding the processes of nature and the life of conscious creatures toward good, without entering into the details of their processes? This is what Tennyson's lines suggest:

So careful of the type she seems,  
So careless of the single life.

But in this view the doctrine of Providence which the religious instinct demands seems almost wholly to evaporate. There is no sense of love in a universe that takes no care for the individual life. What is the use of the type, if the single life is of no account? There is no general welfare in a world whose individuals are sacrificed. For the general good is composed of the good of the units. Either there is no God at all, in our human use of the word and for any practical purpose, or else the Providence that cares for the whole cares also for the parts and for the individuals. But if God cares for us in our enjoyments, and ordains our gains and growth and welfare, how is not God also behind our sorrows, our losses, and our ills?

It has been said that God's Providence, and therefore his power, is limited by man's freedom of will. Mischief enters the world through man's wilful misdoings. This is very like the naïve story in Genesis. The fact is that all that man calls evil in the physical world, including man's own brute ancestry, lies back of Eden and is wrapped up in world conditions with which man had nothing to do. The worst enemies of our happiness are not plague and pestilence, but ignorance, hatred, jealousy, selfishness—all inherited with the animal nature. If these things constitute "original sin," then we did not originate sin, any more than we created our own wills, but sin is simply our misfortune; or—shall we say?—one of the inevitable conditions upon which we are made to be men.

Let us frankly admit that we cannot see how to limit God's power, or his wisdom, without also limiting his goodness as well.

If there is a God in any valid sense, he is not a blunderer. He is not a mere learner as we are; he has not abdicated his responsibility, or left blind forces to act in his stead; he cannot be handicapped for want of adequate power; there is nowhere the sense that his power is giving out. If he cares for the whole, it must be by virtue of caring for all the details and the parts. If he is one, it is because he is also immanent in all things. If he makes the good to appear, it must be because he uses also what we call evil. In short, a divine Providence must be a Providence in particulars. Everything and every life enters into the divine order of a universe.

There is one form of the limitation of the divine Power that we have not considered: Omnipotence, at least if guided by wisdom and goodness, cannot do preposterous and incongruous things; cannot make a square other than a square, or two plus two more than four. It cannot at the same time have a thing and go without it, any more than we can. It cannot create a finite world in time and space, and not use the conditions of finiteness. In other words, we cannot think of God or his universe except in terms of rationality.

Let us venture now, though with becoming modesty, to suggest certain respects in which we men may enter into, and even sympathize with, God's limitations in the working of his Providence. We, who are parents or teachers, admit hardships, pain, and trouble into our children's lives as really as God admits the same factors into the lives of men generally. We sit by with unused power to help them and unused knowledge to direct them, and we let them stumble and fall and suffer, and do not interfere. We put sharp tools into their hands, prevising that they will cut themselves. We could keep them off the ice, or out of perilous sail-boats, or out of games and sports; but we choose to see them go into various ways of danger. The tender mother on occasion sends her boy to die for his country, and often to do business in the wilderness or on the sea. It is the highest form of human love that thus lets its children suffer. It is a lower form of love that tries to exempt them from all pain.

The truth is that life is somehow a study or discipline, and also at the same time an appreciation and enjoyment of values in a great developing hierarchy of "uses," as Swedenborg truly insists.



We might conceivably get for our children ease, comfort, luxury, wealth, exemption from pain. But, without depreciating these things, we know that they are of very low value. Comfort and luxury rarely, if ever, make men any better, or bring anything more than a momentary thrill of happiness. We know that, like an enervating atmosphere, they mostly harm the lives of young people. We also know that out of bumps, bruises, cuts, falls, blunders, humiliation, children learn to walk, to ride, to sail, to wrestle, and above all, to reach the high terms of courage, constancy, loyalty, truth, friendship.

We do not "chasten" our children; we do not arbitrarily trip them up and make them fall; we do not stand over against the child and send humiliation or distress upon him. On the contrary, in the true home, we are with the child in our sympathy; we suffer with his bruises and wounds; we feel his humiliation when he has failed in his lessons or has done wrong. We suffer with him, even though we can foresee how brief his pain will be, and know that he will be better and not worse for it in the end. It is a world of cost. There is no value without the law of cost. God himself cannot have human values without human suffering.

We may catch here a hint or parable of the divine Providence. We cannot think of God as standing away from the world of men and inflicting discipline as a taskmaster. But we conceive of God as in and with all human toil, struggle, and suffering. Life is not our business as men, apart from God, or God's affair apart from men. The enterprise, the values, the cost, the sufferings, are his and ours too. It is a common life. This is the real doctrine of the incarnation. The story of the Christ is only the type of it. It is universal. If God suffered in one man, he suffers wherever men suffer.

Here is the mystery of love; it cannot be at all without cost and pain—not in God or man. Omnipotence could not set at nought a spiritual fact. Here is the mystery of pain. It can be translated into power, into wisdom, into goodness. We see the almost miraculous process daily. God's love is like our love; it contains sorrow as well as joy, and is richer so and more truly love.

All this goes with a different thought of God from what was

once held. God was the Absolute and the Abstract. You got the thought of God by thinking away whatever was most real to you as a man. God could not suffer or sympathize. This was to deny a real God. We are coming reverently to think of God as the one Life in which all real things consist; in which power, beauty, order, justice, love are one; in which therefore sorrow as well as joy is contained. Who was ever hurt, that is, made to be less truly a person, because of sorrow? The divine Life is not less, but more, by reason of this fact. We conceive that sympathy, then, is in the very nature of God. This conception, once entertained, alters forever the problem of the nature of the divine Providence touching human calamity. We see what is meant in the saying that the "whole creation groaneth and travaileth in pain together." All this is part of the order of a divine universe.

We have already spoken of the risks and ventures of life. Let us be bold enough now to suggest that the element of hazard is essential to life. In other words, life would mean less and be less without it; and omnipotence could not repair the loss if this strand were cast out of the world. We practically say this daily. We would not vote to exclude risks and ventures. Or if we would so agree, it would be in our moods of weakness, fear, and indolence, not in the hour of our health and the mood of our manliness. A part of the daily work of life is to clear away wreckage, to bury the dead, to lay broader foundations, to build straighter road-beds and stancher ships—not to flee from the struggle and cost of existence, but to adjust ourselves more intelligently and hopefully to its ruling conditions. Thus the people of the wrecked city of San Francisco went to work at once to rebuild on the same risky site. They were willing to take their venture, though they might have sought a place safe from earthquakes. We take certain risks every day in our sports with a sense of joyous excitement, as also in the hazards of legitimate trade. We actually should not love life so well in a world where nothing happened, where no ventures challenged our daring, where the Weather Bureau had learned to be perfectly accurate in its forecasts. We are shy of a Bellamy Commonwealth, partly because it looks too prosperous, too comfortable, too safe, too barren of heroism. We say this in perfect

consistency with every attempt to modify brutal hazards, to save life, to assuage suffering, to transfer the field of venture from gross and vile forms of injustice and war to the fair fields of helpful social enterprise. We still believe that man must take brave ventures in some form as long as light and darkness alternate on the earth.

Shall we not be right now in saying that there is a poetic or dramatic element in life? We do not mean in a vulgar or spectacular sense, but rather in that view of the drama in which it has been said that it is the work of tragedy to "purify the soul." To call the development of the world and the process of history dramatic is to call it intellectual, moral, spiritual, significant. We should despise life if we did not surmise that it moved toward some splendid end and was finally to be interpretable into the victory of goodness which Paul calls "the manifestation of the sons of God."

There are two ways of looking at any work of construction. You can see it as a whole, as it lies in the mind of the poet or architect. In this sense you may pronounce it all very good. At our highest moments, in view of the grand procession of noble persons who have walked the earth, we men may even dare to say this of the universe. We see the splendid lines of its integrity; we see light always shining beyond its shadows; we see beauty, goodness, heroism, unity; we see in the noble and generous lives the high fruitage of God's world; we see all things ministering to the grand result; we think of ourselves as belonging, like citizens, to an ideal realm; at our best, we are sure in this large perspective that life is worth whatever it has cost.

The other view of the work of the poet or builder is as one sees only a part at a time, or looks on as the work progresses. We see the bare beginnings of the edifice, with the dust and chaos. We read only a part of the story, wherein there are chapters of pain and disappointment. The poet himself, we are certain, suffered also at these sorrowful points in his story. There are places in the drama where we may wish we had not come to see it, glad as we are afterwards that we stayed through to the victorious close.

Now it is not in omnipotence to have the whole and not to have the parts of which it is made; not to have the contrasts, not to have the heart-rending chapters, not to have the solemn passages, not to

have the seeming defeat of true love, before love had learned its mighty lesson of absolute devotion, to be willing to die that love might live.

So, we conceive, it is not in omnipotence to have man at all in this universe and not to have him first as a child or even as an untutored savage. It is not in God's power to have the type of Christ prevail in this world, and not to pass through terrible chapters where Herods and Caesars oppressed the innocent. Neither is it possible for any of us, even though we may hope that we share at times the thought of the infinite builder and poet, to stand by the wreck and waste and sorrow of some great human tragedy, and not cry out in sympathy, as men of the old times cried, "How long, O Lord, how long!" It is well for us to cry out, but we have a new hope in our cry. God is with us in it. There is no vengeance behind the calamity. Daily we learn to use the powers of nature as if indeed we were God's sons; to be unterrified by them, to rise superior to them; and even, if we must, to give up our little lives under their shock, with unabated confidence that they cannot hurt the indomitable spirit of man.

Men are already learning to a wonderful degree to take almost at the same time these two different views of vast public calamities, conflagrations, earthquake shocks, railroad accidents. On one side we are touched with the sense of a common suffering. We are all made to share it. We call it dreadful. On the other hand, we see it, as perhaps men never could have seen such an event before, with a sense of the wholeness of history. Again and again we find a great population undaunted by their troubles and stirred to a new civic patriotism. We see the civilized world coming to the help of ruined cities or famine-stricken provinces, and pouring in material and treasure to repair the loss, just as the wounded body draws contributions of restoring life from every cell. We see an awakening of sympathy and humanity binding the races of men together. We look forward a little while, and foresee safer and more splendid cities than those which have been destroyed. A little later the signs of the wreck will be covered with beauty. On the vast scale of the life of mankind, nothing has happened more serious than when, in a child's life, he has bruised his finger in a door or cut his foot with an ax. In the case of the great tragedy,

as with the sorrow and hurt of the child, no real or lasting evil has come to the values of the moral and spiritual life. There is no loss of human courage, patience, loyalty, good will. On the contrary, these grand values stand forth in clearer light.

There is a fine thought of Browning in his *Asolando* that may help us now. He traces the course of evolution:

From the first, Power was—I knew!  
Life has made clear to me  
That, strive but for closer view,  
Love were as plain to see.

Let us venture to develop this thought. It is as if an artist were painting a picture. The artist sees it all in his mind's eye before he begins, as the Almighty Creator eternally carries the world in his thought. But look at the artist's beginning. It is a bare surface of pasteboard or canvas; then we see a mere crude sketch and vague lines; then the appearance of daubs and patches of color. Who would not criticize and condemn if this were all?

So with the course of God's world evolving in time. What could there be first except power? How could love show itself in the tremendous processes of a cooling planet? How could love be manifest in the great dull saurian creatures? Yet love is present, waiting and pressing to appear, though everything else must come first. Love is moral harmony: intelligence, art, music, and righteousness must work their way into the picture before love, the harmony, can come to view.

Intelligence now appears on the scene; men come with minds to ask questions and share the wonder of thought. The sense of beauty and the moral sense come to birth. Love presses the more to enter into the world. It takes its risks as it comes into a society only emerging from the animal life; it enters a world of strife and passion. It is the mightiest form of power yet known. But few yet possess intelligence enough to know the power of love when it comes. It has to win its way. The points where it appears seem out of relation with the great masses of the old crude wash that covers the canvas. The men who first know love are sufferers and martyrs, standing out in relief against the brutal world around them. The Christs go to their death. The lovers of liberty are

beheaded. All the more love, always pressing for admittance, wins over the hearts of men, stirs new thoughts in them, rouses their sense of justice, creates fresh and ideal demands. Every martyrdom is at last translated into a prayer, taken up now by the millions, that the world may be changed and redeemed from the ancient struggle of force to the beautiful order of love. Every pain is a mode of urgency, calling for light, intelligence, skill, and goodness. Every prayer or desire of man for the ideal things is the pressure of the love of God, the tireless artist, bringing beauty, welfare, and joy. Nothing is wasted in his work. Love comes as intelligence comes, as fast as men can bear it, as soon as they want it. It comes where power alone and knowledge alone have made men cry out for the harmony and unity that only love adds to life. Men could not have love, men could not understand it, nor pray for it aright, nor value it enough when it comes, if they had not first known the contrast of a world of power without love as yet made evident in it. The brute, selfish, loveless life must come first in the order of growth, that love might conquer at last. The law of contrast is in the nature of the universe, in the mind of God.

We may get some light now on certain alleged facts that men call "special providences." There are those indeed who repel us by their claim to be God's favorites, for whose sole benefit interventions are made, while others must suffer. The trains on which they travel are safeguarded, they tell us; they are providentially kept from taking the steamship doomed to wreck. We refer to another class of happenings. The most intelligent of men will sometimes tell us that everything in their lives seems to them, as they look back, to have been ordered aright. At least everything was usable and assimilable. All the events have fallen into line, and combined to make a unity. Even what seemed untoward things have proved to be good and not evil. It is as if the individual life followed some divine pattern or plan.

What now would you expect? Once grant the idea of an almighty artist or master of life, and it follows that, deep beneath the show of things, lines and patterns must everywhere prevail. God sees them and means them. It follows, again, that whenever any man enters into or shares in a measure the divine intelligence, and especially shares the divine purpose of goodness, in other words,

when a man orders his life with intelligent good-will, he sees somewhat as God sees; the patterns, the beauty, the unity, disclose themselves in small things as in large. The wing of the butterfly is as marvellous as the sight of the Alps. The story of the individual life may be more complete a unity than the bodily organism is. Take, for example, the Life of Gladstone, or Andrew D. White's Autobiography, or Booker T. Washington's *Up from Slavery* "All things work together for good" in such lives.

It is possible that we might even go further, and catch a clue to certain strange psychic facts. If all life goes by a master plan, who shall say that sensitive minds, Isaiah, for example, or Joan of Arc, taught by love, may not on occasion see below the bare surface of things, or see further than their neighbors, and so detect the ruling lines of destiny? For the world is structural and orderly; coming events do often cast their shadows before. There is a real science of prophecy, whereby the lover of justice or the seeker for truth has glimpses from the mountain top, and sees as if with the eye of God.

All this may seem to be very bold. "Who by searching can find out God?" Let us then put aside every venturesome word. Let us suppose that it is useless to question the divine Providence, or to seek to understand it. There remains a solid and impressive series of facts of experience. There is an attitude or mood in which man is at his strongest and best, in which indeed he is invincible. It is the attitude of trust—we will not say resignation; it is a higher and richer mood; there is hope in it or expectancy of good. Observe that this is exactly the attitude which one would take on the assumption of a divine world and a beneficent God. It is the attitude that corresponds to the ideas which we have been considering. It looks as if the ideas and the attitude ought to go together. But we will suppose now that a man takes this habitual attitude of trust, without seeking to give it any intellectual interpretation more than this vague but splendid faith, namely, that life must be well, here and hereafter, and in all times and places, for him who seeks to do his best and to "follow the glint." This is the substance of practical religion.

Now it is evident that the universe answers to the use of this trust in it. We have the testimony of innumerable witnesses on

this point. The noblest intelligences are one with the host of the humble good. The world certainly behaves like God's world to those who treat it so. No one ever took this attitude and found it to fail. No one ever took it for a day who found that day idle or unhappy. No one having strayed from this way ever came back to it and did not find it more solid than ever under his feet. No one in this attitude was ever discomfited. It looks, therefore, as if we touched here as firm a bit of reality as the world contains. In short, "the witness of the spirit" throughout generations runs with Whittier's lines,

That more and more a Providence  
Of love is understood,  
Making the springs of time and sense  
Sweet with eternal good;

That death seems but a covered way  
Which opens into light,  
Wherein no blinded child can stray  
Beyond the Father's sight.





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## *THE COLLAPSE OF THE NEW ENGLAND THEOLOGY*

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### I.

Doctor Foster's book<sup>1</sup> has brought to the attention of scholars the entire movement of the New England theology in its genesis, development, culmination, and collapse. The book is conspicuous for learning, ability, fairness, and sincerity. For the thorough apprehension of this school of theology the volume is the best that we possess. When we reflect that an entire generation has risen up since the last great master of the New England divinity closed his labors, at Andover, in 1881, and that students of theology today can nowhere hear the old system expounded as it was wont to be expounded, Doctor Foster's book is at once seen to answer an essential need of the time.

While the psychological interest in Doctor Foster's work is the keener, owing to the fact that during the composition of it the author passed from the position of a disciple in the New England school of thought to that of one no longer able to name himself among its adherents; and while it is a significant witness to the writer's integrity that, had he rewritten his book after he underwent this change of opinion, the historical and critical portions of it would hardly have required at his hand any considerable modification, yet it is on the whole to be regretted that the final state of mind to which Doctor Foster felt himself obliged to come

<sup>1</sup> A History of the New England Theology. By Frank Hugh Foster. University Press, Chicago, 1907.

could not have been the shaping spirit in which his work was cast. For after all what concerns us most is the collapse of this system of belief. Having lived so long, and having proved itself mighty over so many generations of able and noble men, how came it suddenly to melt into thin air? It is not enough to expound the old beliefs and to exclaim, "How are the mighty fallen!" If possible we wish to know why the mighty are no more. In addition to the important service that Doctor Foster has done as the historian of the New England theology, may we not hope that he will lay us under still greater obligations by a volume embodying his final and elaborated criticism of this school of thought? While awaiting this greater service, some thoughts are here offered in explanation of the sudden and complete collapse of the historic theology of New England. As no wise man cares either to write or to read a merely negative production, I shall consider the collapse in the interest of certain precious survivals, and these again as preserving under new forms a permanent theological type.

What is the New England theology? In a general way it is the philosophy of the Christian faith originating with Augustine; reduced to severe order and expounded with energy and consistency by John Calvin; revived by Jonathan Edwards, and by him and his successors related to the speculative questions and religious conditions of a new land and a new people. From first to last it consisted in five main determinations, the old five points of Calvinism slightly rearranged: the sovereignty of God, the depravity of man, the atonement for sin made by Jesus Christ, the irresistible grace of the Holy Spirit, and the perseverance of believers in Christ. The system began with the divine sovereignty; with the predestination of all events; with a world fallen, yet under the purpose of God; and with a scheme of salvation limited to a certain predetermined number, and exclusive of or indifferent to the rest of mankind. Nathaniel W. Taylor here speaks for the entire school. In his discussion of the doctrine of election he remarks: "The simple matter of fact which I would state, and which constitutes the entire doctrine of election is this: That God has eternally purposed to renew, and sanctify,

and save a part only of mankind." The perseverance of true believers must be read in the light of the irresistible grace of the Holy Spirit; this again must be traced through the sacrifice of Christ back to the elective decree of the Most High; and still further this determination to save only a part of mankind must be seen to be one phase of God's absolute sovereignty in the universe.

Upon this general framework of belief all the New England theologians were agreed. For them there were but two systems of theology, the Calvinistic and the Arminian; and for the latter they had, in general and in particular, something very like contempt. So far as I have been able to search their writings, no one of these thinkers has defined the science of theology. They did not conceive definition to be necessary. They had absorbed from childhood the Calvinistic scheme; it took tremendous, almost exclusive, hold of their intellect. When they studied the Bible, it seemed to look into their souls from nearly every page, and the history of this sad world was the conclusive witness to the truth of its doctrine concerning man. Jonathan Edwards, the elder and the younger, Joseph Bellamy, Samuel Hopkins, Nathanael Emmons, Nathaniel W. Taylor, and Edwards A. Park, the great masters of the school, were at one here. Horace Bushnell is the pioneer of a new movement, and therefore does not in this connection concern us. Samuel Harris was a deep thinker in theology and an eminent teacher; but he too had outgrown the old New England categories. Professor Park was the last of the New England theologians. These thinkers without exception held the sovereignty of God, whether construed as including or as not including the fall; they held to the innate depravity of mankind; they traced this universal condition of the race to the sin of the first man, however they may have differed with older thinkers or among themselves in the account given of the relation of the individual to Adam; they were agreed that without atonement there is no forgiveness of sin, and that this necessary atonement had been made by Jesus Christ; they were united in the belief that the Holy Spirit is essential to the conversion and regeneration of man, that till the Spirit's influence descends upon him, man is helpless in the presence of his moral

obligation, that when the divine grace comes it is irresistible, and that its dispensation is ruled not by the forlorn condition of a humanity lying in wickedness, but by the divine decree; and they were unanimous in their conviction that true believers in Jesus Christ will persevere to the end and be saved with an everlasting salvation. Upon this last point great emphasis was placed. It represented the final issue of the aboriginal sovereign decree; it was held with a vigor answering to the certainty of that decree; and hence any hesitation here was regarded as a reflection upon the supreme honor and power. Oliver Cromwell, in his question, Does once a Christian mean always a Christian? represents the seriousness of the entire New England school upon this subject. A certain minister once complained to President Sparks of Harvard that his church was greatly distressed over the perseverance of the saints; to whom President Sparks replied in the modern spirit, but at the same time failing in insight into the Puritan character, "Our trouble here is with the perseverance of the sinners." It is a sign of the distance we have come, that the famous remark of Doctor Williams of Providence upon this subject is cherished as a supreme example of humor in theological debate. It was, however, far enough from this character in the mind of Doctor Williams. Meeting one day a preacher of Arminian opinions and demanding of him a proof-text for the monstrous belief that a soul once converted to God could fall away and be lost forever, and receiving in answer the citation of the parable of the ten virgins who all went forth to meet the bridegroom but of whom five fell away and were lost, the contemptuous rejoinder of Doctor Williams was that any man who believed a doctrine of Scripture on account of what five women said, and five foolish women at that, deserved to go to perdition.

In the presentation of these five points there were among the New England theologians noble rivalries and generous differences; there were, too, marked superiorities and inferiorities in acuteness and vigor, in force and felicity of exposition, in dialectical and apologetic skill; but, with the single exception of Edwards, they rarely went outside the Calvinistic plan, and without exception that plan stood as the final thought upon man's origin, history,

and destiny. Doctor Foster, while sensitive to the personal force of Edwards, is strangely wanting, for a mind of his candor, in appreciation of Edwards's rational strength. In ranking the founder of the school below Taylor and Park, he cannot be said to appreciate the solitary distinction of Edwards. Taylor and Park are, after Edwards, the acutest thinkers in the school; but in compass, in depth, in fertility of rational device, and above all in speculative genius, they are not to be mentioned by the side of Edwards. A full examination of the unpublished writings of Edwards would show a mind of singular openness and of unceasing movement. When a young man he wrote:

I observe that old men seldom have any advantage of new discoveries, because these are beside a way of thinking they are used to. Resolved, if ever I live to years, that I will be impartial to hear the reasons of all pretended discoveries, and receive them, if rational, how long soever I have been used to another way of thinking.

It can be said that this resolve, made in his early manhood, exerted over Edwards a continuous influence, an influence more decided in his later years. In his published writings Edwards occasionally forgets the traditional system and goes forth in the great quest of truth. His essays on the Will, the Nature of Virtue, the End for which God made the World, and the Religious Affections are untrammelled discussions. They are related logically to what in Edwards is deepest and most truly his own, his conception of the absolutely perfect God; and they succeed or fail according to their fidelity or infidelity to that conception. Edwards's size and passion win even for his errors a kind of consecration; while his occasional free movement in the pure vision of truth out beyond the boundaries of tradition marks him as unique in his school.

Still we must return to the simple fact that Calvinism was from first to last the philosophy of man and man's world held and taught by these thinkers. Side issues there were, many and important; large questions of theodicy were often in debate, especially in the case of Bellamy and Hopkins and Taylor; speculation concerning the moral government of God was rife; the consideration of human freedom called into existence, in addition to the great treatise of Edwards, a voluminous literature; the

divine life in man soared away into a wild idealism, as in the Hopkinsian conception of love; now and then these thinkers, and emphatically Edwards and Hopkins, struck notes more akin to the music of Spinoza than to that of John Calvin, and we hear in them answering strains to the lofty one-sidedness of the words, "He that truly loves God must not desire that God should love him in return"; yet, when this is freely admitted, it must be said that after these excursions these New England divines one and all returned to the main outline of the Calvinistic scheme, and settled in it as the final account of their religion.

## II.

That this system of opinion has lost control of the religious mind of the present generation will be universally admitted. There are many teachers of religion with no theology; many with a new, and still more with a crude theology; but nowhere do we find men of modern training and respectable intellect holding the New England theology. Our question then is, How came this system of belief, dominant in our churches for more than one hundred and fifty years, suddenly in the last quarter of the nineteenth century to lose its hold upon thinking minds? What causes brought about its sudden and final collapse?

In any fair account of this collapse, while the chief blame must lie with the system itself, some blame will be seen to attach to the state of the public mind. There has arisen within the Christian Church considerable indifference to speculative thinking. Practical interests have been engrossing, as they should be; but the dependence of living, practical interests upon fundamental ideas and upon clearness on fundamental subjects has not been seen. The mill-round of the mind has been substituted for the sun-path. An indescribable pettiness, a mean kind of retail trade, has largely taken possession of the teachers of religion. The eternal spaces in which, like the planet, the world of practical interest lives and moves and has its being have fallen from the public mind. Hence questions of the origin of sin and its permission in a universe over which God is sovereign, serious thinking upon moral government, the nature of virtue, the character

of disinterested love, the decree of the Most High, and the eternal economy of his being, have not appealed to this generation. To the discredit of the generation be it said.

This age is characterized by a strong aversion to severe thinking. Immediacy has become a habit, perhaps a disease. Its motto is, He that runs may read; and the reader who intends to run as he reads must not choose for his race-course the New England divinity. The New England writers are far from dull; they know how to express themselves with precision and vigor; but they are thinkers, men who deal with ideas, who set ideas in new lights and support their views with definition and argument. They tax the intellect of the reader, and in return for his toil they make him aware of his intelligence—a thing that does not always happen at the present day with books on theological subjects. The discourses of Edwards and Bellamy and Hopkins and Emmons were spoken to New England farmers, their wives, and their sons and daughters; and when they were published they were read largely by the same class of persons. There was in those days eagerness to attack and master a difficult subject, keen interest in matter that in order to be understood had to be read a score of times, enthusiasm for some attainment in rational strength and in argumentative skill. Today, whatever cannot be understood in the twinkling of an eye is generally regarded with aversion. The supreme heresy in thinking is the call to intellectual toil. The kindergarten, while it may be good for children, when it becomes a universal method makes escape from intellectual childhood difficult. If severe thinking were as much admired in the New England of today as it was in the New England of fifty and one hundred years ago, more respect would be felt for the old divines, and their best works would be oftener read.

There is in the public mind the absence of a due sense of the difficulties that inhere in every possible view of the world. Criticism of the New England system has been current for so long that it has gained possession of the thoughtful public. The criticism is largely well founded; but it is apt to lead to utter revolt from the works of these able and honest men. They are blamed for failing to do what no mortal man has yet succeeded in doing, presenting a philosophy of man's world true to all the known facts



and giving complete satisfaction to the reason. In our new thinking we accept at our own hands a philosophy far enough from complete rationality, and we refuse to do the same by the men of the older thinking. It would do our philosophy of religion good to be considered and debated by the New England divines. We might find, perhaps, that all the difficulties and impossibilities are not with the ancient creed, and that some serious mysteries need clearing up at our hands.

While fair-minded men will, I think, admit the truth of this indictment against the public mind of today, the charge must be renewed that the chief causes of collapse must be found in the character of the ancient creed. The New England theology had taken for granted that it was substantially the final theology. While resting in this easy assumption it was, to the amazement and incredulity of its latest masters, suddenly outgrown. It fell from power and passed away because it was outgrown by the religious consciousness whose interpreter and servant it professed to be. On this ground its discharge was inevitable. The full significance of this explanation will become apparent, I hope, through the following observations.

It must never be forgotten that the New England divinity was not in any profound sense an original movement of thought. It was a new version of the system of John Calvin, in whom again, it must be observed, the system was not original. As is well known, the New England theology, while derived from Calvin, dates from Augustine. Thoughts of infinite moment are found in rich profusion in the writings of Augustine; and, next to his ecclesiasticism, the outline of a theological system contained in his works is the least of his services to the Christian intellect and spirit. There are in the profound spiritual and speculative life of Augustine hints toward a philosophy of Christianity other and infinitely nobler than that which he outlined, an implicit philosophy which continues to invest his great spirit with enduring fascination.

Still the outline of dogma made by Augustine has been the basis of the traditional scheme from that day to this. His idea of a race universally depraved, traced to the sin of Adam as its source, has been a ruling idea. His doctrine of salvation on the ground of Christ's atonement by irresistible grace calling into existence

saving faith and securing the perseverance of the believer has been a ruling doctrine. His scheme of deliverance as originating in the decree of God, and as contemplating the redemption of only a part of the fallen and miserable race of man, has been the dominating scheme. From Augustine's day to this the traditional theology has never held the idea of anything other or better than a salvation of the remnant. Therefore notwithstanding the order and vigor imparted to this scheme by John Calvin, and the valid distinctions, fruitful modifications, and noble expansions introduced by Edwards and his successors down to Professor Park, in whom the line terminates, the philosophy of man's life in this world and in the next presented in the New England theology is essentially that of the great Bishop of Hippo.

The New England scheme is thus wanting in fundamental originality. It arises out of no face-to-face contact with the problem of man's existence; it never occurs to it to interrogate the vast and tragic reality at first hand. Man and man's world were not independent and absorbing objects of study to the New England divines; man and his world did not possess their imagination; the knowledge of human beings already in existence did not in them raise the hope of richer knowledge; the scientific spirit, of which Bacon is the great modern prophet, the attitude toward their world of inquiry, concrete and severe methods of study and hope, did not control them; the human reality before them did not win them into an original relation to it, nor fascinate them onward to fresh discoveries, nor so engage them that they could not let it go till they had wrung from it by direct struggle its divine secret. These men were not seers; they beheld no new worlds of ideas rising up out of the mighty order of fact; they found no richer and deeper meanings in man's nature and history, such as would have inevitably suggested a new plan of salvation. They made little use, as will be seen later, of their Master in seeking a principle for the interpretation of the moral character of the universe; like thousands before them, they missed entirely the meaning of their Master's promise concerning the spirit of truth. They assumed that the religious vision of the world was complete as given in the New Testament; they did not grasp the fact that the words of Jesus are spirit and life, that they are an

organism of spirit and life; they never dreamed that Christianity is on its intellectual side the soul of sure search after all truth, the soul of assimilation to its own growing organism of all the special truths in all the different departments of human inquiry and concern, the soul that seizes these threads of discovered being wherever found and that weaves them into the ever-greatening structure of its own faith. Like their predecessors for more than a thousand years these New England divines were without original vision of the divine universe; they were mainly thinkers within traditional lines, expounders, advocates, diffusers of beliefs that had been fixed by ecclesiastical authority. All this is matter of fact. Whether they are to be praised or blamed for this attitude may indeed admit of difference of opinion; concerning the attitude itself there is no room for difference. I repeat that there is no distinct original consciousness of man and man's world in the New England divines; nor is their vision, in the full meaning of the words, deep, comprehensive, free. They all read the tragic reality through the ancient categories. They recall the traditional scheme essentially unaltered, and turn it into a philosophy of the Christian faith for themselves and their people. That such genius for theology as we find in Edwards, Hopkins, N. W. Taylor, and Edwards A. Park should have gone this dreary way is indeed deplorable. There are few greater warnings against the evils of self-commitment to tradition. The suppression of individuality, the settled disregard of inward misgiving and protest, the sacrifice of the ideal of reason and conscience in the service of faith, have seldom presented themselves in more conspicuous examples. Strong enough as these men were to overturn tradition and throw the contents of faith into new moulds, fitted as they were for original vision and interpretation of human existence, they one and all adopted, adapted, and tinkered the ancient scheme, while God's great growing world was speeding forward heedless of their poor categories. That a new version of an ancient and incompetent system, however impressed with the vitality of powerful minds, and however the bewildered masses allowed themselves to be driven to rest in it, could not last in a free world of which it is no true account should seem to reasonable men only natural, and indeed inevitable. Originality in theologi-

cal theory, fundamental constructive originality, there has been none from the age of Augustine to the present generation. Under such circumstances, in a growing world, there is no need of a ghost to tell us that there is something rotten in our theological Denmark.

It may be contended that there is one fairly original element in New England theology, its theodicy. Several of the greater masters of the school were deeply concerned with the fact of moral evil, and its existence in a world over which the righteous God is sovereign. Here the discussion turned upon two subjects, one the divine perfections, the other the freedom of man. Doctor Foster says, "New England theology to the end sacrificed the doctrine of freedom to that of the divine perfections." This is true, but it is not the whole truth. The New England theologians failed both in their conception of the divine perfection and in their idea of human freedom. Here, for example, is one of the multitude of utterances in Edwards concerning God. He had been speaking with his father about his religious experiences :

And when the discourse ended I walked abroad alone, in a solitary place in my father's pasture, for contemplation. And as I was walking there, and looking up on the sky and clouds, there came into my mind so sweet a sense of the glorious majesty and grace of God that I know not how to express. After this . . . the appearance of everything was altered; there seemed to be as it were, a calm, sweet cast, or appearance of divine glory in almost everything. God's excellency, his wisdom, his purity and love seemed to appear in everything; in the sun and moon and stars; in the clouds and the blue sky; in the grass, flowers, trees; in the water and all nature. I often used to sit and view the moon for continuance; and in the day spent much time in viewing the clouds and sky to behold the sweet glory of God in these things; in the meantime, singing forth with a low voice, my contemplations of the Creator and Redeemer.

In this poetic way Edwards sets forth in his early manhood his conception of God—a conception that grew upon him to the end, and that drew into itself his whole being and all its interests. Here is the point at which the modern mind arraigns Edwards. His vision is of a God absolute in love, and yet that vision in no fundamental sense rules the evolution of his thought. The con-

clusion to which Edwards comes concerning man's world is an appalling contradiction of the original vision and premise. This contradiction would not have been possible if Edwards had conceived the divine perfection in the spirit of his Master Christ. In Edwards's idea of perfection, and in that of his successors, there inheres a fatal defect. This idea of perfection is not what we mean when we apply it to the best of men and then add thereto infinity. In the bulk to which the idea is raised, an immense subtle evil has crept in. Something may be good in God that evil is in me; this is the hidden germ of unhallowed issue in the vast and imposing conception. So much for the New England theology and the divine perfections.

The idea of human freedom entertained by the masters of this school is formal and even superficial. Had they taken Augustine's position here, and held with him that the good will is alone free; had they seen that it is the inevitable tendency of the divine perfection and every other form of moral power to lead the will from bondage to freedom, they might have done permanent service to theology by their theodicy. As it stands, their discussion both of the divine perfection and of human freedom is without substantial originality.

Edwards did not care primarily for the freedom of man; he cared for it because of its relation to the sovereignty of God. Only such freedom could he see as would not conflict with the divine sovereignty. His idea of freedom is simply the unhindered expression of fixed habit either good or bad. There is surely little originality here. Deeper than the power of habit he did not go; nor did he at any time divine the existence in man of a rational order that might overturn worlds of evil habit. Plato had taught that right education consists in taking pleasure, under the rule of fixed habit, in the proper objects of pleasure. Deeper than this Edwards does not go; his discussion does not go behind the pleasures, good or bad, in which men take a habitual interest.

Nathaniel W. Taylor fixed attention upon the power to the contrary in the will. So far, so good; such power is doubtless there; but Taylor has done nothing to make it evident, nothing to show its worth, supposing it to exist. Taylor cares no more for human freedom than does Edwards. He argues in favor

of freedom that he may save man's responsibility, and thus clear God of accountability for the introduction and continuance of sin in the world. Taylor's freedom is formal, and exists mainly for apologetic purposes. Into the real freedom of man, or the point of contact between man's capacity for real freedom and the Divine perfection that works for man's freedom, Taylor had little insight. He was an able and an honest man; at the same time he was under the spell of abstractions. A power to the contrary which in the entire history of man has never been exercised is something to which only the consciousness of an apologist can bear witness. It is no true account of man's spirit, it is an abstraction, a dream. The freedom of man is no such miserable abstraction and dialectical device, it is life concurrent with the truth of things; and the relation of the spirit of truth to a will in error is in such a display of the persuasions of truth that the reasonable soul shall be eventually won by them from bondage to the liberty of the sons of God. Freedom is not the mere possibility to go either of two ways at the fork of which a man may stand. Such an idea of freedom is trivial. Freedom is insight into the true order of existence, susceptibility to that insight, obedience to it, and harmonious existence under it. If one is without that insight, one has capacity for it, and the Divine perfection is the assurance that it will be ultimately won.

The relation of Professor Park, one of the acutest masters of the school, to the question of freedom is interesting. Park maintains that the will always is as the greatest apparent good. If this is the case, one of two conclusions follows: If this apparent good is unreal, God is alone responsible for this condition of the individual will; if the apparent good is real good, the individual will is good, and again God is the efficient cause. But how are we to make the transfer from apparent good to essential good? Obviously there is but one answer; it all depends upon the behavior of the Most High. That a mind as alert and acute as that of Park should have been brought to such a pass is indeed strange. It could not have happened if the thinker in question had been profoundly concerned with the free life of man. In that case no one would have been keener in the observation that man's rational nature contains the provision, under the illumina-

tion of experience, of escape from the field of illusion into the world of true eternal good. This rational nature, under the illumination of experience, finds no adequate recognition in the thought of the New England divines; and therefore, here in the sphere of their special activity no less than in their general scheme, their work has passed from power because it was wanting both in originality and in depth.

This ancient theology had in it from the first, and preserved untouched to the end, a fatal contradiction. According to this scheme the world was made by God, and yet the world in its misfortune and misery was condemned by God as if it had made itself. When any good was found in the world, it was at once argued that it was due to God and his sovereign decree; when moral evil and misery and death were discovered in the world, it was argued that they were due to man and his abuse of his freedom. If the divine decree did not include the fall of man, then the world broke from the divine control and remained largely triumphant against God; if the divine decree did include the fall and all the events in human history, then men were obliged to read the character of God from that history. Universal predestination and partial redemption either eventually wreck the scheme in which they meet or they work a woe infinitely deeper, they wreck confidence in the moral character of God. Nothing in the high and serious thinking of men is more melancholy than the perpetual see-saw between the universal decree of God and the universal depravity of man for which the human will is held accountable; between the racial need of redemption and the partial response of God in the gift of grace; between this partial bestowment of the Holy Spirit and the universality of the atonement as held by the New England divines; between the sovereignty of the God of love and the eternal damnation of a vast portion of mankind. In view of this interior inconsistency, both intellectual and moral, the wonder is not that the scheme eventually collapsed, but that it endured so long. In a fair field and no favor, in open and free discussion, it would have gone to the wall centuries ago. Authority, sentiment, despair in the presence of the task of finding a better philosophy, fear lest precious things should be exposed to peril if reason took a bolder range,

and the conservative instinct in man, doubtless combined to protect and perpetuate this crude scheme; still, to authority, to the absence of full freedom in the Christian Church, this creed is chiefly indebted for its thousand years of gloom.

It must be said that in much of its thinking the New England theology was artificial. By this I do not mean that it so appeared to these thinkers, but simply that their method led them away from human life. Few things are more dreary than the New England discussions on the atonement. Till Bushnell arrives upon the scene—and he is not in the New England circle, he is the prophet of another order of ideas—the atonement in all the phases of its presentation was as nearly destitute of ethical value as anything could well be. The moral governor of the world, under whose government sin came into the world, could not forgive it until a life of infinite worth had been offered as a satisfaction to the majesty of violated law. This was the central proposition round which the dreary and dead debate proceeded. A moral God played only a nominal part in the scheme, a Father in Heaven had no part in it, the spiritual nature of the soul was ignored by it, and it never even got a glimpse into the law of the spirit of life in Christ Jesus. Of no other section of New England divinity can one say without some qualification that it is a simple rubbish heap of dead opinions. Anything can be taught in a divinity school by heroic scholars, and anything can be studied and understood in part by persistent students; but ideas there are that cannot be preached with any degree of interest where men are ethically sound and mentally sane. The record of the ways and means whereby able and good but misguided men tried to force successive generations of believers into emotional states answering to the requirements of the governmental theory of the atonement is a record of the rankest kind of unreality. It is not to the point to say, what indeed is true, that there are worse forms of the doctrine of the atonement than the governmental. The contention is that here is one reason for the passing of the system from living interest. At a point of infinite depth, the relation of the human soul in sin to the Eternal Goodness, it had thoughts only legal, forensic, mechanical.

Indeed, it may be said that every historic phase of the atone-



ment except the moral phase reveals uncured the malady of the human mind to which Jesus spoke his healing gospel. That malady is the issue of a false conception of the character of God. The sacrificial systems of the world were built upon the idea that the divine power must be placated if sinful man would be forgiven. Propitiation is at the heart of them all; and so deep into the mind of the most enlightened races has this hideous distortion of the character of the Eternal Father gone that the gospel of Christ perfected in his death as the servant of truth and love, and attested thereby, would probably have failed of gaining a governing influence over those to whom it was addressed had it not been translated by the apostles into the sacrificial language of the people of Israel. The soundness of this remark is confirmed by the purpose and method of the author of the Epistle to the Hebrews. That great writer discovers the pure spirituality of the gospel of Christ, its transcendence of the old sacrificial system of Israel; and yet in order to be understood in this endeavor he is compelled to translate this transcendent and spiritual faith into the language of priest, altar, and sacrifice. Thus deep was the mental malady in the apostolic age. And here we see clearly how that which is central and most precious in the gospel of Jesus, his idea of the eternal fatherly love of God, was endangered by this translation into the unclean idiom of the world. For the historic forms of the atonement are a chapter in religious pathology; they have a great and a pathetic human interest. They discover abysmal depths in man; they disclose the vastness and wildness of man's world. At the same time they contribute nothing toward the positive showing of the way in which the soul escapes from its sin. They build upon the old notion which Jesus came to displace. In their successive forms they perpetuate the idea that God is essentially unfriendly to poor, erring mortals, that he requires to be appeased by some offering, propitiated by some costly sacrifice, or satisfied in some public relation of his character, before he can lift into hope a penitent child. From the point of view of the conception of God as Father, the group of ideas perpetuated in all phases of the atonement except the moral phase are the worst blasphemy ever offered to the Most High. They come from religion as conceived and

operated by the priesthood of the world; they are contradicted and set at naught by religion as conceived and presented by the greater prophets of the race, and supremely by the supreme prophet, Jesus of Nazareth. His parable of the Lost Son is his version of his own heart; his version, too, of the heart of God. The idea that heals the malady of the human mind is the idea of God in the teaching and life and death of Jesus. In this recurrence upon the supreme idea of Christian faith the New England divines do not count. They did nothing, at this momentous point, to deliver man from his blasphemy against God; unwittingly they did much to confirm him in unworthy thoughts of the eternal lover of men. The free world of today has no thanks for them here; in strict truth they deserve none.

One of the ablest treatises in the New England divinity is Doctor N. W. Taylor's book, *The Moral Government of God*. President Porter informs us that "the Moral Government of God was the great thought of Doctor Taylor's intellect." "It occupied his mind more than any and every other subject." I read this treatise while a student in the seminary more than thirty years ago, and I was then greatly impressed with its power. I have been reading it again, and I still recognize the ability shown in it. The plan of the work is large, the discussion is thorough and coherent, the order reminds one of the successive deductions in the ethics of Spinoza, the clearness, energy, and precision of statement are beyond question. But, when all this has been said, it must be added that the work is essentially artificial. It is a discussion largely in the air, away from the great realities and forces of human life; it is abstract, dialectical, going mainly in the strength of presuppositions, wanting in concreteness, wholly wanting in the scientific spirit. It is divided into three sections: first, the Moral Government of God in the Abstract; second, the Moral Government of God in Nature; third, the Moral Government of God in the Scriptures. The analogy upon which the work is constructed is civil government. For Doctor Taylor God was a sovereign ruler after the pattern of civil rulers upon earth. This was the thought that chiefly occupied his intellect; and the idea which is basal in Christianity, and the heart and soul of its message, the idea of the Eternal Father, had no perceptible

influence upon this thinker in his chief contribution to the theological thought of his time. If New England divinity, in the hands of one of its greatest representatives, could be so much in the air, so far away from man's moral world, so unaware of the supreme conception of the gospel of Jesus Christ, it should not seem strange that among weaker men it became still more unreal.

One of the great merits claimed for the New England divinity was its distinction between natural and moral ability. All men had the natural ability to repent of their sins and perfectly to keep the law of God; all men were without the moral ability, that is the willingness, to repent of their sins and to meet their perfect obligation to the law of God. There is perhaps some merit in the distinction. There is an impulse, often enough unliberated, in the rational nature of the soul, a reserve of energy in the form of capacity below the structure of evil habit, to which the Christian appeal may sink. If looked at in this way, the distinction may be considered valid. The whole capacity of the soul is not expressed in the current bad character. There is a capacity beneath the actual evil character, to which the sovereign moral appeal may come; a capacity which, when spoken to with might, may become a blazing power in which the evil character is consumed. But this was not the way in which the New England divines were in the habit of regarding the distinction. It was mainly an apologetic device in aid of the theologian when he was hard pressed in other parts of his system. Why should God involve the whole race with Adam, and thus necessitate a first choice that was evil and an endless succession of choices all bad? The reply was, there was no necessity in the case; man had the natural power not to sin, the natural ability perfectly to meet the demands of moral law. Why should God elect only a portion of this fallen race to salvation, and thus exclude the rest? The reply was that God does not exclude the rest; they have the power to repent of their sins, to believe on Jesus Christ, to cast themselves upon God for salvation and be saved. But no man comes to God unless he is under the influence of the Holy Spirit, and why should the non-elect be left beyond the pale of the Spirit's influence? The reply is that they are without excuse in not coming to God without

the special aid of the Spirit, seeing they have the full natural ability to come. Thus ran the wretched riot of dialectical unreality. Professor Park, when he came in the course of his famous lectures to the discussion of natural ability and moral inability, was in the habit of remarking to his class with grim humor,

Ye who have tears to shed,  
Prepare to shed them now.

The memory of that wild wilderness in which was no living thing, not even scorpions or flying plagues, a wilderness predestined never to rejoice or blossom as the rose, is indeed a memory of the dire distress of the Christian Church in New England.

Another conspicuous defect of the New England divinity was its restricted use of human reason. With all its confidence in reason and its bold rationalism in certain fields of inquiry, it set fixed bounds to the operation of free thought, saying, Here shall thy proud waves be stayed. It inherited the unholy distinction between natural and revealed religion; it gave free scope to the human mind only in the sphere of natural religion. The Bible, as the record of revealed religion, was indeed the subject of scholarship, historical, textual, interpretative; but when the history was clear, the text settled, and the interpretation fixed, the function of reason was at an end. The result must be accepted, whether it was the story in the Book of Exodus about God's hardening Pharaoh's heart that he might destroy him, or the account in the Gospels of Christ's surrender of life for the good of the world. Theology became a construction of texts from all parts of the Hebrew and Christian Scriptures. The leading doctrines—predestination, election, depravity, propitiation, forensic justification, the limitation of moral opportunity to this life, the everlasting punishment of the wicked and the heavenly life of believers—were found in texts in all the books of the Bible, which were accorded equal value wherever found. If the moral sense revolted at the result as set forth in Emmons's sermon on Reprobation, or the doctrine of election advocated as baldly by N. W. Taylor as by any of the school, so much the worse for the moral sense. Here is Scripture properly interpreted, and here is the result; accept or reject it, there it stands, and from its finality there is

no appeal. A theology constructed in this way built into itself the soul of revolt, the sure prophecy of its own ultimate destruction. There can be no forced results of an abiding character in the sphere of thought. Coercion is something to which the human intellect cannot permanently surrender. Authority itself is bound to become the subject of arrest, trial, and judgment. While that day is deferred, the Bible stands outside the process of the critical intellect, and from its vast compass the system of traditional dogma may be established. But the thing established on authority can last only while the authority lasts; when the authority decays, the superstructure of dogma falls to the ground.

As we look back from our own free world, this restriction of reason to a particular field, this exclusion of it from the field of profoundest moment, seems very strange. Why did these men fail to learn from the process of the Holy Spirit in their own souls? Why did they not see that life is the parent of literature, that wherever God is in the life of men, in their thoughts, feelings, purposes, and achievements, he will necessarily be in their words? In what way did it escape them that man is most of an agent, most of a creative power, when most under the influence of the Spirit of God, and that wherever words carry the burden of the Lord they carry that burden on the active humanity of men? How came it to pass that these acute thinkers did not discern the origin of the monumental parts of the Bible in the human life that God had filled with his eternal presence? Had they faced such questions, the Bible would have opened to them a new and a momentous expanse of human experience, the supreme opportunity for the achieving reason of man.

There is only one answer to these questions. These men conceived of the Bible as chiefly a book of mysteries; the doctrines of revealed religion were at heart mysteries, and the best work of the human intellect was done when the super-intelligible character of the doctrine was exhibited. These doctrines were for faith and not for reason; they were for faith not as all unverified ideas are for faith, but for faith as passing all understanding. The New England divinity was, therefore, in no adequate sense an expression of the free mind; it was not the result of the unrestricted use of reason. It was a compound of

reason and tradition, the mixed issue of freedom and authority. It is not edifying to see Edwards in the full movement of speculation suddenly pause, begin a new section of his essay, and lug into his argument proof-texts from every corner of the Bible to cover the incompleteness of his rational procedure. He who had such high confidence in reason, so wide a vision of its field, and who exercised his own great gift of insight and argument with such fearless vigor, yet never dreamed that the Bible itself is the supreme product of human reason and the supreme field for the exercise of the reason in the service of the spirit. The isolation of the human from the divine by all these thinkers except Emmons was perhaps the source of this limitation, the putting asunder of what God has forever joined. Whatever the cause may have been, the view that finds in the Bible the sovereign expression of reason and the field for the exercise of reason of greatest moment was hidden from Edwards and all his successors; they never gained the least insight into the nature of the revelation recorded in the Bible. That revelation was to them a process singular, unique, different not only in degree but in kind from the life of holy souls among other nations and among themselves, isolated, super-intelligible; an oracle whose message must be accepted even against the protest of the reason and the conscience.

These criticisms apply equally, it need hardly be said, to traditional theology in its entire course. The attitude of indiscriminating reverence toward the Bible was on the part of the New England divines the inheritance of faith. They were in bondage to a book; and while it is the supreme Book to which they were in bondage, the fact that here, in this greatest sphere of the free intellect, they had no dream of the function of the intellect, is another reason why their dominion has passed away. In ideal, in method, and in result they are superseded. Their ideal of the sphere of reason was a meagre and restricted ideal; their method was without scientific temper and sureness; their results were the uncritical compound of error and truth, of essential and valueless, that one might expect. And if these words seem severe, let it be remembered that the holy cause of sound thinking in the interest of religion, especially in the interest of

the Christian religion, has suffered too long from timidity in the presence of great names.

It must be still further observed that, except in a single direction, the New England divinity refused to learn from its adversaries. It did indeed put itself in battle array. It became keenly alert to strategic positions both for offence and defence. Under attack it assumed a more compact and formidable dialectical shape. Comparison between the form which the New England divinity assumed in the hands of Edwards and his immediate successors and that in which it was presented by N. W. Taylor and Edwards A. Park shows that the system in the hands of these later masters gained greatly in dialectical strength. Indeed, Park spent too much of his force here. He had the gift of the dialectician in unsurpassed power. No man in our American world now living will bear comparison with him here. He developed the logical function to the highest point of efficiency; and till they sat under the teaching of Park, students did not know how fascinating the logician could be. Doctor Foster is undoubtedly right in saying that this thinker did the best that could be done with the materials given him.

But if strong opponents thus pressed the New England divinity into better dialectical form in the hands of its later masters, these masters refused to learn materially from their adversaries. Arminianism was deeply concerned with the freedom of the will, and with the reality of man's responsibility for his deeds. New England Calvinism met this deep moral concern with ill-concealed logical contempt, with the ghostly distinction between natural ability and moral ability, and with the poor verbalism of the power of choice to the contrary, which, apart from electing grace, in the entire history of mankind had never once been exercised. New England Calvinism under pressure of the moral soundness and passion of Arminianism never once faced, in scientific temper, the question of human freedom; it continued to treat this burning issue dialectically; it therefore refused to learn from an adversary less powerful than itself in intellect, but upon the question in debate morally deeper and truer far to the consciousness of normal men.

Equally persistent was the refusal to learn from Unitarian-

ism. Unitarianism was regarded as the supreme form of heresy. Unitarianism so wounded devout feeling for Jesus Christ, so struck at what it regarded here as superstition, appeared so indifferent to that which the New England divines conceived to be the essence of the Christian faith, that they are not without excuse in their attitude of exclusion. But while they are not without excuse, they are without justification. They failed in the presence of an immense opportunity. For it has become obvious to competent judges in all denominations that Unitarianism in the hands of Channing and his successors rediscovered the Christian doctrine of man. This is a service for which immortal thanks are due; and, as is generally the way in cases of this kind, the thanks are expressed by silent appropriation on the part of all enlightened religious bodies of the idea thus rediscovered, not only with no recognition, but with even aversion, for the rediscoverers. To be sure, the Unitarians were quick to follow with a similar device. They took over into their body of thought without acknowledgment and without reasoned insight the heart of Trinitarian theology; they put into God the Father the content of character and pity found in the Second Person of the Trinitarian faith; they gave what they had taken a new name and nothing more. Our business here, however, is not with the weakness but with the strength of Unitarianism in relation to the exclusiveness of the New England divinity. In the face of the self-evident and glorious humanism of Jesus revived by the Unitarian movement, the masters of the traditional divinity presented on the whole a closed mind. In no perceptible degree did it influence their doctrine of man. He still continued from birth to conversion and adoption a lost soul and no child of God. Here the failure of the New England divines meant disaster to their cause. They lost the chance to appropriate the Christian doctrine of man, to affirm two incarnations, one in all men because they are children of God, the other in Jesus Christ as the supreme Son of God; one universal, and the other ideal, in the light of which the universal is to be understood. They lost the chance to renew in a deeper and surer way their doctrine of Christ and their doctrine of God through the new doctrine of man. This, I take it, is one of the greater mistakes of the tra-



ditional divinity. It never did see the value of man; it could not take in that value when brought to its attention by its Unitarian adversaries; it did not dream of the fruitfulness for christology and theology of a new consciousness of the worth of man. It was essentially, if the paradox may be pardoned, an inhuman humanism; it went to the wall finally because untrue to the teaching of Jesus concerning man and God. Properly understood, Unitarianism is the complement of Trinitarianism no less than its rival; that is, if the Trinitarian belief in a social God is to live, it must be matched with the Unitarian faith in a social humanity. Further, there must be between the two sets of beliefs action and reaction if they are to come to their full development. If with the Trinitarian we say God is Father, with the Unitarian we must say man is the inalienable child of God; if with the Trinitarian we claim that there is a special, ideal incarnation of God in Jesus Christ answering to his vocation in the history of religion in the earth, we must contend with the Unitarian that there is a universal incarnation in mankind in virtue of which man is man with the impulse of the Eternal in his heart. In failing to see in the positive message of Unitarianism the complement to what was highest in their own faith and the correction of its malady of errors about man, the masters of the New England theology made a supreme mistake.

Universalism was the third stout antagonist of the New England divinity. It met with the exclusiveness which had been meted out to Unitarianism. Besides, a special scorn fell upon it because of its deficiency in scholarship and in intellectual power. There was, it must be admitted, some excuse for this attitude toward the new doctrine. In its early and popular forms Universalism was more concerned in getting all men to heaven than in getting them into a fit condition to enjoy heaven when they arrived there. Nothing could be more shocking to the majestic moral sense of the Puritan than popular Universalism's easy ideas about sin, its shallowness upon every question of conscience, its conversion of the most worthy Judge Eternal into an infinite, indiscriminating sentimentalist. From the first Universalism was a great interest, but for many years it was an interest poorly served. It came as a protest against an inhuman view of God; it was not

accompanied by a deep concern about personal righteousness. It spent too much of its force in denunciation of the orthodox God, and not enough upon the character of the universalist man. It did not go deep enough to see that man has but one interest, and that is righteousness. If it had seen this and seen it whole, it could have repeated with tremendous power the words of Socrates, "There is no evil can happen to a good man, whether he be alive or dead," and the kindred words of Paul, "All things work together for good to them that love God." If Universalism's doctrine of the future had risen up out of the heart of its passion to make man righteous, its power would have been greater far. As it stood, it did not call for strenuous moral manhood.

This was an unutterable offence to the masters of the New England theology. This unfortunate circumstance concealed from them the real question raised by Universalism—the moral character of God. If they had been wise, they would have taken Whittier's "Eternal Goodness" as the form of the doctrine profitable for study; if they had been prophetic, they would have seen how the admission into their theodicy of the main contention of Universalism, the love of God for every soul that he has made and his everlasting purpose to pursue with his redeeming grace all souls in all worlds, would have given it new range, reality, life, and worth. For here again the heresy was the complement of the orthodoxy. The only original element in the New England divinity was its theodicy; that theodicy with the insight of Universalism left out was meagre and hopeless; with this insight included as a principle of revision and extension, the theodicy would have been living and potent today. For Universalism has brought forward the larger view; and the larger view has proved to be the worthier view. No interest of morality is endangered by the faith that the Infinite works, and works eternally, for the perfect righteousness of every human soul. It will be seen, I think, that the moral hope of the race is grounded upon this faith.

This inhospitality of the New England divinity toward new and reconstructive ideas, together with the other defects noted—its traditionalism, its inclusion of fatal contradiction in its own heart, its artificial mode of thought, and its restricted use of reason—kept the system stationary in a swiftly growing world. It fell

from power because it was found beneath the best religious consciousness of the time. It was found to be outgrown in two fundamental ways; it was outgrown in knowledge and in ethical conceptions. A brief statement of fact is sufficient to show that it was outgrown in knowledge. It knew nothing of the application of the methods of free historical inquiry to the Bible. It never took the position of the scientific historian regarding the rise and character of Biblical ideas. Of the Bible as it emerges from the study of the just and devout scientific scholar, the New England divinity was simply ignorant. Its view of the Hebrew and Christian Scriptures was outgrown. In regard to the natural history of man it was overtaken by the same fate. The theory that runs the many different forms of existence in the world today back to a common primitive vitality, that traces the wide-branching tree of life downward to one original root, they refused seriously to entertain. Adam was for them the head of the race, behind which they did not care to go. To the last, in spite of the new vista introduced by evolution, the New England divines continued to build their doctrine of man upon a Hebrew myth. These men, with all their acuteness and power, were essentially provincial in their outlook upon the world. In general they knew next to nothing of the world of fruitful ideas in the philosophy of the Greeks and Germans; nor did they know deeply the best things in French and English philosophy. When compared with the greater systems of thought, their system was a poor and meagre formalism. The riches of the intellectual life of the world lay largely outside their scheme. In general, of this world of wealth these men were unaware. In the few instances, like that of Henry B. Smith, where knowledge was ample, it meant nothing for the system of theology. Nor was there anywhere large knowledge of the great religions of the race outside of Christianity, nor the least sign of a scientific temper toward them. Among the New England divines there is no such book as that of Maurice on the *Religions of the World*. In consequence of this limitation of outlook to their own religion, they were unable to disengage in it the eternal from the temporal. They were almost as much concerned about miracles as they were about the life of God in the Christian soul. They never rose to the

position from which the scholar sees that, while miracles are the concomitants of all the religions, they are essential to none; that religion is essentially the life of God in man, and where God's life as infinite love is purest and richest, as in Jesus Christ, there religion exists in its supreme form and power.

That the later New England divines should have allowed themselves to be outgrown in knowledge is a surprise; that they should have allowed themselves to be outgrown in ethical ideas in something of a reproach. Such is the fact. Edwards's vision of God, that upon which his rapt soul fed, that in whose strength he lived his great life, is destitute of reconstructive influence upon the Calvinism which he adopts and defends. The system of Edwards as a philosophy of man's world, upon the assumption that God exists and that he is absolutely good, is morally incredible. It is beneath the moral consciousness of the average respectable person in any civilized community. Hopkins's ideal of a disinterested soul is great, and of enduring and pathetic value, yet it in no way enabled him to read the character of the Eternal in terms consonant with an enlightened conscience. The doctrines of the fall, ensuing universal depravity, and obligation to obedience where only the ghost of power was conceded to exist in natural ability, limited election, limited bestowment of saving grace, and eternal punishment for all who were found impenitent at death, are as a whole a body of teaching entirely outgrown by enlightened men. It would indeed be the supreme miracle, the contradiction of the solemn order and best hope of mankind, if a system thus found to lie far below the moral consciousness of enlightened persons should still maintain its ascendancy over them. The New England divinity fell from its ancient throne because it was found inadequate in knowledge and inferior in moral ideas. Its greatest oversight I reserve for remark later, its failure to read the character of the universe by the sovereign fact in its faith, the character of Jesus Christ.

### III.

It is high time to change the tenor of remark, since this discussion is not wholly a diagnosis of the causes of death, nor altogether an obituary of the New England theology. It is high

time to call attention to the surviving worth in it, to the eternal soul that we recognize all the more clearly that the old formalism in which it lived has passed away. This precious survival is both subjective and objective, a tradition of great men devoted to the supreme human interest, and a cluster of shining and imperishable ideas.

When the general growth of the community in knowledge has rendered obsolete a previous system of thought, it is the easiest thing in the world, and one of the cheapest, to underestimate the intellectual power of the masters of that system. From this sort of ruthless inhumanity fair-minded men recoil. Progress calls for the conservation of every kind of noble power, and among the noblest kinds of power is the authentic tradition of great minds, enthusiastically devoted to the discovery and the defence of the ultimate meaning of man's world. The person who can read the greater treatises of Edwards without perceiving that he is in contact with an extraordinary intellect is not to be envied. Edwards impresses the honest and competent student as a mind of uncommon acuteness, massiveness, and depth. He is amazing in the fertility and force of his argumentative power. He approaches the character of the Platonic philosopher as a "spectator of all time and all existence." Under idioms of belief and speech that are outgrown, it is easy to recognize speculative genius of a high order, and pervading the speculation the passion of a great religious genius. The image of this great thinker on the banks of the Connecticut or among the Berkshire hills is an abiding consolation to all serious students of man's great and tragic world. And the higher the student rises in intellectual power and in moral passion, the more massive and beautiful in his imagination will the great figure of Edwards loom.

Few preachers are so highly trained as to be incapable of learning anything concerning the prophetic function from the works of Joseph Bellamy. He was a Connecticut pastor, in many ways isolated from the great world of learning; yet in his isolation he annexed the fortunes of the race to his parish, and fixed in it a large vision of the universe. This man's ministry was not concerned with the organization of clubs nor with serving tables. It was free from the pettiness that is the curse of the ministry

in our time. It was occupied with the dispensation of the Eternal, and made its power felt in every parish and in every academic centre in New England. It knew, too, the art of sound reasoning and clear, effective speech. It remains a tradition of intellectual and moral power fitted to aid materially today in recalling preachers to the exalted possibilities of their vocation.

Of Samuel Hopkins, Dr. Channing writes:

He was an illustration of the power of our spiritual nature. In narrow circumstances, with few outward indulgences, in great seclusion, he yet found much to enjoy. He lived in a world of thought, above all earthly passions.

It is not strange that out of such a soul should have come the loftiest piece of moral idealism in the literature of our country. His essay on the Nature of True Holiness is indeed a kind of classic upon the life of the spirit and the height to which a great soul may soar. Here was a mind that had found the supreme secret of existence; that had found it in the world of love and service, girt about with privation of every kind and pitiless misunderstandings. Channing further relates of this master:

I preached for him once, and after the service in the pulpit he smiled on me, and said, "The hat is not made yet." On my asking an explanation he told me that Dr. Bellamy used to speak of theology as a progressive science, and compared the different stages of it to the successive processes of making a hat. The beaver was to be born, then to be killed, and then the felt to be made, etc. Having thus explained the similitude, he added, "The hat is not made, and I hope you will help to finish it."

The devout wish was fulfilled in Channing, and still it is true that "the hat is not made." This sense of the incompleteness of the work of his hands, of the work of his generation, is indispensable to the thinker in every science; it is indispensable to the thinker in the science of theology, and it is the precious inheritance from the New England divines.

Nathanael Emmons is a unique figure in the history of the New England divinity. He was a master in the construction of great sermons, many volumes of which were published and for two generations had an extensive circulation. He was a thinker, acute, fearless, formidable; a teacher of theology who

trained and sent into the ministry more than one hundred preachers; a theist whose vision of God carried him at times into pure pantheism; a splendid patriot and a great man, whose more than ninety-five years of existence in this world is a tradition of many-sided power, of power, too, in a country minister, difficult to match, and still more difficult to surpass, in the history of any community. For the daring mind of today Emmons has a peculiar fascination. His sermons on Divine and Human Agency recall Spinoza. His terrible sermon on Reprobation discovers the impossible side of every system of pantheism. In this and in other sermons of a like nature Emmons will tolerate no disguises. He is absolutely frank and fearless. It was indeed a great community that could accord complete freedom to the man who thus turned New England Calvinism into pantheism. Here is an example of Emmons's manner:

Since the Scriptures ascribe all the actions of men to God as well as to themselves, we may justly conclude that the divine agency is as much concerned in their bad as in their good actions. Men are no more capable of acting independently in the one instance than the other. It is God who worketh in men, both to will and to do in all cases without exception. He wrought equally in the minds of those who sold and in the minds of those who bought Joseph. He wrought as effectually in the minds of Joseph's brethren, when they sold him, as when they repented and besought his mercy. He not only prepared these persons to act, but made them act.

This man had the courage of his convictions, and from him we learn that freedom in New England Congregationalism did not begin yesterday.

Nathaniel W. Taylor has come in for his full share of criticism in this discussion, nor am I able to agree with Doctor Foster in his estimate of the importance of this thinker. It would, however, be a manifest injustice to refuse to recognize his eminence. It is hardly possible to read his work on *The Moral Government of God* without admiration for his penetration, his method of exposition, his logical alertness and skill. Once more we have in Taylor the example of an eminent mind lifted into great efficiency through severe and continued discipline. Such intellects shed upon ordinary minds something of their own grandeur; and their

steadfast diligence, their unslackening and arduous toil in the service of their cause, is a tradition that wise men will not willingly let die.

In Edwards A. Park, whom the writer knew, the most striking characteristic was the native force of his intellect and the degree of brilliant efficiency to which it had been raised by prolonged and consummate discipline. For skill and power in deductive argument Professor Park has never been surpassed by any thinker in our history. If the stuff in which he dealt had been as good as the manner in which he handled it, Park would have been irresistible. His weakness was that of his school, material weakness; in formal skill, finish, and power he stood at the head of his school. It is indeed to be regretted that the memory of such gifts for logical discussion as those possessed by Professor Park, gifts that resembled immense logical instincts raised by long and energetic practice into marvellous efficiency, should become dim. Park's excellence here was a kind of object-lesson in the intellectual world. Through this excellence he became the greatest teacher upon serious subjects that the country has ever known; and the tradition of this keen, accomplished, and powerful mind is too valuable to be permitted without protest to pass into oblivion. In the dauntless intellectual bearing and militant power of the entire New England school there is much to interest and instruct the teacher and preacher of Christianity today. In respect of intellectual magnitude and discipline, we may well say,

We are scarce our fathers' shadows cast at noon.

There is an objective survival in the New England system that as a system has perished. Certain abiding principles are concealed in the passing forms like wheat in the chaff. Criticism here is a process not of extinction but of winnowing. This process leads to a clearer possession of the substance of faith that has been in the Christian Church from early days, and that will remain in it so long as it shall have a gospel to offer to mankind. Sovereignty, sin, judgment, redemption, and the everlasting worth of the human soul, under fresh interpretation and with richer content, are to emerge from the critical process as the new five points of faith. While men believe in the infinite Mind, while



they believe that the infinite Mind is almighty Love, they must continue to believe in the sovereignty of God. Something must be sovereign in this universe. Is it blind fate or intelligence; brute power, aimless, unconscious, or spirit? These are the alternatives, and while faith is sane she cannot hesitate in the choice of her ultimate principle. To be assured that the final sovereignty in this universe is the sovereignty of character, righteous and competent, would be the infinite consolation, to be able to believe in this sovereignty must continue to be the supreme privilege, of Christian faith.

Against the moral idealism of the world there stands forth the tremendous fact of sin. Whether traced to Adam or to a pre-human ancestor in no way alters the fact. The ape of evolution brings into human history the same problem brought by the Adam of the traditional theology. The cry of man in his moral pain is still, Who shall deliver me from the body of this death? The intellect in the service of the conscience still presents its vision of the good; the intellect in the service of the animal still presents its vision of apparent good; and between these visions of good essential and good apparent the soul of man is still in distress. In this sense the race of man is still sold under sin. Moral ignorance, perversity, misery, continue to be the deepest and darkest woes in human history. The only adequate name for man's world is tragedy. The theology that would save itself from shallowness and contempt must renew its vision of sin. Old definitions may be inadequate, old derivations may be antiquated, ancient treatises on original sin may have become mere black mythologies; still, between the soul and the eternal good stand the terrible forms of human ignorance, perversity, weakness, and woe. Into this tragic world of man ancient thinkers looked with profound vision; that vision must be renewed by the thinkers of this modern time who would know what man is, and what he needs in order that he may become what it is in him to be.

The judgment of the eternal God is essential to a living and militant faith. All kinds of behavior cannot be equally pleasing to God if he is a being of moral discrimination, nor can any soul fall outside the circle of his judgment if every soul is of infinite

consequence. The sense of the judgment of God issues in two feelings, one of awe in the presence of the final test of character, the other of hope, that the soul in its evil habit should be of concern to the Infinite. Here the ideal of the saint is renewed; here the hope of the sinner is revived; here in both saint and sinner the consciousness of the infinite dignity of human life is wrought into new intensity and majesty. So long as men believe that the world is under the judgment of God, so long will awe and hope, and the sense of the high import of man's life, continue in the earth. If faith would be permanent, it must include belief in the eternal righteous judgment of God.

Redemption is a word for which we in this day have little fondness. In so far as this means a revolt from ancient ideas about the moral distress of men, it is justifiable; in so far as it signifies that we belong to the respectable and comfortable class in society, secure in our moral conceit, it is not creditable. Redemption has meant deliverance, deliverance of man from his distress by the almighty help of God; and in Christianity it has signified the same thing through the career of Jesus Christ and his servants. If there be no redemption, there can be in our theology no principle of it. If there be no redemption, the world still waits for the advent of its supreme helper.

Under new names the old principle of redemption is in fact more widely accepted and more efficiently used today than at any time since the apostolic age. Our optimism is nothing but our confidence in the coming deliverance of man. Our enthusiasm for education, missions, social service, pure politics, good government, true religion, and a hundred aspects of the Christian ideal, is at heart a new confession of confidence in the great idea of redemption. We are seizing an old idea, delivering it from its mythological setting, clearing it of its aeonian narrowness, translating it into a richer and vaster conception, and making it the final platform upon which as servants of the ideal we take our stand. And with these four beliefs—sovereignty, sin, judgment, redemption—there goes that in the permanence of the human soul. This belief is today, in the great centres of intellectual life, in many cases timid, apologetic, hypothetic. A profounder faith in God as the infinite lover of men, and a deeper life in his

love, will restore this great belief. It is bound up with the consciousness of the moral dignity of man; while that lasts, it cannot perish; when that waxes in vigor, it will return in power. The mystery of the enswathement of the human spirit in flesh is great. It has been obvious to the thinker since thought began. It has been dwelt upon with peculiar intensity, sometimes with exclusive attention, during the last two generations of thinkers. The deeper mystery of the enswathement of the human spirit in God has faded from the consciousness of the time. It is this mystery that contains the key to the other, as Emerson sang,

Lost in God, in Godhead found!

We may believe, therefore, that the New England theology will have this reproduction of its essential ideas, at least, in the new evangelical creed of the future. The old five points of the Calvinistic divinity might not be able to recognize the image of themselves as reproduced in the new five points of the divinity of today; but it is not seldom thus in the preservation of continuity. The principle of inheritance is often obscured in that of variation, the law of parenthood is frequently lost in the advent of a fresh gift from God. It may prove to be the case that the traditional theology has, in a general way, set a type from which the Christian mind as a whole will never depart. A few remarks concerning the possible forms of this persisting type may not unfittingly close this discussion.

#### IV.

Types of thought fundamental in their nature endure. The Platonic type of idealism endures, the transcendental type, whether Plato is regarded as an adequate master of it or not. The Aristotelian type of idealism endures, the immanent type, that which finds in the eternal the force that gives meaning and character to the world of fact, whether the method and conclusions of Aristotle are or are not looked upon as acceptable. Materialism has many forms, but the type endures. Mind is referred to that which is lower than itself; the highest in human experience is under the ultimate sovereignty of the lowest, and

this again is in bondage to an abyss out beyond the individual soul. This is the essence of materialism, and this way of reading the meaning of existence endures. Pure phenomenism is a persistent type, the type that regards our human world as a vagrant, mean or mighty, in the dark immensities by which it is surrounded. In the sphere of ethics we have epicureanism, ancient and modern; stoicism, old and new; Hellenism, with its matter and form in ideal synthesis; Christianity, with its temporal filled with the eternal spirit. For many generations, at least, there will continue to exist different types of theological thought. These different schools of thought will continue to be influenced by ideals widely unlike. If we should say that the common ideal of theology is to give to the reason an adequate account of the religious life of mankind, that life is itself smitten with multiplicity and contrast. For critical students there must be some one religion which shall commend itself as highest. For the student who is a thinker, that one highest religion will issue an ideal in the light of which he will build his philosophy of the spiritual life of mankind. For a long time, in the sphere of the philosophy of religion as in other departments of the philosophy of human existence, we must endure multiplicity and contrast; we must seek to learn from them, and through this wider mutual understanding do something to bring on the day of ultimate simplicity and unity in the religious vision of the world.

Every form of theism is founded upon a humanistic interpretation of the universe. The human mind finds itself plus infinity in the universe. Matter is reduced to force, the ordered force is reduced to mind, the mind is the supreme spirit. Thus the cosmos melts before the ardor of the theistic mood into mind. And the same process takes place in the consideration of our human world with a result infinitely richer. Intellect and character in man, moral experience in the societies of men, the moral order in the life of nations and races, the moral world in the history of mankind, terminate in the mind and conscience of the moral Deity. In every case, therefore—whether justifiable or not is not now the question—theism is the interpretation of the universe in accordance with the principle of human personality. Theism is essentially and eternally humanism.

Varieties of this theistic humanism will continue to exist. The varieties will be of two kinds; those resulting from fundamental differences in method, and those resulting from different estimates of the historic expressions of the religious spirit. The New England divinity is at heart a variety of humanism. As a type it will endure; as a system of opinion expressive of that type it has passed away. From the new outlook which we have now attained, we see new reasons for this result. The humanism of the New England divinity had two fatal defects, one intellectual, the other moral. It used as its guiding principle governmental analogies; it lived and moved and had its being in civic relations; it read the character of the 'supreme Mind through these relations, with the inevitable result that God was for it a king, a moral governor, and men were subjects under this king and governor. This was the intellectual defect of the humanism. It was in no sense Christian in its humanistic principle. Jesus says, "Our Father who art in heaven." He adds, "Thy kingdom come"; but the Divine Fatherhood is primary. The parental and filial relation in human life is for Jesus the supreme principle in the reading of the character of God. Jesus speaks of his Father's house. Here again the human home is used as the institution through which the eternal life in God is to be apprehended. The humanism of Jesus is parental and filial; it is essential and everlasting humanism. The humanism of the New England divinity is external, subordinate, temporal. This structural defect runs through the entire system; from the first under this defect the system was doomed.

The moral defect of the New England humanism lies in the terrible negative which it carries in its heart. God creates all; puts all in a world in which all will surely fall into sin; so regards sin that the sinner is doomed to eternal misery; and yet this same God elects to salvation and provides for the salvation of a part only of this lost race. Humanism here falls beneath the dignity of a good man. It justifies the retort of Father Taylor, the sailor preacher of Boston, to the Calvinistic preacher, "Your God stands for my devil." In such a conception of God there is no hint of Christianity; in attaining this conception of God the kind of humanism employed is surely not that found in the prayer of

Jesus on the cross, "Father, forgive them, for they know not what they do." The New England divinity has perished, therefore, because it was a form of humanism wanting in depth and wanting in worth.

Still, the type of humanism which the system served while it lived endures, and is bound to endure. That type sets a high value upon certain kinds of spiritual experience; it also attempts to read the character of the eternal, not through man the individual, but through man the social being; in other words, it is evangelical in its religious feeling and Trinitarian in its vision of God.

This type of humanism looks upon our world under the form of tragedy. Between good apparent and good essential, the world is still in a profound sense a lost world; that is, it is lost to the divine end and use of existence, and it is a world in which misery, natural and moral, abounds. The experience of Paul when he cried, "O wretched man that I am, who shall deliver me from the body of this death," of Augustine in his bitter struggle against a sensual habit, of Luther in his horror in the presence of an apparently impossible moral ideal, is in less emphatic forms and in a general way the experience of awakened men in a Christian community. The great need is moral deliverance, moral hope and peace. When men are delivered from this woe, they naturally become to their fellow-men still in distress apostles, missionaries, preachers, and servants of the gospel of deliverance. The centre of the world is tragedy, and the new insights and the emancipations from old ideas are built round this centre. The new vision of truth to which the descendants of the old creed have come may be the common heritage of the enlightened religious spirit; yet in their case a certain fervor, a unique feeling, a passion as of one living in a world of tragedy, pervades the vision and flushes its calm features into solemnity and hope.

I have said this feeling is evangelical; that is, it is formed with reference to the message and person of Jesus Christ. He occupies the centre of the historic field. This feeling when construed by thought is found to be theocentric in conclusion but christocentric in its method of interpretation; the attachment to the person of Jesus as the bearer and doer of the eternal gospel is ardent and profound. He is the way over which the seeking God and the

seeking soul alike go in the highest religious community, the way in which the seekers meet. The feeling for Jesus on the part of his first disciples is a continuous feeling; the definitions accompanying the feeling may change while the feeling endures. This profound feeling for Jesus is the emotional side of the type of faith served by the New England divinity while it lived. Jesus was God's way toward man, he was man's way toward God; and thus there sprung up in the heart the feeling of the indispensable-ness of the Lord. This sense of his indispensableness issued in a unique state of the heart toward him; and this state of the heart toward the indispensable Master is not weaker, but stronger, in the free descendants of the New England divines.

We turn now from the emotional aspect of the type to its philosophical principle. Here for the sake of clearness it must be said that there is but one mood toward the universe that is non-humanistic. That mood is the agnostic mood. It sees that man must use his own nature in the interpretation of the ultimate reality if he is to attain an interpretation of it, and this the agnostic spirit refuses to do. Every positive view of the universe is attained under the guidance of some aspect of the personality of man used as the principle of interpretation. Materialism, whether crass or refined, is finally the construction of a theory of the universe through the medium of the bodily life; the philosophy that sums up the character of the infinite as unconscious force uses as interpreter one phase of the human personality, will, abstracted from intelligence. Theism reduces itself to two forms, the interpretation of God through man the individual and the apprehension of God through man the social being. The world of facts lies open to the scientific investigator; the world of religious feeling and character lies before the student of religion; the world of spiritual reality in Christianity is in the vision of the competent inquirer upon this branch of history. In each case facts have a determining influence in the selection of the special phase of the human personality to be employed as the principle of interpretation. Certain facts, such as the apparent sovereignty of the lower forces over the higher, appeal to the materialist; other facts, such as the seeming blind might and majesty of the cosmos and our human world, control the mind of the fatalist; other facts

still, such as the indisputable evidence of purpose in the universe, compel the mind of the theist; and once again, there are orders of fact that incline the theist now toward Deism and then toward Trinitarianism. But the facts are impotent without the guiding principle; in every case that is borrowed from the human personality. I repeat, therefore, that every form of theism is a form of humanism. The collapse of the New England divinity has left in power to the future the type of theism known as the Trinitarian type.

It must be admitted that the form of theism most popular today in all the churches is that gained through the use of man the individual. Preachers in all communions have in large numbers turned from Trinitarianism. It is not publicly denied or discarded; it is secretly confessed to have become no part of the working philosophy of religion. This mood will doubtless continue to prevail to some extent in all the churches. For certain minds the interpretation of the universe through man the individual is supremely attractive, because of its apparent simplicity and straightforwardness, its freedom from contradictions, and from the heavy, although at times transfigured, fogs that forever lie on the seas of mysticism. What is known as Unitarianism sets a distinct and persistent type of theism. It is well to recognize its principle of interpretation, its philosophical method, and its enduring fascination for certain orders of mind. It is well to confess that it is one of two rival types of Christian theism, and that today it is winning increasing confidence and support. It should be added that this type of theism holds, inconsistently as it seems to me, that its God is love in his inmost essence, that it carries over into its Deity pretty much the same moral content that one finds in its great rival type. In my judgment this moral content does not belong to it, nor do I think it will remain permanently with the type if it shall continue unchanged; but as matter of fact this moral richness is now there.

The type of theism inherited from the New England divinity is the Trinitarian type. It has not perished, as is sometimes rashly imagined, in the passing of that system. It is imperishable, because it is founded upon the richest and worthiest form of humanism. It is useless to say that the Trinity was invented



to make room in the Godhead for Jesus Christ and for the Holy Spirit of whom he spoke. Perhaps this may be the literal truth; that it is not the essential truth I am persuaded. Even on the surface of the history it is plain that, while the new doctrine of God may have been mainly suggested by the supreme career in the Gospels, that doctrine is logically prior to Christianity, logically prior to historic humanity. Besides, no ancient theologian of the first rank makes room in the Godhead for Jesus; he simply discerns a unique association between Jesus and one phase of the Godhead, the eternal Son, between whom and all men, because they are men, there is an intimate and an abiding association. In recent centuries there is a cloud of confusion resting upon the doctrine of God and the doctrine of Jesus Christ. Into this fog-bank I have sailed elsewhere, and I have no time for another excursion now.

What we are concerned with here is not primarily historic situations, but philosophical principles. The reasons why the Trinity has been abandoned so largely in all communions of Christian faith are mainly two: superficiality in thought, and inability to grasp the principle at work in the entire history of Trinitarianism. Perhaps the two reasons should be reduced to one. If Trinitarianism were seen to be, what it unquestionably is, the result in theistic belief of the use of man the social being as the guide to the being of God, it could not appear to be the sanctified nonsense which it undoubtedly seems to be to many men today. Man by himself is no man. The individual is neither parent nor child, nor lover nor friend. Social man is the being we know; and social man, with his dower of love and his burning moral idealism, is the being whose ground we seek in the Eternal. If the Eternal is a bare individual, it is an impenetrable mystery how he can be a moral being, and we are inclined to conclude with Aristotle that morality, except in the form of intellectual integrity, is foreign to the nature of God. If the Eternal is a pure everlasting egoist, again it passes understanding how he can be represented in an altruistic humanity. That the Deity has the power to create forms of life different from his own, the world of life may be held to prove. Still in every case there is fundamental identity. The link between the nature of

God and the world of matter is force; force being unmeaning save as a phase of will. The infinite variety in the forms of life are again one with God in that he is the living God. When we come to man, we have a being whose essential nature is love. If God does not answer to man here, he falls below the work of his hands. But love, so far as we can see, is impossible except in a social being; if therefore God is lover in some mystic way, he must be social. The question is how to evolve from an egoistic Deity an altruistic humanity. To answer this question of the evolution of humanity is one of the fundamental problems of theism; it would seem to be a desperate problem for deistic theism.

I am here simply stating a principle of faith; I am not arguing now for the truth of a doctrine. The point is that the Trinitarian type of theism has survived the collapse of the old divinity; it will continue to survive, because it is founded on a distinctive conception of man employed as a guide to the being of God. And it should be said, in simple justice to this type—all the more because its friends seem to be few, and these few appear to sit most of the time under the shadow of fear—that the less we think of man the mere individual the less disposed shall we be to rest in the form of theism to which it leads; that the more we regard man as essentially a social being the more inclined shall we be to trust the form of theism toward which it points.

The high contention, therefore, between the Unitarian and Trinitarian types of theism is not ended. It is only at its clear beginning. So far as it has been a contention in enmity it has had its dismal day. The sooner this phase of the debate is utterly transcended the better it will be for the cause of truth and character. A nobler debate now opens, a debate without which the intellect loses half its vigilance and vigor, the struggle in equal honor and utter freedom between the two types of theism. In this invigorating and honorable contest the writer stands in the line of descent from the New England divines. His theism is social theism, he is an out-and-out Trinitarian; at the same time he is moved to confess that he does not find himself in a multitude that no man can number.

Humanism as a philosophical principle covers both varieties

of theism, and theism is after all the sovereign interest of religion. That theism is at heart humanism may be said to be a new insight. That it is not absolutely new, the famous remark of Xenophanes about the way in which animals would construe the universe if they were in a position to construe it clearly shows. Still this form of thought, in its complete self-consciousness, is essentially new. When we construe the Eternal by the human we take the risk of faith. We may be mistaken, yet our mistake is a tribute to the Eternal. We judge him by our best, and add thereto infinity. Humanism is our greatest word because it covers the greatest fact that we know, the phenomenal world of man. This phenomenal world is our surest path to the Eternal. We have no means of getting at what is except through what appears; and the highest appearance is the highest revelation of the hidden reality. Contempt for man's world is contempt for the world of the highest man, Jesus of Nazareth, and contempt for his world is contempt for the Eternal, if the Eternal has equal worth. The phenomenal world is all that we have; nor is it a world isolated, vagrant, desolate. The Eternal is its refuge, and underneath it are the everlasting arms. It is indeed shot through with the imperishable reality whose revelation it is. Here the conscience of the thinker is under infinite bonds; he is under bonds to do well by man's world. The way in which Doctor F. H. Bradley kicks the phenomenal world out of doors in the name and in the interest of a ghostly, anti-human, noumenal world is not calculated to increase respect for his philosophical method nor confidence in his conscience as a thinker. The resolution of the world that surely lies in intellect and feeling, and which has value for intellect and feeling, into something that does not lie in intellect and feeling, and which for both is as destitute of worth as pure negation must always be, is a procedure that must meet with the everlasting protest of the humanist. If we must give up either the phenomenal or the noumenal, let us surrender the anti-human, the noumenal, too poor to deserve respect of any sane soul, and whose poverty is only equalled by its pride. Let us, so says humanism, hold to the reality and worth of man's world, and use it as our surest instrument in our endeavor to ascertain the character of the Eternal.

*HELLENISM AND CHRISTIANITY*

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The long period of helpless infancy through which the human being who is to survive in the struggle for existence must pass is proof conclusive that from the time when first men were men—and from an even earlier time—they must have lived together in groups. Whether those groups were, as in the case of the gorilla, patriarchal in kind, or matriarchal, as they are seen to be, or may be conjectured to have been, in the case of some tribes very low in the social scale, is still a disputed question. The tendency of those groups, however, was in the patriarchal direction; this tendency strengthens even in times when the tribe is still migratory, and is fully established by the time when the tribe settles down in a fixed habitation as a village-community. From the village-community the city-state develops; an amalgamation of city-states may produce a national state; a national state may become a world-power, and even seek to establish itself as a world-empire.

In each and every one of the forms, just enumerated, through which human society goes, the human beings that constitute it are conscious of the fact that they do belong to it and that strangers do not. As belonging to it, they have purposes and interests in common. Their consciousness of those purposes and interests is a common consciousness or collective consciousness. As common or collective, it is neither confined to, dependent on, nor created by, any single member of the community. It is there when each man is born into it; and there it continues, though any one member be removed by death from the community. It directs and even determines, within limits, the thoughts, the beliefs, and the actions of those born into the community. It is the Custom of the community. It prescribes what each member of

the community may or may not do. It even determines what he shall think and believe. This common or collective consciousness has its own psychology, its own psychological laws, which are distinguishable and ought to be distinguished from those of the ordinary psychology which are gained from study of the individual considered in abstraction from society.

Among the conceptions found in the common consciousness and ever evolving in accordance with the laws of its psychology the most interesting are those of morality and god. Primitive man regards everything which happens to him, or within the range of his observation, as the act of some agent. That is the theory of Animism, established by Professor E. B. Tylor and accepted by all competent to judge. To primitive man the category of cause and effect is unknown, as Wilhelm Wundt has shown in his *Völkerpsychologie*: it is by the concept of act and agent alone that primitive man seeks to explain things. Very naturally, indeed necessarily, in the case of many things the assumed agent cannot be found: he exists but is unknown. His act is a fact, patent to the common consciousness; and he is a power, as is apparent to all; and, if unknown, then he is an Unknown Power. The community collectively is conscious of his existence and his power. To him are ascribed any other acts, i.e. facts, in the case of which the community can find no visible, tangible agent. A relation exists between him and the community affected by his acts. That relation is a bond, a *religio* according to one etymology of that word. And the bond exists in the collective consciousness of the community. It not only exists but it persists. It may persist so long that the unknown power, necessarily conceived as an agent, and so far resembling man, acquires a proper name; and then many more doings are related of him than those which originally attracted the common consciousness to the fact of his existence—he becomes the central figure of myths, an All Father such as is found in Australia, Melanesia, America, Africa.<sup>1</sup>

But many of the facts or acts for which primitive man seeks an author are ascribed by him, on what he considers good evidence, to some visible, tangible, material, or animal object. And

<sup>1</sup>See A. Lang, *The Making of Religion*; R. Hoffmann, *La notion de l'Être Suprême chez les peuples non-civilisés*.

such an object, or rather the power which manifests itself therein, will take its place in the common consciousness of the community as the power to which the offerings of the tribe may be made and its requests preferred. In either case, whether the power does or does not manifest itself in material form, the community, as a community, has a god. But whereas acts may be ascribed to various animals or material objects, and a plurality of such deities may accordingly arise, if an unknown agent is credited with any one act, any number of further acts may be credited to his account—a multiplication of deities is not necessary. In Australia and other places a multiplication seems not to have occurred. Elsewhere it undoubtedly did.

The god or gods of a nomadic tribe, when the tribe settles down into a fixed habitation, become the deities of the village-community; and, if it grows, of the city-state, and even of a nation. The community of worshippers, even in the last case, remains, if not in fact, then by convention and fiction, a body of men of common race and origin worshipping the god or gods of their fathers and forming a political as well as a religious community. And, if one nation by force of arms establishes its authority over others, it may weld them into one political whole, an empire, as Rome did. A new political community is created; but will a corresponding religious communion be developed? The question admits of no general answer; but what actually happened in the case of the Roman Empire and the Christian religion is coming to be better understood, and is accessible to the general reader in such a work as Doctor Paul Wendland's *Die Hellenistisch-Römische Kultur in ihren Beziehungen zu Judentum und Christentum* (1907), from which this article will borrow largely.

Looking backwards on the chain of historical occurrences, we may be inclined, with the wisdom which is born after the events, to regard that which happened as that which alone could happen in the circumstances, as the necessary effect of the causes at work. But increasing knowledge, and the power which it brings to us of placing ourselves by the use of the historic imagination at the scene and the time of the events, is apt to weaken that impression. We can realize the conditions which prevailed and under which the event took place. But in doing so we also realize that there

were other contingencies which were also, and equally, favored by the conditions.

The Jews of the *diaspora* were widely scattered over the Hellenistic world; wherever they settled their monotheism attracted proselytes from amongst the best type of men; why should they not have converted the world to Judaism? Rome's conquests brought as one of their consequences the irruption of Mithraism into its army and amongst its citizens; its expansive force might well, as Cumont's investigations show,<sup>2</sup> have spread it over the whole of the ancient world; yet its spread was arrested. Above all, in the time of the Empire, the worship of the genius of the Emperor, as it was the symbol of the unity of the Empire, had at its back not only the whole force of the government but also the whole-minded approval of the governed: what could stay its progress?

These were among the contingencies. What were the conditions under which or on which these and other tendencies had to work? First we may notice one, without which no form whatever of religion could have become common to the whole of the ancient world. It is a very simple condition in appearance. It is merely that that world formed one community, a whole. And what unified it into one whole was not the fact that one and the same political government was imposed upon it, for its unification began before the Roman Empire. That process of unification, so far from being a result produced by the Roman Empire, paved the way for the accomplishment of what, according to Ihering, was Rome's task in the history of the world, that is, the revelation of the idea of a world-empire as superseding the principle of nationality; of a universal religion as superseding all national religions; of one legal system, that of Roman law, as superseding all others. That process of unification is what is known as Hellenism—the process by which Greek culture was brought within the grasp of the non-Greek world, and by which that world was Hellenized. Like the hand of the dyer, a new idea—and still more a new system of ideas, such as that offered by Greek culture to the non-Greek world—must be subdued to what it works in.

<sup>2</sup>Franz Cumont, *Les religions orientales dans le paganisme romain*. Paris, 1907.

To be received by the ordinary mind it must be lowered to the level of the ordinary mind; or rather perhaps we must say that the ordinary mind grasps as much as it can and in such way as it can—it can only understand a thing by, at least partially, misunderstanding it. The Hellenizing of the ancient world began before Rome's day, with Alexander's attempt—and failure—to establish a world-wide monarchy. Though the attempt failed politically, it did however lay the ancient world open to the "pacific penetration" of Hellenism: the Greek language (or rather the *Koinê*) and Greek modes of thought poured in, and fertilized the area they inundated. Hellenism endowed the ancient world with one culture, not provincial but a *Weltkultur*, inspired with Greek thought and expressed in the Greek tongue.

To say however that the ancient world owed its unification to Hellenism is scarcely adequate. Hellenism made it a new-created world. The possession by the world of a common tongue, the *Koinê*, awoke the world to the consciousness of its common humanity. The Greek distinction of the peoples of the world into "Greeks and barbarians" could not survive in the atmosphere of Hellenism. The only distinction which Eratosthenes could recognize between man and man was not that of Greek and barbarian but that of "good and bad." If Hellenism thus levelled old distinctions, if Hellenistic culture had a levelling tendency, at any rate the distinctions it abolished were distinctions that offended and resisted the growth of our consciousness of our common humanity. In this connection it is no accident and no matter of insignificance that the conception of the *οἰκουμένη* now for the first time appears, transcending differences of race and nation, and furnishing the complement to the conception of a common humanity.

Not only, at the bidding of Hellenism, does this new-created world arise, but in Stoicism we see it in process of becoming conscious of itself. The true state, in the Stoic view, is the *Cosmos*; its citizens are all men, ruled by one divine law; it has no temples or images, the work of man's hands, unworthy of gods; in it there is no marrying or giving in marriage; neither is there any money. Cosmopolitanism, humanity, the brotherhood of man prevail therein. Social distinctions disappear: the woman is



as the man, slaves and masters are unknown, there is neither bond nor free.

The unification of the world of culture, which was the work of Hellenism, was a condition which rendered possible the spread of any form of religion—whether Judaism, Mithraism, or the cult of the Emperor's genius—which had within it power to propagate itself. But a second condition which we must notice—the growth of the individual's consciousness of his own existence as an individual—though compatible with Judaism and conducive to the growth of Mithraism, did not lend itself to the cult of the Emperor's genius; for that was demanded of a man not as being individual and thereby, to the very core of his being, distinct from all other men, but as being a citizen and, as such and in respect of this obligation, indistinguishable from any other citizen—without individuality.

In those forms of ancient society in which the religious community was co-extensive and identical with the political community, individual piety and personal religion had but little room in which to grow, and less encouragement to do so. Compliance with the outward forms was all that was required; and as no further direction was given to the individual, no further step by him was usually taken. But, even so, in some cases individual self-consciousness began to manifest itself; and it showed itself usually in an anxiety about the state of the individual after death. The rise of the Greek mysteries is the first manifestation symptomatic of the growth of the individual self-consciousness. That manifestation was spontaneous and from within. But the impact of external forces drove the movement further. The break-up of states and societies which the growth of the Roman Empire involved carried with it the disintegration, if not the dissolution, of the religious as well as the political communities which those states and societies formed. This process disengaged the individual and set him free. Being free, and being conscious to some extent of his freedom, he immediately set to work to weave new organizations, clubs, societies, social and artistic, which were neither limited by nor dependent on the ancient city-states.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>3</sup>T. P. Waitsing, *Étude historique sur les corporations professionnelles chez les Romains*.

If he preferred a political life, all roads led to Rome; and there a career was thrown open to talent. In moral philosophy the claim and significance of individuality and personality was recognized. Ethics generally becomes individual. Epicurus sets forth personal happiness as the end of personal endeavor; and Stoics and Sceptics alike agree with him in seeking the realization of the ideal in the individual apart from society. The ideal wise man of the Stoics, self-centred in his individuality, was immovable by aught external. The personality of Epicurus came to be regarded as a divine epiphany, the revelation of a *σωτήρ* to the world. Biography now for the first time, and now naturally, makes its appearance in literature; portrait-painting in art; realism in the mimes of Herodas. The professions become differentiated; knowledge—even though research was neglected—was popularized and science “vulgarized.” In poetry, oratory, and history the personal note is unmistakable in Catullus, Horace, Cicero, and Tacitus. The moral corruption of society in Rome produced its reaction; and that reaction took the form of popularizing moral philosophy—that is of bringing it home to the heart of the individual, and putting to individual men the questions, Who art thou? for what intended? called to what? And this work was carried out by preaching in the markets and in the streets. It was mission-work carried on by the Stoics. And its interest for us is that the channels it created were to be filled with Christianity, which through them was to flow with what has hitherto appeared such unaccountable rapidity throughout the Roman Empire.

The Stoic missionary, Epictetus tells us, must have the conviction that he is sent by Zeus as his messenger to men. He must have no property, possessions, or home. If beaten or assaulted, he must love his assailant as his brother. Neither friend nor wife must stay him from obeying the call when it comes to him. This mission-work, it cannot be doubted, predisposed the hearts touched by it for Christianity. It was a *praeparatio evangelii*. It prepared the soil, especially by preaching the doctrine of personal responsibility for wrong-doing. It has left its effects even on the Epistles of the New Testament, as was first shown in detail by Heinrici's commentary on the Corinthians. If we would

have a picture of the Stoic street-preachers, we can reconstruct it from Acts 17, where Paul appears in Athens even as they did: every day he was in the market-place, addressing himself not only to the Jews and devout persons but to all whom he found there, and attracting to his audience even his rival street-preachers, the Stoics and Epicureans. Of such Stoic and Epicurean missionaries many were converted to Christianity; and what Augustine says of those of later times is true of those of the earliest period—the Church did not require them to change their habit or their mode of activity. Naturally too those who went over to Christianity took with them not only their bodily habit but also their intellectual outfit, and necessarily but unconsciously modified their Christianity to go with it. Later, Christianity not only recognized its debt, thus incurred, to heathen moral philosophy, but even exaggerated it: not merely did Tertullian recognize that Seneca was often Christian, but a forged correspondence between him and Paul was produced, and the hand-book of Epictetus was twice edited *in usum Christianorum*.

Thus, then, even before the Roman Empire arose, Hellenism had made the *οἰκουμένη* into one social, one moral and intellectual, community, and had prepared a field alike for Judaism, Mithraism, or the cult of the Emperor's genius. Next, not only was a community, co-extensive with the ancient world, created, but the individual rose to the surface of his own self-consciousness—a new condition in the state of things, and one which was not likely to lend itself to the development of the cult of the Emperor's genius, however much it might encourage the individual to exercise his personal freedom in choosing a religion for himself. Thirdly, we have seen the development of a system of personal appeal on the part of the Stoics, carried out by means of street-preaching—a mode of appealing to the individual which, though devised by pagans in the interests of moral reformation, afforded to Christianity a singularly effective method for its rapid propagation throughout the world.

Thus Hellenism had created a new community, imperfect indeed in its structure, because the unifying force of a common religion was as yet lacking to it, though the bonds of a common culture, intellectual and moral, at present held it together. Yet

the new society was composed, in a sense in which none other yet had been composed, of individuals; and it was for the individual to decide what, if any, form of religion—existing or yet to come—should be common to all members because it was the personal conviction of each individual. The political changes accompanying the growth of the Roman Empire, which had everywhere broken up the city-states, had disintegrated the worship of the city-gods, and even the faith of the ordinary citizen in them. The growth of science and philosophy had, even in pre-Hellenistic times, led the cultured to doubt and sometimes openly to deny the received polytheism; and in Hellenistic times it had even undermined the religion of the people. The human spirit, however, was not prepared to acquiesce in blank and empty negation. It moved first, in its search for something positive and real, in the direction of universalism. The polytheisms of different nations were to lend mutual support and testimony to each other by being shown to consist of the same gods under different names: the world was one community, having not indeed one God but the same plurality of gods everywhere for the object of its universal worship. The movement in this direction, which shows itself in the pages of Herodotus, and which availed itself of the prestige and fabulous antiquity of polytheistic Egypt, appeared to be forwarded in Hellenistic times by the fact that the cult of Egyptian, Phrygian, and Syrian deities propagated itself widely throughout the Hellenistic area. But the very success which it had was fatal to itself: the identification of one god with another, of each with all, and all with each, resulted in something which certainly was a non-polytheism, but which, as it evacuated every deity that was submitted to the process of all distinctive characteristics, yielded but a negative monotheism. One God there was in name; a god indeed of all peoples and nations; a god that could be found by theological speculation, but could not be found where he was wanted, unconsciously perhaps, by the individual seeker—in the individual's own heart.

Doubtless an obscure, though still real, sense of what there was wanting in the abstract and negative monotheism in which the tendency to universalism had resulted both gave rise and gave support to Euhemerism. The bond between god and man,

which in the village-community and the city-state had been felt to exist, and which the decay of polytheism, or rather of worship as it existed in the city-state, had disintegrated, Euhemerism, as a theology, sought to discern in the divine in man, which it saw in the great personalities that overtopped ordinary mortals. The roots of this belief may possibly be traced back to the Greek belief in a man's *daimon*, and to the Greek worship of Heroes. It is belief in the divine power manifesting itself in and through man; but, we may note, it is the outcome of a belief in divine power, not the source or origin of that belief. The first great personality in the Greek world thus recognized as divine was that of Alexander. His successors enjoyed like honor; then in Egypt Ptolemy I, after death, was thus consecrated; and the deification of Roman Emperors eventually and naturally followed. Logically enough, the person in whom the divine power was thus manifested was addressed—before the Christian era—as σωτήρ, *praesens deus*; and his manifestation was spoken of as ἐναργής ἐπιφάνεια. One of the lines on which Christianity was to run, or rather on which it did run, was thus prepared: the world was to some extent trained to the conception, or prepared for the idea, of a Divine Saviour, manifested here and now on earth. How impotent was that conception, taken by itself, is shown by the fate that attended it when it took form in the deification of the Roman Emperors. The spiritual need of the individual who was a member of the moral and intellectual community created by Hellenism was not for an abstract and negative monotheism, but for a personal God to whom he could have access in his own heart. Euhemerism set up a process which was based on the recognition of the divine in man, but which ended by bidding man find God, not in his own heart but in the person of a mortal individual like himself. The conception that such a mortal was a *praesens deus*, an ἐναργής ἐπιφάνεια, was not merely illusory, it was, or rather it proved, derisory. Nevertheless Roman statesmanship—and the statesmanship which could create and maintain the Roman Empire needs no other testimony than that capacity—sought to find in that conception both a visible and outward sign, and also the inward and invisible bond, of the unity of the Roman Empire. This idea was not the artificial product of political

expediency; and it was something more than a piece of Euhemeristic theology gone wrong. To understand it we must call to mind the fact that the stage of religious development reached by the early Italian tribes before they came under the influence of neighboring peoples was very low: their *di indigites* were in a rudimentary stage of development, their belief in the *genius* of each individual man was already deeply rooted. The history of their religion turns on the successive inundations of foreign worships which commercial and political relations with foreign nations brought in their train: by the side of the *di indigites*, the *di novensides*, the "newly settled gods," took their place; first Greek divinities, and then Oriental—Cybele, Bacchus, Mithras, Isis. Religious receptivity was the characteristic of Rome—religious receptivity, indeed, rather than religious activity. This Roman receptivity became in statesmen the tolerance which is religious indifference—a tolerance which, as statesmanship, insists on the importance of religious forms for political purposes, and combines with the observance of forms absolute indifference to the individual's belief or want of belief. Thus at Rome the form of worship was emptied of all content: a vacuum was created, abhorred by nature and to man abhorrent. The consciousness of sin, the desire for expiation, and the need of salvation, which favored, if they did not originate, the growth of Mysteries in Eleusis and elsewhere over the Hellenistic world, were found also in Rome, and the mysticism which springs up from such a soil has left its mark in the Sixth Book of Virgil's *Aeneid*. This feeling of the need of expiation was utilized, for political purposes, by Augustus. His rule was to be recognized as marking the rebirth and renewal of the human race. The expiation was indeed to be national, not individual, and to be marked by ritual elaboration. Horace was called on for a *carmen saeculare*. Temples and priesthoods were restored. Old institutions and old virtues were to be re-established. Virgil was called on to link the greatness of the present with the glories of the past in his *Aeneid*. And yet this attempt to set back the clock failed. Or rather it succeeded; for its real meaning and veiled intention was not to revert to republican times and a republican government, but to facilitate the transition from the Republic to the

Empire by representing the movement as a return to the ancient state of things. The motive throughout was not religious but political. The emperors regularly became *divi*, their *genius* an object of worship. From the dizzy mixture of all kinds of religion—native Italian, Greek, and Oriental—the worship of the Caesar rises, and overtops and overshadows them all. The old Italian belief in the *genius* was thus impressed into the service of political and imperial ends. Combining religious and patriotic sentiment, the worship of the Caesar appeared admirably adapted to unite the peoples, differing in nation and religion, who formed the Empire; to serve as the common expression of their adhesion to the Empire; as the outward and visible mark of the unity of the one and indivisible Empire. But the worship of the Caesar did not revivify the ancient religious beliefs. It placed them in the second rank, and sucked the life's blood out of them. And though it thus deprived them of what vitality was left to them, it gained itself no religious strength thereby. It was a purely external form and act, having no religious content, and affording no satisfaction to the religious instinct.

By the Roman Empire the *οἰκουμένη* was unified into a political whole. By the action of Hellenism it had been endowed with one culture, a *Weltkultur*. What was then still wanting to it was religion. But the demand for religion sprang from the cravings of the individual self-consciousness, the birth of which was a greater event in the history of the world than the rise of the Roman Empire or the growth of Hellenic culture. And the demand for individual, personal religion could not be satisfied by the Caesar-worship which was all that the religious indifference of Roman statesmen could produce to meet the need. Indifference however manifests its better side as tolerance; and the religious tolerance of Roman statesmanship, at any rate at first, allowed the individual to follow his religious instinct as he would. The Stoic propaganda, as we have seen, sought to direct personal piety into a moral rather than a religious channel. Accordingly the religious instinct, when it could not be appeased by mere morality, threw itself largely upon Oriental cults. Better means of communication, military roads, increasing commerce, above all the lengthy stay of the legions in the provinces and on the frontiers

and the steady infusion of the legions with *peregrini*, facilitated the spread of Mithraism, the favorite religion of the soldiers. A god thus worshipped was limited to no city-state and to no one nation: his worshippers formed a community capable of embracing all mankind, capable of producing a universal religion. And the tolerance of Roman statesmanship permitted Mithraism to spread as it would, and as it could.

Judaism also, like Mithraism, though by the action of different forces, had been spread broadcast over the Hellenistic world. But it was the Jews of the *diaspora* and not those in Palestine who alone became exposed to the action of Hellenistic culture. And the way in which Hellenism affected the *diaspora* is manifest and indisputable: not only did the Jews of the dispersion become Hellenized in speech, they absolutely could not understand their own scriptures, save in a Hellenistic version. To a certain extent, even, Greek thought permeated through the barrier of their national exclusiveness; but it was to a limited extent only. If Philo is a conspicuous, he is also a unique, surviving instance of the influence exerted by Greek philosophy on the Jews of the *diaspora*. And as the action of Hellenism on the Jews of the dispersion was small, so their reaction on it was, in effect, trifling. Proselytes who came to them they did accept. But the seed which is to grow in the soil in which it is set must burst in order to grow. Judaism however had become much too rigid for any such expansion; the "cake of custom" had dried and hardened round it till expansion was impossible. What gives later Judaism its peculiar hall-mark? "Is it not," says Bousset (*What is Religion?* p. 158), "is it not religious custom—circumcision, the maintenance of the Sabbath, the tithes, the avoidance of mixed marriages, the laws concerning food, directions for purification, and *not* sacrifice and worship in the temples? Throughout the world a Jew is recognized by these things."

If the Jews of the dispersion were rendered by their tribal exclusiveness incapable of absorbing more than the merest modicum of Hellenic culture, the Jews in Palestine were absolutely beyond the reach of its action. Points of resemblance, indeed, between the Judaic and the Hellenistic worlds there were. But they are resemblances inherited by both from an earlier stage of culture—



a stage which all the peoples of the earth enter, and from which some emerge. One such point of resemblance must here be noted: it is the belief in evil spirits, demonology—a belief found amongst the Jews as well as other people, a belief inherited by Christianity from the Jews. The behavior of such spirits is the same all the world over; everywhere they plague men, and much in the same way. Everywhere they are driven out by exorcists; and for this purpose the use of sacred names was not confined to the Jews and Christians, but was familiar to the heathen also (London Papyrus, ed. Kenyon, p. 67: *ἐξορκίζω σε κατὰ τῶν ἁγίων δυνάμεων*). Even in the formulae used a resemblance naturally springs up: *φιμώθητι* is a word specially used in this connection. Sickness is hypostasized (*πνεῦμα δαθνεύας*), not in the New Testament alone. And the further we depart from the oldest strata of Christian literature the more frequently do we meet with the marvellous. It is only in the more recent strata that Hellenistic influence manifests itself, whether in institutional matters or in mythical realism.

Primitive Christianity, originating as it did in Palestine, stands aloof from Hellenism, uninfluenced by Graeco-Roman culture. It did not seek at first to operate on or through literature. As Wendland says, it did not belong to the Paper Age: Peter, James, and John wrote nothing. The oldest letters are letters, not epistolary compositions. The *Koinê* used is rather the spoken than the literary *Koinê*. Luke first shows any signs of response to the demands of literature and style. The feeling still was that the pagan world with its science and philosophy belonged to the powers of darkness. "Let no man spoil you with philosophy" was the warning issued. It is intelligible therefore that the pagan world, for its part, saw at first in Christianity a barbaric doctrine, hostile to culture.

But if primitive Christianity, cut off from Graeco-Roman culture (or sheltered from it?) made no appeal at first to literati or philosophers, if it ignored or was ignorant of philosophy and literature, it was because its message was to the heart rather than to the mind, to the religious consciousness of the individual. Religion was revealed as based on and manifested in the individual's immediate experience of communion with God. The personal piety

which Stoicism labored by its mission-preachers to stimulate and maintain was to be enabled to find its God. But, though the individual was addressed, he was addressed not as such, but as being, or to be, a member of the Kingdom of God. Released from national restrictions, from the customs which had caked round the religion of the Jews, the Kingdom of God was to provide the community without which, or apart from which, the individual religious consciousness droops, if not withers. As the individual himself cannot exist, or even come into existence, apart from society; as he is born into a common consciousness, neither created by nor dependent on him alone; so the objective facts of his religious consciousness are not peculiar to his experience alone. It is only because they are universal that any individual can participate in them; that they are constituent of the objective and collective religious consciousness; and that the individuals participating in them form a religious communion.

The course of historical events is apt to appear to us, looking back at them, to have had but one order which it could follow. When however we immerse ourselves in the facts, there seldom appears to have been but one direction which they could take. For the spread of Christianity there were two routes, through Jewry or to the Gentiles. The Jews of the *diaspora* lived in strictly organized communities which maintained an active intercourse with the mother-country. What more natural, what more inevitable, than that Christianity should first seek outlet along those lines? Yet it was in those strict communities that Christianity was most bitterly opposed; and, had it succeeded in following those lines, it would have found its course blocked, for the reason that Judaism in effect purchased toleration from Rome at the price of renouncing proselytism. The road through Jewry to a world-mission was thus doubly blocked. Paul's choice was speedy: he turned with little loss of time to the Gentiles, and preached that in the Christian community there was neither Greek nor Jew, nor bond nor free, nor male nor female. The essential unity of the human race, the equality of all men before God, which is correlative to the Christian idea of the one God and was implicit in Jesus' gospel, was brought into the full light of consciousness by Paul. It was a truth which had already

become manifest on its moral side to the Stoics, who were even then teaching that in the true state there is neither bond nor free and the woman is as the man. But the Stoic apprehension of the truth was moral and intellectual. Religious it was not. The Stoic mission-preachers, like the missionary Paul, made their appeal to the individual. But it was an appeal to his moral not to his religious consciousness: "*unum bonum est*," says Seneca, Ep. 31. 3, "*sibi fidere*." "*Turpe est etiam nunc deos fatigare . . . fac te ipse felicem*." The appeal to the Hellenistic world found it also, as we have seen, in possession of the ideas of sin and weakness, of the need of salvation, of a *σωτήρ*, a saviour and intermediary. But Christianity gave those ideas another content. Asceticism and "other worldliness" were in existence in the Hellenistic world before the time of Christianity; "the simple life" was preached and practiced, as a change, in Seneca's day (Ep. 18. 7; 100. 6).

The representation of Paul's activity in Athens which is given in Acts 17 is of special significance. The account of his preaching in the Areopagus shows that he accepted from the Stoics their theory of man's natural knowledge of God and of man's natural morality. And the version evidently belongs to a period when there was no longer any question or any possibility of Christianity's relapsing into Judaism, no longer any doubt or hesitation as to its universal mission: the Church had always had that mission. How quickly this conviction grew up is shown both by the reception into the synoptists of the words, "Go ye therefore and make disciples of all the nations," "Preach the gospel to the whole creation," and by the consideration that the Fourth Gospel naturally springs from it. The greater importance gained by the Logos doctrine over the Messiah theology is explicable in the same way: Christianity was definitely turned toward the heathen—was consciously become a universal religion. As a universal religion, or in its attempt to establish itself as such, its relations both to the Jews and to Rome were essentially altered. Judaism was tolerated by Roman statesmanship precisely because it was a national religion and had renounced all attempt to become anything more. That toleration was enjoyed by Christianity so long as the Christians were supposed to be some obscure and

unintelligible sect of the Jews. When they emerged from that position, they became an object at once of hatred to the Jews and of suspicion to the imperial authorities: the Christians were persecuted by both. The Jews were hated by other peoples then—and the feeling is not extinct even now in Europe or America—and the Christians, regarded at first as a sect of the Jews, were regarded by the populace with the same antipathy. On the part of the authorities, the persecution of the Christians was inspired by no feeling of religious intolerance: sheer obstinacy alone could be invoked to account for the Christians' refusal to do what every other sect did—why could they not worship their supreme god under the name of Zeus, recognize their angels under the names of the other subordinate deities, and render formal respect to the genius of the Emperor? That the formal, official religion of the State, the established religion, could be attacked on religious grounds, was an idea which could not present itself to statesmen who, at least from the time of Augustus, in their personal indifference to religion, had seen in religion no potentiality but that of being one of the instruments which lay ready to the hand of the statesman to be used for political purposes. The danger of that mistake indeed lurks wherever an established religion exists. But if the statesmen of imperial Rome were at first unconscious of the fact that it was with a religious force they had now to deal, the Christians were not. The struggle evoked the self-consciousness of Christianity. The demand to render to the genius of the Caesar the worship which was God's was one to which the answer had been provided by Jesus. And the answer from the Church went up in a tumultuous explosion of fanaticism which to this day flames with extraordinary—and to the ordinary reader incomprehensible—brightness in the Apocalypse. Rome, drunk with the blood of the saints and of the martyrs, shall be consumed, and her smoke go up forever and ever. Never again did Christian fanaticism flame so fiercely against the Empire as it does in the Revelation of S. John the Divine; but, as Doctor Wendland says, it is not insignificant that that apocalypse was received into the canonical scriptures.

But if fanaticism, inflamed by persecution, shot forth in one direction with a fury which finds no justification in the spirit

of the marvellous words, "Render unto Caesar the things that are Caesar's, and unto God the things that are God's," on the other hand, first Paul (Romans 13) and after him the Church, made more politic use of the permission to render to the Caesar the things that were his. The friendly attitude to the authority of the State which manifests itself in Luke and in the Fourth Gospel is borne out by the prayers for the Emperor which were used early by the Christian communities and by the loyalty which was preached even in spite of persecution. But on this side, too, it was possible to misinterpret the words, and to abandon their spirit. The spirit of the words is the indifference to be felt by the Church Universal toward forms of political government: to none can it be limited, still less can it be identified with any. This fundamental truth was obscured from view by the issue of the struggle as to whether the Roman Empire should dominate Christianity, or Christianity the Empire. Christianity became, in the issue, the established religion of the Empire and an instrument of the political ambition of the Papacy. Its consciousness of its mission to become the universal religion was overpowered by desire for universal political power. So it did indeed gain the political strength which enabled it, when the time came, to fight Mohammedanism with Mohammedanism's own weapon, the sword. *Sed non tali auxilio*—it is not by such a weapon that a religion can win its way. The sword has broken in the hands of Mohammedanism: Islam has now no political unity. Its only hope thereof is a Holy War—a hope not yet banished to the limbo of political impossibilities. The political weapon broke in Christianity's hands also: the Reformation shattered it, though the Church of Rome still feebly stretches its hands after it—in vain. No national, no established church, no church which is the tool of political ambition, will or can be the Church Universal. It is from America that the majority of missionaries proceed; though let us not forget that Rome too works, and always has worked, unceasingly in the mission field. In that field at any rate the differences which divide Christendom diminish in importance; there the consciousness of our common Christianity is taken for what it is—the supreme fact. If it is now as impossible for all within the Church Universal to recognize the infallibility of the

Pope as it was for all within the Roman Empire to render worship to the genius of the Roman Emperor, the ultimate issue in the one case as in the other will justify the protest and the protestants.

Indifference to forms of political government is in effect the principle on which the evolution of a world-religion depends. But the lesson was, and is, one hard to learn. To postpone the realization of a Church Universal until a world-empire has established itself is to proclaim that the Church must, to realize its own proper end, subserve the ambitions and back the policy of some one political power—must render to Caesar, Kaiser, Czar, or Emperor the things that are God's. Christianity can live, and has lived and flourished, under any form of government. It even survives when it relapses into the form of a state-religion, or established church. But, in such a case, it also throws out fresh roots in the form of free churches. But Christianity is not to be confined within any bonds, not to be limited even to the free churches. It is the religion by which Jesus brings us all to Our Father. The religious consciousness is a common consciousness of objective facts, the reality of which is given in the individual consciousness, but given in that very act as of universal, and not merely subjective, validity and truth.

[The work of Professor Paul Wendland to which Professor Jevons refers (p. 171) is part of a Handbook to the New Testament which is being published by the firm of J. C. B. Mohr, in Tübingen, under the editorial supervision of Hans Lietzmann. In it the author, who possesses exceptional qualifications for the task, has described in comparatively small compass the civilization of the Greek and Roman world at the beginning of the Christian era, especially as it influenced the spread or development of Judaism and Christianity.

In a series of interesting chapters he discusses the changes which the establishment of a universal empire wrought in religious as well as in political conditions; the development, in theory and fact, of cosmopolitanism and individualism; the prevailing conceptions and ideals of culture; the missionary activity of philosophical schools, and the popular discourse (diatribe) as a

means of propagating their influence; religious development in the Hellenistic world and under Roman rule; the influence of contemporary culture on the Jews in Palestine and in Greek-speaking countries; the relations of early Christianity to Hellenism, especially on its religious side—attraction and repulsion; finally, on syncretism and gnosticism.

The extent to which the missionaries of moral philosophy prepared the way for the missionaries of Christian faith has not been generally recognized. The paragraphs on Paul are fresh and full of insight. The volume forms an admirable introduction to the study of the New Testament and of early Christian history. Its value is enhanced by the judicious treatment of the abundant and somewhat scattered literature on the subjects with which the volume deals.—Ed.]

*SOME RECENT WORKS ON SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY*

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Systematic theology in its classic form is at once a philosophy of religion, a philosophy of history, and a world-view. It sums up in its master mind, St. Thomas Aquinas, the knowledge of its age. A great picture it is—none greater was ever conceived; indeed, for completeness, for dramatic movement, and for religious interest, none has ever remotely rivalled it. The great epics of Hinduism and the world-views of Buddhism and Islam fall far short in power and unity, in scientific grasp and form, in philosophic insight and in moral purpose; while the modern world has nothing which can be put in comparison, for our world-view is incomplete, discordant, perplexed with doubts, nor has it come to an understanding with the religious and ethical nature of man.

What forces went into the formation of the masterpiece, scholars well know; but we cannot so much as name them here, nor shall we attempt to discriminate and to determine how far it represented primitive Christianity. It was the growth of a thousand years, and, completed, it had centuries for its own; science and philosophy, literature and music and art, were its hand-maidens, and it ruled them rigidly. Not even the Protestant Reformation could disturb its sway, for only details were in issue, and the world-view remained undisturbed; indeed, its dominion was extended as common men were thenceforth instructed in its outlines.

Francis L. Patton, *A Summary of Christian Doctrine*, 1906 (copyright, 1875).

Augustus Hopkins Strong, *Systematic Theology*, seventh edition, 1902; eighth, 1907.

William Newton Clarke, *An Outline of Christian Theology*, 1898.

Clarence Augustine Beckwith, *Realities of Christian Theology*, 1906.

William Adams Brown, *Christian Theology in Outline*, 1906.

George Burman Foster, *The Finality of the Christian Religion*, 1906.



Dante once for all gave it immortal form, Milton carried it wherever the English tongue was spoken, and Bunyan made its rudiments as household words. Thus it entered into the minds of the people, fitting well enough the naïve cosmology derived from the senses and their interpretation of the Bible, since its science is the simple knowledge of the common man.

But the completeness and absoluteness of the system proved its undoing. How great the revolution between the thirteenth century and our own, between the seventeenth century and our own! Moreover, so much was unnecessary, since already in the sixteenth century men were quick to see that Galileo's doctrine undermined the system. What of its history, of its cosmology, even of its dramatization of the incarnation—he descended from above; he ascended into heaven; he sitteth at the right hand of God, from whence he shall come to judge the quick and the dead? We shall not dwell upon the story, but Melancthon and Bellarmine were right, the assertion of the truth of the Copernican hypothesis was the denial of theology.

How far we have come in these last four hundred years! What item of the knowledge of the thirteenth century now remains in philosophy, logic, history, natural science? Moreover, the new knowledge is widely extended in its influence, displacing the old even with uneducated folk. No Bunyan indeed has arisen to popularize it, but it is the commonplace of our schools and magazines and newspapers, and is embodied in the appliances which contribute to our modern civilization. The old learning is not disproved but forgotten. Theology alone of the mediaeval sciences remains still in its mediaeval form, with the same style of argumentation, the same framework and categories, the same material in largest part, and the identical illustrations. Only in points here and there has it been retouched, for theology has been identified with the truth—the truth about God necessary to men's salvation—and religion has been identified with creed, and thus a sacred conservatism has protected the system, and men given to its study have deemed it the holy place of the Most High. We are slow to think our concepts together, and nowhere so slow as here, while to keep differing forms of thinking separate, to be of the thirteenth and the twentieth century simultaneously or alter-

nately, is part of the fortunate inconsistency of mind which makes at once transition and continuity possible, which makes a progressive society possible.

A review of recent books of theology suggests this line of thought. Our list is taken only from representatives of the evangelical churches in the United States, and has none upon it whose author is not in regular standing in his communion; yet how various the attitudes, and how widely different the degrees of consciousness of the conflict of world-views! The study is interesting as an investigation into the manners and ways of the theological mind.

Modern text-books of Roman Catholic theology avow at once their adherence to the theology of St. Thomas Aquinas, as indeed they must since the encyclical of Leo XIII, "Aeterni Patris," August 4, 1879. In the same spirit certain Protestant theologians with equal confidence maintain the scheme of the seventeenth century scholasticism; and it is to be noted that the world-view of the seventeenth century scholastics differed not at all from that of the "Angelical Doctor." One might compare profitably the *Manual of Catholic Theology* by George Wilhelm and Thomas B. Scannell (1906) with the work of Dr. Strong to see how closely the two resemble each other. They are of the same school, and the advantage on disputed points is in doubt.

In our first group are men who permit the modern view to exercise no influence upon their theology, and for substance of doctrine the papal encyclical against Modernism would trouble them not at all. President Patton in a brief manual sums up his conclusions; a very few quotations will show his point of view. Theology is for him still queen of the sciences, and its acceptance the most important of intellectual acts, and this because of its utility. "The most important truth to every man is that which makes known the conditions of a happy hereafter. 'The doctrines' claim a position above all other truth because of their practical value" (p. 5); and this view is set forth in the ancient forms: "Entering heaven, the weary find rest, the wanderer a home, and the pilgrim leaves his tent for a city that hath foundations. Earth's sinning Christians shall wear white robes. Earth's sorrowing disciples shall waken notes of joy from harps of gold" (p. 116). Crit-

ical views as to the historicity of the Biblical narratives and as to the composition of the text are simply denied: "The historic credibility of the Bible is a settled question. The books of Moses were written by Moses. The Gospels are genuine biographies, and were written by the men whose names they bear. What is true of the Pentateuch and of the Gospels is true of all the other books of the Bible" (p. 25). "All the parts of the Old Testament are put on the same level. No difference of rank or value is recognized" (p. 27), and, in short, all "the Bible is infallible" (p. 26). We are descended from Adam and inherit his guilt (p. 36). And our relationship to God is primarily that of the criminal to the judge, for the saving act is not moral, nor is it pardon, but it is directly forensic. Christ has paid our penalty so that we owe nothing and are free (p. 59 ff.). God is understood and his existence proved in the ancient way, and Paley's watch still does service in the teleological argument. The incomprehensibility of God is above reason but not against it, while still we can judge of him neither by our standards of reason nor by our standards of morality, as the laws which govern us do not apply to him (p. 19). Modern science does not exist; acceptance of evolution is referred to contemptuously, and it is categorically affirmed that "there is no evidence that any species has developed by gradual transition out of a lower species" (p. 12). It is in accordance with this type of doctrine that the chief authority for President Patton is Professor Charles Hodge, and that the edition of 1906 still bears the copyright date, 1875.

The same attitude is maintained in a far more elaborate work by President Strong, of the Rochester Theological Seminary. He differs, it is true, on various points like "imputation" from the Princeton view, but the argumentation is of the same character and the two are in the same class. They represent together the instruction given in a majority of American theological seminaries. Our author's *Systematic Theology* appeared in its seventh edition in 1902, and the first volume of the greatly expanded eighth edition bears the date 1907. In the five years Dr. Strong's opinions have been modified at a few points, but the system is scarcely touched. In the seventh edition he accepted the Mosaic authorship of the Pentateuch (p. 82), while he now adopts Wood's theory of

"stratification" (p. 171), but this does not affect the substance of doctrine. "The Bible is the work of one mind." "Not one moral or religious utterance of all these writers has been contradicted or superseded by the utterances of those who have come after, but all together constitute a consistent system" (p. 175). "There are degrees of value but not of inspiration" (p. 220). "We do not admit the existence of scientific error in Scripture" (p. 223). "It may be safely said that science has not yet shown any fairly interpreted passage of Scripture to be untrue" (p. 224). And the same may be said of its history (pp. 226-228); while it is denied that such errors, if they existed, would injure its value as a revelation (p. 228).

These statements carry with them acceptance of the great age of the antediluvians and the flood (p. 229), and stories like those of Samson and Balaam (p. 196). Science and the Bible are "reconciled" in the usual fashion (pp. 223 ff.). We cannot forbear to quote some illustrations from the seventh edition, the corresponding section of the eighth edition not having as yet come into our hands: The Mosaic narrative of creation is "a pictorial-summary interpretation," "a rough sketch of the history of creation, true in all its essential features." It is so given that "it could expand to all the ascertained results of subsequent physical research" (p. 193). So with Genesis 3 1-7: "Its general character [is] not mythical or allegorical, but historical" (p. 302). If we ask how it is then that death was in the world, as geology shows, before the fall, the answer is at hand: "God arranged even the geological history to correspond with the foreseen effect of human apostasy" (p. 353). One admires such powers of argumentation almost more than he does the miracle of an inspiration which so elastically sketches essential features that they can stretch to embrace all possible discoveries. In argument and revelation the human and the divine are in a rare combination, defying all hostile science, a combination which is invincible, and needs only to be supplemented by the author's position that miracle and prophecy constitute an important proof of revelation since some such outward sign seems necessary to secure the recipient against self-deception and to make the revelation authoritative to all (p. 116, last edition).

We respect and admire Aquinas, and we can even understand the attempt of the Roman Church to impose his teaching on the present age. In a fashion one admires the audacity it shows, while recognizing its utter futility. By his authority the Pope may, it is true, silence Modernism in the church; but he cannot extirpate it, nor influence in the smallest degree the great world-movement which it represents. So one may admire the Westminster Assembly of divines, without joining in the notion that their views are sufficient for today. Our Protestant scholastics of the twentieth century are engaged in the same attempt as is the Pope, but without his authority. They stand much nearer to Rome than to distinguished theologians of their own denominations. For example, how can we measure the distance which separates Rochester from Colgate if we are to judge by their theological output, yet both are of the Baptist denomination. The professor of theology in the latter, however, seeks to understand his own time, and he writes for living men.

For Professor Clarke there is no longer any absolute system of theology, for all our truth is relative. "The theology of any age is largely an expression of the Christian experience of that age." "Theology is formed in it as in an atmosphere. The theologies of today are part and product of the Christian life of today. . . . This is why they differ from previous theologies" (p. 19). Thus there is no hard and fast faith once delivered to the saints, nor any revelation which may be—must be—tortured and stretched to meet all contingencies. "Christian Theology is the intellectual treatment of the Christian religion" (p. 6). It is therefore subject to all the limits of intellectual endeavor, and it is also enriched by all the fruits of intellectual achievement. "In order to success in theology, a man should be sensitive to life and able to think in sympathy with the living thought of his time" (p. 57). No scientific knowledge is foreign to him, for he has reverence for all truth. These judgments condemn not only the authors of our first division but most of the voluminous theologies of the past fifty years. It follows naturally that the questions of the origin of the world and of men are not to be settled by learned exegesis of the earlier chapters of Genesis, but by the appropriate sciences (pp. 222-223). For religion is not dependent upon these terms

of origin, while it is apparent that science gives "an evolutionary answer" (p. 224). Coming so far, Doctor Clarke faces fearlessly the critical problems of the Bible, and all questions of date and authorship are left unhesitatingly to the results of scholarly investigation.

That these principles are not carried out in a thorough-going fashion is not to the discredit of Professor Clarke. In the discussion of sin, the third chapter of Genesis still remains, not as history indeed, but "as a strikingly true picture of the real nature of sin and the principle on which it entered to mankind" (p. 241), while the reader may be referred to the discussion of the Trinity (pp. 161-181) and of Christ (pp. 260 ff.) as indicating how far the older categories retain their mastery. Yet even here, how widely different is the spirit, and how constant the effort to realize the truth in the experience and to make the ethical and religious supreme; and what a difference between the robes and harps of President Patton and Professor Clarke's thought of salvation, which is "to be transformed into the likeness of God in Christ"!

Probably no one else has so influenced the evangelical theology of the twentieth century as has Professor Clarke; his spirituality, his ethical soundness, his moderation and self-restraint, his avoidance of current terms applied with little appreciation of their meaning, and his holding fast to the old until assured of the new, have all combined to give him wide influence. For Professor Clarke science is manifestly no longer the hand-maid of theology to be scolded and commanded, but it too is a revelation of God. Reason has come to its full rights. Once the Christian religion entered the domain of reason, the Greek philosophy, as an alien, submitting to its laws and adopting its methods. Naturalized, it modified its adopted home: grown strong at last, it seized the reins of power and ruled; but only to cause constant revolts, as reason could not remain enslaved, and asserted itself, at first in the outer courts, but at last in the centre of imperial power. Natural science, logic, philosophy, and now religion, acknowledge reason as supreme. For Professor Clarke the day of dogmatic authority is ended. It is inevitable that others shall attempt to go farther on the same road.

We turn to the Congregational denomination for our illustration, and find it in *The Realities of Christian Theology*. With Professor Clarke the rights of historical criticism and of science are admitted, but Professor Beckwith is to give us "a fresh interpretation of Christian experience in terms of modern intelligence" (p. vii). In this endeavor two factors are of prime importance, psychology and evolution. "The value of psychology in our discussion is many-sided. In tracing the development of religious beliefs, for instance, it is to be remembered that these have all had a psychological history. They have taken their rise in consciousness and followed a genetic order." "No study is more fascinating, as, indeed, none is more rewarding, than to trace the psychological history of the belief in God, the conception of sacrifice, the notion of sin, and the doctrine of a future life" (p. 5). "The new psychological study of conversion is doing more to reveal its true nature than all other inquiries combined" (p. 9). "The number of adolescent conversions discloses a uniformity of experience which can be accounted for only on the basis of a law of consciousness" (p. 10). But psychology has also its transforming influence on particular doctrines. "All the questions which come up with reference to the development of the kingdom of God on earth, of a so-called probation after death, of a Second Coming, and subjects associated with these in theological discussion, of punishment and blessedness, have been profoundly modified in the precise degree to which the essential laws of the human consciousness have become fully known" (p. 11). Evolution, too, "is to be frankly and heartily accepted as furnishing an interpretative principle to all those events with which theology is concerned." "First, in respect to the world itself." "Secondly, Christianity, both in its origin and in its development, is subject to the same law" (pp. 11-12). We do Professor Beckwith injustice in these quotations, as one should read his entire introduction to see how completely he adopts the modern point of view.

But when we turn to his discussion we are perplexed, for "The traditional order of topics is mainly followed, partly for convenience, and partly because to one who travels through a country it is of less importance by what route he goes than what he sees

on the way" (p. ix). But the route determines the country one travels through and fixes in advance the objects he shall see. The ancient dogmatic order is not of secondary consequence, but belongs to the system; and it leads straight to the heart of the thirteenth century. So after all, in the *Realities of Christian Theology* we have the old questions discussed once more, and in much the old way. It is true that in the doctrine of God we have an interpretation of the origin of the concept of God from a study of comparative religion—a wrong derivation in my judgment, but that does not matter—and then precisely the same list of attributes and the same distinctions as to being, distinctions carried out into full scholasticism in the final chapter on the Trinity. In the discussion of man, also, Genesis reappears; and when one turns to the "last things," it is emphatically not psychology which is predominant. The attempt indeed is foredoomed to failure, for if one is to have a theology with psychology and evolution as guiding principles, it is clear that not only the old order and the old terminology but the old problems are doomed. They arose in different circumstances, they are the product of a different world-view, and they look askew when seen from the standing-ground of modern men.

But are we prepared for such a reconstruction? Philosophical schools are in chaos, and we have only the beginnings of the psychology of religion. Ladd, Höffding, Leuba, and James have given us careful studies; but neither do they agree among themselves, nor would any of them attempt to reconstruct the doctrine of the resurrection or of the second coming of our Lord by the aid of this discipline. Ladd and Höffding show us what religion really is to men who understand psychology; and they by no means find the traditional order of topics convenient, nor do they pass through the same territory or see the same things.

The same thing may be said of evolution, for one does not see its value as a determining principle in a theology which stands by the old categories. They are framed on the principle of *being*, while it adopts the notion of *becoming*. Really to adopt this principle with its consequences, making all knowledge strictly relative, would affect, not the angle at which the old doctrines are



seen, but the foundation principles on which they rest; for the principle of Heraclitus destroys a scholasticism built upon a union of Neoplatonism and thirteenth century Aristotehanism. And, once more, is evolution in a condition to give us a theology? One cannot find so much as an authoritative definition of the word, and Professor Beckwith never tells us what he means by it. In the clash of modern scientific schools one knows no certain ground for the construction of a world-view. In our judgment the application of biological terms to regions where they do not apply, especially to the range of studies roughly grouped under the titles anthropology and sociology, has wrought only injury, and, in particular, the comparative study of religion has suffered. Man's biological development was complete before his religious development began, and a new mythology and a new scholasticism are created when the facts of religious history are forced into an alien framework. But, to do him justice, Professor Beckwith is not open to this charge. His use of these categories is not scientific but rhetorical, and his idea of evolution reminds one not of Darwin or of De Vries, but of a faint shadow of Hegel.

The third book we have chosen to illustrate the effort to bridge the chasm between ancient topics and modern thought is *Christian Theology in Outline*. Its author brings adequate learning to his task, and a clear epistemology which controls his thinking. In this volume is no loose use of terms, but careful definitions formed with equal attention to the past and the present. Every sentence has been studied, and the temptation to a rhetorical use of borrowed terms has not assailed the author.

Professor Brown at the outset discriminates and sets forth his purpose:

I am well aware that there are not a few thoughtful people in our day who, for causes into which it is not necessary here to enter, have moved so far in their sympathies from the historic forms of Christianity that any attempt to relate the living content of our present spiritual life to these forms seems to them misleading, if not disingenuous. I believe that one of the most important problems which face the Christian theologian at the present day is how to present the permanent elements in the Christian message in a form to appeal to those who have thus broken with the past. But, legitimate and fascinating as this attempt may be,

it is not the task proposed in the present book. The public which it addresses consists of those who still feel themselves at home in the Christian church, who value the heritage which has come down to them from the past as a priceless possession, but who do not always see clearly how to relate this treasure to the world of thought in which they are living, and so find themselves in a situation of perplexity, if not of positive distress. To such the reinterpretation of old terms here proposed may serve as a help and not a hindrance, fostering that sense of spiritual unity with the past without which the religious life of the present must necessarily be impoverished.<sup>1</sup>

The position has indeed its difficulties, and they are scarcely made less by their recognition; none of our other authors thus far has seen them so clearly. The question for the theologian before all other questions is that of truth, and our first problem is this: Can the "historic forms of Christianity" be rendered into the modern world-view? If not, efforts in this direction seem to partake of *ho-ben*, an expressive Buddhist phrase which means the adoption of forms cast aside by the teacher for himself but used for others for paedagogic purposes. It is perhaps not surprising that our author has been charged by one sharp critic with being disingenuous, while other critics have held that his use of these forms is misleading since he is governed by a thorough-going rationalism. But the charges from the left and right are untrue, as indeed they are untrue for all our mediating theologians. Professor Brown proves by his book that he is sincerely devoted to the terms and forms of historic Christianity; for him they have far more than a paedagogic value, as they represent fundamental and enduring truth. With enthusiasm he receives his precious theological inheritance, and it is not merely for convenience' sake that he adopts the ancient itinerary and travels through the familiar scenes. These are his not only by birthright but by mature reflection and conscious adoption.

Yet the older presuppositions have disappeared; for example, he no longer holds the metaphysics of being, for activity is the category of reality for him, so that a person or a thing is known by its doings. If one would appreciate how far-reaching is this principle, let him read the chapter on the Trinity and compare

<sup>1</sup> Pages viii-ix.

it with the corresponding passages in Clarke and Beckwith. For Brown the triunity is not in the being of God but in the receptivity of our minds, and its truth therefore is found in his manifestation to us; for our knowledge of God, while not of some abstract being, is all the more real on this account. For as the sun has warmth and light as thus we respond to its power, so is God love and righteousness as his presence awakens response in us. Moreover, as we know the sun only through our response, so only do we know God. "The self-revealing God is the real God,—the only God we can or need to know" (p. 161). Here is no misleading use of psychology or of evolution; but the transformation is more thorough-going, since epistemology applies directly to all problems of theology—indeed, for the consistent thinker, as is his epistemology so shall his philosophy and theology be.

Nevertheless, the philosophical interest of the old system reasserts itself: a philosophical trinity is essential, and the doctrine remains as "the most concise and the most comprehensive statement of the Christian faith, gathering into a single phrase all the richness of content which has entered into the thought of God through the Christian experience of redemption" (p. 163). When we ask why this is so, we are told that our reason demands a unified world-view, and that this is met by the philosophical trinity (pp. 159–163). One may question, to begin with, whether any philosophical trinity gives us a unified world-view, however readily we may agree that it gives to us a comprehensive statement of Christian experience. Granted that the intellect demands a unified world-view, ancient dualists and modern pluralists to the contrary notwithstanding, still does it follow that theology must present it, and specifically does the Christian religion present it? And once more, does our modern science make it possible, or is the doctrine of the Trinity adequate to this demand? Modern science may admit monism as a demand of the intellect and accept it as a practical postulate of faith; but the demand can be met only tentatively and hypothetically, and in no sense in some single phrase which shall be accepted as fundamental. For Professor Brown the ancient form clouds the discussion, and leads here and there to unexpected statements; for him in reality, we

take it, this unified world-view is like the possibility of a complete knowledge, it is a *terminus ad quem*.

The same may be said of his discussion of the absolute; the reader must keep Professor Brown's epistemology in mind and all his wits about him or he will be misled. Here again the substance agrees with the epistemology, but the form makes the order wrong, and this tends to leave a false impression on all but the most discerning readers. And once more, in the discussion of God the fitting of the new material into the old forms makes too great demands on the reader, for though the definition of an attribute leaves nothing to be desired if we catch the author's thought, the order of the following discussion takes us to the verge of unreality.

However, it is apparent that the volume meets a genuine need and serves a high purpose; it is a large and increasing class of ministers and laymen who occupy precisely the position Professor Brown has in view. They have not broken with the historic forms of Christianity, and they do breathe the atmosphere of our age. Books like those in our first class present to them a dismal alternative—either they must give up Christianity or they must surrender scientific truth. The encyclical of the Pope puts Catholics into this dilemma, a dilemma the more terrible in proportion to the strength of the love for our religion. Our Protestant scholastics lack the thunders of the papal power, but so far as in them lies they force their readers to the same fatal choice. To all perplexed by the dualistic severance of theology from truth, come the mediating theologians with discernment, learning, religious fervor, and profound truth, showing the way themselves have found to peace. Professors Clarke, Beckwith, and Brown in their several degrees perform this service for the church.

With Professor Brown however the method is at the breaking point; a little larger application and it is shattered. We doubt if more of the new wine could be poured into the old bottles and still both be preserved. It remains for some one to cast the forms themselves wholly aside.

This Professor Foster essays to do in *The Finality of the Christian Religion*. He is to discuss the real problems, and we do not expect him to adopt the old order of topics as a convenience nor

to travel by the old route. Indeed, for him the past has been destroyed like the island of the Malay Archipelago which the explosion on Krakatoa overwhelmed, and for our author no faint sound of church-bells beneath the sea causes even a passing pang of regret.

The book in its greater part is an account of the explosion; from point after point it shows the destructive energy of the seismic force, summing all up in the fifth chapter, *The Changed View of the World and of Life*. But our author is not content with this, but goes on to bring the resources of modern scholarship to bear without reservation upon the gospel narrative itself, and raises the main question, whether there be any permanent in Christianity (p. 10). His argument is not dogmatic but apologetic. Science is knowledge of truth; it is not simply a hypothesis, though hypotheses enter into it; it is not a body of opinion out of which certain opinions may be taken and others left; but it is what we know, and this knowledge differs *toto caelo* from the knowledge of the thirteenth century. For Professor Foster there is no light-hearted acceptance of psychology and evolution as giving our old dogmas in new lights, but a resolute grasp of the facts and an equally resolute rejection of all which is opposed to them.

This is the general impression made by the book and by the earnestness, fearlessness, and industry of its author. For him no difficulty is too small and no discussion too intricate, so that our second impression is that the work is fine-spun and prolix. For example see in Chapter 7 the discussion of the method of historical study: Is it idiographic, or nomothetic, or teleological, or, as the author thinks, a combination of the first two (pp. 303-324)? One may ask indeed for whom was the book written; not, surely, for thosewhom Professor Brown has in view, for they would be bewildered, offended, and left in suspense; but also surely not for men who have broken with the old forms, since for them the destructive part is a slaying of the dead and the construction is all too slight. It is not for the modern man who doubts the Christian religion, since for him as apologetic it does not enter into the main question at all. It reads like a record of the progress of the author's own convictions, and its value is chiefly for

men passing through the same phases of intellectual experience. How else shall we account for the long chapter on the sources of the life of Christ; for should an author assume that he must say it all, and that his readers have only his book open to them?

Perhaps, after all, the older types still exert their influence, not now as formative, but negatively as worthy of combat. This would account for the fierceness of his onslaught; but positively also they remain as ghosts, forcing him to long engagements with history and with naturalism, until one asks whether the finality of the Christian religion can indeed depend upon these minute discussions and this intricate argumentation. For Christianity was the faith of plain people before it became the prey of scholars; it was a saving power before it became a world-view. The real issue is this, Does Christianity still save? Modern science would be as unconvincing to the world as is theology if it consisted only of its discussions as to atoms and ether and method; but science embodies itself in facts, and forces itself upon our attention as it lights our houses, drives our cars, and revolutionizes our civilization. Real knowledge starts with facts, and to facts it returns, and by facts it is judged.

Professor Foster, it is true, gives us here and there the truth by which he lives, "The veracious self-dependence of love as the kernel and star of the religious life—this is the innermost meaning and message of the Master" (p. 472). Love "has the sublime composure of creative power; it has divine genius and authority. It is this love, *and this alone*, that Jesus says is required of men" (p. 472). Christianity, he tells us, is "the spirit of Christ" (p. 134). "Faith in the divine truth of Christianity is not founded on the bodily resurrection of Jesus, . . . but on its new content, the world of love and grace" (p. 137). So we believe in God, "not on the basis of any external authority whatsoever, but on the basis of our own moral experience" (p. 135); and in Jesus as "reconciler," because "his Spirit dwells in us and fills us with the peace of God" (p. 136).

In general we may say the point of view is Kant's, but filled out and given motive power by the spirit of Jesus. "We are saved, not by ideas, but by ideals. Thus, too, the revelation which Jesus brought is himself; and Kant was right when he said that

there was nothing good in the world save a good will alone" (p. 187). Christianity is "not a religion of facts, but of values; and values are timeless; that is, Christianity is an eternal religion which is *in*, but not *of*, the historical" (p. xiii).

The treatment is incomplete; a second volume is promised in which the constructive will be more evident, and until it appears it is unfair to criticize the present work as more than preparatory, but as such it is representative of much of the work of modern men. They are endlessly patient in details and fearlessly honest; they follow truth wherever it leads them, even though it be to an increasingly thorough destruction, but they are not equally clear in their statements of positive truth, for as yet, we take it, they are not certain as to that saving faith by which men live and for which they would die. Nor, we may add in conclusion, does Professor Foster show upon what terms men who have never held the ancient forms may come to the central message; and this question deserves an answer—whether without the very doctrines he rejects the modern world would have found the truth he holds.

Our survey of these notable books raises once more the question of the possibility of a systematic theology. The old we know. Its great authors had no question as to the truth of its world-view and of its entire accord with Christian facts; but its acceptance in our day is impossible, unless we admit a fundamental dualism of truth, agreeing that what is false in science is true in theology. That cannot be; and as the opposition becomes apparent, men will choose, and not for theology. The crisis is in Protestantism as in Romanism, and its end is easily foreseen.

Then shall we retranslate our terms into modern speech? The attempt is laudable and necessary, it would be unfair to the present as to the past if it were not made. Let the old order and the old forms and the old beliefs be arrayed in the costume of the present. In all seriousness let me repeat how deeply I sympathize with the attempt and how sincerely I could wish it entire success; but to men who have broken with the old forms it looks like a masquerade, ingenious, interesting, but unconvincing, unreal, and ready to disappear at dawn.

On the other hand, we have the philosophy of religion, and we

are told that it will suffice. Its advantages are great; it is of the modern age, whose methods are its own by birthright; it is freed from the trammels of the ancient order of topics and of the ancient material. It need not profess omniscience, but can openly avow that it does not know; but for all it does not give us religion, as it does not profess so to do, and at least it leaves room for the thorough-going treatment of our faith. Religion is a permanent fact, and its greatest expression is Christianity. Religion is in the feelings, veneration, adoration, worship, dependence, trust, and these are called forth by objects we agree to name divine. Religion may be formal, it may be superficial, it may be degrading and degraded, but at its best it is the deepest response of the self to the highest we know. Religion is essentially subjective, and in the self it finds its reality. In all religions a vital experience has been sought for; unfound, religion is only a rite, a creed, a pretence. What then shall call forth the deepest trust and the holiest adoration? Answer, and you describe your God. It is apparent that one has qualifications for theology only as he has the experience. The essence of Christianity will never be discovered by learned discussions, but only by a living faith. What is it that is God to me, to you? This is what we meant by Christianity being a fact, a fact of saving power, a fact for scholar and for boor, a fact of blood-red earnestness, a fact whose everlasting symbol is the Cross. It is this first of all, or it is only an elaborate subject for learned discussion, signifying nothing. What is the significance of this experience, how is it related to Jesus, and finally is it true, not simply as bare fact—this we know—but true as related to the totality of our experience? Was Jesus' trust of the Father justified? Is our trust in the eternal goodness justified? Was Jesus right in his choice of a life-purpose and of the means he adopted to this end, and are we justified in seeking to be of his mind?

Theology can never divorce itself from the quest for truth; it can never permit *ho-ben*, nor can it content itself, like mysticism, with mere experience. Its task is not the ancient one; it no longer takes all knowledge as its field nor has it a list of propositions as unchanging norm. It deals with few topics, but they



the highest. Its task is never finished. In religion man in his deepest experience surrenders himself to the highest he can know. To divine this highest is a limitless task for a widening experience, and glimpses of new truth stir afresh the soul. Old things pass away; all things become new. Only when we know as we are known can we have a theology which shall need no revision; and only when we see face to face; when we enter into full communion with the Father, can we describe the finality of our religion. All else is subordinate, mechanism, metaphysics, history, since to one task and to it alone theology should devote itself. And we still wait for the genius who shall state our fundamental faith in accordance with that insight which the modern man has gained.

*ETHICAL MONISM AND THE PROBLEM OF EVIL*

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A favourite argument of the neo-Hegelian apologists for the appearance of evil in a perfect world is the contention that without evil good could not exist. By this we are to understand, not that evil is a *sine qua non* of the existence of the good, unavoidably incidental to its production and maintenance, but rather, indeed, that it is an indispensable factor in the very essence of perfection and positively contributive to its value. Unaltered in accidents yet changed in substance, it is, as it were, transubstantiated by an eternal act of consecration in the mind and purpose of God. That we neither perceive nor comprehend the miracle is due to our human limitations. Could we see things as God sees them, "under the aspect of eternity," we should then understand how what we call sin and suffering and defeat and shame have their place in the economy of the whole, and provide, along with the other oppositions and conflicts in the world, the indispensable condition of that victorious battle with obstacles and limitations and that triumphant resolution of contradictories in higher syntheses in which the life and happiness of the absolute consists. So, though our partial and superficial experiences do not enjoy the triumph (and indeed cannot, since were we conquerors or indifferent to defeat there would be no evil to transcend), we may yet have faith that in our deepest and total self the victory has been won and peace attained. Thus God's ways are justified to man; and though the world is apparently full of evil, we are still entitled to believe it really good, and are able intelligently to account for and defend our belief.

If we divest this theory of its rhetoric, its weight stripped is that the imperfection of the part is consonant with the perfection of the whole. This is the real thesis which underlies the various fashions of the argument. Its distinctions between the partial

and the complete points of view, its invocations of analogies drawn from aesthetic experience, its appeals to the verities of the moral life, all do but seek in different ways to make credible and inspiring this cold and homely proposition.

The design of the present article is to sketch in bare outline an *exposé* of this attempt. Such a sketch must necessarily be disjointed, for it has not only to show up the thesis itself, questioning the validity of the proposition *a priori*, but also to follow it in its appeal to concrete experience, pointing out the confusions of which it is guilty and the inappropriateness of the analogies upon which it relies. Of necessity, then, we shall be forced to string the points which we wish to make somewhat loosely upon the thread of argument.

Let us join issue then at once. Our first step may well be to clear the ground and expose the main position by making once and for all the distinction between moral and natural perfection. It is all the more important to do so, inasmuch as the crucial difficulty with the absolutist's position seems to lie in his inability not to confuse them.

It must be obvious that the moral imperfection of any or of all the parts in no wise contradicts the natural perfection of the whole. Natural perfection is synonymous with explained systematic existence; and the explicability of things has nothing to do with their moral values, in the narrower sense of the term. We are as able to find sufficient reason in the constitution of mechanical nature for what we call evil as for what we call good. The causes of sin and suffering as well as of virtue and happiness can be traced, and both will be found equally congruous with its systematic character, equally intelligible, and hence, metaphorically speaking, equally good from its point of view. It is one of the axioms of the scientific method and interest that whatever is, is right.

So far then as the absolutist is a naturalist and imputes merely a mechanical perfection to reality, we have no quarrel with him. But he is not usually so discreet. He insists upon attributing to reality a perfection in which not merely our passion for truth but our passions for goodness and beauty find, did we but know it, their absolute satisfaction.

This, on the face of it, is a different proposition. The ethical ideal is determined by other purposes beside the scientific. In the world of moral values things are not justified by their existence, nor do they find sufficient reason in their natural causes. The moral interest in them is not satisfied by showing their place and necessity in the natural order. They are good only if room can be found for them in an ideal reconstruction of the natural order determined not only by logical but by aesthetic and moral considerations. I do not mean, be it noted, that this ideally reconstructed world would not be mechanical. On the contrary, there is no *a priori* reason why a perfect life should not flourish in a mechanical order. As it is, such a view of nature seems best to satisfy the logical and scientific interest in understanding the world. And it would answer to the moral demand also, provided only the mechanism were such as not to subvert our other interests, but to furnish us rather, as it did the Epicurean gods, with the means of happy self-realization:

Omnia suppeditat porro Natura, neque ulla  
Res animi pacem delibat tempore in ullo.

But, to revert from this digression concerning the mechanical hypothesis, it is certainly difficult to understand, at any rate on the level of abstract reasoning, how any whole can be morally perfect if any of its parts be morally imperfect. For the moral value of the part would seem necessarily to be estimated by its congruity with the total moral order, just as its natural value is determined by its explicability by the natural order in question. Its inexplicable or chance character means its inability to find place and ground in the conceived total system; its imperfect character, its unfitness for inclusion within a perfectly satisfactory whole. To say then that the world may be perfect in spite of the imperfection of its parts, is on a par with saying that it may be completely intelligible notwithstanding an absence of sufficient reason in its constituents. And any demonstration that a morally imperfect fact can belong to a system of facts in its entirety morally satisfactory and perfect will implicitly justify the conclusion that an incomprehensible event can be part of a perfectly comprehensible universe.

At this point, however, the absolutist is likely to take his cue for an impressive entrance. We have given him, he will say, just the opening he was looking for. The part taken by itself may seem chance and unintelligible. It becomes intelligible only when seen in its relations to the total series and system. Taken by itself, also, it may seem imperfect and evil. It becomes good only when seen in its relations to the whole. The origin of evil lies just in the partial and finite point of view.

The correctness of this resolution of evil into partial and fragmentary vision we might sharply challenge, if we chose. It involves a reduction of physical and moral evil to metaphysical evil which is quite unwarranted except in a thorough-going mysticism, and it exemplifies admirably the confusion of moral with natural perfection. But, as the situation is in no wise altered by the contention, it is scarcely worth while to raise the point.

For the absolutist has not solved the problem of evil; he has merely restated it. Grant his contention that evil is a matter of appearance and partiality, and that it is transcended and transmuted to good from the point of view of the whole, the question still remains, how account on his own premises for the existence of the appearance and of the error which it involves? If the world be really perfect, how can it be the basis of any point of view which finds it imperfect? The illusion, at least, of sin and suffering is real enough. The consistent naturalist can perhaps deal with it by saying that the illusion is simply one fact among others. That we make moral distinctions, that we find the world imperfect or irrational, is just one expression, on a par with all other facts, of the nature of things. But if the whole be conceived as possessing a value consonant with our ideal of moral perfection, as responsive, that is, to the demand not only for logical consistency, but for absence of pain and sin as well, the existence of the illusion becomes inexplicable. For the illusion is an evil. Error would be, then, *a priori* impossible in a perfect world. The perfect reality which the absolute is could not account for the imperfection of its appearance in the eyes of what is a part of itself; nor is it comprehensible how the opinion that things are irrational and unsatisfactory should contribute to their real rationality and satisfactoriness. If, to paraphrase Bishop But-

ler, this were a perfect world, it could not be imperfectly comprehended.

The absolutist, however, is ready with his reply. We have not understood him. We have argued on the assumption that good and evil, perfection and imperfection, are contradictory and reciprocally exclusive. But it is this which he denies. It is not contrary to the law of contradiction that evil should be at the same time evil and not evil. A thing may be painful, and yet we may like it; an obstacle, and yet we may enjoy overcoming it. Witness the thrill of pleasure in titillating a sensitive tooth with one's tongue, or the proverbial New England enjoyment of ill-health. And, that his examples may not be wholly pathological, he formulates an elaborate appeal to normal aesthetic and moral experience and to psychology which it now becomes our task to examine and criticize.

We have first to note an invocation of the aesthetic analogy in general. Evil in the world is like the villain in the play, the harsh note or chord in the harmony, or the shadows in the picture. As these, by reason of their very mean, discordant, or dark character, are not only indispensable to bringing out the full value of their opposites but actually enhance the worth of the whole composition, so evil, by virtue of its vicious and evil character, sets off the good and improves the universe.

This is, however, a singularly incorrect and confused translation of ethical into aesthetic terms. Whether or no aesthetic and moral values, regarded in their proper spheres and as expressive of different interests, need coincide, it is plain that if we are to speak analogically of the one in terms of the other the aesthetically good must correspond to the morally good, the aesthetically evil to the morally evil. Only by such a deliberate and exact translation of the one by the other, forced though it may be, is it possible to use the simile at all, and to describe or practise life as a fine art and have it still a moral life.

It is manifestly improper, then, in the example given above to liken moral evil to villain or discord or shadow. For from the point of view of the artist these are in themselves a neutral subject-matter, capable of being made elements in either beauty or in ugliness according as they are well or ill treated. Moral

evil should rather correspond to the unconvincing conception or presentation of the villain, or the inappropriate introduction of the discord, or the wrong painting of the shadow. But in that case the analogy proves a *reductio ad absurdum* of what it is invoked to demonstrate. To say that the world is better for the evil in it, turns out to be like saying that the play is more artistic for being inartistically written, the symphony finer for being ill-composed, the picture greater for being indifferently painted.

But the absolutist will put this aside as a mere sophism: the point is, he will insist, that here we have an example of how a thing regarded in itself may seem evil, but in relation to a larger content, good. We may concede this without hesitation. Just as the moral imperfection of the parts was consonant with the mechanical, so it might be with the aesthetic perfection of the whole. Instead of regarding nature as a mere machine, indifferent to good and evil, we might regard her as an artist equally gratified in both. Appreciative audience of her own actions, she might applaud the dramatic propriety of all, finding the villain as necessary to the value of her play as the hero, and prizing him accordingly. But granted all this, it throws no more light on the problem of reconciling moral evil to a moral absolute than did the congruity of sin and suffering with the mechanical perfection of the physical order. Indeed, to resolve the opposition between good and evil into a harmonious difference of complementary artistic effects is merely to drape naturalism rather diaphanously with the pathetic fallacy. The world that admires all its parts as equally appropriate to its aesthetic perfections possesses the same ethical significance as that in which all are regarded as equally necessary and characteristic features in the operation of its mechanism. To neither world are moral values applicable or relevant.

The analogy, then, from aesthetic, as that from natural perfection, may be dismissed, so far as the argument is concerned. In the one case as in the other, any apparent pertinence rests upon an ambiguity in the use of the term "good" or "perfect"; and wherever the figure is correctly and strictly developed, it discredits the point it is employed to illustrate. It is in moral

experience alone, then, whence all possibility of equivocation has been excluded, that we can find, if anywhere, the justification of the absolutist's contention. And here it is that we are confronted immediately with a number of facts which, as it seems to him, irrefutably bear out his position. The very pleasurable-ness of pleasure, he points out, depends upon an antithesis of pain. There can be no satisfaction without a preparation of dissatisfaction; no sense of beauty except in opposition to ugliness; no virtue which is really virtuous without vicious tendencies; no merit without temptation and struggle. And, finally, there is the supreme fact that we enjoy the struggle; that we take pleasure in pain and labour; that peace is only peace if it be wrung from conflict.

It is evident that it is only with this last argument that we need really deal if we so choose. For, granting the interdependence of contraries which is the gist of the first series of contentions, we may well ask whether here again we have anything more than another restatement of the problem of evil. To say that there can be no pleasure without pain, beauty without ugliness, good conduct without vicious propensities, or perfect activity except in overcoming obstacles, is not necessarily to show how imperfection may be transubstantiated into perfection, but might be taken as merely an emphatic demonstration that the world is imperfectly constituted.

The pessimist will say frankly that such a world is not worth what it costs. The majority of men, while willing to pay what they do for it, are responsive to Leonardo's cry, "O God, that sellest us goods at a price of great weariness." They would beat the world down if they could. To naïve common sense, at least, it seems as if it were just this fact that everything had to be bargained for and nothing valuable was free in which, from the point of view of morals, the imperfection of nature consisted. In a perfect nature the good would be free as air, and all activities would be naturally directed through happy performance to happy results.

Still, these statements of the interdependence of contraries are not only irrelevant but specious in themselves; and, if only in the interest of a pleasanter view of life, it will be well for us to



stop a moment and try to dispose of them. The first point, the interdependence of pleasure and pain and of satisfaction and dissatisfaction, seems capable of an obvious *reductio ad absurdum*. If they be not independent feelings, and can only be expressed in reference to one another, it is pertinent to query how they could enter experience at all. For neither can exist prior to the other, yet one must come first.

Moreover this linkage is not borne out by introspection. There are mixed pleasures, indeed, but there are quite as obviously pure pleasures, even on the physical plane. The comfort of a good digestion, for example, is neither constituted nor enhanced by the memories of indigestion. Nor is it necessary to suffer intermittently with melancholia to enjoy living.

To the pure pleasures, again, all the aesthetic and intellectual pleasures would seem to belong. There is nothing in experience to corroborate the statement that beauty is beauty only in contrast to what is not beautiful. One does not have to know the worst in order to enjoy the best in art. The musical chord is not more pleasing because one has heard discords, the painting more delightful because one has seen chromolithographs. Nor is the idea which suddenly flashes upon one a whit less thrilling than that which is painfully precipitated by a racking brain.

We have then discovered a large class of goods neither the existence nor the essence of which is in any way conditioned or constituted by the presence of evil. The aesthetic, the intellectual, and many physical satisfactions may be quite unconscious of any conquest over any antagonist, and may be revealed by a kind of grace which exacts nothing in return. To state, then, that the value of all perfection is to be estimated in direct proportion to the price paid for it is too hasty and sweeping. And to ask whether the value of any perfection is properly so to be appraised becomes now our task. Hence we turn to examine the last stronghold of the absolutist, the case of moral excellence.

Here the *prima facie* evidence is against us. It cannot be denied that the value of virtue seems to depend upon the existence of vice and to be enhanced by it. If there were no moral evil, there could be no moral good. For virtue consists in conquering

vice; merit is the fruit of struggle; character is made by temptation and suffering.

But cross-examination reveals that we are not really confronted with a good which gets its essential goodness from wrestling with its contrary. The "moral character" of a good turns out upon inquiry to mean no new kind of good, but rather to express an accidental and undesirable relation in which the sovereign good stands to the will. It signifies that the good is unattained and insecure. It presents it as something to be wrung from the midst of adverse conditions, and consecrates the pursuit of it as imperative. Virtue, in a word, is remedial. Could it attain its end and eradicate vice, it would, it is true, itself cease. But in losing its life it would have found it. Activities would have become easy which before were laboured, conduct natural which before was artificial. In such a transfiguration, surely nothing valuable would have been lost. We should be at last in undisputed possession of that the value of attaining which alone made virtue worth while, or indeed differentiated it as such from other behaviour. Virtue then might well take leave of us in the words of Virgil's parting with Dante:

Non aspettar mio dir più, nè mio cenno.  
 Libero, dritto e sano è lo tuo arbitrio,  
 E fallo fora non fare a suo senno;  
 Per ch' io te sopra te corono e mitrio.

The case of merit is even more striking. As a matter of fact we do become perfect through temptation and suffering. This is what the moral life means. But are we entitled to conclude that because we are better *post hoc*, we are therefore better *propter hoc*? Is not merit based upon the state actually attained, and not upon the struggle by which we have attained it?

It is certainly difficult to disassociate merit from its antecedents, and to distinguish the extrinsic conditions under which it is displayed from its intrinsic value. Yet this failure to discriminate between means and ends, and a consequent inversion of their relations, is of great mischief to philosophic thought. There can be no merit without temptation. Granted. It is but a special instance of the interdependence of virtue and vice. But in the

instance, as in general, the value is prospective, not retrospective. We merit, not because we have merely conquered temptation, but because the victory has brought us nearer the ideal. It is from the fruits, not the fact, of victory that our merit comes. An indiscriminate slaughter of desires for the mere sake of seeing the blood run has nothing noble or meritorious about it. Yet did merit and character depend upon the overcoming and not upon the nature of the adversary, the man who fought all right desire down would be as perfected through suffering as he who suppressed all wrong; and if he had the harder time and stubborn contest in his task, even more so. Sound comment upon this view is the rebellious proposition of one of the many philosophic *enfants terribles* cradled by the University of Paris in the fourteenth century: "That God can order a rational creature to hate him, and it in obeying him acquires more merit than if it loved him at his command, *quoniam hoc faceret majori conatu et contra propriam inclinationem.*"

It is as noble, however, to be conquered by good inclinations as to conquer bad ones. The fight is worth fighting only if and because it advances us toward the ideal. We may, to be sure, enjoy the fight for its own sake, but the pleasure can be adjudged good only if the cause be worthy.

In fine, are we not dealing again with the old confusion of natural with moral perfection, instanced here in a failure to distinguish between the strength and the moral direction of the will? There is, it is assumed, a kind of moral excellence in mere withstanding; and the character which is confirmed in power through such overcoming is intrinsically better than that which is spontaneously right. But on what possible moral ground is so-called strength of character admirable save as a means to moral rectitude? Given an imperfect will, in which the habit of right action is not innate but has to be acquired, and merit depends upon struggle, since perfection is attained through struggle. Given a perfect will, naturally endowed with rectitude, not beset with temptations, and unhindered by obstacles, exercising itself in a wholly favourable world, and with the temptation and the struggle all merit if you like, as all virtue, will have disappeared. But all that made the struggle with temptation and adversity meritorious, and made

the temptation and the suffering themselves valuable discipline, will remain. The disposition to right action and an environment wholly gracious and responsive to it, which it is the aim and justification of the moral life to foster and establish, will still, or rather will at length, exist. Only, man will come naturally by that to the acquirement of which moral action is a necessary means in an imperfect world, and by its subservience to which its moral goodness is alone defined.

Again, the intrinsic value of the means is not altered by their necessity as conditions of acquiring the good. That evil is indispensable to the attainment of the good, or brings forth good in the end, does not make it any the less evil. The necessity, for example, or the prospective success of an operation, are not anaesthetics. Nay more, however necessary and however successful the operation may have been, the medical record of the patient is the worse for having had to undergo it. In like manner one may be made perfect through sin and suffering, but one's history as a whole is the less clean and satisfactory for their incidence. Else why repent of the sins through which one has found grace, or talk of the "sufferings" which have ministered to one's restoration to health, or, for that matter, if one be truly philosophic, even of a "restoration." And however happy the eventual dénouement of the world-process may be, that process, seen "under the aspect of eternity," cannot but be marred by the pain and wrong through which its salvation has been worked out. It is the old Aristotelian opposition between the *οὐ βέβαια* and the *οὐ οὐκ ἀνευ* with which we are dealing. But Aristotle was not blind to their true relations. He saw quite clearly that if evil be necessary to the existence of the good, then the good is rendered incomplete and the world imperfect by the very conditions which render them possible.

If it be not true that in losing their lives virtue and merit shall find them again in the spontaneous perfection of a new heaven and a new earth, the whole moral life is stultified. For it aims at nothing less than the elimination of evil altogether, and hence at suicide. And if evil be an element in the good, beyond this death there is no happy immortality. The end of moral action becomes the extinction of all that makes it valuable, each

partial conquest is but an advance towards ultimate defeat, each so-called betterment of the world no more than a blow at the foundation of its goodness. Thus the sustaining vision of our lives is an Agamemnon's dream, luring us to catastrophe under the guise of victory; or, to change the figure, we think that in overcoming evil we are soaring upwards, when we are really only cutting from beneath us the ground on which we stand.

It is no question here of whether or not the ideal be attainable. That is irrelevant to our argument. To pursue an unattainable ideal may be natural and noble, provided only that in its attainment our nature would find its perfection and peace. The point at issue is far graver. It is not that to pursue the ideal is criticized as vain, but that to have an ideal at all is implied to be irrational. For to desire that the attainment of which would involve the annihilation of all that makes it desirable is madness. Yet, if our opponent be right, it is just this which we naturally desire, and in proportion as our will becomes moral and our aspirations rational, consciously worship and pursue.

It is not surprising, however, that the confusion of means with ends, or of medicine with food—the figure may be infinitely varied—should take place. We live not in a perfect but an imperfect world, and we incorporate the ideal with our lives only by a long process of struggle with and triumph over obstacles. The good we find is worth the labour of producing it. In this wise the means gain a fictitious glamour from their relation to the end. Concomitants and conditions of realizing the good, they come to be regarded as contributive not only to its existence but to its character. We fancy that because we are better because of the struggle in one sense, we are better because of it in the other; that is, that since we become better *by means of* the struggle, we are better for having had to go through with it. By persistently making the best, then, of the exigencies forced upon us by imperfection, judging them as we do in the light of their results and their uses rather than of their intrinsic values, we are the more predisposed to agree to the philosopher's assertion that they are positive elements of perfection, especially if his appeal be adorned with solemn and religious imagery. Nay, we are ready to yield a sentimental acquiescence when he con-

justifies us to invert the relation between means and ends altogether; to believe the end to be valuable merely as a stimulus to the struggle for it, and to conceive the good to be good only in so far as it is not attained.

The absolutist, however, will stand manfully by his position. It is we, he persists, who are inverting the relation between means and end, not he. The true end is in truth the wrestle with obstacles, the sweat, the panting, the resistance, the joy in it all. No other pleasure is so sweet, no other so noble: To the battle the vision of victory is but an incentive. The good lies in the battle itself. The palm withers as soon as it is won.

The psychology upon which this argument rests is sound enough as far as it goes. There can be no doubt that we enjoy activity for activity's sake. We like not only what the struggle brings us but the feel of the struggle as well. Indeed we often enjoy the game more than its prize. Upon this fact, too—upon the enjoyment, as it were, of making money for the pleasure of business—rests largely the plausibility of the method we were discussing in the last paragraph of estimating the value of existence by its expensiveness.

But we may raise a doubt at once as to the pertinence of this experience to the question in hand. In the first place one might turn against the absolutist his own objection to our insistence upon the painful elements involved in some struggle. We might remind him that, given his premises, he has no more right to hail as a real good the joy in the conflict or the triumph than have we to stigmatize suffering and failure as real evil. He denies the real or ultimate character of evil on the same grounds that we might deny the real or ultimate character of what he makes a good. The evil in the struggle, he tells us, is not ultimately evil, because it is overcome in the absolute life. Its real value, then, depends upon the end it subserves. And, as we have already pointed out, there is no other reason for considering the joy in the struggle a real or ultimate good. On the other hand, if it be admitted that the joy of a successful tussle be a suitable characteristic of absolute perfection, it would seem as if the absolutist were in reason bound to grant in return that what pain or seeming defeat may be involved therein is as real, as ultimate, and as

absolute. In last resort the relativity of the two values or their absoluteness should stand or fall together.

The vital objection to the argument, however, challenges not so much the premises or the experience upon which it rests as the correctness of the inference or interpretation it makes. We may acknowledge gladly the suitability of the pleasure in work and struggle to a perfected life. We have no more desire than the absolutist to sit down forever in Spencer's "lady-like, tea-table Elysium." A perfected world does not mean a world in which there is nothing more to do; it means only a world in which we always enjoy our work. But it would seem impossible to find any antithesis of good and evil in such work, however hard. In the labour we delight in there is no pain to physic, so far as we truly delight in it and find it an unalloyed good. It is at this point that the absolutist's interpretation seems faulty. He appears to forget that the most breathless struggle, at the moment when it becomes an end in itself, becomes as pure an *ἐνέργεια δεινότητος* as the most silent contemplation. To keep pace with the wind is to float ever in halcyon calm. In that tempestuous activity, that glorious strain and stress, that jubilant hurling of obstacles to one side, there is no experience of evil whatsoever. The difficulties which we enjoy overcoming are not enemies but friends. In our wrestle with them there is no misfortune, no mutilation of our purpose, no thwarting of our will. It is a sport; not the painful pursuit of a good, but the possession and enjoyment of it. Such activity is quite different from the grim life and death struggle with evil. There the enemy is no welcome adversary but a hated foe. We do not want him; we want rather to be rid of him. He is not the necessary condition of pleasurable exercise, but must be chased from the field before the sport can really begin. What distinguishes the moral life from a truly free and perfected activity is just the fact that the obstacles it involves are hindrances, not helps, to happy self-expression; that its struggles we do not enjoy; and that its victories are won at a cost of self-curtailement and sacrifice of possible good. No sleight of hand can juggle it into the semblance of a sport nor philosophic incantation civilize the devil into a friendly opponent in an exciting and delightful game.

But it is into such a friendly and welcome adversary that the devil is necessarily reformed in the absolute experience. For were there any contest with evil *qua* evil, the absolute would not be perfect. His experience would have in it something, we must insist, which he had rather have out. However, if evil be merely the welcome obstacle, necessary condition of sport and victory, it is hard to see how he can have any moral value for us. We are butchered to make his holiday. That his experience includes and feels directly our sufferings is no sanctification either of it or of them. On the contrary, if he share the pains he inflicts and enjoys, his life is beyond the pale not only of the moral but of the sane.

In any case, moreover, we have no access to his perfected experience, no share in his victory, no thrill of his joy. Nay, we cannot hope to know and share them; for were we happy, there would be no suffering for him to transcend, and hence no victory and no felicity. It is this last fact which adds insult to the injury already done the moral ideal. Were he merely himself untroubled by what troubles us, or unruffled even, and without compunction at the sight of our unhappiness, we might deal with him as we deal with a mechanical world. The moral life would not be forced indeed to violent and tropical growth, but neither would it be dulled and blighted. As he is, however, human aspiration must move ever in the shadow. For as he is, the only thing that could trouble him would be that we should be untroubled. Nothing whatever could mar his happiness save our own.

We are forced then to disallow this supreme appeal of the absolutist to the moral life as no more convincing than his invocation of the aesthetic interests. Not only does inspection of ethical experience fail to assist us toward the desired solution of the problem, but it invalidates, as we have seen, the conclusions it is employed to support. We cannot find there, more than in aesthetics and psychology, any justification for that paradoxical snobbishness which refuses to bow to the good unless it have evil relatives or forbears. On the contrary, in the light of ethics also this attitude is seen to be due not to a keen eye for worth and dignity, but rather to an incomplete, if not mistaken,



knowledge of who's who. Not only are there some goods which are pure of any base admixture, but it is these which set the type and standard for all goods so far as they have been able to live down their pasts and lose all trace of their origins. Evil then appears as something which, by definition, refuses amalgamation with or inclusion in the good. And in no experience fulfilling our demand for moral perfection can we find any place for it at all; nor in any possessing even a sympathetic moral meaning can we conceive it as appearing as other than a defect. We must conclude that if the absolute is to be one in value, and yet to include within himself all distinctions of value, he can be and do so only by turning these distinctions into mere differences of equally valuable, and therefore, so far as we are concerned, equally valueless facts. In fine, a monistic view of the world cannot give any cosmic significance or metaphysical import to the moral life. The only possible monism is naturalistic; the only possible pantheism a moral indifferentism.

The significance of this conclusion for metaphysics in general must be clear. If it be valid, it must eliminate once and for all the ethical monist variety of absolutism from the list of possible systems. Thought indeed would seem to be restricted to one of two directions. It must choose in last resort between, on the one hand, an explicitly—or at any rate an implicitly—naturalistic interpretation of reality, which, though it deprives the moral life of cosmic sympathy and superhuman meaning, yet leaves the interests and ideals upon which it rests vital and convincing so far as human life is concerned; and, on the other, a pluralism which, though it may supply metaphysical justification to our preferences and divine encouragement to our aspirations, still disrupts beyond hope of philosophic repair the single-heartedness of the world.

*THE MINISTER AND HIS PEOPLE*

PHILLIPS BROOKS

The Faculty of the Harvard Divinity School provided for their students in 1883 six lectures by officers of the University representing other departments of government and instruction, as follows:

The Minister and the People: Phillips Brooks, D.D., of the Board of Overseers.

The Evolution of a Christian Minister: J. F. Clarke, D.D., of the Board of Overseers.

One Word more about Free-Will: William James, M.D., Assistant Professor of Philosophy.

Plato's Idea of Immortality: W. W. Goodwin, LL.D., Professor of Greek.

The Natural History of Altruism: N. S. Shaler, S.D., Professor of Palaeontology.

Vivisection: H. P. Bowditch, M.D., Professor of Physiology, and Dean of the Medical Faculty.

The first of this series was delivered by Phillips Brooks on the evening of February 21, in the Chapel of the Divinity School; and no one who was present can forget the profound impression of candor, insight, searching of the heart of youth, and self-revelation of the speaker's heart, which the address conveyed. At its hearing the effect of simplicity and spontaneity was irresistible, but closer study reveals the firm structure and steady movement of predetermined thought which give permanent dignity to the most casual addresses of Phillips Brooks. The lecture was fortunately recorded by an unusually skilful stenographer, and was published in the *Christian Register* of February 28, from which it is here reprinted with the consent of the proprietor. Its subject, its relation to the Harvard Divinity School, and its undiminished timeliness, appear to justify its reproduction.—Ed.

You will excuse me if I begin by expressing a little surprise and embarrassment at the audience which I see before me. Some months ago, when I had the privilege of conducting the service at the college chapel, the President asked me if I would some time in the spring give a talk to the theological students. I said

I would with the greatest pleasure in the world, and now I scarcely recognize the occasion. You will understand, therefore, that I came simply supposing that I was to meet a group of young men devoted to the work which seems to me to be the best work to which a man can give his life. I shall venture to address you all as if you were theological students—or I shall venture to speak to those who *are* theological students—and to speak altogether from the experience of a minister who has been engaged in parish work for a good many years. I come to you precisely as one might come who knew that a body of men had been engaged in the scientific study of agriculture, and who came as a practical worker himself to speak of the things which he had found most useful in his actual labor in the field.

I cannot begin without congratulating those to whom I speak upon the work which lies before them, and assuring them of the perpetual richness and growing life of that profession in which they are engaged. I cannot begin without assuring them that everything that is in the promise of that profession is more than realized in the actual operation of it; and also of my deep conviction that the time has not come, and will never come, when the work of the Christian ministry will be obsolete. I believe that there is every promise of a larger work for the Christian minister to-day than has ever been in the past. Otherwise I should speak in despair, if I spoke at all.

And yet one of the first things that comes before us, as we think of the work of the theological student and Christian minister, is the great changes that have come in the nature of his work. I am reminded at once, as I begin, of the largely prevailing conception there is of the difference which has come in the relations which the Christian minister holds to his people and to the community. As we look back and see the position which he held fifty years ago, we are constantly reminded of this difference. We are told a great many anecdotes of the way he stood then, of the prestige which clothed his position, of the authority with which it was invested. We are then pointed to the great changes that have taken place, in which the minister has been stripped of all that prestige, and has no such authority clothing the utterances which he gives from the pulpit.

There are two ways of regarding that change, both of which I should discourage. One of them is the supposition that there has come to be a lamentable deficiency, a great falling away; that the minister does not occupy that position which he once occupied. I remember a clergyman who was an old man just at the time when very many who are now becoming old were very young—I remember hearing this remark repeated, which he made to one who was just going into the ministry: "It has been my exceeding good fortune to have my ministry just at the best time. I entered when it was at its highest degree of prestige, and had the good fortune to leave it just as it lost its prestige and influence." It was not a very cordial word for a young man who was entering it.

Then there is an entirely different tone upon the other side—a sort of congratulation that that earlier prestige has passed away, and rejoicing that man can now stand before his fellow-man without any of the artificial discriminations that used to belong to the ministry years ago.

It seems to me that both of these methods of regarding the change that has taken place are superficial, and that there is something a great deal deeper to be said about them. We are bound, I think, to recognize that there is a distinct progress going on, and that the old position has a true relation to the new position in which the minister stands today. The old position in which the minister stood, clothed in a certain recognized authority which had its visible symbols, seems to me to have been the crude anticipation of the position in which the minister stands today.

We may say that the changes that are going on are in general of one great sort. Both Christian doctrine and Christian institutions are leaving off their arbitrary forms and showing their essential conditions. Things manifest themselves in their arbitrary forms first, and afterward show themselves in their essential conditions. Take, for instance, one or two of the Christian doctrines, and we can see how the change has taken place. There was a time when man was supposed to be appointed to fixed, certain, and precise conditions in the other world—the condition of those who were saved and the condition of those who were lost. It was an arbitrary condition, and one difficult to anticipate.

It was a distinction which one found it very difficult to apply to his own life. I believe today that men are looking forward to another life, believing that moral issues are to rule in that life as they rule here; that man's destiny is fixed there according to his nature, and not according to any arbitrary judgment which it is impossible for him to anticipate. The two worlds are thus brought together in healthier association, so that men live today in healthier anticipation and with a more impressive sanction of the other life than they have lived in the past.

So take the other Christian doctrines. It seems to me that the change we find in them all is the change from the arbitrary to the essential; the change from that which rests upon the will to that which has its root in the very nature of things. This fact, applied to the position of the Christian minister, must be the keynote, the principle that solves and makes clear the whole.

With that point in view, I want to speak of the relation of the minister to his people. I shall speak of his relation to the intelligence of his people, to the property of his people, and to the consciences of his people.

When I say "his people," I recognize that there is no such constraint upon the minister today as there has been in times past; that one of the healthier processes of the position which he holds today is the opening of his influence; that he has a right to exercise it today in ways which were not open to him in other days.

Let me try at the outset to give one designation or definition which shall apply to it all. It seems to me that what we want to say about the relation of the minister to the people now is that it is vastly more human and vastly less ecclesiastical than in the past. That is one result in which we may rejoice. There are certain relations which men hold in view of their common humanity—relations between men of different kinds of intellect and of different stations in life; and all these are in the very nature of their human life. Now I conceive the Christian Church to be simply humanity struggling forward to the realization of its own idea. I cannot conceive it to be something distinct from humanity. I think of it, when it has come to completion, as humanity come to its completion. The Christian Church has suffered all its worst effects and worst corruptions from separating itself

from humanity. Whenever the Church has conceived of itself as possessing privileges which do not potentially belong to the whole human race, it has immediately sunk into corruption. The true and healthy Church, separating everything that is corrupt from its life—the true Church is simply humanity beginning its work, and gradually forming within itself a nucleus of that which is ultimately to embrace the whole human race.

When I say that the relation of the preacher has become more human, it seems to me that I say that this process is going forward, and that the Christian minister stands as a man toward men, as a man in relation to his fellow-men, and not as the creature of some artificial organization. I wish I could make you bear that in mind as I go on. The relation between the Christian minister and the people who are around him is simply the relation between a certain man, put in a peculiar and helpful attitude to his fellow-men. It is not something organized by churches and councils, but is something rising from human nature itself.

What relation then does the minister hold with regard to the intelligence of the people around him?

There are only two positions a man can hold with regard to the intelligence of his fellow-men. He can either be the depository of truth, holding it and dealing it out to them, or he can be a fellow-student of truth, seeking for it just as they seek for it. These are the only two relations which he can hold to his fellow-men with regard to the attainment of truth and its distribution. We know how largely the first idea prevails in the Christian world today. The Christian Church is conceived as a depository of infallible truth, which it is to dispense to men who stand waiting with open ears and open eyes to receive it.

The first assertion of Protestantism is that there is no such depository of truth. It is a matter of deep congratulation that the recognition of this fact has been going forward all through the centuries. Every one of the reformations of the Church has been the dislodgement of that infallibility from some fortress in which it has intrenched itself, and the opening of the enlarged idea that man is seeking always the truth by the exercise of his faculties consecrated to the service of the divine will.

The Romanist turns to us, and says: "See to what you have

reduced the search for truth! Is there no being, no group of individuals who are authorized to declare certainty with regard to the great things which are forever pressing upon the human soul; with regard to the nature of the human soul itself, with regard to its relations to the great future, with regard to that mysterious event which came in the manifestation of Jesus Christ upon earth?" The Protestant Reformation, among historic movements, then shows how afterward men tried to lodge infallibility in the Bible, and to believe that there was an infallible record which could be appealed to.

The great point of our present belief is that there is no such infallible record anywhere, in church, or council, or book; that man has been sent here to strive after truth, not by any necessity to be sure that he has come to the ultimate truth in regard to these great final problems of the human soul.

Is that a dreadful or a welcome thing? Is it something that closes the gates upon man's knowledge, or is it something that opens them? It seems to me that for a man to set out to seek after truth, never sure that he shall find it with perfect infallibility, always sure that he shall grow into greater capacity to use it, is the noblest position in which a man can be placed in regard to the great problems of the human soul.

In such a condition as that, what is the relation of the preacher to the intelligence of the men who are around him? It is certainly not to stand and deal forth that which by his utterance has an infallible warrant. It is simply the attitude of one who, with superior opportunities, stands and guides his fellow-men in their search for truth.

The function of the minister in relation to the intelligence of the people is threefold:

1. In the first place, he must awaken their spiritual activity.
2. In the second place, he must give them the results of his study.
3. In the third place, he must lift their life to the higher tone which Christianity assures.

Look at each one of these three.

1. First, he is to awaken the spiritual activity, the insight, the real desire to know with regard to the highest things. When we

look around upon our fellow-men, we see that the one thing that presses on us most is not the extent of men's ignorance: it is their indifference. It is that so many men are wrapped up in the things of the present life; that to all that vast region which we know exists beyond they are wholly indifferent. To awaken the spiritual sense, to make them care for unseen things, to make them long for some sort of entrance into that great reality which they feel around them—that is the great function of the Christian minister. Even if he had nothing distinctly to tell of certainty with regard to this truth, the mere awakening of men in their own blind way to search for religious truth would be one of the noblest things he could do.

Mr. Matthew Arnold a few months ago analyzed Mr. Emerson; and the result of his teaching was this. He said that Mr. Emerson, although he might not be as great in some points as some of us thought, was great in this: that he was "the friend and helper of those who would live in the spirit." That criticism of Mr. Arnold upon Mr. Emerson was very largely criticized. It seemed to some that he had degraded the philosopher. It seemed to me that this objection was a melancholy sort of criticism upon the standards that we have in this life.

Is there a nobler thing than when a critic comes and says of him whom I reverence and honor that he was the friend and helper of those who would live in the spirit? It seems to me that he said something infinitely greater than if he had said that he wrought the noblest system of philosophy that has been framed in the world. The man that is doing the best work for mankind today is the guide and friend of those who live in the spirit.

Then we may be able to take one step further, and know that there has been one manifestation of the spiritual life in this world that surpasses all other manifestations. Whatever may be our theological conceptions in regard to him, we know that Jesus Christ stands as the supreme inspirer of the spiritual life; and he who would be today the guide and friend of those who would live in the spirit must of necessity turn to Jesus Christ and put himself in relation to his spiritual life. There is where the minister becomes a Christian minister—in the simple desire, through contact with the life and work and death of Jesus Christ, to stir



the soul and the spiritual life of man. The testimony of all ages is that there has been no such spiritual power as Jesus Christ.

That is the first work, then, of the minister: to reach the spiritual sense and to stir it to some kind of activity.

2. What is the second one? It is his duty to know something that those to whom he ministers do not know. Just as the professor in some department devotes himself to its study and gives to mankind that which he finds in that department, so it would be a strange thing if a minister, set apart to study a special work, had not something to tell men which they did not know. Not that that implies any infallibility in the Christian minister, but simply the education of a consecrated life in the highest things which engage the intelligence of mankind. The minister who simply stands before men and says, "You must be spiritual, but I can tell you nothing about spiritual things," is absolutely false to his function. What may we tell men in regard to spiritual things? We may tell them how the whole history of mankind has been permeated and filled with spiritual things. We may show how mankind has always done the best in intellectual regions when it has been filled full of spiritual influence. We may scatter such a foolish belief as exists in men's minds today with regard to the possible extension of the Christian faith around the world—the superficial objectors to foreign missions who are ready to believe, without any just comparison, that there is a religion on the face of the earth today that can for a moment compare with the religion of Jesus Christ in all its conceptions or forms, taken as one great whole. We may show how the history of the Christian Church is a necessary part of the intelligence of humanity today. These are but a part of the simple information, the mere instruction, which the Christian minister can give.

3. Then just one thing more. It is his place to elevate the tone of life everywhere; to bring it into contact with those sublime principles which are essential to humanity, which are struggling to the surface of human life everywhere, and have come to their best manifestations in Christianity—patience, long suffering, large charity, and, above all things, hopefulness. The perpetual tendency of the world to lose its hopefulness is one of the things which the Christian minister, by every power in his life, is bound

to resist. I can understand a Christian minister denying almost the essentials of the Christian faith; I can understand a minister teaching things from a Christian pulpit which I feel to be untrue; but I do not see how a man can take the place of a Christian minister unless he is inspired by a spirit of deep hopefulness in regard to the human race, always believing that man is the child of God; that his fortunes are fastened to the deep fortunes of the world; and, unless the whole is rotten—unless there is nothing which has an assured future to it—man, bound by the conditions of his life, being a child of God, must be a creature of perpetual hope.

Now when one says to me that I have lost much that the Christian minister in other times used to have; when one says to me that I am not able to speak with the authority with which a Christian minister used to speak, so that my life is gone and my function is useless, I turn to these three things: It is my place to awaken and to make active the spiritual sense of men; to tell men everything that I have found with regard to spiritual truth; and to make men hope with every possible assertion of their relation to the highest and divinest which it is in my power to make. Is not that something to fill a man's life in the Christian ministry—each man fulfilling it in his own way, but every man doing those three things, and so becoming a protest against the lowest in humanity, and a continual assertion of the highest?

Before I leave this first part of my subject, I cannot help saying that, after all, I myself feel that the relation to his people is not the deepest relation which a minister holds. Almost all the errors of the Christian ministry, almost all the heresies of the Christian Church, if we really retain that word in its true meaning, have come from supposing that man's relation to his fellow-man may be superior to his loyalty to the truth. It is the reversal of that order again and again in Christian history that has led to the worst things that have happened to the Christian Church.

There was a time when men believed that they must assert certain doctrines which they only half held, because they thought that if those doctrines were not asserted men would go to ruin. Largely under that sense of duty and that impulse and belief was the doctrine of the necessary everlasting punishment of certain

souls asserted year after year. You went to a man and said, "What is the ground upon which you preach the necessary everlasting perdition of certain souls?" What was the answer? "Because if you do not preach it, men will sin; because if you do not believe that that is true"—for I may not charge men with simple blank hypocrisy—"if you do not believe that that is true, sinners have no sufficient motive to repent." I say that any man who rightly perceives the relation which mankind sustains to truth knows that this is an argument which had no place there. My business is to seek and find the truth, and to leave it to God to guard that it shall not ruin the lives of men.

Does not the same error appear also to-day upon the other side? When any man today makes less exacting, less earnest or imperative, any one of the statements of truth or divine justice and righteousness, in order that his fellow-men may be induced to do the less when he thinks that they will not be induced to do the greater; when any man pares down doctrine or truth, in order that men may be induced to believe that which alone he thinks they are fitted to believe—then it is sacrificing the love of truth for the sake of men. No man has any right to make that which he believes to be the truth of God any less exacting, less sharp or clear, because he thinks his fellow-men will not accept it if he states it in its blankest and baldest form.

I read an incident in a newspaper the other day that seems to me to illustrate this point. A tired and dusty traveller was leaning against a lamp-post in the city of Rochester, and he turned and looked around him and said, "How far is it to Farmington?" and a boy in the crowd said, "Eight miles." "Do you think it is so far as that?" said the poor tired traveller. "Well, seeing that you are so tired, I will call it seven miles." The boy, with his heart overflowing with the milk of human kindness, pitied the exhausted traveller, and chose to call it seven miles. I know I have seen statements of the truth that have been dictated by the same motive. Never make the road from Rochester to Farmington seven miles, when you know it is eight. Do not do a wrong to truth out of regard for men.

There is another point, if one may speak out of his own ministry and from observation of the ministry of others: men do

not *dread* to believe, men *long* to believe. The one thing that we do not have to do is to pare down the truth for man's capacity to believe. Give them all the truth: you cannot make it too exacting. The whole of Christian history has been full of testimony that you may claim your fellow-men by virtue of the very imperiousness and absoluteness of that which they have been called upon to believe. The old *credo quia impossibile* of Tertullian had philosophy in it. Men long to believe; and, while ultimately every healthy human faculty will reject that which is not congenial to it, you cannot help men better than by laying before them all that which is true, even in its blankest and most uncompromising form. Just as there are many men whom you cannot get to go down the street for you, but who would go half the way around the world for you if you needed it, so there are men who would not accept the truth which they felt had been pared down for them; but, when you put before them God in his eternity and infinitude and the soul in its vastness and mystery, then the power of belief, stirred to its greatest task, lifts itself up and does its work.

I pass now to something subordinate and inferior to the point in regard to the intelligence of men—the relation of the Christian minister to the property of those to whom he ministers. Many seem to think that he has the property of a large part of the community at his disposal; certainly of all that part of the community that is associated with him. If I were to do half the things with other people's money that I am asked to do every year, I should impoverish the city of Boston.

It seems to me that the minister is simply called upon to count his people as stewards of the Highest; not to be the distributor or almoner of other people's goods, but to make other men such, by the spiritual things which I have been trying to describe, that they shall enter into the privilege of doing that which has been intrusted to them in the highest use to which it can be employed. No man deals properly with a man until he accounts him more than his property. "I seek not yours, but you," said Paul. The spiritual life, the good of men, the good of the soul—that is the thing that the Christian minister is to seek.

The result of having something to do with that will be that

sordid coffers will flow forth and bless the world. It is the old story of Sir Launfal,

Who gives himself with his alms feeds three,—  
Himself, his hungering neighbor, and me.

Give yourself with your gift. Something is gained if you get a man's five hundred dollars here and there; but it is not the work of a Christian minister. Let other people go and beg for money without the slightest regard of the way in which it is bestowed; but it is for the Christian minister to make a man know himself capable of consecration, and then to make him consecrate himself, which must include the property which he possesses. This, it seems to me, is the only definition which we can give of the relation of the Christian minister to the property of those to whom he ministers. He must work through the characters and natures of his people. Again and again a man has lost the power to do that work by the way in which he has been appealing to the individual. I will stand before my congregation and tell them of the glory of charity. I will tell them what a grand thing it is to give for God, then let them do the good for themselves, and go forth and give of their means; but I will not go to a man in any way that can possibly involve my personality, knowing that he will give out of friendship to me, and extort one dollar or five hundred from him for the best of objects.

And here, it seems to me, comes in one great function of the Christian minister that I hope all of you will not forget; which is that you must have such a large interest in great human necessities that you should be able to inform those that are able to give how to bestow their goods. The Christian minister has no right to shut himself up in ecclesiastical interests. He is bound to consider everything that relates to humanity, and to consider that a dollar that is given to the sufferers in Louisville is as consecrated a dollar as that which is given for an altar or a font. The minister stands in a position in which he can bring information to men that they might not have otherwise. To bring that information by the powers which he can wield over the spiritual life, and to make men feel called to give just as soon as they see that they should give—that is all, it seems to me, that the Christian minister has to do with the property of the community.

And, if one can again bear testimony out of his own experience, I can say that there is a wonderful *readiness* to give. It seems to me that the one great thing that we lack is sufficient information in regard to the things which money can be devoted to. The advocate of every great cause is apt to be dishonest—unconsciously dishonest—and to represent his cause as greater in proportion than others around it. That is the way in which the minister can stand between his people and such advocates, and show them the comparative importance of objects brought before them.

And now I pass to consider the relation of the Christian minister to the conscience of the community. The conscience of the community is nothing but the aggregate conscience of individuals. When we speak of that, we open a large and sometimes dark page of human history. We talk of the abuses of the priesthood in other times. I think we have no idea of the clamor that was made then upon the priests to guide other people's consciences. The Christian minister is not so much bound to refrain from asserting a claim upon the consciences of men as he is bound not to allow himself to be the master of their consciences. It is one of the embarrassments of the intelligent, spiritual minister that people are so ready to put their consciences under the control of others. I am sure if we could go back into the ages which we abuse most, the time when the priesthood set themselves over the consciences of men, we should find that the real trouble came from men and women who were seeking to be thus guided. It is the education of the great mass of the people so that they have felt themselves called upon to accept the great responsibility of the guidance of their own consciences that has released the clergy, rather than the disposition of the clergy themselves.

Just as soon as we talk of the relation of the Church to the consciences of mankind, I suppose we are called upon to make that division which must always be made when we talk about sinfulness. There are two classes of wrong-doing, two classes of sin. One comprises those sins which have no intrinsic good, which are always wrong whenever they are done; the other comprises those things which are harmful to the individual soul or are harmful to other people, and are therefore not right to be done. There are certain things that no man, under any circum-

stances or in any age, should ever consider right to be done. There are some things of which, if a man should ask me why I do not do them, I should say, "They are absolutely wrong." Of other things I should say, "I know, if I did it, I should be a less upright, less holy man; and I know that I have no right to do it." "Do you pronounce it to be absolutely wrong?" "No." Some things are wrong in the eighteenth century which are not wrong in the nineteenth. Complications of certain conditions may be harmful to the spiritual life—I mean, the best life of man. I do not use these words in an official sense. There are such things as the spiritual life of man, as the consecration of the man's powers to spiritual things; and when anything becomes harmful to them, no man living has a right to do it.

Now let us consider what the Church and the minister have to do in regard to these sins. In the first place there are some things which, as already said, are absolutely wrong. Slavery, for instance, is absolutely wrong: it is to be rooted out. On the other hand, when the minister comes to deal with a sin which has an individual and personal character, there can be no such absolute statement, and the one great, sublime function of the Christian minister is the awakening of the individual conscience to examine its own obligations, to recognize its own sins. I think it is not good that any man should accept a duty simply or solely upon the word of another man. Duty is something never done, unless it is done out of a man's own conscience. For me to go to the slave-holder and say, "It is wrong to hold any man in bondage," and to have him answer, "I cannot think so; but, since you think so, I will let them go free"—how absolutely unsatisfactory that is! There are always such things in the life of the minister when he feels that a man's own conscience has not come to have the fullest light and to work in the most legitimate and healthful way. The danger of the minister and the Church is that they should be satisfied with that, that they should be satisfied with something or other short of the absolute persuasion of the man's own conscience.

That is the position, then, of the clergy and of the Church with regard to those things which are absolute or intrinsic in their moral character.

With regard to those other sins that have grown out of the special complications of life, the work is not so clear. It is not so satisfactorily recognizable, but it is just as truly the work of the minister. Let me persuade the conscience of my fellow-man so that it works truly, so that he has really tried to do right, and I have done my total duty for that man. And when he comes to a different judgment from me, although I cannot see how he can do it, yet as a minister I may rest absolutely satisfied. When I have given him all the light I can, then I rest satisfied with the true independent judgment of his own life.

Now is there not left here a function for the minister? If our Christian Church, as a whole, could do that for our community and nation today; could call upon it and persuade it to cast away those sins which are absolutely and certainly wrong, and, with regard to all doubtful questions, to enter into a searching examination of them all and to act according to its best light, then the Christian minister would have regenerated our land. I do not believe that the Christian minister has a right to abdicate his function as the director of the human conscience; but it is important that he shall know that it is a living thing, and shall direct it as a living thing. Just as you put every power of growth into a tree, and then let it grow according to its nature, so with the conscience: we shall not bend it according to our conceptions of the right, we shall simply inspire it with a passion of righteousness, and then let it develop in its own true way. Here is a relation to the conscience which is quite enough to occupy your thoughts, your earnest anxiety, and your time, so long as you are ministers.

One thing more. Everything I have said to-night rests upon one great assumption, which we are anxious to have asserted in our country; and that is, that the people, not the ministers, are the Church. We quarrel with the phrase used in the old country, though not entirely unknown here. They speak of a young man as "gone into the Church," meaning thereby that he has become a minister; but ministers are nothing but the servants of the Church, and the clergy are nothing but their agents in doing the work which the Church has to do.

That was the good thing accomplished by our Puritan an-



cestors. New England would have been dominated and oppressed by its clergy years ago, if it had not been that every one of these stiff, stanch Puritans really felt that he belonged to the Church, that the minister was nothing but the servant, and that upon him rested the great responsibility, the real duty, and the persistence in the future of the Christian Church.

Then come back to that which I said at the very beginning, that the Christian Church, however we may talk of it distinctively, is nothing in the world except the first sketch of completed humanity. The Christian Church has nothing which is essential to its belief that all men ought not to be believing; it has no duties resting upon its members that all men ought not to be doing. Then I think we can see its relations truly to the community around us.

The majority of men do not today belong in associated relations to the Christian Church. What does that mean? First, that the Christian Church has not made itself broad enough to make earnest and true men recognize the ideal of their humanity in it; that it has been too special, too fantastic. Secondly, that it has a great work before it so to declare its human application that it shall commend itself to every man who really is in earnest in his thought and earnest in his deed. The Church seems to me to have that great function before it, and never to have had the possibility for the fulfilment of that duty so large and open before it in all the ages of its existence as today. Therefore I would rather be a Christian minister than anything else; and I welcome with all my heart those of you who are preparing for that good work.

*RESERVE IN MATTERS OF RELIGION<sup>1</sup>*

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I think it safe to assume—and I shall assume—that every college student has a certain amount of religious conviction and belief—more than we sometimes think—more perhaps than he is himself conscious of having. I am emboldened to say this because I believe that religion—that is, the relation of the human in us to the divine in us and above us—is a part of the essential nature of man, potential even though latent in every man, and because the Christian environment in which most college students have passed their early days must have called these potentialities into more or less distinct consciousness.

But what I recall in myself as a young man, and what I see in others, tells me that when this religious consciousness is made the object of appeal and of summons to expression and action it is very much inclined to withdraw within itself, and to fold itself about with reserve, and even to take on a kind of resistance. And when I examine this state of mind in myself and others, I think I can see that in a certain stage of spiritual immaturity, and perhaps more or less always, this reserve in religious expression is justifiable and even normal.

First, because religion itself is so largely a matter of mystery. The realities on which it rests are not matters of exact knowledge. We know only in part. The whole region is the domain of imagination and faith and spiritual vision, and is to be approached with wonder and awe and silence. The truly reverent spirit will not rush into its precincts with unseemly assurance. Faith itself will shrink from hasty affirmations. Something is to be said for a modest agnosticism: "Though desiring to know, and hoping to know, I do know but little as yet." How much better this than to say, either, on the one hand, "I know that I cannot know," or, on the other hand, "I know that I know," we mean-

<sup>1</sup>A Vesper Address to Students.

while questioning the reality of your knowledge, and not being convinced by your assurance.

Again, some degree of reserve may be pardoned as a natural and healthful reaction and protest in the face of much overconfident assertion and profession. When utterance on these high and solemn themes ceases to be cautious and modest, when religious avowals become voluble and loquacious, then very properly reserve comes to the rescue of sincerity, and says within the heart of the young man, "Beware of this! Keep well on the safe side of this!"

Again, religious consciousness rightly claims for itself certain sacred rights of privacy. The deeper our feelings on any subject, the less we are inclined to make confidants of others. There is a beautiful shyness in youth respecting very deep feeling, and most of all perhaps in respect to religion. *Maxima debetur reverentia*—the profoundest respect is due to the sacred intimacies of the young heart in its religious musings. Let us not misconstrue reserve as though it were necessarily apathy. Deep silences may hold what loud voices could never utter.

Have we now done full justice to this side of the subject—to the causes, the meaning, the merits, the rights, of reserve in matters of religion? If so, we may now look at some considerations on the other side.

First, when reserve passes a certain limit, and becomes actual repression of a genuine conviction or emotion, it works hurt to the moral nature. Modesty, reticence, is good: enforced dumbness is not good. We endanger our sincerity, certainly our frankness, when we put too heavy a restraint upon our convictions or our feelings. There are times when to suppress feeling is to induce and even cultivate stoicism. A confirmed habit of apathy is devitalizing. There are communities of Christians who suffer both spiritually and ethically from an abnormal dread of enthusiasm, as there are also those who suffer from forcing and counterfeiting enthusiasm. Some poet—I forget who he is—has given us a person—a girl, I think—who is so oppressed by a secret she must not tell that she runs off and whispers it to the brook, and so relieves her heart. There are religious emotions which so

burden and oppress the heart, there are others which so exalt and inspire, that they must have expression. To stifle them is a harm and a wrong to the moral nature.

Again, too great reticence in matters of religion is unsocial—may even be a social wrong. It is sometimes said that one's religion is something between one's own soul and God. It is that and something more. It is a source of new social relations and duties. Even when we have entered into our closet and shut the door, we are in thought to bring in others and say "Our Father." At one time in my youth I used to meet every day a very distinguished scholar of world-wide fame, who was known as an unbeliever, and allowed himself to be so known. This perplexed us young men. Here was a man of great ability, whom we admired as young men will admire a great man; and what we understood him to say to us was that for some untold reason he declined to be ranked as a Christian. But after his death, when his will was made public, we learned that he there made avowal of devout faith in Christ, an avowal which he had withheld because it would have been to his worldly advantage to make it. A beautiful and heroic act of self-denial, doubtless, but one in which a teacher of young men might have questioned his right to indulge himself. In place of helping us to settle one of the great questions of life in what he himself thought the right way, he, by his unnatural and easily misconstrued silence, hindered us from making a right decision. I suppose that all of us, according to our degree and light—we mature men and teachers, you young men and women, with far more power in certain ways to influence your fellows than we have—are all the time, whether we will or no, saying something to one another on this greatest of questions; saying it by silence as well as by speech, by withholding perhaps the simple, frank word which brotherhood and fair dealing would prompt us to say.

For when we come to think of it, while on one side religion is mystery, and tends to induce brooding and reverie rather than speech, on the other side it is hope, cheer, inspiration, power, life. The final word of religion is not silence but song. Personify religion, and you cannot imagine her speechless, dumb, a nun of La Trappe, as it were. She will rather be a St. Cecilia. It

is on this account that so much of the Bible is poetry; and that so large a part of the best poetry is religious. A man belies his religion if his habitual expression of it is reluctant and restrained and prosaic. Doctor Arnold maintained that even the creeds and confessions should be set to music and sung—that they are not syllogisms but lyrics. If you will look for it, you will find a good deal of theology in the “Te Deum”—more and better than in some creeds—but it is theology sublimated into religion, and given forth in great peals of song.

Can we now put our two thoughts together into some reconciling statement? Reserve in matters of religion is good in its place. That place is not where it covers voluntary apathy, or a spirit of indecision, or a distaste for the things of the Spirit. Let no one think that reserve is of such merit in itself that it condones an attitude of reluctance and aloofness toward religion itself. Reserve is in place when it affords a refuge from the persistence of opinion and emotion and action which may have the approval of one person, but which he has no right to force upon another; when one is brought into the presence of a great truth or a great movement, which for the time awes and stirs him, before which he stands waiting and expectant like the disciples when they were “all gathered together in one place” waiting for the Pentecostal impulse which gave them utterance; or, finally, when in all humility, and with some disappointment with self, one is conscious of a lack of inward response to a call which others find compelling, but to which one may not give simulated or counterfeited assent. There is no more pathetic situation in religious experience than that of the many persons who are silent and sad while others are filled with the Spirit, and who, notwithstanding, sit not in the seats of the scornful. And let us understand that always, even when at its best, reserve is provisional, a stage in progress, never a counsel of perfection.

And, finally, a word as to the claims and merits of utterance. Gardeners and florists find that the life of the plant depends as really on the leaves as on the root—indeed that the root itself depends as much on the leaves as the leaves on the root. Carry this principle up into the spiritual realm and it means that the

spiritual life cannot be healthy and growing without spiritual utterance in appropriate forms. The Psalmist says of the good man, "His leaf also shall not wither." To repress or minimize intellectual and emotional expression causes the inner life to shrivel and wither. Hence the pains which the Church has taken in all ages, following the example of our Lord himself, to encourage and guide religious utterance. Hence among the most precious and most prized gifts of the Spirit are those supremely great utterances of belief and praise and prayer which the saints, that is the gifted and superior souls, have left to us who have all their needs but gifts and attainments how far less than theirs! How poor spiritually should we be if deprived of them! How thankful are we that we have them! How ungrateful and unwise if we neglect them! It is open to question whether certain methods which encourage extremely immature Christians to give public utterance to their thoughts and feelings is spiritually wise. But the wisdom of the Church and of the Spirit has provided a more excellent way. In psalm and hymn and anthem; in the inspired utterances of patriarchs, prophets, apostles, evangelists, martyrs; in the biographies of devout men who have left records of their penitence, their consecration, their aspirations; we have an anthology of spiritual utterance from which we can appropriate confession, and trust, and hope, and praise, in accordance with our needs and desires. Why should we confine ourselves to an iteration of the little worn-out phrases of our particular conventicle, when we have full heritage in the oecumenical psalmody of devotion? Why should we be pleased and satisfied with the tinkle of the religious nursery, when all the pipes and stops of the great organ of spiritual melody are ours if we will only command them? When all the Church with its thousand voices is crying to us,

"O magnify the Lord with me, and let us exalt his name together," be it ours to respond,

"O Lord, open thou our lips, and our mouth shall show forth thy praise."

*ARTICLES ON RELIGION IN PERIODICALS<sup>1</sup>*

Periodical articles on religion are like the plague of frogs in Egypt not only in number but in the fact that they appear in the most unlikely, not to say unsuitable, places. A special apparatus is indispensable to all who have any reason to try to keep track of them. Mr. Ernest Richardson, formerly librarian of Hartford Theological Seminary, now of Princeton University, an experienced hand, with the co-operation of several other bibliographers, has undertaken the laborious task of preparing a special index to this literature on the general plan of Poole's Index. The volume before us includes articles on religion published in the ten years, 1890 to 1899 inclusive, in not far from fifteen hundred periodicals. At a rough estimate, making no subtraction for repetition, the whole number of entries is between 60,000 and 70,000.

The index arrangement has wisely been preferred to any scheme of systematic classification. To each entry title is subjoined a short definition and a reference to some convenient Encyclopaedia in which the user may find general information on the subject. The definitions are sometimes inadequate or incorrect, as when Shamanism is described as "Religion of the fisheries of the Arctic region," or Halakah as "Jewish literary work (2 forms)," and the references not infrequently to sources of no credit or long out of date; but these shortcomings do not impair the usefulness of the Index, to which presumably no one will resort for first aid to the ignorant.

The distribution of articles under the sub-headings of the longer titles is not always well-considered: for example, under Armenia is a special head, "Armenia (massacre)," yet many articles on this subject are not to be found there, but under the

<sup>1</sup>An Alphabetical Subject Index and Index Encyclopaedia to Periodical Articles on Religion, 1890-1899. Compiled and edited by Ernest Cushing Richardson. 8vo, pp. 42+1168. New York: Published for the Hartford Seminary Press by Charles Scribner's Sons. [Copyright 1907.] Price \$10 net.

main entry, apparently because the word "massacre" does not occur in the title. Articles referring to Regensburg are divided, on no discoverable principle, between "Ratisbon" and "Regensburg," and the cross-reference runs only one way. The main classification itself is sometimes erroneous: "Occultism," e.g., is so defined as to exclude magic, but an article on the history of magic is entered under Occultism, doubtless because the title runs, "*Les sciences occultes au xviii si cle.*"

Even the simplest index classification of articles, many of which are known only by title, few of which can possibly have been read—a classification mechanically made by cataloguers—cannot help putting many articles in a wrong place; or at least not in the place where a scholar would most naturally look for them. The only remedy for this state of things is either an objectionable duplication of entries or a very free use of cross-references. In the volume before us cross-references are used much too sparingly: under "Animal worship," e.g., there is no reference to "Totemism," and conversely; under "Religion" there is none to "Paganism," yet two or three important articles on the history of religion are buried under the latter entry.

In conclusion it is perhaps not inappropriate to warn the student or the "general reader," who cannot for himself distinguish the obsolete, the void, and the fatuous from the live and significant, that such an index as this is a dangerous tool. Indeed, it might be maintained without paradox that nothing contributes more to the perpetuation of antiquated error and humbug than indexes—especially to periodical literature—and the subject-catalogues of great libraries; for they make it possible to "read up" and "write up" anything in heaven or earth, without the painful necessity of knowing anything about it.



## BOOKS RECEIVED

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- JESUS CHRIST AND THE CIVILIZATION OF TODAY; THE ETHICAL TEACHING OF JESUS CONSIDERED IN ITS BEARINGS ON THE MORAL FOUNDATIONS OF MODERN CULTURE.** *By Joseph Alexander Leighton.* 12mo, pp. 248. New York: The Macmillan Company. 1907. \$1.50 net.
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## *THE NATURALIZATION OF CHRISTIANITY IN THE FAR EAST*

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It is sometimes said that Christianity has been so long identified with the West, it has so thoroughly become a Western religion, that it is not adapted to take a great place in the mind and life of the Eastern nations. It is not intended in this remark to overlook the fact that Christianity is itself by origin an Oriental faith, an outgrowth of Judaism. Nor is it denied that, in considerable numbers, men of Oriental race, mainly within the borders of the present Turkish Empire, have from of old confessed Christianity in forms familiar to us in the Greek churches. But these Oriental Christians sustain rather than disprove the judgment which was above expressed. Not only have they shown since before the rise of Mohammedanism no perceptible zeal for the propagation of the Christian faith among other Orientals, but they have reacted powerfully against the propaganda on behalf of Western forms of the Christian faith in their own midst.

What is here meant to be asserted is rather that Christianity, at least as current among those who have been deeply interested in missions, is so largely indebted to Hellenic and Roman and Teutonic culture, so long associated with the civilization of Europe, as to be antipathetic even to the Semitic peoples out of the midst of whom Jesus of Nazareth arose, and totally alien to the remoter Asiatics like the Chinese and Japanese, or even to those who, like the Hindus, share with Europeans at least a common Aryan origin. The Christianity which in fact is offered, whether by Roman Catholic or Protestant emissaries, to these

children of the East in all the pride of their intellectual and spiritual inheritance, is, in the form of its doctrinal statement, the direct result of a history of thought whose field has been mainly the basin of the Mediterranean and, more recently, Western and Northern Europe. It is, in the form of its organization, so palpably the reflection of conditions which for ages prevailed in Europe that that form cannot be understood among us without reference to these facts, and ought not to be offered to others without acknowledgment of these facts. The phase of Christianity which is likely now to be carried to the East by zealous adherents is, in its form of worship, the direct deposit of the feeling and experience of a more or less defined group of races which have a common aesthetic as well as intellectual tradition. And finally, the ethical assumptions, or at all events the moral emphases, the whole type of life both public and private, in which this Christianity has expressed itself, the conduct it has fostered, not to say the institutions which it has produced, are those which have been evolved mainly within the area of the history of European morals.

Yet, whether from the side of the Roman Catholics or of the Protestants, those who have been eager for the propagation among Eastern peoples of the faith dear to themselves have not been, for the most part, of those who were prepared to make these sweeping admissions. Or, to put it differently, those who have been prepared to make these admissions have not been, until recently, in numbers among those who have been moved by an enthusiasm for their own faith and belief in its saving efficacy for others which launches men upon a propaganda involving isolation and reproach. The appeal of the missionary career, in the early stages of the work, is primarily not so much to the reflective as to the active, not to say the heroic, qualities in men. Its demand is for those qualities which pioneers, explorers, and adventurers show, for the men whom Stevenson describes as "mighty men of their hands, the smiters and builders, the judges who have lived long and done sternly," who have not always indeed hesitated when they might, but who at all events reveal that the world was not made in hesitation. The career has gathered to itself men who have loved their cause and their fellows and have created

problems which very possibly require for their solution other gifts than those which the pioneers themselves possessed.

A work thus inaugurated comes to a point where it needs pondering, solemn review, and sympathetic questioning. It has need of much that a man may do in his study. It has need of that which a man much in his study may see with his eyes when he transports himself to the field. It has need of the man of much study who will spend his whole life in the field. It has need of continual readjustment of its measures, not to say even transformation of its ideals, as in its maturer stages it meets the maturer and more complex problems of the mind and life of the nations to which it has gone. It has need of perennial reconsideration of its own principles and of its own nature in the light of that which its experience reveals. And not the least of the services of the endeavor to propagate Christianity among alien races is that which this effort renders to the understanding of Christianity itself. If certain assumptions concerning Christianity which have obtained largely unquestioned within areas where Christianity has been long in the ascendant are found to be baseless, inadequate, or perverse, surely we have cause to be grateful to those whose wider contacts tend to rid us of our provincialisms, to rebuke us for our pharisaisms, and to bring home to us some sense of the simplicity, the vital quality, the self-transforming capacity, of that which in our Christianity we really do possess.

It is beyond question that the most of those who have, at any time thus far, been ardent for the propagation of Christianity among alien races have done so under one form or another of the assumption that Christianity is an absolute religion—the absolute religion—destined to be universal because absolute. For some of those this assumption has gone even farther. It has amounted practically to the conviction that the form in which they themselves had experienced the blessings of Christianity was identical with the whole revelation of God for the religious life of man. By this assumption they have stayed their souls on the Eternal in all the vicissitudes of their endeavor. By this they have without doubt moved multitudes and do now move them. When ever has not the conviction of the absolute been a source of peace and again of might to those whom it possessed? When ever is

not that conviction, put forth by some, profoundly impressive to others? This ring of certainty has had much to do with the success of any propaganda. When ever did a doubter win men to the overcoming of their doubts or lead them to the abandonment of that which they had deemed assured?

The conception of the absoluteness of Christianity and the place of Christianity in the history of religion has been much discussed of recent years. It is to most men so obvious, once their attention has been called to it, that a religion cannot be in the same sense both absolute and historic, that the time seems opportune for the illumination of this theme from current experience as well. It seems fitting to set that proposition in the light of facts such as may be witnessed in the Orient at the present moment, and to test it by observations of the living contact of Christianity with the living faiths of the East. If it has conduced to clearness that men should debate in what sense it is possible to allege that Christianity is absolute and in what sense not, no less do we free ourselves from embarrassment and gather power from the perception of the relativity of Christianity. Prolonged administrative experience, observation on the field, the compulsion to formulate one's reflections and if possible to shape a policy—these should contribute something toward the bringing to a fruitful conclusion a discussion which only too easily may become abstract and remote. Exactly through these the theoretical propositions issuing from the comparative study of religions should be made more helpful to the cause of Christian missions and more useful to the understanding of our own Christianity, with which we must ever be afresh and without fear concerned.

We were saying that without doubt, with many of those who have been engaged in the missionary endeavor in the East, that certainty of Christian experience out of which they speak has been unconsciously expanded into a conviction of the absoluteness of the form of faith and practice in which they themselves have been born and bred. What could be more natural with these than the assumption that other men would have the great experience of conversion and of progress in the Christian life under the same forms with themselves? We all have a feeling somewhat akin

to this concerning the atmosphere of the home in which we were born, the tradition of the family stock and neighborhood, the nation to which we belong, the maxims of the early discipline which we received. It is only by experience and reflection that we are made aware how many other homes there are, how many other traditions and inheritances, other environments and stimuli. We realize that through these others have had experiences which were for them of absolute worth. And, coming to religion, did not the earliest disciples of Jesus, having received still as Jews from him, a Jew, the precious experience of truth and grace and of redeeming power, assume that all others must receive that experience with the same appendages and in the same way? Was not that the gist of the great struggle between them and Paul? Was not that the crisis and parting of the ways of the earliest Christianity, typical of all other crises and partings of the ways which have been ever since? Indeed it is not half so wonderful that ten men, and those the personal disciples of the Master, stuck fast in this notion of the absoluteness of their Judaism, as that there was found even one, and he a man who had not seen the Master, who had the insight and courage to rebuke them to their faces, and to have his whole life made at once miserable and glorious because of his unfaltering adherence to his vision of the greater meaning of the Master's gospel which possessed him. And are we not, as we said in our initial sentence, Western Christians, or—to put it more correctly—being Western, are we not Christians, in the sense of our own real experience, only because Paul and men like him insisted that the Gospel in going to the West should leave what was Eastern and Semitic behind it? They urged that it should become Greek to the Greek, Roman in Rome, African to the Carthaginians, Gallic to Gauls, Teutonic at the last to our own ancestors. It was not merely clothed with the garments of new times and places but fed with the food, vitalized with the rich blood, of the new races, domesticated, naturalized, nationalized, transmitted from father to son, as all part and parcel of the mystery of the transmission of life. All futile, impertinent, and unpardonable obstacles were to be left behind. The inward spirit of it was to be so merged with new traits as to be no longer identical with its old self in any sense save this, that



what had blessed some men in Galilee under the terms inviolable, human, and therefore divine, of real religious experience which Galileans naturally had, now blessed peoples then unheard of, and still blesses us. That is the old, the perennial story.

We in turn must have so great a faith as to realize that though we cannot set ourselves outside of our own skins one whit more than could Paul outside his Rabbinism, though we cannot personally shed our Occidentalisms when we cross the Hellespont trending eastward, any more than could Paul divest himself of his Orientalisms when he crossed it passing west, yet we anticipate that the faith we bear will leave wholly behind it many of the forms, dear to us, in which we bear it. It will not perpetuate itself as a mere imitation, but as the life of men who live. It will transform them indeed, but, exactly in that measure, be itself transformed into a likeness past all our forecasting. It will be the life in God as revealed through Christ to the soul of the Chinese man. It will be this or it will be nothing to the Chinese man. Paul's own inheritance was too much for him. The Judaism of his teaching is often as pronounced as is the anti-Judaism of his practice. He cannot forget the things which he breathed since his earliest breath and drank with his mother's milk. But had the ordinary destiny of literature befallen the letters which he left, or had the Church come earlier to a truer sense wherein the inspiration of those rare letters lay, nothing could have prevented the complete decomposition of Paul's cherished forms of argumentation, like the corn of wheat which falls into the ground and dies. Nothing but that strange fate which ultimately gave to Paul's lightest letter the same kind of value as a verbal oracle which Paul himself assigned to Law and Prophets could have committed men removed from him by fifty generations and by half the circumference of the earth to the endeavor to find in those incidental elements of synagogue dialectic the forms in which we still must believe in our own Christ. Meantime the whole logic of Paul's life-contention and the whole history of the Occidental churches which he gave his life to found proved just the contrary. They expressed the deep meaning of the Gospel and the spirit of Paul's adored Master in forms Paul never would have dreamed.

In the same manner, we cannot go to the Orient as other than

the Western men we are. And when we put on Chinese coats and have a thin blond queue projecting from the fringe a British bald spot makes, we do but make the matter worse, not better, it would seem. We cannot expect to be taken seriously when we are always playing a part. We understand the Gospel in the way we do in the wake of an immemorial inheritance. It is ours to speak it as we understand. Not in one lifetime nor in nine, could these be given us, should we surely see things as the Chinese man sees, who not only has not our inheritance, but who has one, vivid and immemorial, of his own. We do not need to torture ourselves to see Christianity otherwise than as we do or as we imagine that the Chinese man may see it. The problem of the transmission of faith is easier than that. The level of the transfusion of the blood of religion is different from that. Least of all need we join the ranks of those who deem that nothing can be done until we arrive at a statement of the essence of Christianity. The pursuit of the philosopher's stone is not more futile than that notion, and this for the simplest of reasons: so soon as you have stated this essence, it ceases to be essence and becomes a concrete, a local, temporal, personally conditioned, partial, and passing embodiment of that essence. We might as well say that we will transmit nothing but the pure spirit of learning to our pupils. We cannot do that. We can only with joy impart to them such scraps of learning as we have, with all their imperfections on their heads, and hope that in the process students may catch something of the spirit of learning which will make them living and life-giving in the field of scholarship, and cause their achievements to be greater and better than our own have been. There is, therefore, something sublime in this faith of the Christian man as he goes among men and takes in simple courage and good cheer the faith which he has, the character which he is, the spirit which Christ has enabled him to be, and, without blinking his own imperfections or being deterred from work by those who insistently remind him of them, yet trusts that God will make all but the true life of his religion to rot as the mere body of it, but will also make that true life of religion to prevail among the men over whom he yearns, and in them and in their world to have what body God shall please.

But, as we were saying, quite the opposite of these ideas has prevailed in the large in both the Roman Catholic and the Protestant communions. In the one the forms of sound doctrine, organization, and practice, stand identified with Christianity, and Christianity with these. Their truth and permanence has been guaranteed by the authoritative tradition of the Church—a tradition which in the last analysis is regarded as infallible. The greatest wonder of the long history of this Church is the flexibility which it has shown, its power of adaptation to most varied circumstances. In its missionary practice it has shown a disposition to accommodate itself to the ideas and customs of the peoples whom it set out to win for which it has indeed been often bitterly reproached. It is curious, therefore, that this Church should appear to be unconscious of the principle which these concessions illustrate. It has been most confident in its assertion that it has never changed and will remain unchangeable, all the while that it is in itself the greatest witness of the transformation which we have suggested through the influence of the environment in the midst of which it has worked.

On the other hand, the Protestant churches deemed that they went back to the New Testament. They believed that they reached a statement of faith, a form of government and practice, guaranteed by that Testament, and having something of the same inviolability which appertained to that New Testament. The tradition was declared to be human and errant, but the document which lay at the source of the tradition to be divine, infallible. It was not perceived that even if men could perform the miracle of transporting themselves thus from the sixteenth century to the first, not even thus could they escape that contingency and relativity which belongs to everything that is historical. On the whole, it is but fair to say that the Protestant missions have been far more shy of "accommodation," as it has been called, to the principles and practices of the non-Christian peoples among whom they worked than have the Roman Catholics, and that for a creditable reason. They have had less confidence, or rather no confidence, in mere external relation to the Church and in the saving efficacy of its sacraments. They have been less tempted to work for numbers and imposing visible results. They have

cared less that their converts should be influential in state and society. They have worked more for inward and spiritual transformation as antecedent to all others. But it cannot be said that the sensitiveness about accommodation, however well grounded, has tended to make the Protestant missions appear to be more liberal than the Roman Catholic, but rather less so. It has made their emissaries to appear to be more insistent on a certain, necessarily Occidental, form of statement of faith and practice of devotion and outward shaping of the life, as the essential prerequisite of their converts being allowed to bear the Christian name at all. We are confronted with the singular anomaly that those missions which have said with perfect truth that they desired only to teach men in their inward spirit, that they cared nothing for form, have yet achieved, in those whom they have profoundly influenced, such a reproduction of the typical religious experience as we are familiar with it here at home, such an acceptance even of our forms of statement of the mysteries of faith, and such a conformity to traditional Protestant, not to say denominational, practices, as the Roman Catholic, working in his less intensive way, never achieves, and possibly never designs or desires. One going into a Hindu or Chinese Christian church is positively astounded to see how completely some of the converts represent, seemingly to the minutest detail, the type with which we are familiar in the devout life of our churches here at home.

But these converts, much as we may rejoice in that which is undoubtedly genuine in them, give us food for reflection. They surely represent the intense influence of devoted missionaries upon some. But they surely are witnesses of the fact that this Christianity, real as it is, is still exotic. They are too much like ourselves for us to have the deeper joy of them we seek. They are the proof of the still ascendant influence of the foreigner. They are the evidence that among them Christianity is not yet naturalized. They explain how their compatriots may come to look upon the Christian as denationalized, and on conversion as equivalent to alienation; upon adherence to the Westerners' faith as proof that one has gone over absolutely to the stranger. Such phenomena may indeed be an evidence of the intensity and power of conviction with which Christianity has been taught in foreign

lands and of the revolutionary effect which it has without doubt had upon individuals. They show the complete displacement of previous convictions in such individuals, the transformation, not to say transfiguration, in feeling and life which these have undergone. They may be the indices upon the part of certain peoples or of certain strata of these peoples of almost complete receptivity toward the thoughts and the example and impulse given by the stranger from the West. Of the people of India the remark has often been made that, probably as the result of the age-long domination of one conqueror after another, they are in considerable degree pliant to foreign influence, and, despite the proverbial conservatism of the East, are liable in individual cases to go over to the standard of the stranger with an unreserve which seems amazing. The emissary of the foreign religion has already reaped in some measure the unhappy consequences of his identification with the military, civil, social, and commercial conquests of his race. He is certain to reap those injurious consequences in yet larger measure still. But momentarily he did reap an advantage. So soon as he advanced to the point where he made any impression at all, he impressed his constituency with the almost absolute contrast of that type of thought, feeling, life, which he offered to that which he found. He was able to win over some almost without reservation or resistance to this contrasting type. Perhaps he felt, and perhaps they felt, that only by this breach with the convert's past, this practical denial of his antecedents, this separation from his environment, this projection along a new path, could the integrity of his faith, the purity of his life, the characteristic element of his experience, be preserved. In many cases this may have been so. But the question is a far larger one than of the individual case. The question would not be answered by the accumulation of such cases. The question is, Is this multiplication of the foreign type what the Christianization of these lands would mean? Is this a practicable aim, upon the largest possible scale and for an indefinite time? Is it a goal which ever can be attained? Is it a goal which, when we calmly consider, we even wish to attain?

Meantime portentous changes are taking place, with which we must bear reckoning if we are to achieve anything further.

These changes affect both the missionary himself and those to whom he bears his message. It is sometimes cavalierly assumed that those alterations in the apprehension of Christianity which have taken place in the intellectual centres of Christendom within the nineteenth century, and which are beginning profoundly to affect the Christian body at home, have been as yet largely unfelt by the Christian representatives and their following abroad. Observation does not confirm that view. That all missionaries are thus affected is not asserted. That all ministers, or even laymen, here at home are thus visibly affected, probably would not be claimed. But that some veterans in the field, and some others, younger in years, who have escaped an obsolete style of training, are as much touched by the modern movement of thought as are any among ourselves may be affirmed. It would seem that the thoughtful among these persons stand over against the non-Christian world in a relation very similar to that in which the early Church stood in the face of the Graeco-Roman world. They are able to judge of principles and practices, not merely theoretically, as we may do from our studies, but in the actual contact with the persons to whom these faiths are a living reality, with institutions which they have created, and with a public and private life which they have inspired. Other things being equal, these men are in a better position to judge the faiths with which their own is brought into comparison, and to judge them by their influence and actual achievement. In like manner they are in a better position to judge their own faith, not by that which has been traditionally claimed for it, or even solely by that for which it may have stood in their own personal experience, but by the power which it shows in actual competition for the allegiances of men, the power to work a real redemption of men in the world and of the world through men. They are in a position to form a just and generous estimate of the great historic faiths which dominate the Orient, of the strength of these and of their weaknesses, of their points of contrast with Christianity and of resemblance to the same, of the virtues which they breed and of the vices which they cause or tolerate, as well as of the vices rampant in Christendom and still more on the fringe of Christendom in the isolation of the East.

It is certain, moreover, that the spread of Western education in the East, the increasing number of youths of standing and ability who from the East are being educated in the West, are exerting a levelling influence the full effect of which has been yet by no means felt. In the vast population of India, despite the long fidelity of the British government and of the missions and in spite of the zeal of some classes of the Indians, it is yet only a small portion of the people which is moved. In the still vaster population of China the agitation and upheaval is but just beginning. In Japan, with its small population, its compact area, its excellent means of communication, with the instincts of leadership by an enlightened minority inherited from the feudal age, and with a political situation which pushed Japan forward for self-preservation as no nation in the world was ever pushed, the movement has been successful almost beyond belief. Japan stands already among the great educated and educating nations in the world. The view which these countries have had and are now having through the residence of their youth in our universities; the impression they derive of the standing of Christianity within Christendom, of the shortcomings and delinquencies of our civilization at home as well as abroad, of the contrast between the ideal and the actual, of the friction of the sects among themselves and the alienation of a large part of the public from them all—these observations, with the testimony of travellers and the witness of the press, are not likely to make just the Christian propaganda to stand out from all the mass of things, European and American, which in the Orient have lost prestige, as the one which has not thus suffered loss. Quite the contrary, the nemesis of the connection between the mission work and national ambitions, international complications and race agitations, commercial exploitations, and what not, is upon us. In a far higher degree than we really have been responsible for these, we shall be complicated in the issues. For having once, even only in a left-handed way, profited by these, or only not sufficiently rebuked them, we shall have with our own right hand to help to pay the bill. If the native was once too pliant to the foreigner, too easily influenced, he may turn out to be not pliant enough, and not easily influenced even when the reasons for being influenced might be very good.

If he was once too ready to abandon his own faith for that of another, there may come a time when he will be altogether adverse to the religion of the foreigner, and that not because he is more faithful to his own, but because he has lost all serious interest in any. He will have become secularized in the wake of this vast secular movement in the midst of which he is, materialized, paganized, with the real paganism, of which there is plenty in America, having lost his interest in anything except dollars and pleasures, and in this also adopted the attitude of many here at home.

Many things have made for great change in the aspect of the self-consciousness of the peoples of the Far East within a generation. Pride of race, fidelity to the tradition of a great past, these races have always had. But its directest working was to make them ardently desire to perpetuate their isolation and to shut out the Occidental with all his ways and works. This spirit animated the dealings of Japan with the West until well within the lifetime of men now living. It animated the official course of China until the year 1900. But there came a change in Japan all the motives of which we do not fully know. The central element in that change was the perception on the part of the Japanese leaders that the old policy of isolation, the effort to maintain the hermit position, was a mistaken method. With the resources then at the command of Japan, every outbreak of popular feeling—often natural and just—against the encroachment of the foreigner led only to yet more damaging encroachment, to fresh concessions wrung from a helpless people. It was clear that the end sought would have to be gained by a path precisely the opposite of that which had thus far been pursued. Whereas heretofore nothing was to be learned from the foreigner, now everything was to be learned from him, or at all events everything was to be learned about him, in order that the people of the Island Empire might meet the foreigner on his own ground. Japan was to become other than her traditional self in order that she might remain herself. There was at one time even too great an avidity for things foreign, merely as foreign, and not necessarily as true. There was some too light-hearted parting with things beautiful and germane to the real character of the race.



One saw far too much of the impress of what is mistaken and unworthy, of what is stupid and vulgar and utterly disheartening, in our own civilization. In so great a metamorphosis it is likely that such a state of things was for a time inevitable. But whatever hallucination men may once have indulged, no one now imagines that this great transformation—one of the most wonderful episodes in human history—took place because the Japanese had lost their national sense. Rather, we see clearly that it was the strong race-sense, the passionate national consciousness, a patriotism which has thrilled the world, which was the deep underlying motive and true explanation of the transformation. No one who reflects upon the use made by the Japanese three years ago of the sciences and art of war by land and sea, of the hygiene of camps and transportation, of remedial measures of the hospital or the battlefield; no one who compares their commissariat with our own in 1898 or that of Great Britain in South Africa in 1900; no one who studies the Japanese constitution, the procedure of the courts, the methods of taxation, the organization of railways, telegraphs, express service, and the post; no one who has sailed in their ships and watched their commercial navy eating up the trade of the Pacific; no one who has listened in their universities, been conducted through their schools, can any longer dream that Japan is playing with some one else's weapons, imitating other people's methods, and walking in the foreigners' way. These things they have absolutely made their own. Through them they express themselves. Each year will see less and less of the incongruous and superficial and more of true assimilation, vital reproduction, more of the resurgence of the mighty spirit of the race.

And what has happened for Japan may be predicted, with the modifications which belong to it, for China too; all the more because Japan has given to China ocular demonstration that this is the path to tread if China also is ever to be rid of a foreign aggression which has already cost her much, and has seemed at times certain to cost her more. The differences between the two peoples with which we must needs reckon are many and striking. The vast numbers of the Chinese, their lack of homogeneity as compared with the Japanese, the greatness of their territory,

and the scant means of communication as yet, the weakness of the central government and the lack of any veneration of the Chinese for it, the want of anything resembling the leadership which the old nobility gave to Japan, the militant democratic trait of the Chinese—these considerations and others like them may make the movement slower. The episode of 1900 was the end of an era. It was sufficiently dramatic to be ever remembered as such. There are possibilities of revolution which no man can reckon with. But, though a revolution of national proportions might jeopardize incidentally the foreigner in life and property, no such attempt in principle to rid the nation of the foreigner is any longer probable. Slow as are the peasants in the interior provinces to understand what the viceroys on the coast are trying to do, the sense surely has penetrated China that there are far shrewder things to do with the foreigner than to kill him. From the stranger much is to be learned. All that he brings is to be used. The exploiter is to be exploited. That the Chinese man loves the foreigner better than he used to do there is no reason to believe. But “China for the Chinese,” the cry ever on men’s lips, means a different thing from that which it meant only ten years ago. It means an aim the legitimacy of which we cannot for a moment question. In an antagonism some phases of which we may deplore, we do well to remember that there are causes of that antagonism of which we men of the West cannot be proud. Of the issue of this movement in the long run it would seem that no one can be in doubt. It will be a China open to the world, not merely in the sense of travel or even only of commerce. It will be a China open to the world, not merely diplomatically or socially but also intellectually and morally. It will be a China profoundly influenced by the world, but profoundly influencing the world in turn, in a way that we have never looked to China for influence. It will leave us the superiority precisely in those things in which we are superior and in no others. It will be a China not passively recipient of education and religion from the West. It will be a China intelligently receptive, in the end, only of those aspects of the intellectual or Christian life of the West which are really profitable for China, and rejecting all the rest. It will be a China so vividly transforming that which it does

receive as to become an interpreter in its own fresh way of the inner meaning and the further consequences of Christianity to those from whom the Chinese have received that faith.

Of one thing we may speak with confidence. The enlarging of the so-called spheres of influence to which the Powers in 1901 so ardently looked forward, and from which they were perhaps only by their own dissensions held back, the virtual partitioning of China which was to be the prelude to the overt and formal partition that once seemed to the over-confident Europeans so easy—that occupation would surely not have retarded, it could but have accelerated, the awakening of China. It would have increased the embitterment which everybody now is trying to allay. It would have given the foreigner more territory to defend, whereas he is just now sufficiently doubtful about being able to defend what he already has. The issue of the war with Russia shows that the task would have involved in the maintaining of these armies of occupation an expenditure of men and money of which no one in those days dreamed. It might easily have involved the Powers in conflict with one another. If persisted in, it might easily have precipitated a conflict of China with no small portion of the Western world. Such a conflict men would then have jeered to hear suggested. But when one thinks of the numbers of the Chinese, of the potential wealth of China, and of the strides of her recent military development, no one is jeering now. The moral, intellectual, and even commercial influence of the West upon China may in the end be far greater because certain things which were then supposed to make for the might of Europe in the East were not done, and because it is absolutely certain now that they never will be done.

No one can maintain that those portions of China in which the foreigner, of whatever nationality, has had least disputed sway have been the regions in which the best fruit of Christian teaching has been shown. They have been the regions in which, for missionary and merchant alike, not merely a theoretical extra-territoriality under treaty could be claimed, but in which, through the volunteer militia company within the Concession or through the gunboat off the Bund, that extra-territoriality could on a moment's notice be enforced. It cannot be said, however, that

these were conditions ideally adapted for the making of the true impression of the Gospel of the Prince of Peace. These have been the regions in which, indeed, foreign virtues of the highest order have been shown, but, as well, foreign vices of the most scandalous sort have cried to Heaven. If under the benign régime of governments sufficiently far away, and not certain to be in accord, although their subjects in emergency were sure through thick and thin to stand together, an occasional pharisee made broad his phylacteries, at all events it must be conceded that there were many publicans and sinners too. Even now it might occasionally go hard with a foreigner in a Chinese court. It goes hard also with a Chinaman at times in a Chinese court. But the time cannot be far away when to the Chinese also, as to the Japanese in the years after the adoption of their Constitution, this extra-territoriality of the foreigner will come to seem to be an insufferable indignity, a violence to the nation's honor which must be done away. We should hail every advance in China which tends to make possible its doing away.

And as if it were not enough that the foreigner, both good and bad, should be beyond the jurisdiction of the government upon whose soil he lives, some one in a moment of enthusiasm wrung from the Chinese government the concession that even a Chinese convert to the foreigners' religion might enjoy a partial extra-territoriality. At least the dealings of his government with its own citizen might be reviewed officially or unofficially by a subject of a foreign power, to see if that citizen were not being persecuted for his faith. One can never be sufficiently amazed that at the time of the adoption of this clause in the treaties there seems to have been no forecast among those who had the cause of truth and goodness at heart of the immeasurable evil which this would work. But you do wonder that it was not foreseen that never, so long as such ruling obtained, could Christianity make any progress toward naturalization in the land. Never by any possibility could it get beyond being the religion of foreigners and of those who found it profitable to cast in their lot with the foreigner to the possible detriment of the institutions, and in violence to the just sentiment, of their native land. We must suppose that at the time when Christian men made this provision and rejoiced in it

they did not clearly look forward to that kind and degree of naturalization of Christianity in China which seems to us the ideal. They did not realize overwhelmingly, as we have come to do, that Christianity in China must become native or nothing. Only in becoming native has Christianity ever meant anything to any people. The very reason why the forms in which we know and love Christianity are potent to us is that they are the forms in which the spiritual impulse which Christianity is took shape all naturally among our own ancestors. And the very fact that they are natural to us makes them unnatural, and in the end impossible, to other men. The function of the living and loving emissary of Christianity and of the doctrines and practices which he knows about is only a temporary one. The very purpose of them is that they shall function just so long as to bring the life of a new race into contact with the truth, and then they shall cease to be. The new race untrammelled and, as well, uncoddled is to have its own way with Christianity, or Christianity will never have its way with that race.

We have dwelt long upon these external parallels because they seem to bring home with tremendous force the thing we wish to say. The time will come when the Gospel will be preached in China and the Christian Church built up—or else will fail to be built up—for the same reasons and under the same conditions in which the Gospel is preached and the Church built up in England or the United States. We may rejoice in that prospect. The period of tutelage has been long enough. At all events it has been long enough to develop, with the virtues, also the weaknesses which are developed under tutelage. And, whether we will or no, we are being forced to the period in which we must take all the risks, suffer the evils, bear the trials, and reap also the excellent consequences in character—our own and that of those whom we instructed—of a period whose ideals are far different from those of tutelage. To say that the days of missionary usefulness are over is absurd. It would be more true to say that they are just fairly begun. But the days are over of the kind of influence and the method of exerting it which have perhaps on the whole in the past preponderated, and that often with very good effect. The difficulties of the older situation were great. In face of such resistance

as China offered to Morrison and those who followed him any success was admirable, and the success achieved amazing. But the difficulties of the propaganda for Christianity in a China open to us as it is today are not less great. They are certainly of a different sort. The thing which grows upon us as we think of these nations whose problem is ever more and more like our own is that there is no barbarism among them which is not also here at our own doors. There is no real heathenism among them the like of which is not illustrated in our own community. There is no dark shadow of immorality and superstition among them which has not its parallel in our own midst. There is no faith of men sincerely held which has not done for them something of that which our own faith has done for us. And a faith, even if it be our own, insincerely held, can hardly be expected to accomplish on the other side of the world what it cannot do on this. In face of some things which we might mention in our own recent history, we hesitate to call other nations uncivilized. It needs explanation to our own soberer selves and to others when we make bold to call this a Christian nation. And there are some of us who have almost laid away the appellation "heathen," or when we bring it out for service are quite as likely to apply it to inhabitants of avenues in our own country as to the denizens of the heart of Africa or of the islands of the sea.

We may deplore the fact that the problem of all the other nations, even of those old Oriental ones, is so fast becoming so much like our own. We may deplore this devastating advance through the East of the Western type. We may even waste time in recrimination as to whether the merchant opened the country for the missionary, or the missionary for the man of trade. That makes little difference now. The one thing which stands out in the religious relation is this: that if Christianity in the East remains an exotic—English, German, or American; Roman Catholic or Protestant; Anglican, Puritan, conservative, or radical, as we count these differences—it will be among the things which, as meaningless for the future of China, will be swept away. If in its moral and spiritual force, its idealism and optimism, in its law of service and of sacrifice, in its comfort and inspiration, as the stay of private goodness and of public virtue, it holds the hearts

of the Chinese, and the Chinese hold it in their hearts and express it freely in their own lives and institutions, its spreading in his land the Chinese man cannot permanently prevent. If it gives him more hold upon what is greatest in human life than does his Buddhism or his Confucianism, it will dominate him in the end in spite of these. If it does not give him such hold upon what is greatest in life, we should not wish it to dominate him. If we have any real faith in our own religion, we believe it will be so. If we have no such faith in our religion itself, then how can we have any faith in the paltry things which we may do in its name?

But indeed, if we have ever lacked this kind of confidence in the inward spirit of Christianity; if we have ever doubted its ability to adapt itself to new and strange conditions, its capacity to transform nations and incidentally itself to undergo the most radical of transformations, that must be because we have forgotten how great a transformation Christianity has already undergone in its march from one region to another people. We have not reflected how alien to its Jewish, Hellenic, Roman self it has in time become, in order that it might be to us Teutons and Saxons what it is. We forget how recent are many forms which we call ancient, and how much of what we deem essentially Christian is not Christian at all! No aspect of Church History is at the present moment claiming more attention from scholars than the survivals in Christianity of the forms of thought, feeling, and action of the earlier faiths, which Christianity would thus appear not wholly to have displaced. No study is more interesting or instructive than that of the deposit in the types of Christianity successively current from the media through which it had to work. That Christianity was itself primarily a religious revival within Judaism; that its first adherents, and even the Lord himself, were devout Jews—the evidence of all this is written broad and long both in the Synoptic Gospels and by Paul. That this strong Judaic element, these traits of the old upon which the new life of Christianity was grafted, were not eliminated for generations, nay more, that, owing to the peculiar standing given them as witnessed in the inspired Scripture, they are even now only beginning to be generally recognized as Jewish survivals and eliminated—this may be regarded as among the assured results of New

Testament study. No sooner did Christians pass beyond Palestine, even only to the Jews in Alexandria and Asia, than Christianity accommodated itself to the forms current in the centres of Hellenic influence upon Judaism. These things are evidenced in the thought and life implied in the Epistle to the Hebrews and in the Fourth Gospel. The same thing is yet more evident when we look at the witness of the writings of the Apologists and of the early Fathers, Greek, Roman, African, and of whatever racial and cultural affinity they were. Nothing is more impressive than to behold how those who most rejoiced in the conquest of the pure Gospel in the world, those to whom the pagan life about them was but the proof of an evil spirit, and pagan thought but the pathetic evidence of the powerlessness and error of the human mind, yet themselves never write or speak or act but they give evidence of being profoundly influenced by that life and mind. Conquer the Western world they did, these glowing advocates of a vital faith, these exponents of a new religious power. But into every institution which they framed, into every system of instruction in the faith which they put forth, into the methods of defence of that same faith which they devised, they took up all unknowingly, and in a profound sense all rightfully, elements fundamental to the life and thought which they deposed. In the long retrospect of centuries we perceive that it was exactly by these elements which they unwittingly wrought into composition with the characteristic impulse of their faith that they conquered as they did. In these elements lay their temptation and their weakness often, to be sure; but in these elements lay also one of the secrets of their strength and achievement as well. Books have been written to show how, in the seething caldron of the nations which the Roman Empire in the two centuries after Jesus had become, elements of religion the most incongruous were mingled, and composite types arose. Syncretism was the trait. Surely it is a most naïve assumption that in the midst of this religious syncretism the Christian religion alone stood, and through the generations, through the ebb and flow of races in the mobile population of the vast united Empire, Christianity alone remained unquickenened and unimpaired. The Christianity of the basin of the Mediterranean, the Christianity which we inherit,



is itself a syncretistic religion. If it had not been such, we never should have inherited it. The creeds the Church has cherished, the systems on which it has relied, are the children of the fruitful union of that Jewish revival of religion which the earliest Christianity was with the intellectual genius of the Greeks. The institutions which are to us traditional are the fruit of the reaction of Jewish, Hellenic, and Roman impulses to order and efficiency in the social combinations of mankind. Was the eremite, the monastic, the coenobitic ideal, which played such a part down to the Reformation, a Christian impulse? Was the priesthood as a class a Christian notion? Was the dual standard of life for spirituals and for other people within the implications of Christ's teaching? Was asceticism a thing native to Christianity? Was the contrast of the sacred and secular Jesus' notion? Was not the substitutionary thought of the atonement a reminiscence of Teutonic social order? Or, to come to things small, is not a Christmas tree a pagan symbol? Are not many of the customs of our religious festivals the result of the partial infusion of the Christian spirit into ancient popular customs too dear to be taken away from a converted people by the converting priests? Are not some of the saints in the calendar faint recollections of the heroes of folk-lore? Is not the whole worship of the saints, as it dominated the Middle Age, the metamorphosis of a polytheism which was never so far put away as to need to be brought back?

And are not some phases of faith now dead to us the living phases with men who stand at the same point in the religious experience at which our ancestors stood not so long ago? When the Hottentot reads in the Bible about witches, the missionary, with his modern sense about the Bible, is hard put to it to maintain for the Hottentot his belief in the Scripture and at the same time to rid him of his murderous superstition about witches. The poor man believed in witches before he ever saw a Bible. For the moment he believes in them the more, and not the less, because the Bible seems to sustain him in his belief. But so did the Bible prove the witches to our own Massachusetts forbears; and, fortified by the Bible, they too committed abominable crimes and lived in nameless fear. In China it will be pointed out to you that the Scripture of the New Testament gives color to the

belief in demoniacal possession. In confirmation of the Scripture the Chinese believe in demoniacal possession too. All China is, so to say, permeated with this belief. A book written by a missionary not many years ago cites possibly a hundred examples of unquestionably authentic experiences in China, to show that phenomena of demoniacal possession occur in China precisely similar to those recorded in the Scripture. The Chinese explanation of these phenomena is the same as that offered in the words of the Scripture. By these examples the Scripture is supposed to be defended against criticism, and it is made certain that men were and are possessed.

A missionary said that he thought it had been almost a generation since, in the field with which he was familiar, a Western emissary of Christianity had preached material hell fire and the physical torment of the lost. He doubted if the natives of the younger generation had ever heard from a foreigner an exposition of Scripture looking in that direction. And yet there were native preachers, when they went off on their preaching tours, making men tremble, as Edwards in Northampton made our fathers tremble too. Did not the Scriptures speak of a hell fire? Does not the Chinese man in his legal processes resort to torture? But is it so long since our own fathers also depicted their God as an Oriental Sovereign, ruling without a code, or even having a code which might conceivably reverse the maxims of what seems true and good to mortal men? These seem to be most interesting examples of the contact of the Gospel with the rudimentary notions and sad mistakes of men. They remind us, right from the face of our own Scriptures, how the spiritual impulse of the Gospel passed through a period of amalgamation with notions which are not true and do not make for the good. It may be almost in the same order and sequence that a new race, in contact with the Gospel, will pass through some of those same amalgamations too.

Quite apart from the idea of the saving efficacy of the Sacraments and other ideas belonging to its ecclesiastical theory, the Roman Catholic Church has, as is well known, always pursued in its missionary activities a policy which is in fundamental contrast with the prevailing Protestant practice, and which has had

some interesting consequences for that aspect of the history of missions of which we speak. The Roman Catholic communion has assumed, namely, that the true course in the training of a race to Christian conviction and practice is that which identifies the convert with the Church almost so soon as his consent can be gained. It cares for his education in Christian knowledge and his training in Christian character, so as to say, from the inside. It frankly sets Christian maturity as a goal to be best approached by those who have been perhaps for the greater portion of their lives enrolled among the baptized members, if not actually among the confirmed communicants, of the Church. The Protestant emphasis, on the other hand, has generally been upon an initial experience, more or less pronounced, of conversion. The Protestant has hesitated even to baptize, and still more to receive to his other Sacrament, those who have not already made some marked progress in the graces of the Christian character. He has feared lest immature Christians might bring reproach upon the cause, uncertain ones might lapse, the clear distinction between the old life and the new might be obscured; and thus both to converts and watchful outsiders harm be done and offence be given. We have indeed here only painted the same contrast with which these two types of Christians stand over against one another here also in the home land. But the contrast is even more pronounced in the missionary field. This is notoriously the reason why statistics of the one body are practically incommensurable with those of the other. It is often put as if by this method the Roman Catholic Church actually sought vast numbers of apparent converts, not much concerning itself that part of the conquest was thus only apparent. This may sometimes have been the case. Records of the work of St. Francis Xavier show what entire confidence he had in the Sacrament, and how little he cared that his priests often knew no language in which they could communicate with their adherents. But we should be ashamed not to state the Roman theory in the best light in which its advocates might put it. Just so we would put the Protestant theory in the light in which it expresses true care for the souls of men and for the honor of the Church.

It is clear, when they are thus stated, that each theory has some-

thing to say for itself. Each stands for a truth. But each entails its disadvantages. The Roman Catholic Church thus gets nearer to the people, both—be it said—for its own good and ill. It lays itself open more largely to the accusation, and even to the actual temptation, of taking the unworthy or, in any case, the very dubious; of lowering its standard, and accommodating its claims. It actually enfolds within its ample bosom those who have but in slight measure separated themselves from the maxims and practices of their old life and from the influence of their surroundings. It grows used to this state of things, and takes up within itself, consciously or even unconsciously, not inconsiderable elements upon which no regeneration through a new spirit was passed. It presents the singular contrast of being the faith which professes to differ most absolutely from all others, yet visibly differing very little from the old faiths of its converts, and giving them but a confused sense of anything beyond an external allegiance to a punctilious routine for which it stands. The Roman Church, therefore, represents the phenomenon of the naturalization of Christianity in the Orient in a form in which it is only too easy to say that, if this is what is meant by the naturalization of Christianity, then the less we have of it the better. The more we keep clear of it, the more faithful exponents of Christianity we shall be. It is hardly too much to say of the historic example of De Nobilis's approach to Brahmanism in India, that it attained its success by parting with the most of what is characteristic in Christianity. The so-called Malabar Customs seem only too justly to bear the worst possible name. Even the zeal which the potentates of the French Church in contemporary China have sometimes shown to figure as actual magnates of the Chinese Empire, the recognition they have demanded as if they were officials of the realm, may conduce to some other things, but hardly to the understanding of the Christian religion.

On the other hand, the Protestant theory has the defect of its own quality. It is weak for precisely the same reasons for which it is also strong. In anxiously making something like Christian maturity the *sine qua non* of entrance upon the Christian body, it is setting a standard higher, it would seem, than the Master used to set. It deprives itself of its function as nourisher of the

weak, and the weak of that nourishing within the Church which would seem to be a beautiful attribute of the Church. It makes the Church to appear to be only a voluntary society of more mature persons, who have for reasons decided to become members of it. But these are the shadows of the Evangelicals' own light, even as we see them here at home. If at home it is easy for the thought, emotion, and conduct of the new-comer to Christianity to be forced into the mould of the experience of those who came a generation ago, so abroad it is only too easy for the pattern shown in the mount for the Chinese man, if he will be a Christian at all, to be the pattern regnant in England or New England. The whole drift is to the accentuation of that by which the Christian differs from his old self and his fellows. The tendency is to make the Church appear as the voluntary society of those who have been willing to adopt what the foreigner taught, and to conform to a mode of life in which it might sometimes almost seem as if studied reproach were cast upon antecedent and environment, and nothing were left of that which a man once held dear, and which those whom he loved now hold dear. The divisive effect of this situation is often pitiable. The influence of it for that which is conventional and artificial is evident. If the Roman Catholic faith has accommodated itself too much, has in given instances been completely swamped, has been at times in all that was essential done away; if it has thus in spite of apparent triumphs remained nugatory, as to some extent it has, the Protestant faith, on the other hand, has accommodated itself too little. It has been far less potent than it might, because it has been far less assimilated and less assimilable than it should. It has never sufficiently studied how far, and in what particulars, it might be assimilated, and in what not. To make a phrase, it has never been sufficiently recognized that accommodation is death, but that assimilation is life. To be conformed is one thing: to be transformed is quite another. And except a corn of wheat fall in the ground and die, it abideth alone.

The most interesting illustration of this which we know is the attitude of Christian missionaries in the matter of the worship of ancestors in China. This matter, as is well known, was the root of an old contention in the Roman Catholic missions. It is a

living, not to say a burning, question in Protestant circles in China at this hour. It has often been said that, judged in the light of its own principles, a Buddhism which tolerates the worship of ancestors, as does Buddhism in China, is a most singular combination. It has also been said, and probably with much truth, that, had Buddhism, transplanted to China, not tolerated the worship of ancestors, it would never have made the conquests which it did.

Matteo Ricci, the first great Jesuit leader in China, at Canton after 1581 and at Peking after 1601, was a man who carried away the Chinese of governmental and literary circles by his display of learning in mathematics and exact science as taught in the West, and who certainly, in his riper years, was a scholar of no mean pretensions in the Mandarin language and in his knowledge of things Chinese. It is well known that he allowed converts to continue to practise the rites of ancestor-worship, on the ground that he considered these rites purely civil in their nature. So surprising was the success of his mission and that of his immediate followers that high officials of the Empire became alarmed, and steps were taken to limit an activity which was constantly increasing. Moreover, Dominicans and Franciscans, learning of the success of the Jesuits, flocked to China, and the dissensions of the rival orders did more to imperil the position of the nascent church in China than did the opposition of the Chinese themselves. The Dominicans declared that ancestral worship was idolatrous and sinful. The matter being referred to the Pope, Innocent X sustained the Dominican view. But the Jesuits despatched a special agent to Rome, and Alexander VII reversed the previous decision, approving the opinion that the ancestral rites possessed only civil significance. A French bishop in China continuing the agitation, the Jesuits carried the matter before the great Emperor Kang-hsi himself. The Emperor, in a most interesting document, declared the custom to be political. Not to the physical heavens, but to the great Spirit, is adoration rendered in the so-called worship of Heaven and Earth. The worship of ancestors is the mark only of filial piety and veneration. As such the rites may be participated in by men of many faiths. But exactly as such they are of primary interest to the State. As connected

with the family and the clan system and with the maintenance of the social order, when they are denounced as pernicious, when it is sought to alienate men from them, the State must be alarmed.

In 1704, however, Clement XI recurred to the elder papal decision that the rites are idolatrous, and a papal legate arriving in China ordered all converts to desist from practices interdicted by the Pope. Kang-hsi was not the man to take that tamely. He made it known that all those who wished to break with the Chinese social structure would be outlawed. Missionaries were ordered to leave China upon pain of death. Converts numbering hundreds of thousands were deprived of their spiritual guides, and themselves subjected to bitter persecution. Escorted to the frontier, many of the priests returned in disguise. For decades their converts protected them. New priests from the West came in time to their aid. Their resolution and fortitude became legendary in the East. The succession never failed until the opening of the mission work again, far along in the nineteenth century. Incidentally we may say that the external history was not different in Japan. Here also, under the Tokugawa Shoguns, the effort was made to drive out the Jesuits for what seemed to be the attempt to set up a realm within a realm; although here, it is needless to say, this particular matter of the ancestral worship played no part. And here the persecution of the native converts was more terrible than anything that we hear of in China. In Tokio one may see ivory and metal crucifixes worn almost smooth by being trodden on as they lay in the path along which suspected hordes are said to have been driven between ranks of armed soldiery, those who would tread on the crucifix being spared, while those who would not tread into the dust the symbol of their faith were hewn down on the spot.

But to return to the question of ancestral worship, the problem was thus bequeathed to the Protestant period of missions. Difference of opinion concerning it obtains both among foreign Christians and Chinese adherents to the faith. Despite the utterance of the great Emperor and the oft-repeated opinion of many of the most enlightened men, the common man in China presumably makes no such fine distinction in filial veneration between the propitiation of a possibly aggrieved progenitor and

the homage which is natural to loving hearts and closely connected with that patriarchal social order which sometimes seems to be stronger than even the imperial government itself. A Sicilian gentleman would almost assuredly assert that it is not worship which is offered to the image of the Saint. But the Sicilian peasant does not make that distinction. The great mass of the Protestant missionaries assuredly would side with the Dominicans and not with the Jesuits in this matter of ancestral worship. It is not difficult, from the evidence of other matters, to accuse the Jesuits of accommodation, of the willingness to leave the convert in most respects as they find him, provided only the obedience at which these propagandists aim is secured. It is not so easy to explain away the Chinese Emperor's luminous utterance. Surely he knew whereof he affirmed. Still, the opinion which he uttered might well be true for men of cultivation like himself, and not true for the vast mass of the Chinese. Despite the inflexible position which most missions have taken, that ancestral worship must be abandoned entirely if a man is to become a Christian, there are not wanting distinguished men in the Protestant missions today who feel that here jealous and uncompromising Protestantism is mistaken; that it has made a mountain out of a mole-hill, a religious issue out of one which is social and secular; that it has made the way of the convert unnecessarily hard, the progress of Christianity needlessly slow; and courted the misjudgment of itself as socially subversive, in a way that it need never have done. In the end, the missionary will generally refer you to the native convert himself, and bid you ask him how he feels about it. The great majority of those questioned answered that they felt the worship of ancestors to be idolatrous. Yet even by this testimony interrogation was not allayed. The men were so essentially of the type above described as foreign Christians that one could not be sure that they were not sincerely echoing the opinions of their revered foreign missionary teachers and, incidentally, what they supposed to be the opinion of their interlocutor as well. Furthermore, it may well have seemed to these men, as to their teachers, that the safer course is to make a clean breach with many aspects of the popular religiosity, ancestor-worship included, in order to be safe from temptation and com-



plex situations. This may be practically true. But such practical reasoning does not settle the theoretical question as to what we really ought to think concerning the meaning of ancestor-worship. With the lapse of time, the sure tact, the racial feeling of the native Christians who are truly such, when the influence of foreign Christians is diminished or removed, will lead the Chinese Christian Church to a satisfactory conclusion of a question which no man can answer with entire confidence at this time. If the ancestor really is only one more among the many possible malevolent spirits whom the Chinese man must exorcise; if this worship is only part of the general nature superstition which has been such an incubus, and which now, with the advance of knowledge of nature, is being rolled away, then the ancestral worship, too, will go. If, however, it is something different, of nobler origin, and connected with the best and not with the worst traits of men, it will survive, no matter what the missionaries may say or do against it. It will be sublimated and ennobled as it comes to stand in clear relations to a higher thought of God and man. It will still express the fact that the Chinese man reveres the authors of his life and the traditions of his past in a way in which he feels that we wildly energetic, irreverent worshippers of the future do not revere our fathers and our past.

Ricci directly asserted that the worship of Confucius stood upon the same level with that of the ancestors—that it was a social and civil act, not a religious one. The implications of Kang-hsi's statement are the same. The judgment of most students of comparative religion agrees that Confucianism is not a religion, but merely an ethical system. Thus the veneration accorded to Confucius would be but the grateful recognition of one of the greatest benefactors of the human race, the father of the intellectual and moral life of thousands of millions of men through twenty-five hundred years. It is one of the curious episodes, therefore, of the year 1907, that by imperial decree it has been ordered that the same divine honors shall be paid to Confucius which are paid to Heaven and Earth. All sorts of questions arise in one's mind as he asks himself what this decree may mean. Is it the attempt to meet Christianity, so to say, on its own ground? Is it the attempt to galvanize the honor which China has always

done to its great teacher into divine homage, parallel to that which Christians so many generations ago accorded to their great teacher, the Galilean Jesus? Is it thus an attempt by decree to make Confucius to be more to the Chinese man than he has thus far been, and more like what the Christ of theology has been to the Christian Church and world? In an age when the influx of modern learning is displacing ominously the old study of Confucian literature, is this the effort to win the ears and hearts of men for the meaning of Confucius again? These are questions which the outsider asks. Among the Chinese themselves, there are not wanting those who assert that such an elevation of Confucius to divinity is absolutely out of harmony with the teaching and spirit of Confucianism; that it is absurd in the face of what Confucius indubitably said and did, and of the light in which he plainly wished himself and his influence to be viewed. But in state schools and elsewhere provisions have been made to enforce the worship thus enjoined. Participation in it is to be obligatory at least once a month; and, theoretically, no man can be in state employment who does not conform. Still, the enforcement has not yet anywhere been undertaken with great seriousness. In scores of cases Christian converts are refusing it. The whole situation gives much food for thought. Is this the retort of the Chinese to the absolutist view of Christianity which has generally prevailed among those who have brought Christianity into their midst? Can Confucianism be resuscitated in this way? Must it not go over into a syncretism in which a religious factor larger and more vital than Confucianism has ever shown itself to be will find place, but in which also the ethical and social philosophy of Confucius will be accorded an influence far larger than any Christian propaganda has yet assigned to them?

Every one knows the difficulties which missions in India have had in dealing with the question of caste. Almost with unanimity the emissaries of Christianity have declared the caste system to be absolutely opposed to the Christian ideal, and the Christian ideal to it. On the other hand, Indian society has almost uniformly driven the convert to Christianity out from his caste. In many cases it would be practically impossible for the convert to maintain the customs of his caste. For a long time the ad-

herents of Christianity were drawn very largely from the outcasts, whose social condition could not be worse, and might possibly be better, by any change which they might make. Needless to say, a great many other causes are at work in India today besides the spread of Christianity to weaken the hold of the caste system. But Christian converts are still obliged in a measure to create for themselves a social order outside the framework of the one with which they are familiar. It has been much easier to assail the caste system as iniquitous than to provide something which will in the long run take its place, or even to deal justly with the immediate situation which the abolition of the immemorial social order creates for these converts. Nothing is easier than abstraction and negation. One is reminded of the parallel in the case of slavery. It was comparatively easy to be an abolitionist, especially if you did not live in the slave-holding states. Comparatively few would now dispute the principle which was involved in the emancipation, though they may regret the immediate and wholesale enfranchisement. But there was in many quarters a pathetic waning of enthusiasm for the freedmen when the stage of abstraction and negation was once past. Gifts of a different order are asked for when it comes to the struggle of generations—and possibly it will be of centuries—to build up an economic, civil, and social order for the emancipated, or, as is always the true problem, to make the emancipated able to build up such an order for themselves. The parallel seems instructive. It is easy to say caste must go. The democratic trend of modern society makes itself felt even in India, now that India is in mid-stream of modern movements. But what to do with the men and, still more, with the women and children who, as the result of our teaching of Christian idealism, have become outcasts? That is the question. Or at least it is a question. How to sustain them now in love without making them feel that they are always going to be sustained in love. Nothing is easier than to get five thousand orphans on your hands and to utilize the occasion to instil into them the principles of the Gospel. But Christian sentiments are not going to be all of the Gospel which these orphans will need before their life is through. There is much that not missions only but also government must do; much which

the government is making splendid effort to do. There is much which only a new industrial order can gradually achieve. At the present, weak, helpless, many of them, the converts cast themselves upon the foreigner. The foreigner takes up his load, as he ought to do—this load which he has had such a part in creating. But these groups of large-eyed, docile Hindus, become semi-English or American, are not going to solve India's problem. The more completely they are in accord with the foreigner's ideas, the less they will solve India's problem. The bigger the groups, the farther is the solution away. Commerce, politics, and, most of all, education, are working this tremendous upheaval—not Christianity alone. And the immediate effect even of education is problematical. The people who think that if the missionary should withdraw all would be well again show little knowledge of the situation. The movement will go on. But it will go on best with the stripe of missionary who can address himself to the complex, subtle, overwhelming problem which we have endeavored to outline. The day of statesmen, builders of industries, educators and, above all, moulders of the character of men in a struggle which will last for generations, has come. The day of men who dreamed that the function of the emissary of the Christian religion was to stand and proclaim a doctrine, and that by sufficient multiplication of such emissaries we might give the Gospel to the world in the lifetime of men now living, is over. Such a result could be imagined only by one who had a sufficiently small notion of what giving the Gospel means. But though the foreigner may gird himself for this task with a light heart—or possibly with a heavy heart—he realizes in his best moments how much there is of it all which no foreigner can ever do. For East is East and West is West. Impalpable distinctions are insuperable. The greatest and best part of all that we mean, the Hindu must do for himself, the Chinese man must do for himself, or it will never be done. The Oriental world, even when it shall have become thoroughly permeated with the spirit of Christianity, will be still the Oriental world. The Orient will never become Christian in the sense of the transfer of what we think and feel, just as we think and feel it, to the Orientals. It has been mercifully provided that the trees shall

not grow into the sky. And though we sometimes feel depressed that the type of civilization which we know in the West, with all of its good qualities and all of its evil ones, will become dominant over the wide world—everywhere only this one monotonous type, so defective in itself, so unsuited to many peoples in the world, so vulgar and dreadful often we cannot deny—that, too, is a sort of a nightmare. Excesses may be at the moment rife. But we may have profound faith that the quality of races which God has for ages been making for himself will reassert itself, and that what of the Western influence is superficial will be thrown off. What is really made their own by these races will be made their own so truly in their own terms that our civilization and our faith will one day confront us in a different—and why should we not say in a better—light. If by the domination of Christianity in the world we mean the foisting upon the world of those notions concerning Christianity which we have, our zeal for missions would be far other than it is.

It is comparatively easy to say that polygamy and concubinage, as these exist and are recognized in China, do not comport with the Christian ideal. But it is a very difficult question to say what a convert should do who has stood in these relations, and has in the past in good faith assumed responsibility for others, both women and children, and given them a status which was not only in no way illegal but to which no stigma, and hardly even reproach, attached. Shall he signalize his new views of morality by repudiating these obligations and compromising the position of those who, under the old system, were not only not to blame but hardly even unfortunate? It is difficult here not to do evil that good may come; or, at all events, not to do good in a manner which entails much obvious evil to innocent and helpless ones. It might not be difficult to win assent for the proposition that, all things considered, monogamy is the ideal of society, apart from specific Christian or even religious considerations. But as the merest matter of fact it has not been the ideal of Chinese society. The home has existed for a large part of Chinese society upon the contrary assumption. There are few countries in the world in which the home has played a larger part than in China. There are few—possibly there are

no—countries in the world in which the family may be said to be more really the basis of the social order. There are few social systems in the world in which women have, within limitations, a more defined position, and have immemorially—particularly the older women, mothers and grandmothers—exerted a greater influence. Despite dreadful things which one hears concerning the mortality among children, there are few countries in the world in which the having and rearing of children is looked upon more generally from the point of view of duty and privilege, and few in which the love of little children is more in evidence.

One realizes that in touching this general subject he has touched the plague spot of the human race. But at all events, one who has lived to maturity with his eyes open in Europe or America can but have his moments of doubt whether a society like our own, which is theoretically monogamous and supposedly under the influence of Christian ideas, has much to boast of. In any case, if he is candid, it will not be easy to reply when the Oriental tells him that the same things which exist in his land, measurably acknowledged and provided for, exist in ours with the additional horror that they are not acknowledged and not provided for. No question whatever of the ideals. But how to deal with the sad facts? How to get from one system to the other without temporarily, at least, making matters worse rather than better? Or, to put it more pungently still, how to make the great idea prevail among these peoples not merely as well as it prevails among us but much better? Time and economic changes are bound to have the greatest effect upon the patriarchal system and upon the customs concerning marriage. But these are changes in which the foreigner can hardly more than point the way. They are changes which only the man of the race instinct and sympathy can work out.

It will be interesting to see whether the Chinese government and society will be more successful in enforcing a theoretically absolute prohibition of opium than the American government and social sentiment has ever been in the execution of the statutory prohibition of alcoholic drink. The English-speaking missionaries' protest against opium has been heretofore somewhat impaired in efficiency by the fact that, as the Chinese cannot forget,

the English had too much to do with the bringing of opium into the land. But the matter has gone now far beyond a mere protest, however sincere, of the religiously minded. The vice is so obviously ruinous, the havoc which it works so dreadful, that the Chinese people may be said to have risen against it in their might. The fact that, theoretically at least, the State will employ no man in any capacity who is addicted to the opium habit must have weight. The fact that families, villages, and guilds, inflict punishment, and even death, in a way of which the government takes no cognizance, upon members who become obnoxious, makes the way of the transgressor hard if his family come to think that he is wasting family property, or his guild to deem that he is impairing its good name. The democratic assertion of the right to get drunk or to smoke opium, if one pleases, does not go quite so far in China as it does in Massachusetts or even in Maine. The result of this is that the drastic prohibitory measures which have been adopted are on the whole more likely to be enforced in China than similar measures would be with us. Meantime the instinctive and just Chinese view of the Concessions and the extra-territorial governments supposed to prevail therein is not likely to be improved if opium dens, driven out from the Chinese quarters of a city like Shanghai, have only to cross the street to flourish again within the area which is under the foreigners' control. That this control has only too often nothing to do with Christianity is true. But that in a vague way the Celestial holds Christianity responsible, and in a very definite way holds Christendom responsible, is also true. The Christian religion does not gain by such facts as these. There can be no doubt whatever of the longing of China to be rid of the curse of opium. The sufferings of the struggle are acute. The missionary physician in his work of sympathy and mercy may possibly be able to exert, just now, an even larger influence and helpfulness than the preacher with his exhortation and denunciation—which latter are now hardly so necessary as of yore.

The problem of rendering the Scriptures into Chinese has not been an easy one. Indeed, despite the vast amount of learned labor which, ever since Morrison, has been expended upon the task, not even yet have satisfactory results been achieved. Mor-

mission worked with two native teachers almost his whole lifetime in this endeavor. So great are the difficulties of the language that one, at least, of the greater Boards has always pursued the policy of giving to each missionary a native teacher, not always a convert, throughout the lifetime of service. These Chinese teachers act as secretaries and interpreters, and often in touring and school work as companions and general assistants. They have had their share in translation work and authorship, either supervised by the missionaries or at least instigated by them. For it is obvious that the Christian influence through literature would but make a beginning with the translation of the Scriptures. It would advance to the rendering into Chinese of works, both popular and scientific, pertaining to the interpretation of Scripture, and also of works of more general bearing upon the moral and social and intellectual life. Particularly the growth of schools has necessitated the production of text-books of all grades. The attempt to train native physicians has involved the translation of standard medical works of reference. Devotional books, and classics of the world literature, have found place in this ever enlarging catalogue of books rendered into Chinese. Any one who supposes that the missionaries of the last hundred years have done nothing but touring and evangelizing has a new impression in store for himself when he reads a publisher's catalogue of works of the kinds we have named, which have gone from the missionary presses in the old days, or are now going from the presses of the great publishing houses everywhere springing up.

It must not be forgotten that one of the things which have enhanced the difficulty of this work has been the number of dialects, or, almost you might say, of independent languages, which have obtained in different parts of China. Only one of these, the Mandarin, could in any way be regarded as a sort of a *lingua franca* for any large part of the Empire. And one of the most prominent centres for the intellectual life of the country, the Foo-chow province, is one in which the Mandarin is of no avail. In this respect India has presented a somewhat similar problem, while that of Japan is relatively simple. Furthermore, it will be understood that while the terminology of ethical discussion was in large part ready to hand for the Chinese of almost any



dialect, because of the immemorial interest of the people in these things, yet even here large advances had to be made in order to convey the meaning of the characteristic concepts of Western thought. In many of the other departments to which we have alluded, as for example in that of the natural sciences or medicine, the nomenclature had actually to be created. The state of things in which these subjects were taught in English had not arrived. A generation ago this situation would hardly have been prophesied, and a generation hence this condition may hardly obtain. All this means that a vast change is taking place in the language—or, perhaps we should rather say, languages. It means that work once fondly thought to have been done for all time will now clearly have to be done over. In all this change, both in the new development of the language itself and in the production of new books in the changed and changing speech, the educated and Christian Chinese will bear a far larger part than they have done in the past. They will bear a far larger part than the foreigners, teachers or missionaries, themselves in the production of an original Chinese literature of the sciences, of modern philosophy, of religion, and the rest; just as we have already an original and free Japanese literature of the sciences, of religion, and of Christianity. When one sees the crushing weight of practical cares, the exacting routine of practical activities, in which most missionaries have been involved, it is a wonder that the quantity and quality of literary work has been what it has. But it will be at once apparent that a great sphere is here opened for a missionary of a somewhat different type from that which has often, at least, in the past obtained.

We may take a leaf from the history of the Christian movement in Japan, or again in India, to convince ourselves how futile it is to render any books for these nascent Christian communities save the best which are current among ourselves. Large numbers of devout persons buy books here at home because the books say what these excellent persons have already long since thought. They might be interested to have these books translated into Chinese because they would describe the books as safe. But there is no large stable community of Christians in the Orient which buys books or listens to teaching because these latter say

what the Christians have already thought. They have not long thought about these matters. And they cannot be taught to think seriously about them in terms not germane to those in which they are rapidly being taught to think about everything else. It is painfully suggestive that in a country like Japan, where the Christian movement is so new and commitment to certain traditional views scarcely exists at all, a part of the public should speak scornfully of some current teaching of Christianity, whether in the pulpit or through the press, because this teaching seems to rest upon assumptions in science, philosophy, or history, which neither among the cultivated Japanese nor among ourselves any longer obtain. The foundations of the Gospel have indeed been laid in those lands in strata of the population in which such questions are not rife, and perhaps their Christianity is no worse for that. But we need to realize that, with the whole world of Western thought coming in on these people like a flood, the best and most earnest thing which we have to give is hardly good enough. What here merely grows out of our own past will not grow there at all where they have not that past.

Large use has already been made within Christian circles in China and Japan of periodicals and newspapers, the ephemeral publications which in any modern country have so much to do with the formation of public opinion. In respect of the number and quality of its newspapers Japan is the most modern of countries, and China is fast becoming such. It is a marvel how the newspaper press puts the news of the world at the disposal of large parts even of the Chinese public, and affords material by which, through cable transmission or through translation into the columns of the Anglo-Chinese papers, the facts concerning China from day to day might be used for the information of Europe and America far more largely than they are used, if the West were only more alert than it is to the importance of knowing from day to day what is happening in the Far East. One of the things which strikes most forcibly the quick observer as he travels in the Far East is the respectful tone of the Japanese, as also of the Chinese and the Anglo-Chinese, newspapers toward the Christian movement in these countries and the missionary cause. The native and foreign resident in these countries, in the large, appre-

ciates the bearing and influence of this movement, understands the facts, recognizes the achievements of the past through missionary labor. If he is keen in criticism of belated aspects and non-national tendencies of the movement, that is just what he ought to be. If he points out mistaken courses and assails injurious phases of the movement, he thereby renders the cause a service for which open and courageous minds are grateful. Such minds desire for their movement no privilege of not being spoken against. And those timid minds who do desire such a privilege are not likely to get it. The assault of the native press, often purely secular in tone, upon many aspects of the national worship, upon many injurious customs connected with the ancient rites, upon the expensiveness of idol processions, and upon the immoralities of priests, when these are in evidence, are often in a tone which the missionary and the specifically Christian press would not dare to use, and ought not to use, lest it should seem guilty of fanaticism. But ought we to accept the good results of the liberal and liberating work thus done by the press, and then expect immunity for the vices and foibles of the cause which we represent? But we repeat that the attitude of blind and unreasoning prejudice, of stupid abusiveness and vituperative speech at the very mention of a missionary, which so often betrays the gross ignorance of certain people in the West, even though they may have travelled, is practically never met with in those who are conversant in a large way with what is taking place in the East.

Already, in the paragraph concerning literature and the press, we have forecast much that it seems proper to say concerning the general educational movement, and particularly that part of it which may still be in Christian and foreign hands. We are not yet very far removed from the time when there was in China little demand for the foreign education offered in the mission schools except on behalf of the children of those who had already become converts to the Christian faith. These converts were so largely from the poorer classes that the education had mainly to be given away in order that the schools might have pupils at all. Despite the excellence of some work done, the schools made but little impression upon the Chinese people at large. Of the pupils thus

trained a great majority ultimately professed the Christian faith, and even found their way into the work of the Christian teacher or preacher. The educational aspect of the work was really subordinate to the evangelistic. It was felt to be so by the non-Christian community surrounding the schools. It was frankly declared so to be by some of the missionaries themselves. By some supporters of the missionary cause at home it was gravely questioned whether, even in the proportions which this aspect of the work had gradually assumed, it was to be fostered or suppressed.

How has the attitude of the Chinese toward all this changed within the last few years! How has the prevision of some missionaries been verified! How has the opportunity of the mission school been increased! And what an instrumentality for moulding the life of the nation through its youth has the mission school become, if only it is conducted in such a manner as to command unqualified respect as a school! The abandonment throughout the Empire of the civil service examinations in the Confucian classics and in the prose and poetry of the golden age, the turning of the popular mind for the moment almost in a feeling of resentment against the old system of education, is so complete as to seem deplorable. Temporarily, what is everywhere in demand in China is the Western education of the type which the mission schools have long sought to offer, and which they long offered in vain. What the schools founded by the viceroys in their provinces and by individuals of rank and wealth and public spirit throughout the realm are seeking to teach are the topics which the mission schools so long aimed to set forth with their limited means and in their smaller way. It may at some future day become a question whether the mission schools can keep the pace with these new institutions, with vast resources and the national consciousness behind them. But in the chaotic state of many of these new foundations, with the paucity of teachers which yet besets the whole educational scheme in China, with the vagueness of aim and the uncertainty of method which must yet for a little time prevail, that is not a very serious question yet. The graduates of mission schools are in such demand as teachers in the public and endowed schools, the compensation

offered them is so far in excess of anything which the little Christian communities can afford, that already the cry is heard that the ranks of the Christian ministry and of missionary helpers are depleted. Something like that wail we hear in our own country. But if our own country needs true Christian men in every walk of life, how much more must that be true of the land which is going through such changes as we see in the China of today! One thing is clear: it is a great chance for the mission school to have in their youth under training some of the men who in high station are going to be useful in every walk of life. It is a great chance to be allowed to train the teachers who are to go out to raise up another generation of teachers. It is even a greater chance to have been allowed to present the claims of the Christian ministry to a far larger body of men than before, and to train those whom you do train for the Christian ministry, not in isolation, but in contact with men who are being trained for other professions.

If we really look forward to the naturalization and nationalization of Christianity in China, then certainly the question of the Christian schools, and the attitude of the Christian advocates to all the schools, is of an importance which cannot be overestimated. If what we really look forward to is the raising up in the course of a generation or two of a sufficient number of men and women of intelligence and Christian conviction, who shall take upon themselves the whole responsibility of the Christian movement in China; if what we really look forward to is not the propagation of a foreign sect, the perpetuation of a foreign influence, but the permeation of the Chinese Empire with something of that same spirit of Christianity concerning which we have only to deplore that it permeates our own nation's life so little as it does—then the chance which the Chinese today are giving us to have part in the education of their youth is one which a few years ago would hardly have been dreamed, and a few years hence may, if neglected, be closed against us, or in any case much modified and impaired. It would be difficult to conceive a greater blunder than now to draw back from the educational policy upon which we have embarked. Foreign support of these schools and colleges in generous measure will for a time be necessary.

But Chinese control in growing measure, even of the institutions which have been endowed by foreigners, is the path along which their truest development is to be expected. Ultimately it must be upon the Chinese public that the responsibility for their perpetuation and increase must rest. If the history of such institutions in Japan, and notably the well-known case of the Doshisha, proves anything, it is this: that trust in the Christian community in these lands wins trust in return. Though there may be and must be misunderstandings as to the method by which the goal is to be reached, and pain may be caused to those who have given their lives for the institution, and again offence may be given to those for whose sake all has been done, yet, if only there be mutual understanding as to the goal to be attained, the issue is secure. The Christian movement in Japan has long since assumed proportions that make the attitude which a particular institution or individual foreign leaders may take toward the national movement a question of significance only for that institution or those leaders, and not of great consequence for the Christian and national movement itself. One might make the same remark as to the drift of the national churches of Japan toward independence and union. For the foreign ecclesiastical bodies with which they may have been denominationally connected to resist the desire of the Japanese Christians for freedom and their decision to ignore differences which they regard as for them meaningless is merely to make a sorrow out of the maturing of that for which we have striven, while that very maturing should be to us the cause of a deep and solemn joy.

But, before we leave this matter of education and go on to speak of the fortunes of the Church, let us make one more allusion, this time to medical education and its relation to the naturalization of Christianity in the Far East. That medical practice has been the right arm of the Christian movement, both in Japan in remoter times and in China until now, few would deny. If there is one application of a scientific education concerning which the Chinese are all eagerness at the present moment, it is this. The time is not yet far in the past when the superstitions of the masses and the interest of the practitioners of magic in the name of medicine made the foreign physician's lot a hard one. The

responsibility of all cases which he ever touched was laid upon him, even if these had been in fatal shape before they came to him. On the other hand, reasonable belief in his processes was refused him, even when he succeeded beyond hope. The belief in spirits makes, for the lowest of the people, the whole area of disease and suffering one in which cruel fear has sway. Yet in amazing degree the example and precept of foreign practitioners—most of them missionaries, of course—has had effect. The superstition about the evil spirits is vanishing. The people have become aware of the ignorance and helplessness of those who pretended to skill. They are in almost feverish anxiety to put themselves in possession of a few foreign medicines and of the maxims of their use. Cranks and charlatans are abroad without number. The foreign drug store, and the man behind the counter who deals out nostrums in the plenitude of ignorance to a population only more ignorant than himself, is much in evidence. The foreign physicians with their hospitals and dispensaries are too few and too widely scattered. Natives trained in these dispensaries by the missionary physicians under the old régime are too few. And though some of them are well trained others are not. The Chinese students who have studied medicine in Japan or Europe or America and returned to practise in their own country are fewer still. Away from the great open ports the conditions of practice are crude. Yet the need of the people, and the chance both to alleviate their distresses and, along with that alleviation, to impress them with the spirit of the Gospel of love and helpfulness is the same. The few medical colleges are overflowing. The whole aim must be to raise up hundreds and thousands of native doctors and nurses, whose knowledge shall be equal to their Christian devotion, and whose Christian devotion shall be equal to the sound scientific training which they shall have secured. For, while there is much medical practice in China which will be highly remunerative, there is no land where for a long time to come there will be so large scope for men who will do the healing works of Christ for no other guerdon than the love of God and man. Probably no one would think today of sending a missionary physician to Japan. Such a state of things is as yet far distant in China; but it must come. And the medical teachers whom

we now send, the medical colleges we establish, the hospitals and dispensaries now founded and endowed, where all these youth of the new China are to get their training—these are the instrumentalities which will bring on that day. The college is more important than the practitioner, and the native more effective than the foreigner can be.

But if what we have been saying is true of education, medicine, and the rest, it is the more true of the Church as institution, and of the organization of the specifically Christian life among these peoples of the East. The things which we have been discussing may be said to have been only some of the points of application of the Christian spirit in this invasion of the Orient by the civilization which has thus far been characteristic of the West—an invasion which is taking place upon an unprecedentedly large scale, and, more recently at least, with the consent and ardent wish of the Orientals themselves. And though it is true that in these lands the medical work, for example, has often been the means of overcoming prejudice and breaking down opposition which had proved otherwise invincible, yet we must flinch when it is put as if we fostered medical work because we expected by it to gain, furtively as it were, an influence over men's souls which else we might not gain. When it is so put as if a missionary society might not sustain a hospital or school as such, but only if it intended through that hospital as a means to further its propaganda for the faith, then we leave it open to right-minded men to hope that we may fail, and incidentally we open the way to ourselves to the sustaining of very poor hospitals. Is not the hospital itself an expression of the Christian doctrine of mercy and loving kindness and solicitude for the distresses of men? Is not the school an expression, in and of itself, of the Christian longing to know the truth and to be set free by it, and to give to others the freedom of the life which is by the truth? And does not the frank and fearless, but at the same time scrupulously honorable and gentlemanly, exerting of the influence of the Christian character on the part of physicians and teachers present exactly the same problem in China or Japan that it presents here in our own midst? And is not this the real contagion of the spirit of the Gospel?



The one thing which is certain is that all these things, Western education, medicine, business methods, governmental theories and practices, are going into the East in a resistless stream. The question is whether they shall be brought in only by those who are at variance with Christianity or indifferent to it, or whether the representatives of Christianity shall have their share in such works and their influence upon them just as they have done here at home. To that question, whatever may be the attitude of the zealots here at home, the history of missionaries in the field is a sufficient answer. As a matter of fact it has been the missionaries themselves who, for the most part, have been the inaugurators of the educational, medical, charitable, and philanthropic, of the social and humanitarian and ameliorating movements, which often win the approval of foreign residents and as well of native patriots in the East in a way that the direct religious work and ministry do not.

It is possible to lay hold of these, which are so to say the by-products of the Christian movement of these countries, and so to exploit them as to obtain for the general movement related to missions a support among non-Christian merchants and openly anti-Christian nationals which otherwise might not be obtained. It is possible to take these facts as showing conquests in higher classes than have heretofore been in sympathy with Christian missions, or at least approaches to those classes. It is possible in this way to collect on the spot a local budget which seems very large to the missionaries of regular Boards, since they would not be allowed to collect money for current expenses in this fashion, just as they are not allowed in any way whatsoever to enter into business or participate in the profits of any business. It is possible to spend money collected on such a budget from generous residents in the settlement and natives doing business there in such a manner as to make the missionary receiving his little salary from home appear but a poor man, and his affairs but picayune affairs as compared with those which take their place in the general lavish way of doing what the foreigner resident in the East decides to do.

It is impossible for an impartial observer to escape the feeling that that will be truly a rare class of men among whom not one

will sooner or later be demoralized, or at least gravely impaired in his judgment, by such freedom in the raising and spending of money. The maxim that it makes no difference what a good thing costs is true only for people of very good judgment. The habituation to such a maxim is likely to impair one's judgment. And perhaps the maxim is more true when one is spending his own money than when expending money raised for a cause. The lavish spending of money, especially if it can be possibly construed as spent in any way for personal ease or aggrandizement, is one of the most constant reproaches brought against missionaries and one of the most groundless. Those conversant with the facts realize that it can be only a vanishingly small minority of regularly accredited missionaries who ever have any money which they can spend in this way. But too great care can never be taken to avoid the reproach.

It is possible now to live for a few years in the East and do not a little missionary work of a kind, without knowing any language except English, since the most of those of higher castes and classes know less or more English. And all expansions of work and influence which are really such are to be welcomed and rejoiced in. But no one who knows the history of missions in the East in the last three hundred years can fail to be aware that work which has not been built up from the bottom is very precarious. The greater Boards have been right in appointing none but those who will commit themselves to the missionary career for life; in commissioning no men who have not had some form of actual professional training in addition to mere graduation from college; and in compelling all missionaries to learn the language before permitting them to take any large responsibility. The organization under Christian auspices of students for co-operation in moral and religious work is in foreign lands perhaps naturally upon the same basis upon which it stands here at home. Its function is perhaps largely that of organization and sympathy and inspiration. These have their value. But when one thinks of the subtlety and significance of the whole problem, one longs that in those lands, as also here at home, some way may be found to make and to keep the tie between the student movement and those who study. When one realizes what certain missionaries

who might easily be named have accomplished in study of the nations with whom they have cast in their lot; when one recalls the labor they have done in two languages, or in twenty—tasks of an intellectual industry which is nothing less than colossal—one feels like beseeching for the good of the common cause that these men who study be not forgotten in the leadership of the Christian student movements of those lands.

It is certain that neither in the West nor in the East does mere social or philanthropic work, mere ameliorative effort, show that power over the deep places of the personal life, that recreative influence upon character, which the specific religious propaganda has always set for itself. It will be possible in the East to demonstrate as truly as here in the West it has already been demonstrated that mere relief of the distresses of men may leave them only more selfish and vicious, more demanding and less dutiful, more rebellious and less responsible than they were before. So that the missionary who, in all the welter which faced him when he first came to these strange lands, kept close to the problem of the soul was, at all events, in the excellent company of his own Lord and Master, who also must have seen a thousand things about him which needed reforming and ameliorating. But despite that fact, or rather because of his profounder insight into these relations, he kept close to the problem of men's souls. There is, therefore, something very great and beautiful about the work and influence of men and women who for generations, in face of opposition from the men to whom they came, and despite obloquy and misunderstanding on the part of some at least of their own countrymen, have kept on their way, in poverty always, in loneliness often, and stuck to the task, subtle and disheartening in the last degree—the task of endeavoring, through the possession in the secret places of their own life by the spirit which is of Christ, to bring to others something of that same mind and inward life. They have sought to cheer, uplift, and fortify men and women by the touch of Christ for the life they had to lead. They have sought ever to create little groups, communities of men and women of a spirit like their own, which would make for the uplifting and glorifying of the lives of their countrymen. This is the phase of mission work which has preponder-

ated in the past. This is the phase for which alone, perhaps, there was room in the beginning in those countries and with the scant support from home. This is the phase which is just now in risk of being turned away from. It is the phase which is often spoken of slightly, relegated to a period of unsophistication, and generally regarded as a stage good to have outgrown. There is a general cheerfulness abroad, as if in the new stadium that is being entered upon missions were going to win credit and support where these had not been heretofore in large measure bestowed.

We can well believe that that age of relatively simple problems will some day be looked back upon as the golden age of missions, just as one looks back upon the boyhood of his son as somehow the golden age of the relations between him and his father; and just as the Christian Church looks back upon the period of apostolic fervor and simplicity, before the great amalgamation with the Graeco-Roman world took place, as the golden age of the Christian Church. We are very far from being pessimistic enough to believe that these are the golden ages. We mean only that the simplicity and more spiritual nature of their problems, as compared with the complexities and perplexities of later periods, may easily make them to appear such. In any of these cases what is meant is merely that the beauty of childhood is past. That is only another way of saying that the glory of manhood has come. If out of these earliest stages of missions, with all the limitations which may easily be pointed out, there have come—as there have—Chinese, Japanese, and Indian men who have within themselves the life which is by the spirit of Christ, that is enough. That life will take care of the changes which must come. But no changes which must come will necessarily produce that life.

For, the moment it is admitted that the naturalization and nationalization of Christianity is the thing to be aimed at and ardently desired, then it is evident that the nation is the real agent of that naturalization. If once it be recognized that the foreign form of statement or rite in which the foreigner, albeit necessarily, brings Christianity to this new land is not essential, but only incidental; that it is actually a hindrance and not a help to the appropriation of the real Gospel itself; that these forms are not

expected to perpetuate themselves, but only to do their work and be transcended—then it is clear that those who can, in the long run, do this transcending, and create the new and natural and necessary forms of statement, or organization, or rite, are the Chinese, the Japanese, the Indians themselves. The problem is not the building up of Christian institutions after the pattern which it would be natural for the foreigner to create, but the raising up of men who will create institutions after the pattern which will be natural to the Chinese when they have been created. Confucianism has never influenced the Christianity of the West in the least. But it is difficult to imagine a Chinese Christianity which will not have been profoundly influenced by Confucianism; precisely as the early Christian community in the West was, in its formative stage, profoundly influenced by Plato, who was as much the teacher of the whole Western world as Confucius has been of the Chinese. Of what use is it to teach Plato to the rising generation of the Chinese youth, except as a part of general culture, and as helping to explain how the Christianity current among us came to be what it is? But it is of every use that what is great and beautiful in Confucianism should be taught to these youth, who are to be the ministers and Christian leaders of China; who will surely think in Confucius' terms, as will also those whom they teach. The Buddhist literature has exerted as good as no influence upon Christianity. But it is difficult to conceive a Japanese interpretation of Christianity in which much that is in Buddhist literature will not have place. Because these things are true, these faiths are worthy of the most devoted study on the part of the foreign teachers of Christianity to the peoples named. But the most fruitful study will be that of the Christian Chinese and Japanese themselves, which may be likened to the delving of the Christian Apologists and of the early Fathers in that classical antiquity which was the background of the life of their races before Christianity had come to them.

And if we may thus speak with confidence of some elements which certainly will be represented in the naturalized Chinese Christianity to which we look, surely we may speak with equal confidence concerning some elements prominent in the Christianity current among us which will not be there. Of what inter-

est to the Japanese Christianity of the future will be the differences which divide the Protestant sects and make each of these to be what it is? By what possibility can the Chinese man make real to himself certain contentions which have long embroiled Christendom and brought reproach upon the name of Christ? There are quite obvious reasons for anticipating that these unhappy dissensions will never take root in the East, no matter how sectarians may try to have them. They will be buried in the East long before we cease to reckon with them in the West.

If one may put it paradoxically, he may say that the great task of evangelism in China or in the less accessible regions in Japan is not evangelism at all, but the education of Chinese and Japanese evangelists. Certainly it is already obvious that the great problem of the ministry and the churches in these countries is not the indefinite increase of the number of preaching missionaries from England and America to correspond to the wide open door which is set before the church today, but it is the indefinite multiplication of the native ministry and of natives as clerical and lay helpers of every sort. When one hears of a campaign to increase within a certain number of years the commissioned foreign missionary staff two or three hundred per cent.; when one has set before him statistics to show that even then the parishes of these ministering missionaries will be of such magnitude as to make thoroughness of administration impossible, one asks, "But how did we ever come to suppose that this was the way in which the work was to be done?" Such numbers of the foreign missionary staff seem not only impossible to send, but they would work to the suppression of the native church if they could be sent. They would hinder and not help its autonomous development. They would dwarf it by keeping for the foreigner the responsibility by which the native church should be made great. They would perpetuate the foreigners' standard for everything, and prevent the native mind and life from having its way. It will not be considered censorious to say that the fact that we have pursued this mischievous ideal of numbers for our foreign missionary staff even so much as we have is the reason why some part of every missionary staff is composed of such mediocre material as it is.

That we must send men without due regard to their quality and fitness is an obsession. Quite the reverse is true. At present, at all events, it would be far better to send no men than poor men; especially into these ancient and cultivated nations, with all the complex questions which arise in the transition through which they are passing or have but recently passed. In large areas of these countries and in large aspects of our work the function of leadership alone is left to the foreign missionary. It is only by fulfilling this function that the foreigner justifies his presence there. There are large parts of the work which the peoples of these countries can do for themselves far better than the foreigner can ever do it for them. With the situation at which we have now arrived, if we cannot within an appreciable time raise up a body of Christians who will develop their own ministry, support entirely their own churches, and overflow in their Christian activity for the good of their own land, and even begin to take interest in other lands, then our work is a failure, and Christianity as represented by such a mission has no reason to hope for a future in these lands. It is naturalization or nothing. An American who has spent his whole lifetime with Sir Robert Hart in the service of the Chinese Imperial Maritime Customs recently said: "If we cannot through this service raise up Chinese who, in point of intelligence, integrity, and responsibility, can within an appreciable interval take this service off our hands, then we have labored in vain." Surely this is true also, and in even greater degree, of the Christian Church in that land. If a generation hence the cause of Christianity shall be so essentially exotic as it was much less than a generation ago, these peoples may well rise and exclude it as among the exotic things desirable to be excluded.

But it will not be exotic. It will not be excluded. The principles of which we have been speaking are so well understood, they are so sincerely acted upon by the spirits of light and leading on the field, that one must apologize to them for dwelling upon these principles here. It is surprising, however, how little these principles are understood and reckoned with among friends of missions at home. The hundreds of independent Christian churches in Japan, with their own ministers, educated in their own land, or even abroad, and in a manner bearing comparison with any

ministry in any land; with their own methods of administration, wrought out in their own experience; with their own organization for charity, philanthropy, reform, and for the extension and perpetuation of Christian interests in their country, are a demonstration of the thing of which we speak. And it must be remembered that there are in Japan about forty-five thousand such communicant members of Protestant churches alone, and in China about one hundred and eighty thousand. If the Japanese are sensitive, as many of them are, about the sending of any more missionaries to their shores, that can hardly be surprising. It is not that the foreigners now among them, to whom the debt of their cause is immeasurable, are not held in grateful honor and love, for they are. It is not that any foreigner coming among them with anything to say or do would not be esteemed according to the value of what he said or did. It is only that they feel that for a certain kind of missionary, sustained among them by a foreign organization over which they can exert no influence, they have no need. It is only that they feel that a considerable part of the Christendom of the West which is still zealous to send missionaries among them is so precisely because it has no idea of what the Japanese themselves have done for the Christian cause in their own land, and are now doing, and may be relied upon to do. They feel keenly the vast work which yet remains to be done, and would welcome any one who would join hands with them in doing it in those ways which seem to the Japanese, with their intimate knowledge of their own people, to be the right ways. But it is obvious in such a case that, notwithstanding the vast work to be done, it is not necessary to send any men but the very best. It might be wise if we should permit the Japanese to ask before any should be sent. One of the wisest of men, who has spent a long life in the service of the Christian movement in Japan, said not long since to a missionary in China: "You know the joy of doing for the Chinese. You are going in the near future to know the pang of seeing those whom you have raised up take things out of your hands somewhat, and do things, possibly not so well, but in their own way. And still beyond that you are to have the joy of seeing those men whom you have raised up walking by your side, and doing things so well that you feel that your own task and that



of your kind is mainly over, and that the future is secure." These things are not yet for China, but they are surely coming.

It would seem as if, in the line of what has been said, the policy of concentration of the foreign leaders of the Christian movement in the great centres was unquestionably the true policy for the time to come. It is no comment upon the vast amount of touring evangelism which the foreign missionary in these countries has done in time past to say that that will not be the predominant work in the time to come. Concentration, centralization, organization, unification—these must be the watch-words of the foreign leadership, or else it will not be leadership. And if the foreigners' work is not leadership, then it will not be long before the foreigner will have no work or place in this movement at all. In a wise and tactful, a spiritual and affectionate leadership, he may have a great place for a long time to come, and may render an inestimable service to the cause.

If one ever has his moments of misgiving about the working out in the hands of the peoples of these national churches of a problem so complex, and into the solution of which already so much that is precious has been poured, it may be well to recall an observation which every thoughtful man must have made many times concerning the propagation of religion in his own land, which is profoundly true also in the missionary world. There must have been times in your experience when, if you had listened only to the form of statement of faith inculcated and the type of doctrine advanced, if you saw only how the minds of zealous persons fix upon some rite or ceremony and insist upon some small detail as necessary to the faith, you might have been profoundly discouraged. But you realize that these are not the only sources of influence of the man who is in the pulpit or of the institution which we call the Church. Indeed, they are not the main sources. They may not be the sources of his influence at all, but even distinct deductions from that influence. You perceive that the fortitude, patience, and peace which average men and women show; the fidelity and courage, cheer and hope, purity and unselfishness, devotion to ideals, solicitude for others, which their life reveals—these are not only themselves the true fruit of the Gospel but they are the real working power of the

Gospel. It is these which do a large part of the work which is done. It is these which exert an influence which all the narrownesses and inadequacies alluded to are not able to destroy. These things are true at home, as every one of us must have discovered. They are even more true abroad, because these are the qualities which are universally understood. They are felt, and do not need to be understood. Language and race difference may make theoretical propositions which the missionary of the new faith brings, or which the newly trained native preacher sets forth, most difficult and his rites remote. But the character commands respect and reverence. It leaves an impression which never can be effaced. Far more than we realize, it is at this level of character, and by this possession of character, that the Christian propaganda has taken place and is now taking place. When we wonder at the apparent adoption of forms of thought and speech so different from those of the Chinese or the Japanese, it is not that this adoption of foreign forms of thought and speech explains the assimilation of the Christian ideal of character. Precisely the reverse is true. It is that the zeal and desire to be conformed to that type of character which the native sees in the Christian man carries along with it for a time the customs and forms of speech which he has heard associated with that character and spiritual influence. But those customs and forms of speech will be dropped off as easily as they were taken on, in the working out of the Christian character of the Chinese, of the Japanese, or of the Indians themselves. By this absolutely natural and spiritual process, at the level of the Christian character, an Oriental Christianity will arise, and the specific Occidental form of Christianity by which this great transmission of life was mediated will disappear.

# MEDIAEVALISM AND MODERNISM

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"Modernism" has already become as vague and ambiguous a term as Socialism. The latter stands for anything between common Christian charity—a recognition of social duties acknowledged by all and neglected by most—and a systematic reconstruction of the whole framework of society. Similarly, Modernism, thanks largely to the Encyclical *Pascendi*, has come to stand for the mildest as well as for the extremist concessions of Roman Catholicism to the exigencies of modern life and thought and sentiment. Owing to this comprehensiveness, it is possible to group together in one unholy fraternity, and under the same anathema, those who are sincere Catholics by conviction and those who, having lost all faith in the Church, continue Catholics in name and profession, whether through indifference, or self-interest, or consideration for the feelings of others. Men whose modernity is little more than an educated Ultramontaniam are thus brought under suspicion of a secret sympathy with deists, atheists, and agnostics, and held up to the odium of the faithful at large.

It is impossible to discuss profitably or intelligently so wide a range of positions, which have nothing in common but dissent from the uncompromising intransigence of Pius X and his advisers and their refusal to pass an absolute and indiscriminate condemnation on the entire results of seven centuries of human progress. If we cannot define Modernism as a finished system or theory may be defined, we can at least describe it as a tendency, a spirit, a movement. In this respect again it is somewhat like Socialism, which is not the less a real and living force because it has so far failed to arrive at explicit self-consciousness or coherent self-expression. I think then that the term "Modernist" should be restricted to one who believes in the possibility of a synthesis between Catholic Christianity (I do not say Catholic

theology) and modern culture, however little he may see his way to that synthesis or be satisfied with existing attempts. And by a synthesis I do not mean a compromise involving the sacrifice of anything vital or essential on either side, but a unification resulting from a careful criticism of Catholicism on the one hand and of modern culture on the other; from a sifting out of their perishable from their permanent values; and from a recognition that their alleged incompatibilities are apparent and not real.

This provisional definition excludes from the category of Modernism those who consider that the said incompatibilities are real and not merely apparent; whether it be that they accept the results of modern progress as fatal to the claims of the Church, or accept the claims of the Church as fatal to the results of modern progress. Disbelief in the compatibility of Catholicism and Criticism unites these two extremes against the faith and hope of the Modernist; and indeed some of the most ardent allies of Pius X are to be found among the unbelievers inside as well as outside the Church, especially amongst those of the latter who consider that Modernism may give a new lease of life to a moribund and mischievous institution.

An uncritical acceptance of the ultramontane conception of the essentials of Catholicism on the one hand, or an equal credulity as to the values of modern enlightenment on the other, still more a combination of both, will almost inevitably make the hopes of Modernism appear paradoxical. They may be so; but at least it is in the interests of truth that the hope or hypothesis should be tried to the uttermost before it is abandoned. Far slenderer hopes have attained to fruition in spite of far greater discouragement.

"Modernism" was so named, with prejudicial intent, by its adversaries—by men whose hopes lie buried in the irrevocable past and whose attitude towards the present is one of ever increasing estrangement, distrust, and hostility. But the implied reproach falls somewhat flat on the modern ear. Since we must have a sect-name, we might well have a worse than one which expresses our catholic conviction that the Church must be always modern as well as ancient; of today as well as of yesterday; that since culture progresses, the synthesis of religion with cult-

ure is an abiding duty, an unending process. And then it indicates most aptly our specific difference from those Catholics who regard the synthesis of religion with the culture of the thirteenth century as final and valid for all times, and whom we may therefore most justly call Mediaevalists.

"Catholic" or "Roman Catholic" is the common genus of Modernist and Mediaevalist. As belief in Christ makes a Christian, so belief in the Roman Catholic Church makes a Roman Catholic. There are Christians for whom Christianity consists in one, or a very few, Gospel truths, and who regard the whole Catholic system, doctrinal and institutional, as an encrustation—now mischievous and meaningless, even if once necessary and protective. Against these, Modernists and Mediaevalists are agreed in regarding the Church as the work of the indwelling Spirit of Christ; as a divine and not merely as a human creation; as constituted by the legitimate and fruitful marriage of Gospel principles and forces with those of civilization and even of other religions; by the impregnation and leavening of the whole fullness of human life with the leaven of a new inspiration. Both have faith in the Church, in the concrete living community, as they have faith in Christ. As in Christ they see the Son of God where history and reason see but man, so in the Church they see the organ of Christ's spirit and not merely the inevitable resultant of historical conditions. And it is this common faith or interpretation of the divine meaning of phenomena which unites them as Catholics.

The specific difference that divides the Modernist from the Mediaevalist will be more keenly appreciated by contrast with its opposite.

Few readers of the Encyclical *Pascendi* will have paused to ask: "What then is this imperilled position of which Modernism is the negation? If all this is false, what is true?" If Modernism was there depicted so as to shock ordinary Christian susceptibilities to the utmost, Mediaevalism, for like reasons, was decently draped and kept in the background. Thus it was hoped to enlist Protestant sympathy in behalf of a system which in the day of its power could find no place for Protestantism but the stake, and which even in this document gives abundant proof that the

persecuting spirit is still willing though the flesh is weak; that milder manners are to be ascribed to lack of power, not to change of principle.

If Modernists and Mediaevalists agree in their faith in Catholicism, considered as a concrete living reality, they differ in their theoretical analysis and expression of the nature of that life and reality. For the Mediaevalist, Catholicism means a synthesis effected between Christian tradition and the fashionable philosophy of the thirteenth century. Upon that synthesis the Council of Trent set the seal of finality at a time when the new learning seemed to call for a theological revolution which the Church was then too feeble to face and which must have weakened those claims to absolute authority that she was maintaining against the reformers. Since then, the notion that the Church should "come to terms" with contemporary enlightenment has been regarded as a temerity. All subsequent developments, up to the Vatican Council and the Encyclical *Pascendi*, have been on the lines of the *Summa Theologica*, and have only widened the breach between lay and clerical culture. There has been no criticism of categories and methods, no theological revolution like that effected by S. Thomas. So innocent are the seminaries of history or of the historical sense that today the essential "modernism" of S. Thomas is unsuspected. The Catholicism of the *Summa* with all its theology and its institutions; with its seven sacraments (form and matter), its ritual, its dogmatic formulas, its priesthood, its papacy of the Isidorian decretals, its universal sovereignty—all is supposed to be the direct and immediate creation of Christ and his twelve Apostles. If the duty of synthesis between religion and culture, faith and knowledge, the Church and the age, is still admitted verbally, yet it is voided of all sense. "Faith must be at one with science"—yes, but with *true* science; and the test of true science is its agreement with Faith, which is thus judge and accuser at once. Such synthesis means, in practice, the submission of science, not to Faith, but to the elements of mediaeval science incorporated in the dogmatic expression of Faith—the subordination of modern to mediaeval knowledge and reason. To question or attack these consecrated survivals of old-world science and history is, in the

eyes of the Mediaevalist, the same as to attack the Faith itself. Conceiving himself to represent the most primitive and apostolic form of Christianity, he will no doubt repudiate the title of Mediaevalist; but it is none the less true that, in many respects, Modernism represents an older Catholicism than his, and notably in its recognition of this very principle of synthesis, by which New Testament theology gave way to patristic, and patristic to scholastic; and by which scholastic must now give way to historico-critical.

Those who would see a fair and open presentment of that mediaeval Church-theory which lurks between the lines of the Encyclical *Pascendi* cannot do better than consult an article, "The Catholic Church: What is it?" by Monsignor John Vaughan, in the *Hibbert Journal*, April, 1908. Mgr. Vaughan has been aptly described as the brain of the English Roman Catholic community. His books, *Faith or Folly?*, *Thoughts for all Times*, etc., have sold as only the best books or the worst novels can sell. This, together with his high ecclesiastical position and the careful censorship to which the utterances of even the highest are now subjected, guarantees the thoroughly representative character of his exposition, which, had it come from the pen of a "Modernist," might have seemed a travesty or caricature. Apart from certain puns and pleasantries which are all his own, and a certain clearness of style not entirely due to the shallowness of the position itself, Mgr. Vaughan says nothing that is not said in every seminary-manual of theology, nothing that is not held by Pius X and by the vast numerical majority of the present episcopate.

He proceeds therefore to explain (to the benighted Anglican bishop of Carlisle whom he is refuting) that, in order to secure to men the supreme advantage of theological uniformity of expression, "Christ has provided that in his Church all shall be ruled and directed by one. As the sap of an ordinary tree passes up through a single stem, then courses along the great outstretching arms and through each of the lesser branches until it enters into and gives life and vigor to every individual leaf, so the divine sap of revealed truth passes from the lips of the one supreme pastor and is communicated to the bishops, who in turn communicate it to the priests, who finally explain it and propose it to each individual

member of the entire flock." "What could be simpler; what could be more practical and efficacious?"

We have here the great mediaeval simplification by which the whole Church is concentrated into the person of the Roman pontiff, and the private will and judgment of a privileged individual is substituted for the collective voice and mind of the entire Christian community. Dictated by political expediency, inspired by papal arrogance, supported by fictions and forgeries, formulated by S. Thomas Aquinas, repudiated by the Reformers, contested by Jansenists and Gallicans, defended and promoted by the Jesuits, all but defined and imposed by the Vatican Council, it still lives on, in the teeth of history, in defiance of criticism, precisely on account of its alluring and fallacious simplicity—"What could be simpler; what could be more practical and efficacious?"

What will strike the educated non-Romanist reader as something peculiar to Mgr. Vaughan is really characteristic of the entire school of orthodox theology which he so faithfully represents. This naïve self-confidence, as of a rosy-cheeked school-boy who has just won the medal for catechism; this unaffected astonishment at the absurd perplexities of an Anglican bishop in face of the obvious and self-evident; this serene unconsciousness of the obsolete and worthless character of his premises, is inexplicable except for those who know the Roman seminary system from the inside—who know that the doctorate in theology is awarded to mere scholastic dialectic, and that the Sacred Scriptures and ecclesiastical history remain a *terra incognita* for all but a few restless and curious minds.

Here in the middle of the *Hibbert Journal*, like a mummy at a banquet, we have a writer who gives us four *a priori* reasons why Christ could not possibly have done otherwise than create the papacy; and then proves from two or three texts that he actually did so. He does not see that, *a priori* and *a fortiori*, a sinless papacy might have been expected; or that an infallible episcopate by its miraculous unanimity would have served better than an infallible pope, and would have been just as "possible" for the "omnipotence" of Christ. He is not aware that criticism has gravely undermined the authenticity of the texts on which he builds his logical house of cards. He does not know that the early Fathers



interpreted them far otherwise. He flouts the idea that unity of spirit and of charity is the mark by which men are to know the Church. What Christ prayed for was, in his view, that unity of theological formula which can only be secured by the infallible dictation of an absolute monarch. Of the history of the papacy he knows nothing; for, indeed, it sprang into existence on the day of Pentecost full-fledged! Why the papal infallibility, the very rule of faith and orthodoxy, should itself have been disputed for eighteen centuries, and only then defined, he does not say. He admits that "this machinery is of so simple and practical a character that if put into motion it must actually result in unity," *i.e.*, that this purely external uniformity is as little miraculous as that of a regiment of soldiers; and yet we are to see in it an obvious proof of the divinity of the Church of Rome, such as could only be afforded by a spontaneous and independent agreement of a multitude of witnesses. He appeals to the unanimity of the seven hundred bishops at the Vatican Council, as though there had been no recalcitrant minority; no packing of the Council with bishops *in partibus*; no contempt of the representative principle; no coercion, bullying, or intrigue; as though its shameful history never had been written and never could be written.

In all this we are listening not to Mgr. Vaughan but to the present official theology of the Roman Church and of the authors of the Encyclical *Pascendi*. Its place in relation to modern life and thought is that of Mgr. Vaughan's article in the middle of the *Hibbert Journal*—the dead in the midst of the living. "Friend," we feel inclined to say, "how camest thou in hither not having on a wedding garment?"

Neither historically, critically, nor exegetically has this mediæval Church-theory a leg to stand on. Its logic may be faultless, but its premises and assumptions are hopelessly discredited. It is in direct collision, not with some new philosophy, but with a mass of hard indigestible facts. It can only live in the dark; and the most skilfully organized obscurantism will not be able to exclude the light very much longer. Already the books are opened and judgment has begun.

This state of things has forced upon the Modernist a distinction between the Church and Church-theory, as between Christ and

Christology, or between God and Theology. His faith is in the living community, not in the community's self-analysis or self-expression at any given stage of its growth. He believes that within the unity and continuity of the Catholic community the leaven of the Gospel slowly permeates the fruits of man's natural endeavor towards every kind of progress, intellectual, moral, social, political, and religious; that, in alliance with all that is best and worthiest and strongest in the natural order, it struggles towards that highest expression of Christianity which lay hidden in the simplicity of the Gospel. He believes that this attainment can only be won—can only be fruitful and satisfying because it is won—experimentally, through many tribulations and costly experiences of failure and error and defeat and discouragement; that our grasp on the good and true is but infirm; that we do not possess them permanently or profitably till we have tasted every bitterness of evil, struggled in the brambles of every deceit. Thus it is, and not by a sudden creative fiat, but gradually, progressively, yet infallibly, that the Spirit of Christ leads his Church into truth after truth and out of error after error.

If he holds to the Roman Catholic rather than to any other Christian community, it is because he believes in the principles of unity and continuity as necessary conditions of the development in question. For it is only as compressed within the boundaries of one institution that the scattered and diversified elements of a wide collective experience, past and present, are forced to jostle together, to correct and criticize one another, to amalgamate sooner or later in a rich and fruitful unification. The schismatic principle, like other crude simplifications, is essentially impoverishing. It evades instead of overcoming difficulties, and solves the problem by dropping its awkward elements. This method can only result in just that external, regimental uniformity, spiritually thin and insignificant, which is the ideal of Mgr. Vaughan and the Mediaevalists generally. The "excommunication principle" insures that the soldiers shall all be of exactly the same height and as void of individuality as possible. Uniformity, or unity without variety, is the easiest thing in the world to secure, and does not require the aid of the Holy Ghost. Unity in variety is necessarily an ideal from which the Roman Church is as far as the Angli-

can. Here unity is lacking; and there variety. What we Roman Catholics need is the recognition of the value of diversities as something to be overcome, not by violent repression or elimination, but by good-tempered, persevering endeavor to save every real value in a higher synthesis. To further and guide this labor is just the function of sane ecclesiastical authority, could such be conceived.

The hindrances to this alone significant and fruitful unity are to be found either in the "externalism" which gives to the conceptual, verbal, and outward expression of the Christian spirit and aim the same value as to the spirit itself, and therefore, is willing to kill or be killed for the integrity of that expression; or else it is to be found in the "internalism" which underrates or denies the spiritual value of such an outward embodiment of faith and the duty of continually shaping it into a more perfect instrument of the Church's inward life and action. Modernism in this respect stands in the mean between the externalism of the Mediaevalist and the internalism of the Protestant. Only that unity is fruitful which is the synthesis of variety; only that variety which is seeking for unity. With à Kempis, the Modernist does not believe that certainty about purely theological problems is as vital a necessity for the individual as Mgr. Vaughan and his school seem to suppose, or that in the day of judgment we shall be examined as to our views on hypostasis, *ousia*, substance, accidents, and the rest. He holds that there is always more than enough light to live by. Yet on the other hand he recognizes that the collective life of the community requires to express itself in a growing system of conceptions formulas and institutions, by which a fruitful unifying pressure is brought to bear on the luxuriance of individual variations. Only when this system ceases to grow, when some stage in its evolution is apotheosized and imposed as final, does it become, like the Mediaeval synthesis, a sterile uniformity.

Akin to, and as it were a dimension of, this anti-schismatic principle of unity is the principle of historical continuity. The more or less conscious memory and record of past experiences is a condition of fulness and fertility for the collective as for the individual life. All that tends to make a people explicitly conscious

of its solidarity with the past is of priceless value for its healthy development, as determining the direction of its path into the future and forbidding deviations inconsistent with its true character. A radical denial of its own past is impoverishing for the same reason that schism and excommunication are impoverishing. The Modernist is distinguished from the Mediaevalist by his sense of history. The latter denies that his religion has grown, that it has any internal history. It was what it is: it is what it was. Its memory can teach it nothing. The papacy, the three texts, the four *a priori* reasons, "simple, efficacious, practical," were always there—what can the past teach us? For the Modernist, Catholicism is a growth whose present stage can be understood and valued only in the light of every past stage. Hence he is essentially (though not inertly or blindly) conservative—a parsimonious minimizer in the matter of necessary changes and adaptations to current ideas. Forms, customs, and institutions that have outlived all other meaning and utility are still precious to him as so many strands and fibres that tie the present to its roots in the deep-buried past of religious history, and by which the ghosts of his remote ancestry are gathered round him in his worship. Even at a grave crisis of transition like the present, when the accumulated negligences and arrears of centuries of Mediaeval intransigence have to be made up for by the sacrifices of almost a single generation, the Modernist seeks precedents and anticipations of such a reform in the premature aspirations and efforts of men like Abbot Joachim or Savonarola—men who beheld Antichrist in the unrestrained, triumphant Mediaevalism of those days when it was freer than now to bear its deadly fruit unashamed. Nothing is further from his desires than to erect a smart up-to-date Church on the site of the old. The new must transcend, but it must also justify, explain, and include, all the values of the old.

Unlike the Mediaevalist, who identifies the ecclesiasticism and the theology of the thirteenth century with revelation itself, and who therefore may not criticize them without prejudice to conscience, the Modernist in his attitude towards this moribund synthesis is critical and discriminating. He applies the parables of the wheat and the tares, of the good fish and the bad, not merely

to the members of the Church but to the ever tentative and perfectible efforts of her rulers and theologians to build up an outward embodiment and organ of her inward life and character. He sees that wheat and tares have been sown contemporaneously from the very first and at every period of her history; that they have grown and developed side by side, each according to its inherent logic; that there has ever been need of continual vigilance and weeding, according as the true nature of evil and erroneous principles has betrayed itself; that there have been harvest epochs, when the call has gone forth to separate, to bind up, and to burn the tares that long negligence has allowed to accumulate in the Master's field. But, for all this, he knows that for man preliminary error is often the necessary condition of truth, and evil of good; that relatively to an immature mind what is objectively false may be nearer the truth. He knows that no doctrine, practice, or institution has lived and given life on a large scale and for a long time but in virtue of some vital element which must be saved at all costs. Thin, poor, childish, mechanical, as they now seem to any but to the seminarian mind, yet these mediaevalist conceptions of dogma, revelation, faith, theology, inspiration, infallibility, papacy, priesthood, sacrifice, sacraments, saint-worship, hell, heaven, indulgences, purgatory—nay, even inquisition and persecution—all stood for the imperfect expression, or at least for the perversion, of some sound principle of religious life, individual or collective. Taking this external religion as an organic whole and not as a congeries of fragments, independently intelligible, the Modernist sees in it the work of the Holy Spirit immanent in the Christian community, striving to set forth, ever less inadequately, the Infinite and Transcendent in terms of the finite and human, according to the existing categories and beliefs of man's ever progressive mind and character. He realizes that if God is knowable, he is altogether incomprehensible in his transcendence; that of his inward essence, and consequently of man's relations to him, we can have none but symbolic conceptions. Our religion is therefore a mystery, an enigma, a dark glass. Faith is not knowledge; in their literal sense our creeds are not true. Faith is the conviction that whatever they tell us of the love, goodness, beauty, or

greatness of God is immeasurably less than the truth—is only an attempt to supply content to our barren idea of the Incomprehensible; is truer—or less untrue—in the measure that it more effectually raises our minds and hearts and stimulates our energies. According to S. Thomas Aquinas (not to speak of the Gospel), God himself is the central or formal object—in a sense the only object—of our faith. All other *credenda* are proposed to us merely as throwing light on his nature and his relations to man. But it is perfectly evident that the personal, individual spirit to whom we pray and in whom we trust is but a mental image or idol, in man's likeness, symbolic of the Incomprehensible and Infinite. We say rightly that God is at least equivalently spirit and at least equivalently personal; but of that which he actually is we have no comprehension. He is equivalently, but not "formally," all that we conceive. And if this holds of the central object of our creed, it plainly holds of the dependent objects. While treating the objects of faith as matters of miraculously communicated theological "knowledge," Mediaevalism, by speaking of them still as "mysteries," bears witness to the older view that was supplanted by impertinent scholastic rationalism and by concessions to popular materialism. For the Mediaevalist the Trinity is a difficulty rather than a mystery or enigma.

To charge the Modernist with Protestantism and private judgment is cheap but not intelligent. His faith is precisely in the Church; in a judgment which is objective because it is public and not private. It is the Mediaevalist who, by denying all inspiration and critical value to the collective experience reflection and judgment of the entire community, and by subjecting the whole Church, including the episcopate, to the personal will and judgment of a single bishop, has repudiated the fundamental idea of Catholicism and turned the constitution of the Church topsy-turvy. As Mgr. Vaughan puts it, the trunk, the branches, the leaves, all live by and from the root. So all truth and power and grace flow through the miraculously guided Pope down to the furthest members and branches of the purely passive and receptive Church: "What could be more simple?"—Yes; but what could be more false to history and to Catholic tradition?

What more childish, mischievous, and impracticable? What did the uncertainties, disputes, and councils of the Church during nineteen centuries mean, if the popes possessed, or claimed to possess, or were admitted to possess, this "simple, practical, and efficacious" means of producing uniformity?

The Modernist knows the crude modernity, the origin and history, the governmental and political motives, of this mechanical simplification. False as it is, it owes its life and persistence to certain truths which it perverts and caricatures. Like the whole mediaeval synthesis, it is one of those many hypotheses and plausibilities which were bound to be tried and experimentally disproved in the course of the Church's strugglings after truth, and by which her eventual apprehension of truth will be strengthened, deepened, and enriched. She will be all the better and none the worse for having passed through and beyond Mediaevalism, and for her costly experiments in absolutism. For the Modernist, she is a teaching Church just because she is a learning Church; because she can speak with all the authority of secular and worldwide experience; because she is unfailingly impelled to seek for an ever more perfect doctrinal and institutional embodiment of her unchanging faith and spirit. The Gospel is her conscience—a goad that will never suffer her to rest peacefully in any false or inadequate position, but infallibly drives her on in quest of the truer and better.

All this is, of course, as much an interpretation, a theology of Catholicism, as is the Mediaevalist synthesis. But, so far as it is more than a negation and destructive criticism of that synthesis, it is in large part a return to the principles of pre-Mediaeval and patristic Catholicism—to a deeper and more fruitful, because more experienced, appreciation of those principles. Moreover, unlike Mediaevalism, Modernism makes no pretence of being either a complete or a final synthesis. It is before all else a method and tendency rather than a system. Its inspiration or driving-force is history and not philosophy. The whole Mediaevalist fabric rests on a grotesque and monstrous ignorance of the history of the Bible and of the Church; that is, of the story of their genesis. For Mediaevalism they have no genesis, no history: they sprang into existence, full-formed, by a miracle.

Even the most meagre and reluctant estimate of the assured results of historical criticism is fatal to the Catholicism of Mgr. Vaughan and of the Encyclical *Pascendi*. For this reason the main argument of that Encyclical is devoted to an attempted demolition of the scientific method that leads to such disastrous results; while its practical measures are directed to the systematic inquisitorial repression of historical knowledge. The implied admission is surely significant: Rome is afraid of facts. Had Modernists cared only for the barren delights of destructive criticism, had they been the cold intellectualists described by the Encyclical, they would have abstained from all synthetic enterprise and contented themselves with stating facts and asking awkward questions. But being Catholics and believers, they were bound, for their own sakes and for the sake of others, to suggest some interpretation that would enable their Catholicism to survive the inevitable wreck of Mediaevalism; and to this end, most, though not all, of them have borrowed from modern philosophy those flexible categories of life and growth of which scholasticism knew little or nothing. Unassailable as long as they kept to facts and history, as soon as they trespassed on philosophical territory they gave the Mediaevalist (for whom scholasticism is of the very marrow of faith) the chance of crying, Heresy! and of sweeping away their facts along with their philosophy in the dust and confusion of one and the same anathema.

But when the dust settles the facts will still be there, as ugly and awkward as ever. Whatever other elements of the Modernist synthesis may perish—and many will—one point at least is secured for ever; namely, that however the interpretations of faith depend upon and presuppose the facts they interpret, faith has no jurisdiction in the realm of history. Faith may tell us that Christ was God and that he died for our sins; but only after history has told us that Christ existed and was crucified. Whether we know them through human witness, or angelic witness, or divine witness, historical facts remain historical facts, made credible by adequate testimony, and can by no possibility be matter of faith, or more than the natural text whose supernatural meaning faith interprets. On their phenomenal side, as links in the sequence of events, the



miracles of the Gospel belong to history and not to faith; and their factual truth must be as accessible to the veriest infidel as to the believer whose faith alone can divine their supernatural significance. Here is a conclusion to which we are simply forced by the pressure of historical evidence, and which of itself and alone is fatal to the Mediaevalist synthesis. One may excommunicate M. Loisy, but to excommunicate facts is very like excommunicating oneself.<sup>1</sup>

Let us now turn for a moment from the speculative differences of these two systems which have lived side by side for some years in the Roman Church to consider the causes, the character, and the probable issues of the acute conflict which has arisen between them under the present pontificate.

While no doubt believing himself infallible, Leo XIII did not take his infallibility too seriously. "Now that We are infallible," he is reported to have said, "we must be very careful about our utterances." At all events his general action was not governed by that more extravagant interpretation of his powers which the intentional ambiguities of the dogmatic definition of 1870 left open. He fostered his authority cautiously, and took care not to risk it by too rude a conflict with the stubborn realities of a faithless world. Not till his powder was perfectly dry would he venture forth to battle in the name of the Lord.

The faith of Pius X, in strength, simplicity and sincerity, is that of a little child—the faith that in other times and circumstances has often changed the face of the world. Without any sophistical distinctions, he believes that to him has been given all power in heaven and on earth; that he is not only infallible in matters of faith but also in matters of history and science that

<sup>1</sup> For those who would inform themselves more accurately on the subject of Modernism and its history perhaps no book is more illuminating than M. Loisy's latest publication, *Quelques Lettres* (Paris, Nourry), in which, as nowhere else, we get an "all-together" view of his work, his ideas, his conflict. The *Programme of Modernism* (London, Fisher Unwin) is very valuable as bringing to a focus the various scriptural and historical problems which have, so to say, forced the movement into existence. *Lendemain de l'Encyclique* (Paris, Nourry) is also a very brilliant little synopsis of the situation by a group of French ecclesiastics. Finally, the volume on Modernism by the Rev. A. L. Lilley, Vicar of Paddington (London, Pitman), gives a most sympathetic and understanding outsider's view of the movement, and supplies an exhaustive bibliography.

bear upon faith; that the whole Church lives from him as a tree from its root; that it rests on him, the Rock, as an inverted pyramid on its apex; that the jurisdiction of the collective episcopate, of the ecumenical council, of the canon law, is all borrowed from him and can be overridden or taken back by him; that if he chooses he can take the election of bishops entirely into his own hands; that he can, if expedient, appoint his own successor; that, in a word, he alone in his own person is the *Ecclesia docens*—the teaching and ruling Church, while the episcopate, no less than the “lower” clergy and the laity, have no other duty or responsibility but to submit, to listen, to obey. Needless to say, it is no sort of self-sufficiency, no confidence in his own learning or wisdom, that allows a humble man thus to exalt himself, but a childlike faith in the promise of divine, miraculous guidance. Neither cardinals nor bishops were perhaps quite prepared for so extreme and logical a development of their concessions of 1870; but it is almost impossible to question the logic, nor can they now, by any constitutional method, recover their alienated birth-right.

Although anti-Modernism held a conspicuous place in his programme of general restoration, the first efforts of Pius X were directed to the much-needed work of the moral reform of the Roman clergy and prelacy—a reform prosecuted with a zeal and energy highly distasteful to the clerics in question. It was the interest of these latter to divert this zeal into other channels, and Modernism was an excellent lightning-conductor. Men whose preoccupations had been anything but theological became suddenly scandalized at the enormities of criticism; many a broken career was mended, many a spotted reputation restored, as the reward of diligence in the crusade against theological corruption. After all, it is an accepted axiom that orthodoxy is the root of morality. It is futile to cut down the evil tree and leave its root in the ground. Get the theology right, and all will go well. These were considerations to weigh with a naïve, unhistorical mind. Moreover there was the class-ambition of the Roman theological schools enlisted in the cause. These had long felt the sceptre of intellectual leadership slipping from their grasp, and realized that the triumph of the historical and scientific method must be their ruin. Then

there was a whole host of frankly worldly interests—gain,<sup>2</sup> power, ambition, and the like—intimately bound up with the Mediaevalist simplification, and seriously threatened by a reading of history that would restore the laity, the “lower” clergy, and the episcopate to their primitive share in the doctrinal and governmental activity of the Church.

Then there is the considerable numerical majority of lay-folk, and even priests, who have been trained for two generations or so by catechisms and theological handbooks in which Mediaevalism is set forth with all that glaring self-evidence which it presents in the treatment of Mgr. Vaughan, undimmed by the mists of history, criticism, or exegesis. To these the system commends itself not only by its compendious intellectual simplicity, but as reducing their ecclesiastical duties to that of passive, blind, irresponsible obedience. Never having heard or read of any but the Ultramontane interpretation of Catholicism, to assail that is in their eyes to assail God himself; nor will they be patient of a view which would trouble their mental or moral inertia. Thus all the spiritual laziness, all the supine ignorance, of the Church are up in arms against Modernism.

<sup>2</sup> Finance as a factor of dogmatic evolution would be an interesting study. The considerations which shaped the Mediaeval doctrine of the papacy were financial as much as political. What is priceless cannot be sold for a price; yet it cannot be had without an “honorarium,” an alms, a fee. Hence to be the sole source of all spiritual liberties, privileges, and graces is not an unenviable position. If every bishop could dispense from marriage impediments; could do all that Rome does, Rome would be as poor as any other see. Again, the doctrine of the finite and therefore mechanically divisible value of the Mass has been determined by financial exigencies. Also the substitution of a purely vindictive Purgatory for the ancient medicinal Purgatory. A debt of spiritually profitless pains can be cancelled by the masses and alms of survivors. Modernism is not very indulgent to this *locus theologicus*, and not likely to be popular with those who “live by the Altar” in this fashion. In a hundred unsuspected ways it tends to spoil the market. For example, there is an enormous demand for and supply of text-books of correct Roman College theology, moral and dogmatic, which every prudent bishop desires to see in the hands of his seminarians, and which in the eyes of Modernism are considerably worse than waste-paper. For more than fifty years the Jesuit manuals of Perrone, Tongiorgi, Palmieri, Franzelin, Liberatore, Gury, Ballerini, Cornoldi, etc., have deluged the seminary world and been a source of no mean fortune to their common proprietor. Taking human nature as we know it from history, it must be confessed that the strongest and fiercest interest that truth has to contend against is the money interest—not less fierce because it is often subconscious in its influence.

Finally there is the all-permeating Society of Jesus, whose *raison d'être* has been the support of the absolutist interpretation of papal authority. Called into existence to oppose the counter-extravagances of the Reformation, it appropriated, systematized, and defended as of faith the crude absolutism of Gregory VII, Boniface VIII, Alexander VI. Hand in hand with the Roman Curia, strengthening and strengthened by it at the expense of the Church, it worked steadily for three centuries at the elimination of every vestige of the democratic and ancient Catholic conception of the Church's constitution; till in 1870 it achieved the practical abdication by the collective episcopate of all independent power and jurisdiction. Itself a military despotism, it has managed to impose its own constitution on the Church, and so far as Christ's Kingdom is of this world and not spiritual, so far as it has to fight political battles with political weapons, nothing could be more "simple, efficacious, and practical." The Pope now holds the same relation to the bishops, clergy, and faithful as the General of the Society does to the provincials, the rectors, and their subjects. They are nothing: he is everything. Here, unlimited rights; there, unlimited duties. Nor is it only its governmental form and principles that the Society has gradually imposed on the Church. The seminary system, the manual-theology, the enervating casuistry, the mechanical, anti-mystical asceticism, the trivial devotions, the liturgical decadence—these and many other features are not the Church's but the Society's. The seeming verdure does not belong to the ecclesiastical oak, but to the Jesuit ivy which holds it together at a good risk of squeezing the life out of it. Plainly the attitude of the Society towards Modernism with its all-intrusive historical search-light could only be one of unqualified hostility.

The weapons of attack as enumerated in the Encyclical *Pascendi* are such as Modernists have a right to expect from the character and motives of their opponents. An organized system of prying and secret delation; a campaign of systematic defamation and slander; the methods of the *Corrispondenza Romana* and of the "*bonne presse*" in general, compared with which those of the yellowest journalism are Christian and respectable; the boycotting of professors, of journals, of publishers; the suspen-

sion, often entailing the starvation, of suspected clerics; the repression of clerical, and as far as possible of episcopal, reunions and associations—these and the like are the weapons in which the Encyclical puts its trust. For the execution of such a programme none but the basest and unworthiest will offer their services; and thus it is into the hands of these that the destiny of their betters is committed.

Except for the futile attack on the historic method, there has not been in the Encyclical or since the Encyclical any sober and serious attempt to fight Modernism with the sword of history and reason—nothing but rhetorical tirades for the confirmation of the ignorant in their ignorance.

We need no longer, as a few months ago, speculate on the probable result of these methods. Already they are bearing their bitter fruit in abundance. Those outside (and alas! many inside) the Church who identify Catholicism with Mediaevalism and confound the two in one common hatred are witnessing with ill-disguised joy what seems to them the headlong rush of the Church's rulers down the steep that leads to the abyss. When Modernists who would stand between the Church and destruction are swept down by the stampede, they cheer and applaud—and Rome takes their applause with stolid seriousness. But to all the world it is evident that the practical methods of the Encyclical are those of a cause that has lost all faith in itself; that has nothing to hope from the inherent power of truth and justice; that subconsciously knows itself to be intellectually and morally bankrupt.

And of these two bankruptcies the latter is the more serious. The methods of Mgr. Montagnini<sup>3</sup> are after all those of his patron and explicit approver, the Cardinal Secretary, and those of every nunciature throughout the world; and they are such as must subject any government, still more a would-be spiritual government, to the moral censure of Christian civilization. Mgr. Montagnini is in diplomatic disgrace for the crime of having been found out; but how little he is in moral disgrace is proved by his recent promotion to a canonry in the Lateran. And Rome imagines that these things can still be done, day after day, without apology or reparation as in the epochs of her greatest power and corrup-

<sup>3</sup> See *Fiches Pontificales*. Paris, Nourry.

tion—that she can at once patronize the *Corrispondenza Romana* and claim the respect and obedience of upright and honorable men.

One might speak at length of the political and the financial bankruptcy of the Mediaeval system, but enough has been said to show that in the violence of the anti-Modernist crusade we witness not the symptoms of returning health and vigor, but the convulsions of a death-agony, the last flicker of an expiring flame.

This violent precipitation of a crisis for which the Church at large is by no means ready can afford but little satisfaction to the far-seeing Modernist. True, it has given the movement self-consciousness; it has immensely multiplied and united its adherents; it has evoked and justified a spirit of resistance; it has won for it the sympathy of the religious intelligence of the world. But such inevitable and radical revolutions should be slow and noiseless in the measure that the scandal and religious upset of the multitudes is to be avoided or minimized. The *Ignis Ardens* of the present pontificate must inevitably be followed (as is curiously prophesied) by the *Religio Depopulata* of the next.

Yet in spite of this, the true Modernist is, as we have said, one who believes in the vitality and recuperative power of that formless, underlying, pre-hierarchic Church which, as it preceded and produced, so also can criticize, reject, and survive the great experiment of Mediaevalism. He appeals, not with Pascal “Ad Jesu Christi tribunal,” not to a future Pope or Council, but to the silent Church that thinks, feels, endures, and bides its time; from the Church Mediaeval to the Church Eternal.

This no doubt is faith and hope rather than reason; yet not without some basis in reason and history that diverse minds will estimate diversely. For, unlike many abortive anticipations of Modernism in the past, the present movement owes its rapidly accelerating force and impetus, not to uncertain theories and speculations, but to a whole cumulus of facts, each as awkward for Mediaevalism as was the single discovery of Galileo. None has more right than the Modernist to say, “Things are what they are, and their consequences will be what they will be.” Such was practically the response of M. Loisy to Pius X, who, not content

with that critic's profession of the Catholic Faith and promise of respectful silence, demanded an inward renunciation and an outward refutation of his honest historical conclusions—as though there were no such thing in the world as intellectual necessity or scientific conscience! This system, which cannot bend to facts, must break against them. The whole atmosphere of the age is laden with the microbes of Modernism, and all the inquisitorial ingenuity in the world cannot prevent their fructifying in living and active minds. Were every known Modernist to be silenced and excommunicated tomorrow, it certainly would not check, it might for many reasons accelerate, the spread of the epidemic. Of this the perfectly independent appearance of the phenomenon in so many different and distant centres—a fact which only the recent action of Pius X has brought fully to light—is an evident proof. Modernism is independent of propagation by contact.

It needs then no faith to foresee the incoming of the tide, or to predict the inevitable retreat of King Canute to a position of safety. But it needs some faith to believe that this forced retreat may be accomplished without dishonor and irreparable disaster to the cause of temperate and rational authority. Such, however, is the faith of all true Modernists, and the hope, more or less faint, of many who at least wish them God-speed.

*THE PHILOSOPHY OF PLATO AS A MEDITATION  
ON DEATH*

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It is of the philosophy of Plato that I would write, but I would keep in mind a definition of philosophy given by Plato himself when he spoke of it as "meditation on death." I would write, too, not of any inner details of what Plato thought, but of his teaching in its general character and value; and especially, on behalf of my readers, I would assume that, for their purposes as well as always for my own, no fair estimate and no vital appreciation of Plato or his meditation can ever be attained without some understanding of the place of Plato and his philosophy in the history of his very remarkable people, the ancient Greeks, and of their dead civilization.

As an ancient Greek Plato belonged to the fifth century before Christ. He was, furthermore, a great philosopher who possessed the genius of a poet and very unusual powers of intellect, being, what is certainly rare in human history, as clear and discriminating in his thinking as he was far and penetrating in his vision. In philosophical standpoint he was an idealist, whatever his sort of idealism may prove to be; and to his idealism he was in large measure inspired by the life and teaching and martyrdom of Socrates. As to this last matter, however, the very greatness and significance of Socrates lay in his embodiment and dramatic, prophetic enactment of the hurrying fate of his race and their civilization. The times being what they were, and rooted as they were in a glorious past, spoke deeply and grandly through the words, and even more eloquently through the final silence, of Socrates to the poet-thinker Plato.

What it means in human history for a civilization to have produced a great poet-thinker, a man who is at once a seer and a keenly discriminating critic, and into whose life, along with his thinker's genius and poetic vision, such a searching, harrowing,



personal experience as the condemnation and death of a master and leader has entered, must always tax as well as inspire the imagination. Yet when all is said, for the history of Greek civilization the meaning is to be found in the consciousness of the poet-thinker himself: it is well focussed in the peculiar idealism of Plato; and, accordingly, to just that, to its various sources, personal as well as historical, to its character as a reflection and a comment on the past and as a foreshadowing of the future, attention is now asked.

Idealism is very far from being a self-defining term, and at least to understand Plato's idealism, it is necessary to foresee what for many the term is quite likely to obscure, not only that any idealism must always have both a forward and a backward regard, but also that a true and vital idealism is always heroic and sacrificial: it is never shallowly sentimental. An idealism like Plato's is always a victory of the human spirit over a threatening and well-grounded pessimism. It is indeed a meditation, a successful meditation, on death. Did Plato himself mean the death of Socrates? Or, possibly, the approaching death of the Greek civilization? Doubtless both deaths, if they really count as two, influenced and inspired his thinking, and certainly both must help any understanding of Plato's victory over events and conditions that gave good cause for despair.

There is not space here for any long account of the grounds in Athenian or more generally in Greek life, or even in Plato's own direct personal experience, for a dark, despairing view of life; but, while many historians call the time one of great illumination, and while only a few years before there had been the Golden Age, the age of the famous Perikles, when civic pride and splendor and achievement of the highest sort had possession of the people, nevertheless life must always have its paradoxes, and that age of the illumination was really a dark, or at least a rapidly darkening, one.

Brilliant civilizations always spring from conquests; in part from conquests over men and in part, if the two can be separated, from conquests over nature, and certainly the rise of the Greeks' civilization was no exception to this simple rule. In Greek history,

before Plato's time, had come those battles, once if not still the wonder and delight of every school-boy, Thermopylae, Marathon, Salamis, and Plataea. But after battles and their successes, inevitable conceit; and the conceit, which expresses itself, of course, in self-consciousness and self-glorification, in works of art, in sensuously pleasing literature, in all the many ways of staging one's achievement, has the effect of making a naïve, genuine, simple, honest life sophisticated and artificial, rendering patriotism and religious piety and morality, and even the life of artistic production and intellectual inquiry, formal rather than real, cultivated—a very meaningful term—rather than direct and immediately genuine. In a single word, the conceit makes for culture; and culture, brilliant as it may become, must always betray tradition, transforming the once sacred institutions of all sorts from objects of positive devotion into mere instruments or utilities. For a cultivated life, by implication when not openly and confessedly, the traditional patriotism, piety, and morality already are, or are in process of becoming, things to use or wear or publicly to appear in rather than things to own and cherish deeply and heartily or to be essentially. Thus Plato's age, as both Socrates and he have told us in so many ways, was an age that was illuminated, talented, cultivated, but also that was given to an enthusiasm for manner and successful appearance in all things, ever exalting seeming above being.

Perhaps in human history it is the peculiar business of culture always to do just that; perhaps the established ways of a particular civilization, in the interests of a progressive history, need to be turned into mere forms without substance, conventions rather than vital interests; perhaps in history, as in personal experience, it is well that the things for a time supposed real should come to have the character of only passing dreams, however splendid; but, be this as it may, Athenian life in the time of Plato, bright focus that it was of Greek civilization, had become a grand show, a splendid dream; a life that was more ingenious than genuine, more subtle than substantial or responsible, more given to technique, fashion, and display than to righteousness.

And so we can feel the darkness in that age of Greek enlightenment; since betrayal of tradition can have no end save the

passing, the death, of the civilization into which it has come. That age of culture had its chiaroscuro effects. The cultured or cultivated patriotism was shadowed by a more or less treacherous cosmopolitanism; the cultured piety by a growing indifference to real belief; the cultured, sophisticated morality by a loosening of the customs and restraints of the time; the cultivated, professional art by playing to unreasoning passion; and the consciously technical science and philosophy by a fondness for sophistry and intellectual gymnastic. In short, successful battles; conceit and self-glorification; a golden, albeit a sunset-golden age, in which life was staged in wonderful works of art and thereupon robbed of its mystery; and an exaggerated culture, that turned life formal and artificial—such is the history of the Greeks down to Plato's time; and in this history who must not feel, with Socrates and Plato, a coming, if not even, in spite of the outward brilliancy, an already present, gloom?

Not least among the causes for a deep despair was the widespread selfishness. Thus, as but an incident of the artificiality that permeated the life of the time making the existing organization of society little better than an empty shell, the individual had come to stand for more than the class or the institution, or than any of the customs, ideas, or ideals that held the people in classes or gave foundation to the institutions. The life as actually formed or organized was treated as no longer intrinsically worthy, but as only so much personal opportunity, supplying the individual with the means, the definite instruments or conditions, with which, as he was subtle and ingenious, while all the time seeming loyal and respectable, he might work out his own selfish ends. The culture had truly brought a treachery to tradition, and behind the only outward loyalty which survived for a time the reigning motive was selfishness. Moreover, as needs especially to be kept in mind, at that time, as always when individualism has supplanted patriotism and loyalty to the established life, the individual, throwing off the old restraints (except of course as he found the appearance of compliance with them to serve his purposes), was feeling himself—there seems to be no better way of expressing his feeling—just big, nay, swollen, with the life of the whole world. Was he a Greek? Of course, but

consciously and boastfully, not a prudish one. In fact the Greek life was only the garb he wore so well or the brilliant part he was taking on life's much larger stage. Surely he was a citizen of the wide world, at least as wide as the reaches of the Mediterranean; and he was, too, nature's creature, not a bondsman of the codes of a merely local, however glorious, civilization. Yes, the selfishness, the individualism, of Plato's time, must always be associated with that cosmopolitanism which was mentioned above as the dark side of the patriotism in Plato's Athens. Yet perhaps—to digress a little—such a broad, free selfishness, always doing violence to custom, always secretly, if not openly, opposing the authority of the institutions, is also always only a jumping from one set of associations and restraints into another, which, although broader, may—or even must—prove more binding. The broadly natural life to which the selfish man so boastfully turns, after all is said, is truly a harder master, a closer and more inviolate association, than any positive civilization has ever been; and the destiny of the cosmopolitan individualism of Athens, when in the fulness of time that destiny had been accomplished, was a demonstration of this truth. But, returning, the selfishness in Plato's Athens, however affected with the conceit of cosmopolitanism, and because of the cosmopolitanism however promising of good or of ill for the future, could appear to Plato only as one more sign of a threatening doom.

Was Athens unhappy? Athens does not seem to have been unhappy. If the simple arithmetic of her joys and her sorrows could be worked out, the balance would probably be on the side of a good time. Certainly the people attended the performances of the comedies of Aristophanes quite as readily as those of the tragedies of Sophocles. The age, then, had its pleasure as well as its illumination; its gayety, especially at night, a modern who was also a bit of a poet might add, as well as its glaring electric light. Nor can one forget that selfishness, even at its worst, is always stimulating. Of course it prompts dissipation and lawlessness, but also—and with recognition of this the gloom of its time and generation must seem almost to lift a little—it prompts leadership, invention, originality; it assures to a people the birth of genius; it may betray tradition even as it flaunts its brilliant cul-

ture; but certainly it involves just the loosening of restraints that enables invention and progress.

Accordingly the good time of the Athenians could not have been without some sense of the deeper, hidden possibilities of the life which they were leading so carelessly. So often the real zest of gayety, the impulse to its brilliancy, springs from a seriousness that only lacks the courage of expression, or that for some other reason chooses to conceal itself; and, if Athens was as happy as she seemed, her happiness must have had some of this deeper zest. Her citizens certainly were selfish; but, if in Plato's age their selfishness produced the treacherous dissipated Alcibiades, it also produced Socrates. The chiaroscuro effects of that time of culture and treachery, of selfishness and enjoyment, were thus such as to make the light and the shade actually change places even as one looked.

As already said, and as is indeed very generally known, the influence of Socrates upon Plato was very great, and especially the reflection on Socrates's death was one of the determining factors of Plato's heroic idealism. But now what precisely was Socrates's relation to the culture of the time? In general the contemporary writers and thinkers and teachers, all the various exponents of the intellectual life, possessed only talent. They had the art, the skill or ingenuity, of successfully maintaining the conventional life of the day, even while they served their own or their clients' personal desires. Plato's master, however, was a genius, and genius occupies itself not with the conventional, but with the real, not with the selfishness that works through successful appearance, but with the selfishness that works through successful realization. So long as life must be in part always hidden behind its forms, so long as it cannot in its full meaning and intent be explicit, so long as besides the outward and conventional there must be also the inward and vital, genius and its searching originality, as well as talent and its subtle but superficial ingenuity, will have a place and a part in human history. So, again, Socrates was a genius, and it was his peculiar mission, meeting like with like, selfishness with selfishness, treachery with treachery, and above all cosmopolitanism with cosmopolitanism,

to disclose what was real in the life of the people at large but hidden from view, or what perhaps in a spirit of laughing bravado all others were bent on not seeing and truly appreciating. While that reality could be kept under, concealed behind the pretence of loyal Greek life, the irresponsible selfishness, which was already cosmopolitan but in a careless, unideal way, could go on; the Hellenic laughter and the brilliancy and the play could continue; but let the vital fact, the hidden reality, be revealed beyond possibility of concealment and indifference, and it would at once become, what Socrates made it, an object of duty, a recognized and measured responsibility; and with such a change the easy cosmopolitanism of the selfish, fashionable, brilliant Athenians would turn positive and serious. Their friendships could no longer follow convenience; nor their argument, desire; nor their piety, outward conformity; nor their patriotism, fine rhetoric and oratory and public display; but instead all these would be made, in the first place, real and vital, and, in the second place, as far-reaching in their commands and restraints as humanity itself, affecting and embracing the barbarians as well as the Greeks. Simply Socrates effectively revealed and idealized the universal life which so unmindfully his people were already living. There is always idealization, with an accompanying consciousness of duty, whenever something that is real and present is made manifest through somebody's personal achievement.

It is necessary to speak still further of Socrates, although the theme here is the philosophy of Plato. Grote in his *History of Greece* has described Socrates in three ways: an apostolic dialectician, a religious worker, and an intellectual genius. The term dialectician has reference to the very searching character of Socrates's inquiries, to his well-known method of dialogue and destructive cross-questioning, but the last two characterizations are of special interest in this place. As has been said, Socrates disclosed to his times the fact, already too real to withstand resistance, of a cosmopolitan or humanly universal life; and Grote very pertinently insists that Socrates's achievement was with the consciousness of one who felt himself a divinely

appointed messenger. Moreover, proving his religious devotion by his martyrdom, Socrates succeeded in making the people, however reluctantly, feel, no longer their license and selfishness, but their duty, their positive allegiance, to be humanly universal, to be larger and deeper than the idle culture, however brilliant, that was still keeping up the pretence of loyalty to a passing regime. In witness to such an awakening, the death of Socrates was followed by influential schools of ethics that, although immature in their doctrines, nevertheless under the inspiration of Socrates raised questions of life's goal, of its *summum bonum*, and suggested solutions that rested on universal elements in man's nature rather than on anything narrowly personal or racial.

But now with special regard to Plato's relation to Socrates, when Grote describes Socrates as an intellectual genius, and says in explanation that Socrates discovered the abstract, general idea, the conception, he may be calling attention to what is somewhat technical and difficult, but certainly he is touching upon what deeply and directly appealed to Plato. Plato's philosophy comprised chiefly—it had its focus in—a world, or heaven, of the ideas, of just those ideas which Socrates had discovered; so that only after a careful appraisal of those ideas can one understand either the connection between Socrates, the religious missionary of the universal life, and Socrates the intellectual genius, or the peculiar use that Plato made of what Socrates achieved.

The ideas which Socrates's genius discovered and out of which Plato constructed his philosopher's world were manifestly more than ordinary states of mind or consciousness. They had even the character of things, except that they were not such things as we see about us. Those ideas were of a matter, or substance, not seen with eyes nor felt with hands. Their substance, however, is really of much less moment than their character or meaning, just as one might say of souls that what they are really for is more important than what they are made of. The Socratic or Platonic idea, then, in value or meaning was, to use a homely metaphor, merely a nail on which to hang the fact of universality, as well as all the essential implications of it, which was so present and active in the cosmopolitanism of the time, and which Socrates made the great object of his mission. Only, being an

intellectual genius as well as a religious reformer, with the consequent thoroughness of an active, deeply searching mind, Socrates saw all things natural as well as all things human from the standpoint of universality, which is to say, from the standpoint of the "idea." The peculiar trees and stones, the peculiar natural objects of all sorts in any time, in any country, as well as the peculiar human customs and institutions, must be said to be local and temporal, to be provincial; and as these can hardly be conscious for themselves, a great thinker, broad enough and deep enough, sooner or later must become conscious for them, exactly as Socrates was conscious, not merely for the institutions of his people but for all things in their experience. Can you not imagine some olive-tree near Athens brought to the critical moment of asking what a tree truly is, just as the Greek in the city was asking what truly is a man, and with the inquiry made conscious of the opposition between itself—olives, branches, and all—and the universal nature that must embrace all trees, past present and future? Can you not imagine this at just the time when the Greek was feeling himself to be only a part, however important, in a universal humanity? Man has such a habit, as irresistible as it is effective, of reading his whole world, of seeing every thing and object in that world, in his own image, in the light of his own experience; and so at the time of Socrates, and particularly in the person of Socrates, we find man awakening to a cosmopolitanism, not merely for his own immediate human affairs, the various devices of his civilization, but also for every single object in the whole sphere of his life. As the leader, then, in that awakening, as one capable, so to speak, of thinking for the trees and the stones, for the things organic and the things inorganic, of his time, as well as for the things visibly and formally human and social, Socrates was indeed, in the simple but pregnant phrase of Grote, "an intellectual genius." Many men, overcoming a too easy provincialism, are capable of attaining to the feeling, if not to the insight, of a universal humanity; but most need a Socrates to convince them that such a feeling or such an insight pertains to the whole realm of nature. What, too, is intellectual genius, if not a human sympathy with what is not human?

Those who have read Plato's wonderful dialogues have found



him constantly representing Socrates as a seeker after the true definitions of things. What, for example, is justice? Or what is a table or a tree? And always Socrates concludes that no definition can ever be adequate to the real or full nature of anything whatsoever. It is a common saying that life is not definable; but Socrates goes farther, only carrying this notion to its legitimate outcome, insisting that not a single fact or incident of life is definable. All things are what they are. Justice is not in kindness to friends nor in care of the feeble in mind or body; it is larger and deeper than any specific relation; it is, then, really and fully, simply and comprehensively, justice. And man is not Greek nor barbarian, not friend nor foe; man is man; man, as he is to be found the whole world over and all history through. The tree is neither olive nor fir, but just nature's tree, as invisible and indefinable as it is universal and eternal. *The* tree or *the* man or *the* justice is just that invisible reality, call it what you will, force or principle or spirit or idea, in which the things visible and definite, the things provincial, live and move and have their being.

Great thoughts at first reading are likely to seem meaningless, if not positively absurd. Perhaps the reason for this is that greatness is always free from pretence. To have discovered a world, for example, in which things, being indefinable, are just what they are, are just deeply and fully themselves, to have said only that what is, is, may show a great faith, but also it seems decidedly simple-minded. Yet such simple-mindedness becomes glorified when with second thought one appreciates that the seemingly empty definitions are marks of the deepest possible reverence for reality. You are you and I am I, and no one of us would be satisfied with having his nature defined more narrowly than that. So defined, we feel in ourselves the possibilities of all things. So defined, our natures remain infinite. Any definition more specific, making you perhaps mere readers of a certain book and me only the author, would certainly compromise our true, full reality; and Socrates, an intellectual genius, widely and deeply sympathetic, revered reality with a religious reverence, and refused accordingly to compromise the reality of anything. In short, as if a great explorer, Socrates discovered a new world,

profoundly real, a world in which all things, just because invisible and indefinable, were their infinite selves—the world of the ideas. Truly, death would be gain as Socrates suggested, if it insured passage thither; and by its discovery Socrates proved himself, in the fullest sense, a missionary of the universal life.

But Plato, the poet-thinker, with his mind's senses perceived this world, the world of ideas, as probably Socrates never perceived it. Socrates believed in it; explorer that he was, he even reached its borders and led others thither; but Plato, while yet living, had the vision of it, and had the vision so clearly as to be able to portray it for all time. Doubtless Plato's training, so different from that of the humbly born Socrates, being the best that wealth and position and culture could provide, greatly supplemented his native ability for this work, making him equal to the imagination and artistic creation which such a portrayal exacted, but with Plato, as with us all, it was death that made that new world, the world of the ideas, so real, and for his mind's eye so clearly visible. In the to him peculiarly clear reality of that world to which Socrates finally passed, Plato had his answer to, his emotional as well as his intellectual consolation for, the loss of his master. Has death ever failed, after its first pain, to open men's eyes to what is not visible and to inspire their lips or their pens to what has been inexpressible?

The world of ideas, then, which Socrates discovered, was very real to Plato; it was as real or as "concrete" as a picture, or, better, as the world that you and I see when we look about us. We are accustomed to see, as we go on our way, only all sorts of particular objects and people, but Plato saw—what a vision was his!—the types or seeds, the universal realities, the infinite potentialities, of which the little things of our customary consciousness are only very uncertain reminders. Each one of those seeds or types, each one of those ideas, was as if a centre, or focus, for all the different members of its class throughout all time; and in the world of them all, in the world of those infinitely pregnant seeds, Plato walked seeing. Presumably any man might walk there, too, if he would; but walking there and seeing as Plato saw are not very common.

Today we have a name for Plato's world of the infinite seeds of all things. We call that world by no less a name than nature, although we are not commonly alive to the deepest meaning of the word. Nature, moreover, is very real and present. But Plato's real world was a world apart, a heavenly place, and it is quite pertinent to ask why? Too easy is the reply, so often accepted, that Plato was but foreshadowing a Christian view. Of course Christianity has long conceded to a few pagans such foresight, and Christian apologists have often relied on Plato as well as on other Socratic philosophers, for support of their various theses. This good old Christian reply, however, while not without point, is far from sufficient. To the question asked the direct answer must come from Plato's own experience or from the times determining that experience. Plato's doctrine was his own. His doctrine of a real world, the world of the real ideas, as a world apart, immaterial as well as sensuously invisible, was just his protest against the obstinate conventionalism of his time, the wholly degenerate conservatism, which by allowing selfish motives and jealousies to prevail, by subjecting justice to personal spite, had brought Socrates to his death. To Plato, as hinted already, the death of Socrates was but a focus, in an intimate personal relation, for conditions involving the whole fabric of the life of the time; and, to add to what has already been said of these conditions, the notorious failures of certain Athenian enterprises, notably the overwhelming disaster of the Sicilian expeditions, due to selfishness and corruption, and numerous acts, publicly scandalous, of political treachery, of impiety and of immorality, had their certain effect on Plato's mind. His own personal disappointment, too, when his hopes and efforts to establish on earth an ideal commonwealth came to naught, must have been very much like the proverbial last straw. In a word, the life of the time, both in many of its outward expressions and in its inner conditions, and Plato's own personal relations to this life, were such as to turn him, successor to Socrates as he was and genius in his own right as also he was, to a poet's idealism, to a vision of another world, to a life that, just because of its reality, could not be Athenian, or for that matter natural or earthly on any plan.

Socrates died, and almost at once Plato, his devoted pupil, also left Athens. Subsequently returning in body, not in spirit, he founded the Academy, and so effectively took philosophy and the world of philosophy out of the life of affairs, out of the streets and public places, where Socrates, the public nuisance, had for a time kept it. Then, writing those wonderful dialogues, he dramatized the master's life and teaching, presenting them, no longer in the market-place, but in a book or books, and in this manner making the way of philosophy a way of retirement from the world; and, as dialogue after dialogue appeared, as Plato's poet-thinker's genius grew into the fulness of its power, only expressing in theory what already he was practising for himself and others, he ideally constructed his real world, a world apart, the heaven of the ideas, to which Socrates had already journeyed, and in which Plato himself—such was the power of his poet's imagination—had come more and more truly and confidently to live.

Plato's vision of another world was thus more than an interesting pagan anticipation of the Christian belief in heaven. So to view it would be to make it only accidental or miraculous; a result that would neither bring credit to Plato nor deepen the truth of Christianity. It was indeed an anticipation, but also it was, as said already, Plato's own answer to, his very natural defence against, that blindly obstinate, brutally selfish, ingenious but not genuine, conservatism of his time. His other-world realism was relative to the persistent unrealism at Athens. It was, again, just his cry of victory, his triumph over the despair, deeply evident to him, of Greek civilization.

A heroic philosophy, then, a heroic, sacrificial, idealism; not shallowly sentimental, but deeply reflective; a triumphant "meditation on death"—such was the philosophy of Plato. In a separate world of ideas, of the eternal, infinitely teeming seeds or principles or spirits of all things, he found assurance when not only the death and the disaster, but also even the glitter and the brilliancy, about him suggested despair. And, more than this, as remains now to be observed, in a way not yet remarked the idealism of Plato was a triumphant reflection on death. With a meaning that will speedily appear it was triumphantly retrospective. It was

also triumphantly prophetic. The idea had been supreme once. It would be supreme again.

In the *Phaedrus* there is one of the most famous of Plato's so-called myths, and in this myth, where Plato (or Socrates) is describing the course of the souls in their chariots through the Heaven of What Verily Is, we read: "There follow . . . souls, which all do strive after that which is above, but are not able to reach unto it, and are carried around sunken beneath the face of heaven, trampling upon one another, and running against one another, and pressing on for to outstrip one another, with mighty great sound of tumult and sweat of the race; and here by reason of the unskillfulness of the charioteers, many souls are maimed, and many have their wings broken; and all, greatly travailing, depart uninitiated, not having seen That Which Is, and turn them to the food of opinion." So in effect has Plato given something very like to an account of the fall of man. The wreck of those chariots threw the souls of men from heaven to earth, from the realm of pure vision, of true knowledge, to the place of mere opinion; and, if the reader will recall how the history of a civilization is always a passing from the naïve, pure-minded life to a life of sophistication and intrigue, or say even from the spirituality of childhood to the complexity and artificiality, the sensuality and worldliness, of maturity, he will see, too, how the rise of a civilization, exactly like that of the Greeks, always must bring a fall of man. It brings a time when there is peculiar point in the thought, as expressed in at least one place, that except as men become as little children they may not enter the kingdom. Plato's ideas, then, being the direct evidence of That Which Is, were as if reminiscences from the time before the fall, from the childhood of his race. They were the pure, inarticulate spirits of all things, with which, to one looking back, the life of long ago must seem to have been informed, or by which, with the unconsciousness of a child, it must have been originally inspired and directed. Plato made much of reminiscence as a way to truth, his ideas were all native to men's minds, but lost or forgotten or obscured by the fall, and in many places he wrote of a Golden Age in the remote past; so that, in his world of ideas, as he set it out before him and made it an object of belief, one can see him

only taking as still real the high estate, the clear vision, the wise and simple life, of his people's long ago. Man ever seeks what man has lost. If only again he could be what once he was! If only he could return to that time in his past when, his vision being clear, all things were possible to him.

Accordingly memory had its share in Plato's victory. But the simple, purified, all-powerful spirit of the past, a spirit which, being informed with every one of the ideas of Plato's world, was very real, and was loaded with infinite possibilities for all things in man's experience, had another value besides its character as a comforting memory—a memory that seemed to Plato even to reach back into another world. Its very reality, when coupled with its separation or liberation from the formal life to which man had fallen and in whose subtle and alluring brilliancy man had been lost for a time, gave a peculiar confidence for the future. The long ago and the hereafter have ever been the same region and the same life. A true spirit of the past, a vital idea, any commanding ideal, is always both that which has heretofore given life its real worth—being, as upon its discovery men so often say, what really and truly they have been meaning all the time—and that which henceforth is to be lived up to. A vital idea, just like any idea in Plato's world, as it is truly freed from the restraints of form and tradition, as it is put where it can be real and not merely relative, universal and not particular, is always motive as well as memory, being a deeply appreciative projection of the broad spirit of the past into the future. Recall that Plato's ideas have already been described not only as the principles, or spirits, but also as the infinite potentials, of all things. As potentials, those ideas, being also unassailably real, were as truly earnest of the future as witnesses of the past. Recall, also, how in personal experience one's memories always both give freedom from the formal restraints of the present life and inform the life that lies before with its vital purpose. No motives are ever so impelling, so productive or creative, as life's old, old stories.

Moreover a realism, a realistic idealism, such as Plato's, though it find reality only in a separate world of ideas, cannot be wholly opposed, or negative, to what is present and manifest. In some

sense and measure the revealed hereafter must already actually move with some power in the present life. It may look askance at the form or structure of the life that is; but from the life itself, from the general spirit and intent to which the existing structure is simply become no longer adequate, it cannot hold itself wholly aloof. Indeed the more realistic, the more confident, an other-world realism such as Plato's becomes, the more it is bound to make some concessions of worth and reality to the world now and here. Similarly we have often been told that fully to believe in heaven is to believe that "now is the accepted time," that the present, not merely the long ago or the hereafter, and this world, not merely the other world, belong to it. A philosopher, too, must always regard reality as a theologian has to regard God. The real faith of the philosopher, like the faith of the theologian, is seriously compromised if its object cannot take all things, even the things that seem unreal or that seem quite unworthy, unto itself. Surely there is nothing quite so hospitable as faith, nothing so capable of compassing all things. And this need, so essential to perfect faith, of making its object hospitable to all things, gets peculiar force and worth, when the object, the reality, present to the vision, is felt to have, as Plato's ideas had, the value of a reminiscence. Though the believer's fall from reality may have been great, such a feeling gives not merely the assurance, already alluded to here, of still really and truly meaning well, but also a sense of still having something worthy to do, and—which is more—of still being able to do it. With regard, then, to that Greek life to which Plato was writing, civilizations are very like men: even at the moment of their darkest degradation they do acquire faith. Their faith, moreover, always born of memory, refuses to be merely in a separate, ideal world; for the very reality of the ideal brings it into the life of the world that here and now is, and makes it inspire this life with hope, and what is more, with a motive to renewed action and with a real power for action.

In Plato's heroic idealism, therefore, one may expect to find, what certainly one does find, that he triumphed over his pessimism; his belief dispelling despair, not by wholly excluding the conditions or causes of the latter, but by heroically taking the

latter up into the former. Perhaps Plato's triumph was not as complete as this would imply, but the ideas, although the realities of a world that stood apart, in a genuine sense were real also here and now; they were real and active at least in men's minds as always loving truth and in men's wills as always seeking reality. The souls of men "all do strive after that which is above," although "by reason of the unskilfulness of the charioteers many souls are maimed." Plato's idealism was thus at least sufficiently confident, his fiction was sufficiently superior to any visible fact, to save him from condemning this world, including Athens, to hopeless error and despair, and then setting over against it another world of sheer truth and perfection. His faith was deeper and stronger than is ever possible to any such crude dualism; and at least he went so far, besides recognizing the striving of all men, as also to teach that all the formally visible things of this world in some measure participated in the nature of the realities of the other, and that man accordingly, perceiving these things or acting with reference to them, however limited or "maimed" his vision, was still not wholly ignorant nor wholly evil. True, the things seen were but shadows of the real ideas, the eternal "principles"; but therein lay some ground of hope; and Plato firmly established the hope when he placed in earthly creatures, however fallen, that aspiration or striving to the "Heaven of What Verily Is."

That aspiration is the love, the "Platonic love," of which Plato wrote so often and so earnestly, and of which others since his day, more given to romance than to either history or philosophy, have often written so loosely. In their worldly, sensuous lives men truly are creatures of opinion and of quite superficial convention; but, very much as habit, even when judged bad, must still show devotion, though a misguided and misapplied devotion, to law and order, to uniformity and consistency, even so opinion, though false, must really love true knowledge, and convention, however hollow, must itself feel its inevitable ennui and yearn for what is real and substantial. "Love," said Plato in the *Symposium*, "is the name of our desire and pursuit for what is whole," and again, "Love is the desire of having the good always for one's own"; and while Plato summed all up with the doctrine that



philosophy is complete life, it is to be added that the love which inspired philosophy was alive, though not always well nurtured, in every man. All opinion, then, at least loves the truth; all artificiality at least craves reality; and such love or such craving saves even the life that is degenerate, giving it soul, imparting to it at least a good will, making even it real and active with the reality and activity of the ideal.

To an honest faith, evidently, to the faith of a realistic idealist like Plato, who could not but defy his own dualism, nothing here or anywhere can be so false or so bad that it is not at least potentially in touch with what is truest or what is best. A real ideal must always forgive the unideal, because in the unideal it must always detect a worship of, a striving after, itself. Even death—of Socrates or of Greek civilization, of any body or of any thing—cannot unsettle a real faith. Men may be prisoners in a cave, as the myth in the seventh book of the *Republic* would have them, but the bare fact that they can see the unsubstantial shadows of things is enough to insure them at some time their release and enlightenment.

Yet it must now be said, as has in fact been hinted already, that even Plato's faith was measured. Must we say that it was too true to the Greek spirit, and went only so far—not too far? Was it Greek moderation that held Plato to his dualism? That kept the ideal from being wholly cordial or hospitable to the real, or the real from resigning itself to the ideal? These are immoderately subtle questions perhaps; but certainly Plato was too near to the Athenian life, to the disasters and treacheries of that life, ever fully to overcome the repulsion with which it affected him. He could not forget the manner of the death of Socrates. For him the ideal world, therefore, had still to seem another world. Moreover also—although here to many may appear a hopeless paradox—in spite of that repulsion, he was too near to the almost blinding brilliancy of the Greek life about him; he was himself too good a Greek, too deeply an Athenian, not to paint his other world, the ideal of his poet's thinking, in Hellenic colors; and, painting it so, in just so far he betrayed or compromised both its reality and its presence. Nor could his doctrine of love or participation or shadows compensate for such betrayal. The real

ideal, actually present and alive even in Athens, could not have Hellenic form for the simple reason that Greek life itself, as has been shown here, was itself become Hellenic only outwardly. Inwardly it was already cosmopolitan; and the real ideal, accordingly, always bound for its reality to be hospitable without restraint, could be brought from the other world into this only as it fully identified itself with the cosmopolitan universal life.

Plato's idealism, then, was indeed realistic; but, being an aristocrat and an Athenian as well as an idealist, he never quite reached the supreme confidence. His realism fell short of the reality. Can any dualism, theological or philosophical, even while it speaks of love and aspiration, of good will and faith—always a waiting faith—ever quite compass reality? Can it ever escape being narrow, as even Plato's was Hellenic?

But Plato's idealism was said to be prophetic. It was prophetic because the ideas were not less motives than memories, and because, as real, they could not be wholly aloof from the life of this world or from actual conditions at Athens. A commanding sense of another world must always foretell the coming of some new dispensation in this world. Of what, then, in positive history was Plato a prophet? This question answered, the present study will have accomplished its purpose.

Plato was a Greek prophet—not accidental or providential, but inspired directly by the very life that had already set in among the Greeks—of the Roman Empire, of that in those days world-wide, cosmopolitan, humanly universal state, which did but make Plato's ideal materially present and real, and which undertook to carry out the compulsion that reality of an ideal always justifies. That universal life to which Athens had fallen—or risen?—which Socrates as an intellectual genius discovered and heroically revealed to his people, and which Plato portrayed with the confidence of an idealist, Rome achieved with the even more perfect faith, the supreme and spiritual realism of action.

Sometimes we are asked to take a blindly fatalistic view of history, as if nations rose and fell under the power of some force and destiny which they themselves have had no part in and can find no sanction for; but when we see a great genius like Socrates

or a great philosopher and poet like Plato so deepening his own Greek life as actually to translate it into an ideal which a conquering people subsequently fulfils, the fatalism loses its meaning. Socrates and Plato, even in the moment of death, by their acts and by their teaching quite belied fate, and made even death seem like opportunity and gain. Even the passing of Greek civilization was fulfilment, a liberation of the Greek spirit.

And, finally, in the *Republic* there is a doctrine to which special reference seems fitting, for it, too, in a way that must appeal strongly to any student of history, has the value of a prophecy of Rome. Thus Plato drew an analogy between the inner parts or phases of the individual self and the various classes of society. In the self he recognized three chief parts, appetite, will, and reason, and in society three corresponding classes, artisans, soldiers and law-makers. Similarly he might have said also that the self was a bundle of many impulses or instincts, such as the religious, the aesthetic, the intellectual, the political, and the industrial, and then have pointed out that in society there were just as many distinct classes to correspond, such as the religious class, the intellectual class, and so on. But the fact that such an analogy is drawn is more significant than the terms used to express it; for even while it made the two organizations, the individual and society, correspondent part to part, it also differentiated them in a momentous way. As belonging to the individual, the parts or instincts recognized were free and undefined, while as identified with the life of the various classes of society they were only such special developments, relative to place and time and nation, as the existing civilization had produced. In general, any distinct class in society always shows some phase or interest of our common human nature made the basis of a visible institution or profession and accordingly subjected to certain prescribed ways and laws, to a certain technique or ritual; and Plato's analogy can be appraised only with this general truth in mind. In that analogy we see man's untrammelled instincts set over against the confining institutions of a particular civilization, or man's universal nature opposed to only local and temporary embodiments of it. We see, for example, labor set over against established industries, political life against partisanship,

or religion against a reigning orthodoxy. While society was all things formally and narrowly and visibly, the individual was revealed as being all things invisibly and broadly or infinitely. But so to separate the individual from the established life of the time was to make him look beyond its local and temporal affairs to a new life, broader and deeper, in which all the old, old interests or impulses of his nature would find new embodiments, in which all the various edifices of civilization would rise, as it were, against the sky in some foreign land, on some new shore.

Of course Plato's ideas, native as these were to the mind of every man, were also terms in an analogy of the individual, not however merely to society, but to the whole complex sphere of life, to the natural as well as to the narrowly human environment. They implied such an analogy down to life's very minutest details, and they issued the same call for new life by bidding the local and particular, the visible and definite, to give way to the universal, the only passing shadows to the real and eternal. They gave to the personal individual the same superiority to whatever can pass away. But the simpler analogy of the individual's peculiarly human instincts to the various parts of a formally organized society has special interest here. In it, in its irresistible call for a new social organization that should be more imperial to human nature, one cannot fail to see, once more, the Platonic prophecy of Rome.

Did Plato himself foresee Rome? Yes and no. Plato saw the Holy City as a mirage in the sky. All in good time the freed Greek spirit, joining others on the same journey, would cross the seas to the new shore and, beholding even the great dome, enter into the life so miraculously—yet was there any miracle?—revealed to it.

An idealist, then, was Plato—a heroic idealist, confidently victorious over death; and in his idealism at once a liberator of the Greek spirit and a prophet, who, let it be specially remembered, in company with other prophets that have also meditated on death, has shown human history to be more than blind fate.

**BISHOP BUTLER AND CARDINAL NEWMAN  
ON RELIGIOUS CERTITUDE**

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Until within the memory of men little past middle life Butler's *Analogy* was a standard text-book in American Colleges, and up to 1850 it was among the books for the final examinations in the University of Oxford. Recently it has been brought into fresh prominence by the publication of Gladstone's *Subsidiary Studies*, and by the sumptuous edition of Butler's works issued by the Oxford University Press, to the preparation of which Mr. Gladstone devoted the last months of his illustrious career. Furthermore, within a short time two critical biographies of Butler have been published, one by W. Lucas Collins, Prebendary of Peterborough, and one by W. A. Spooner, Tutor of New College, Oxford, and Canon of Christ Church. The interest in Cardinal Newman is perennial, and fresh appreciations of his philosophy and of his unique personality are continually appearing.

Let us ask, What was the attitude of these representative men toward the question of religious certitude? What were the criteria which each would apply to ethical and religious data in order that they may be stamped with the mark of certitude? What tests, in their opinion, would justify the judgment that we are sure that this or that statement of religious or ethical truth is true?

An exhaustive discussion of these matters involves, of course, the fundamental problems of epistemology and metaphysics: How is knowledge possible? What is the true nature of reality? These, however, are not the realms in which either Butler or Newman moved.

Our course of thought may be conveniently outlined as follows:

- I. The doctrine of Butler's *Analogy*.
- II. The influence of this doctrine upon English theological

thought and upon the school in which Newman was trained.

III. Newman's own doctrine.

IV. The contributions of Newman and Butler toward a more comprehensive view.

## I

Throughout the *Analogy* Butler concedes that the argument for the Christian revelation is one that leads to a greater or less degree of probability on its behalf: he nowhere claims that it is demonstrative or conclusive. Of course every one admits that there is a degree of probability which gives practical certitude. Butler maintains, however, with all his vigor, that, since the preponderance of evidence is on the side of the revelation, a rational man is justified in accepting it and in acting upon it as if it were conclusive. The maxim that probability is the guide of life he fearlessly applies to belief as well as to conduct. In his *Subsidiary Studies* Mr. Gladstone repeatedly calls attention to the wisdom of Butler's counsel that, on the one hand, the amount of belief which is yielded to any conclusion must be measured by the amount and character of the evidence which can be adduced in support of it; but that, on the other hand, in all practical matters, and in religion especially, we have to content ourselves with an amount of evidence which falls far short of demonstration. It is the part of wisdom, therefore, to ascertain on which side the balance of evidence lies; then to close the case, and to act with as much courage and directness as though the evidence had actually reached the point of demonstration. The action of which Butler makes so much is not simply the performance of the deeds inculcated by religion: in many passages Butler makes it plain that he is contemplating the acceptance on the part of men of the Biblical revelation itself. According to the *Analogy*, and according to Mr. Gladstone, the disposition to determine our beliefs and our behavior by the balance of evidence is the secret of life here and of life hereafter.

Mr. Gladstone is certainly right in extolling the philosophy of the *Analogy* as an excellent discipline for the business man

and the statesman. Whether or not it is a sound religious philosophy is open to some doubt.

There is something peculiarly robust and British in this doctrine. What could be more in accord with the practical, common-sense bent of English human nature than to weigh the evidence, make up your mind, and then act as if all the evidence had been on one side? That is what the English business man and statesman have always done. Why is not the principle equally applicable to religion? The Englishman who gave attention to such matters believed that it was. Mr. Gladstone says over and over again that it is. The evidence does not give you certitude; but you have a constructive certitude by striking a balance of the evidence, closing the case, and then acting as if the evidence had been conclusive. That is the way we act in every-day affairs; that is the principle upon which law is administered; that is a sound principle in religion.

It is singular that Butler stands almost alone among the greater English writers in his failure to exert any appreciable influence upon the Continent. A German translation of the *Analogy* appeared at Leipzig in 1756, and a second translation in 1787; a French translation had practically no circulation. Mr. Gladstone notes that Zart's enumeration of the forty-eight British authors who influenced German thought in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries does not include his name.<sup>1</sup> This is the more peculiar when we recall the influence of Locke upon the French Encyclopedists, and of Hume upon Kant. The truth is that the hard, mechanical, legal view of religious matters which Butler's doctrine of Probability involves is not congenial to the modern Latin mind, nor to the Germanic temperament with its instinct for inwardness. Locke and Hume are hard enough, but an attractive personality gleams through their discussions. They are frequently dry, but they are never gritty.

The fatal objection to the constructive certitude which Butler's argument establishes is that it is not real: it is constructive. The process which Butler recommends is too much like the act of an unskilful accountant, who, unable to detect the error in his reckonings, forces a balance. When not only action but belief is in-

<sup>1</sup> Einfluss der Englischen Philosophie. Berlin, 1881.

volved in the transaction, that is just the process that the mind repudiates as illicit. We can easily close the case in an affair of behavior, and treat the preponderance of evidence as conclusive. We cannot do that in a case of belief; for the mind cannot honestly yield its assent unless it is convinced, and it cannot be convinced so long as the evidence itself is not conclusive. In religion the conviction itself is the main matter. In religion the action which does not come from a convinced mind and a spirit at peace with itself is of a meagre, prudential type, and utterly destitute of that exultant confidence and self-abandon which are the springs of Christian devotion and heroism. It is utterly impossible to imagine an ideal Christian character built upon Pascal's wager, or upon any such basis as action upon the preponderance of the evidence.

Indeed, men have no right to treat their minds as Butler's principle would suggest. It is immoral to consider insufficient evidence as sufficient. Such a course involves a wrench to the normal operations of the intellect comparable to the injury done a fine watch by throwing a wheel out of its plane. The mind cannot be forced to a belief by an act of the will. That is not what the phrase "the will to believe" means. Strictly speaking, of course, no mind can believe what it does not believe. What actually takes place in the course we are describing is that the man tampers with his own processes. Henceforth his faculties do not function properly, and all of their products come under legitimate suspicion. Many of the unveracities and self-deceptions of truly religious minds have their origin in a pressure to believe.

## II

Let us now glance at the relation of the *Analogy* to English theological thought and to the Evangelical School in which Newman was trained. The *Analogy* exercised a profound influence upon English thought. It did this in two ways. It substituted constructive for real certitude, and it restricted the so-called "evidences" to the external and formal accompaniments of Christianity.

No one can read the theological literature of England from



Hooper to Doddridge without being convinced of its pre-eminent spirituality. That is why Latimer and Baxter, Howe, Owen, Chillingworth, Jeremy Taylor, and even Laud himself, have survived. It is a great literature. The thinking is not fundamental, but within its limits it is sane, thorough, and robust. Now what was the doctrine of English theologians during this period as to the bases of Christian certitude? It found consummate expression in the article on the Bible in the Westminster Confession. Dean Stanley said<sup>2</sup> that this article and the chapters on Justification in the Decrees of Trent are the ablest creedal statements of the ages. Perhaps, however, as Professor Philip Schaff suggested,<sup>3</sup> it may be more aptly compared with the Tridentine decree on Scripture and Tradition and the Vatican decree on the dogmatic constitution of the Catholic Faith. The Westminster article reads:

We may be moved and induced by the testimony of the Church to a high and reverent esteem of the Holy Scripture; and the heavenliness of the matter, the efficacy of the doctrine, the majesty of the style, the consent of all the parts, the scope of the whole (which is to give all glory to God), the full discovery it makes of the only way of man's salvation, the many other incomparable excellencies, and the entire perfection thereof, are arguments whereby it doth abundantly evidence itself to be the Word of God; yet, notwithstanding, our full persuasion and assurance of the infallible truth and divine authority thereof is from the inward work of the Holy Spirit, bearing witness by and with the Word in our hearts.

We may notice in passing that the source of this article is Calvin's *Institutes*.<sup>4</sup> This doctrine of the Testimonium Spiritus Sancti is not only the doctrine of the Puritans, but it underlies the whole body of English religious thought from Latimer to Tillotson (1630-1694). It is not often elaborated, but it is there. In the second and third generations after the Continental reformations, theologians began to feel that the doctrine of the Testimonium afforded too much play for the subjectivity of the individual,

<sup>2</sup> Contemporary Review, 1874, p. 499.

<sup>3</sup> Creeds of Christendom, I, 767.

<sup>4</sup> Institutes, I, vii.

and they substituted for it the doctrine of the verbal inspiration of the Scripture, which came to mean the inspiration and authority of the dominant creed or theologian.

The doctrine of the Testimonium is undoubtedly a variety of mysticism; and the important thing to notice is that the early reformers, Continental and English, and the great body of English theologians down to the revolution (1688), reached certitude by the mystic path. They admitted that arguments about revelation would lead to a high persuasion as to the probability of its authority, but certitude—the full assurance beyond the shadow of a doubt—they believed came from the witness of the Holy Spirit. The theology of the eighteenth century is at a positive disadvantage compared with that of the seventeenth in its substitution of constructive for real certitude—a substitution which was in part due to the influence of Butler.

The influence of the *Analogy* was seen in another direction. A variety of forces was at work leading to an over-emphasis upon the external features of the Christian revelation. The old Arminianism of Holland, which entered England soon after the Synod of Dort and had been espoused by Archbishop Laud, placed the strongest reliance upon miracles and prophecy as the sufficient credentials of revelation. The influence of the great jurist and theologian Hugo Grotius (1583–1645) was almost wholly in this direction. The rapidly increasing vogue of the philosophy of Locke; the speculations of the English Deists; the answers elicited from such men as Leslie, Sherlock, and Conybeare; and the revolution itself which seated William and Mary on the throne, substituting for an inherent authority in the royal line the external force of the public will—all these tendencies were in the direction of making the Christian evidences purely external and formal, and the influence of the *Analogy* fell in with the popular drift and strengthened it.

In passing from Howe (1630–1705) and Doddridge (1702–1751) to Paley (1743–1805) and Blair (1718–1800), you are aware that you have entered into another latitude with another climate. The inward aspects of the Christian revelation are almost ignored. The reasoning moves in the domain of the mechanical and the outward. A comparison of that beautiful work of Doddridge on

the influence of the Spirit<sup>5</sup> with Paley's *Evidences* illustrates the change that had taken place. In the former you are brought into the realm of the responsive, passionate, beautiful life of the soul; in the latter you move in the realm of dry precedents, of the arguments of opposing counsel, and of the balance of probability.

It would be wrong to disparage the vast service the *Analogy* rendered in answering the Deists out of their own mouths; but Butler's triumph over the Deists should not blind us to the formal and unspiritual aspects of Christianity which he emphasized in the *Analogy*.

In thus characterizing the theological drift in England during the eighteenth century we must not forget that there was a remnant of the High Churchmen who were still loyal to the older theology. They are represented by William Law (1686-1761), whose beautiful life and character made a strong impression upon Gibbon,<sup>6</sup> and whose power of reasoning wins a cordial acknowledgment from Sir Leslie Stephen.<sup>7</sup> But the school of Law was only a handful. He was little more than a voice crying in the wilderness.

It was John Wesley who brought back the popular religion of England to its mystic basis. He confesses that he could gain nothing from Law. Probably there was some temperamental barrier between the two men; but what he might have received from Law he gained from his visit to Herrnhut and from the Moravian theology. Wesley's doctrine of the Witness of the Spirit brought Arminian Methodism to the platform of the Article on the Bible in the Westminster Confession.

The Evangelicals in the Church of England represent the influence of the Wesleyan movement upon the English Church. A study of the Evangelical theology as represented by Romaine, Simeon, and Scott will be apt to leave the impression that the party had the zeal and the devotion of the Wesleyans, but that its theological position had not been thought through. We should never forget that the great philanthropic and missionary move-

<sup>5</sup> Works, I, 472-590.

<sup>6</sup> The Life of Edward Gibbon, Milman Ed. p. 17.

<sup>7</sup> English Thought in the Eighteenth Century, II, 72.

ments of the nineteenth century arose within this party. It gave birth to the Anti-Slavery Society and to the Sunday School movement; to the Naval and Military (1780), and the British and Foreign Bible Societies (1804); to the London Missionary Society (1795) and the Church Missionary Societies (1799). But its good works did not save it. The fate of the Evangelical party is a conclusive demonstration of the necessity of a consistent theology if a Church would lay hold of the forces of human life. It shows that a Church has a mission to thought as well as to sentiment. It is useless to attempt to describe the theology of the Evangelical party in the English Church. It was neither Calvinist nor Arminian. It took something of Wesley's doctrine of the Witness of the Spirit, but fitfully and partially. Its attitude toward the question of certitude was that of Butler. The main reason for believing in the Christian revelation was that the balance of probability was in its favor.

This was the school in which the Tractarian leaders, Keble and Newman, were brought up. The mother of Newman was a member of the Huguenot family of Foudrinier. She herself was a moderate Calvinist, and taught her children to read the authors of the English Evangelical School such as Scott, Romaine, Newton, and Milner. Newman says: "The writer who made a deeper impression on my mind than any other, and to whom, humanly speaking, I almost owe my soul, was Thomas Scott of Astor Sanford. I so admired and delighted in his writings that when I was an undergraduate I thought of making a visit to his Parsonage, in order to see a man whom I so deeply revered." <sup>8</sup>

### III

Let us now pass to Newman's own doctrine. The Tractarian Movement has been construed from many different points of view, but, so far as Newman was concerned, it was an endeavor to find a firm basis for religious certitude. Beneath all the discussions about the Real Presence, Baptismal Regeneration, Apostolic Succession, the note of the true Church in the English Establishment, and the like, that was the real question.

<sup>8</sup> *Apologia*, p. 5.

The *Apologia* is the record of the processes of Newman's thought; the *Grammar of Assent* is his exposition of the logic of those processes. These works show that Newman reached certitude by the means of two principles, the self-evidencing power of divine truth and the action of the "illative sense."

A famous passage in the *Apologia* defines his position, and our interpretation of Newman will be largely influenced by our disposition to take this passage at its face value. He says:

Starting then with the being of God (which, as I have said, is as certain to me as the certainty of my own existence, though when I try to put the grounds of that certainty into logical shape I find a difficulty in doing so in mood and figure to my own satisfaction) I look out of myself into the world of men, and there I see a sight which fills me with unspeakable distress. The world seems to give the lie to that great truth of which my being is so full, and the effect upon me is, in consequence, as a matter of necessity, as confusing as if I denied that I am in existence myself. If I looked into a mirror and did not see my face, I should have the sort of feeling which actually comes upon me when I look into the living, busy world, and see no reflection of its Creator. . . . Were it not for this voice speaking so clearly in my conscience and in my heart, I should be an atheist or a pantheist or a polytheist when I look into the world.<sup>9</sup>

In Newman's inner life the truth of God is self-evidencing, but the external confirmations of that truth are not what he could desire. He would have the rational evidence match the intuitive persuasion. The a priori element in Newman's spiritual development was not the assumption that the Roman or the English Church was the custodian of an infallible external authority, but that somewhere there was an objective witness to God which matched his interior conviction.

There are many resemblances between Pascal and Newman, but there is one important difference. Pascal could write, "The heart has reasons which the reason knows not of." Newman could adopt the kindred motto, "Cor ad cor loquitur." But Pascal, if the fragments of his *Thoughts* reveal him correctly, could and did trust the interior conviction as Newman did not.

<sup>9</sup> *Apologia*, p. 241 f.

It may have been due to the powerful influence of the school based on Butler's *Analogy* in which he was trained, or it may have been an effect of temperament, but Newman was not content, as Pascal was, to take what external evidence he could find and accept it gratefully as a corroboration of his interior conviction: he insistently demanded that the external evidence should match the interior conviction. This it was which led him to Rome.

In many respects the *Grammar of Assent*, though the least read, is the ablest of Newman's books. It is the most carefully reasoned; its tissue is closest. It was published in 1870, in the full maturity of his powers, after long processes of reflection had clarified his mind. In 1870, no more than in 1845, is he able to believe that the logical understanding can justify the interior conviction, but he holds that the "illative sense" can at least conclusively demonstrate that the Roman Church is the perpetual witness of God in the earth. It should be noted that this doctrine of the illative sense is not an afterthought of Newman. In the *University Sermons*, delivered in his Anglican days, the doctrine is adumbrated. There it appears as "the implicit reason." There is nothing especially recondite about this theory. In a word it is this: our judgments, whether we will or no, are not wholly the product of the logical understanding, but temperamental, sentimental, experiential, and many other considerations enter into them, and rightly so. Evidence addressed to the logical understanding is not so much a test of truth as a path by which we attain access to the truth. The responses and reactions of the human spirit are also pathways to truth.

A familiar illustration may make the point clearer. In an appreciation of an eminent financier the writer says in substance: For a number of years, up to his death, I sat on the board of directors of the X. Y. Co. with Mr. A. Many times I have observed his mental processes. He would listen with absorbed attention to the statement of the facts of a given situation, but I never knew a man more impatient of an argument about the facts. After he had the facts before him and had reviewed them, he reached a conclusion; and he used to amaze the other directors by the insight, sagacity, and adequacy of his judgments. Another thing surprised me. When Mr. A. was called upon to give his

reasons for his conclusion, his argumentation was exceedingly weak. We used to say that almost any member of the board could defend Mr. A.'s policy better than the author of it.

Now what elements entered into those sagacious judgments? Formal logic hardly at all. But first there was a natural business sagacity, akin to the endowment of the artist; then large experience in dealing with similar matters; then a capacity of looking at the whole situation in the large; and then a peculiar insight into human nature, so that he could readily forecast the practicability of his policy.

In what is probably his greatest sermon—that on “Implicit and Explicit Reason”—speaking of the nature of reasoning, Newman says:

One fact may suffice for a whole theory; one principle may create and sustain a system; one minute token is a clue to a large discovery. The mind ranges to and fro, and spreads out, and advances forward with a quickness that has become a proverb, a subtilty and a versatility which baffle investigation. It passes on from point to point, gaining one by some indication; another on a probability; then availing itself of an association; then committing itself to some popular impression, or some inward instinct, or some obscure memory: and thus it makes progress not unlike a clamberer on a steep cliff who, by quick eye, prompt hand, and a sure foot, ascends, how he knows not himself, by personal endowments and by practice rather than by rule, leaving no track behind him and unable to teach another. . . . And such mainly is the way in which all men, gifted or not gifted, commonly reason,—not by rule but by an inward faculty.<sup>10</sup>

Newman calls this power which enables us to arrive at our conclusions the “illative sense.” He likens it to the sense of beauty or to the capacity for dealing with affairs. He illustrates its nature and working in the various departments of human activity. By it the lawyer or the general or the business man or statesman reaches a certitude as to his own conclusions through the response of his whole personality to the situation.

It is a fair question, How far did Newman's reasoning satisfy

<sup>10</sup> University Sermons, p. 256 f.

himself? Why did he restrict the operation of his "illative sense" to the claims of the Roman Church, and not apply it impartially to the whole round of doctrine? The truth probably is that he never really cut himself loose from the old evidential school in which he had been trained at home and in his early days at Oriel. It seems as if he could not have submitted to Rome, after all that he had written in the *Via Media*, except through the working of the views which created a parching thirst for an overwhelming objective authority.

#### IV

Let us now ask what contribution did these great thinkers make to a more comprehensive theory of certitude? Thus far, in referring to Butler, we have only considered the teaching of the *Analogy*. Butler wrote the *Analogy* against the Deists, and of course he had to meet them on their own ground, and he did not, in an apologetic directed to a certain phase of thought, expound his whole philosophy. In Butler's *Fifteen Sermons* he did work which abides. And no judgment of him is just which does not take into account the specific occasion of the *Analogy* and the doctrine of the *Sermons*. In the *Sermons* Butler regards the voice of conscience as incommensurable with the inferences from evidence. There is a trace of this doctrine in many nuances of the *Analogy*, especially in chapter viii, but in the *Sermons* it is thrown into the boldest relief. The certitude which parallels the certitude of our own existence is the sense of obligation to do right, the conviction of the authority of righteousness. Butler says, "Though a man should doubt of everything else, yet he would still remain under the nearest and most certain obligation to the practice of virtue."<sup>11</sup> The voice of conscience is like a royal invitation. Such an invitation becomes an imperial mandate; it supersedes every other engagement. The structure of human nature makes this sense of obligation its own witness. The vindication of the place and authority of conscience is Butler's superb service to theology. Principal Fairbairn holds that

<sup>11</sup> *Analogy*, II, 16, Gladstone's Edition.



Butler's doctrine of the supremacy of conscience is inconsistent with his doctrine of probability.<sup>12</sup> Perhaps Butler did not discriminate so sharply as would be well between conscience as a faculty, a function, and a product; or between conscience and the moral consciousness, or between the sense of obligation and moral law, but he laid a firm foundation for moral and religious certitude in his recognition of the nature and place of the authority of righteousness. The truth of the supremacy of conscience, or, to put it in another way, of the authority of righteousness, is at once a fact and a standard of judgment. To work out the legitimate sequences of the fact as vindicating the moral order of the cosmos, as witnessing to a supreme moral personality manifesting himself in that order, and as indicating the necessity of construing the universe in the terms of personality, is one of the most fascinating and rewardful tasks of the modern theologian. But the authority of righteousness is also a criterion of values, and we are sure of the truth of every insight that clarifies and ennobles the moral ideal.

Newman, also, made a contribution to a more comprehensive view in his doctrine of the interior conviction. Butler has hardly a word about the internal evidence of Christianity. He only refers to it to corroborate the external argument. Newman, on the contrary, makes the self-evidencing power of the truth primary, and his quest is to confirm it by external evidence. At bottom this position of Newman was a return to the doctrine of the Westminster Confession, to the doctrine of John Calvin, of John Wesley, and of Jonathan Edwards. Calvin said that "it was preposterous to attempt by discussion to rear up a full faith in Scripture." Our confidence "must be derived from a higher source than human conjectures, judgments, or reasons; namely the secret testimony of the Spirit."<sup>13</sup> The Bible approves itself by its own clear illumination. No one could surpass Calvin in his emphasis upon the self-evidencing power of the Truth. In comparison with that the authority of the Church or of external miracles is secondary. Jonathan Edwards speaks to the same intent:

<sup>12</sup> *The Place of Christ in Modern Theology*, p. 11.

<sup>13</sup> *Institutes*, I, vii, 4.

The gospel of the blessed God does not go abroad abegging for its evidence so much as some think: it has its highest and most proper evidence in itself. . . . Unless men may come to a reasonable solid persuasion of the truth of the gospel . . . by a sight of its glory, it is impossible that those who are illiterate and unacquainted with history should have any thorough and effectual conviction of it at all. . . . After all that learned men have said to them there will remain innumerable doubts on their minds: they will be ready when pinched with some great trial of faith to say: "How do I know this or that? How do I know when these histories were written? Learned men . . . tell there is equal reason to believe these facts, as any whatsoever that are related at such a distance: but how do I know that other facts which are related at such a distance ever were?"

All this has a strangely modern sound. Edwards evidently was sympathetic with many of the questions now raised in our churches and lecture-rooms. His answer was just what we might expect:

He that sees the beauty of holiness or true moral good, sees the greatest and most important thing in the world. . . . Unless this is seen nothing is seen that is worth seeing: for there is no other true excellence or beauty. Unless this be understood nothing is understood worthy the exercise of the noble faculty of understanding. This is the beauty of the Godhead, the divinity of divinity (if I may so speak), the good of the infinite fountain of good.<sup>14</sup>

In a sense this answer of the soul to spiritual realities is one with the verifications of truth imparted by the sense of the authority of righteousness, but the inward response we are now contemplating is that of the whole personality.

All thoughts, all passions, all delights,  
Whatever stirs this mortal frame,

are the agents and media of this verdict. The spirit of man becomes aware of the congruity between itself and truth, and witnesses to it. Whether this self-evidencing power of the truth is due to the structure of the soul, to the *Testimonium Spiritus*

<sup>14</sup> Edwards's Works, V, 186, Dwight's Edition.

Sancti, to the mystic endowment, or to the quality of truth, is of secondary consequence to the fact itself.

These principles of certitude are to be supplemented by a third, which both Butler and Newman recognized, as all Christian thinkers in some measure have done. In the sermons of both it underlies the discussion like the granite ledges under a New England hillside. It may be called the pragmatic sanction—the witness of experience. In the act of “doing the truth” we unseal in our own hearts a fountain of assurance. The absolute self-surrender of the personal life to the moral conviction marks the beginning of a spiritual experience which, in normal lives, is not pathological like most of the instances described in Professor James’s *Varieties of Christian Experience*, but thoroughly physiological and balanced. The normal Christian experience does not introduce fantastic spirits into the soul: it drives evil spirits thence, and leaves the man clothed and in his right mind. This moral conviction may be as to a definite act of righteousness, or as to the duty of a generic choice, or as to the claims of Jesus Christ, for even these register themselves in consciousness as a moral conviction, and there is no essential difference between the choice to tell the truth against the strong temptation to lie and yielding one’s self to the claims of Christ. The inward harmony, the confidence, the divine peace—the peace that passes understanding—which follow self-surrender to a moral conviction, are among the most impressive aspects of the inner life as it has been recorded through the ages.

In regard to the relative importance of the internal and external evidences for religious truth, Butler and Newman represent two distinct types of thought. Butler seems to stake everything on the preponderance of the evidence. Newman starts out with an irrefragable interior conviction as to God. And yet, in the authority of conscience Butler recognized a certitude that is not given by argument, and Newman, who believed so thoroughly in the interior conviction, went to Rome for an external authority. And both recognized the subtle but convincing verification of experience.

When therefore Butler and Newman are asked, In view of what principles does the normal mind come to certitude as to religious

truth? though they differ widely in their philosophy and their outlook, they appear to agree in answering that we reach religious certitude in view of the sense of the authority of righteousness; in view of the mysterious responses of the human spirit to truth, corroborated by the conclusions of the reason; and in view of the verifications of experience.

*THEOLOGY FROM THE FAR END AND THE NEAR*

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Professor James tells us that pragmatism has suddenly precipitated itself out of the air. Of absolutism the opposite is true: while not losing its definite centres of influence, it has gradually diffused itself into the air. Everywhere the tendency has been to exalt the universal and to minimize the individual; to belittle the human and to ascribe all to the divine; to emphasize the far end and to ignore the near. This absolutist atmosphere and tendency is the theme of the present article.

The absolutist types of thought are largely, if not essentially, deductive and a priori: they are drawn from a conception of the universe, and reject what does not fit that conception. Such systems have an inherent attractiveness, for they are generally large and orderly and appeal to the intellectual imagination. They carry with them an air of assurance, especially when presented in the form of the dilemma. In the last resort we seem to be shut up to one of two conclusions, one apparently impossible, the other equally inevitable. But a deeper reason for the continued influence of a priori reasonings is found in the truth they contain. The dynamic unity of the mental life precedes its elements and the analysis of them. Experience and reflection upon it imply something anterior to experience. A human mind has certain native instincts, inherent ways of dealing with experience, apart from which experience as we know it would not be possible. Thus we inevitably act upon the principle of contradiction; we behave as if we believed it long before we are able to grasp the idea. This seems to be the simplest and most fundamental aspect of the great idea of unity—an idea corresponding with an ultimate fact that works unconsciously in our life long before we grasp it as an explicit idea. Deductive arguments derive their interest and force from their bold use of such constituents of thought and the frank appeal they make to them.

These presuppositions, however, are not to take the place of a careful examination of facts, but are to guide us in dealing with experience. The history of thought makes it clear that when men try to deduce truth from necessary principles they fall into error. Fruitful results are obtained only when we keep close to observation and experience, which we interpret by the light of reason. The more religious the theologian is, the greater his need of this warning. For religion is largely rooted in the fact that men can and do pass through and beyond the details of life and reach some conviction regarding the final purpose and significance of all. A chief function of theology is to see whether such an attitude can be formally stated and justified. A theology is valuable in proportion as it unites the religious disposition of the heart and will with the most uncompromising loyalty to fact. It is not difficult to work out harmonious and beautiful schemes of the universe, but the insistent question arises, Upon what facts do they rest? Theology must be very cautious in reasoning from the infinite, and give greater attention to the humbler but more serviceable task of thinking toward it. Though it is late in the day to say that the argument, "It must be so, therefore it is so," is discredited, absolutism gives many occasions for saying it. Deductions from general ideas of universal law, infinite intelligence, or perfect goodness, must be used very sparingly. Reasonings based upon definitions, such as the contention that since the term "universe" has a certain meaning the reality must accord with it, can be given little weight in a modern theology. An understanding of the world can be had only from an investigation of it. The conceptions of the nature of ultimate reality which we from time to time formulate are valuable, and doubtless give us some knowledge of the truth, but they are not so complete and accurate as to warrant us in setting aside as unreal any of the contradictory phases of life because they do not fit our ideas of the whole. To do so is to fall into the vice to which system-making is always prone, the tendency to tyrannize over the contents of the common consciousness.

These general remarks may close with a consideration of the most important presupposition of absolutism. A chief ground and fundamental justification of its method—sometimes avowed,

often used only implicitly—is an application of the maxim of parsimony which runs thus: All investigation proceeds upon the assumption that causes and explanations are not to be unnecessarily multiplied. Reason, then, naturally seeks simplicity and unity; and absolute reality must be in accord with this method, or all our study and reasoning are useless.

This contention cannot be allowed, nor is such use of the maxim of parsimony valid. In our speculative thinking we seek not the simplest and fewest principles, but the most correct. Our concern is not with the most convenient way to handle things, but with their final nature and meaning. We do not know beforehand whether the universe is fundamentally simple or complex, and to assume that it is either is to beg the question in dispute and to close the investigation in the act of opening it. If reality be not ultimately simple, it is an error to simplify it theoretically. The initial step of absolutistic logical method is thus seen to be the work of a presupposition that seeks to dictate the character of the universe rather than to discover it, and exploits nature in the interests of a theory instead of studying her ways.

The type of thought we are considering is generally set forth as peculiarly modern. In its religious form it claims to be the only theology that fits our civilization. In estimating the truth of this claim we will be empirical and begin at the near end. What is the most characteristic thing about the development of modern civilization? Probably no one thing would be so generally named as the increasing importance and worth of the individual. To make his liberty sure; to safeguard his civil, political, and religious rights; to afford him the largest possible room for personal life and development, is a chief aim of the movements of modern life. Along with this has gone—partly as effect, partly as cause—a deepening sense of the dignity and worth of men. Do we not regard a civilization as modern or otherwise in proportion as it gives or fails to give emphasis to the worth, the dignity, the rights, and the powers of individuals? This exaltation of the individual has reached its highest expression in our English-speaking race. From the earliest glimpses we have of that race to the present day it has been distinguished by an assertion of the worth and importance of the private citizen and a sturdy use of his rights and liberties.

Much speculative monism serenely ignores or directly contradicts this feature of modern life. If modern civilization has any suggestion to offer philosophy, surely it is this sense of the value and significance of the individual. If the tendencies and principles of historical development are to mean anything for us in our attempts to frame some scheme touching the final nature of reality and the ultimate significance of life, surely the first thing they mean is that the importance of the individual, his profound significance, and his supreme worth are to be made essential elements of such a scheme. The numberless variety of men, the endless diversity of personal life, the rights and powers of individuals, are to be taken, not as hindrances to be overcome nor as puzzles to be eliminated, but as a master-key to aid in the solution of the problem. Here is a great defect in the prevalent absolutism. Whereas a modern philosophy ought to be democratic, it is monarchical. Far from being modern, it is, in its essential idea—the absolute supremacy of One—characteristically ancient and mediaeval. Its fundamental conception is better fitted to Oriental habits of mind than to our modern, Western, American civilization.

Speculative thought is slow to grasp and use the suggestions of modern civilization. There is still to appear a thinker of the first rank who will take in earnest the democratic, individualistic impulses of the modern world, and use them in a final philosophy. Leibnitz did something of this sort, so far as his realm of monads differs fundamentally from the attempts to reduce all things to the manifestations of a single reality. Lotze also has some fruitful ideas in the same vein, but nothing very important. Professor Howison's book, *The Limits of Evolution*, is made seriously defective by the author's rejection of the idea of the evolution of the soul, and his advocacy of a metaphysical theory of its eternal pre-existence. Pragmatism will probably in time lead to some positive results, but as yet it has done little for constructive thought. Unity remains the dominant idea in our thinking. And it is assumed that unity must mean the absolute rule of one being or principle. Modern life suggests a very different conception. The world is to be thought of, not as an absolute monarchy or empire, but as a commonwealth of souls, wherein all



power and right are not derived from a supreme ruler, but are lodged in the individuals comprising the community. The supreme ruler derives his right to rule, not so much from the fact that in him all souls originated, as from his purpose to regard the rights, the powers, and the welfare of all the members, to restrain and punish those who refuse to recognize the rights of others and oppose themselves to the general welfare; and from his wisdom and power, by virtue of which he is able to enforce the laws of righteousness. If our theology is to be really modern, must it not follow some such suggestion as this rather than continue to build upon monarchical conceptions? Has philosophy nothing to learn from democracy and republicanism? To the advocates of absolutism who assert that any other than their way of thinking is a survival of outgrown "dualism" it is fitting to reply that their characteristic ideas are survivals of old-world influences, conceptions carried over from times when men were unable to conceive of order and stability except under the rule of an absolute monarch before whom individuals were nothing. The real choice for us lies not between a dualism of God and devil, on the one hand, and absolutism, on the other: it is between the conception of God as an absolute ruler of individuals, devoid of any real initiative of their own, and the thought of the universe as a commonwealth or family of souls, each of whom has his rights and powers which God himself cannot ignore or override. Herein is the very heart of the problem for the modern mind.

Recently it has become evident that many absolutists see the defect of their thought touching personality, for they endeavor to amend it. The intention is clear, but its success is not. Assurances that unqualified monism is not inconsistent with personality or careless of its interests are not sufficient. Indeed their very explicitness reveals a fundamental weakness. The principle of personality must be an integral part of the whole. Mere protests and amendments do not do it justice.

Coming to a more specific theological realm, it is important to notice that the progress of theology in America, especially in New England, has been vitally connected with an increasing sense of the value of man, personality, and freedom. Among the oddities of theological nomenclature is the inappropriate though common

use of the phrase "The New England Theology." It is generally applied to a system of belief which, thought out by Calvin in Geneva, was imported into New England, and was in no way peculiar to it. The title would much more fittingly be applied to the liberal thought which, beginning in a reaction and protest against the Calvinistic doctrines of God's unlimited sovereignty and man's moral inability, found its first great exponent in Channing. This theology is a native growth; and is the natural expression in religion of the New Englander's faith in democracy and assertion of liberty. Herein is one explanation of the way in which its principles have permeated and influenced the religious life of New England. This liberal theology has, in its great representatives from Channing to Everett, taught the moral freedom and ability of men, the dignity and worth of the individual. This factor has rightly been as prominent as its doctrine of God; and Hedge thought that it should have been called "humanitarian Christianity." Likewise with a similar theology in England: Martineau, who thankfully acknowledged his indebtedness to the inspiration of Channing, made the freedom and value of the individual a central conception of his theology, and in his final exposition of his thought gave the world his *Types of Ethical Theory* in advance of the *Study of Religion*. Of late, however, there has come into liberalism a strong current of determinism and absolutism, the force of which is derived mainly from the tendencies of scientific speculation. It directly contradicts some of the most characteristic conceptions for which liberalism has stood, and its assertions of the absoluteness of God and the inability of the individual are not logically congruous with the principles of liberalism nor lineally descended from them.

Modern life, and the distinctively modern interpretation of life, have something further to tell us about the significance of the individual. By a characteristically modern interpretation of life is meant one not explicitly given by older schools, and different in essential respects from those of past ages. The really modern man regards life as an opportunity for personal achievement, a chance for him to do something with himself and his environment. Life is taken, not as a gift to be passively received nor as a problem to be solved by reflection, but as something to be acquired

by working and waiting. This emphasis upon the active, practical aspect of life constitutes an attitude different from that of the Middle Ages. With the dawn of the modern era, not independent thinking only, but active energy began to have a larger place in men's lives. Ideals of understanding the world were not merely supplemented by ideals of mastery over it: they became subordinate to them. Instead of speculating about the shape and size of the earth, men explored it to see what it might be and how to use it. This change received expression in philosophy in Kant's subordination of the pure or theoretical reason to the practical or active reason—an expression the full significance of which was not seen by Kant himself. Fichte took it up and enunciated it in some of the most inspiring teaching the world knows. Carlyle (chiefly in his earlier writings) and Emerson gave it more complete expression. These men and their utterances roused others to gird themselves, to stand up and deal with life in the power and dignity of manhood. Under such inspiration life is taken as a challenge, and men are led to be masters and creators as well as thinkers. "Trust thyself; trust the world; get something good done"—such is the teaching.

This individualism of will is one of the causes of the supremacy of the English-speaking race. It is a Frenchman who has recently called attention to it.<sup>1</sup> Anglo-Saxon superiority is due mainly to the individual energy and self-reliance of the Englishman. He does not wish society to care for him; he asks only for a fair chance. He wishes to earn his living and to make his own way. He is not afraid to face the world and to take risks. So he gets on. Spain and France each started with a better chance in America than did England. But the Frenchman, depending too much upon a central government, and the Spaniard, dreaming of gold and a fountain of youth, failed. The Englishman, self-reliant and enterprising, saw in America not a paradise of ease, but an opportunity for liberty and work. He set to work. His individual enterprise and energy made America.

Protestantism is largely rooted in this individualism of will, and we are slowly finding it out. Whereas with the Roman

<sup>1</sup>Edmond Demolins, *Anglo-Saxon Superiority*. Translated by L. B. Lavigne, 1898.

Catholic salvation is a gift to be received from the Church in return for obedience and submission, Protestantism more and more sees in salvation a fuller, higher life, to be attained by the coöperation of a man himself with God. The Church is not to provide a sure entrance into heaven after death, but to help men to a nobler character and a richer life here and now.

A specific instance of the practical result of this modern attitude may be given. After the steamship "Deutschland" made her first trip across the Atlantic, a technical journal published the tabulated statements of the working of her engines and boilers. From the fact that the engines developed, for each pound and a half of coal burned, one horse-power exerted for one hour, a calculation was made as to the increase of the world's available energy. It was shown that to develop power equal to that produced by the annual yield of coal in the United States, if used with similar results, twenty million workers would have to labor one hundred and eight years. This increase of available power has been brought about by the practical wisdom and enterprise of individual men. Yet in the name of modern thought it is gravely argued that to suppose that our human wills have any power of initiative is childish conceit! Fortunately discoverers, inventors, and leaders of enterprise do not think so. This tremendous energy lay useless, even unknown, until men who supposed they did count for something and could initiate something grappled with the apparently unpromising elements of the earth. Our wills, we are frequently told, are only tiny, meagre, and feeble manifestations of the one universal will, vain and helpless without God, and can originate nothing. That wholly apart from God we could do nothing, and would be nothing, is not here questioned. But if facts of history give any indication of the truth, many of them indicate that in important ways God is helpless apart from men. By means of irrigation men cause deserts to blossom as the rose. In modern market-gardening the farmer makes any climate and soil he desires, and gets five crops a year from one piece of ground. Mr. Burbank has in a few years outdistanced the work of thousands of years of nature—the universal life which some assure us is the absolute master of men. Electricity as a natural force is perhaps the oldest of all forms of power, but only recently has it by the

skill and toil of men been made subservient to our welfare. In this progressive subjection of nature to human welfare an eminent American economist finds a new economic basis of civilization, and tells us that we have passed out of the "pain or deficit economy," in which men had to fight a deficit, and have entered upon a "pleasure or surplus economy," in which our problem is how to distribute equitably a surplus of resources.<sup>2</sup> In substantial harmony with this is the view of a great English naturalist who sees in man "nature's insurgent son," whose appearance made a new departure in cosmic evolution, whose will has become a new ruler that has profoundly modified not only his own history but that of the whole living world and even the face of the planet<sup>3</sup> on which he lives. Are these characteristics of human life in general and modern life in particular to count for nothing in our thought? Is it reasonable to suppose that they have no ontological significance? Should we ignore the conceptions of our own civilization, and allow other ideas to direct our thinking? And if we continue to follow such a course, would it not be well to see the true character of our principles, and not confuse ourselves by calling them modern and civilized?

But, it is confidently asserted by theological absolutism, our whole conception of an orderly, systematic world makes it impossible for us to believe in individual freedom and initiative; for in a universe "there cannot be any room for independent and creative wills actually thwarting the Good Will."<sup>4</sup> If there were such, there would no longer be a universe, but only a "multiverse," and this choice between chaos and cosmos is held to be ultimate and decisive. But is our knowledge of the universe so full and exact as to warrant such confident assertions as to the possible and the impossible? No reason based upon observation and experience is given for the statement just quoted. It is offered as a self-evident truth, belief in which is compelled by the law of contradiction. Two conceptions are compared, and, being found incompatible, one is taken and the other left. For modern thought, however, the question is, What kind of a world is given in expe-

<sup>2</sup> Simon N. Patten, *The New Basis of Civilization*, 1907.

<sup>3</sup> E. Ray Lankester, *The Kingdom of Man*, 1907.

<sup>4</sup> Charles F. Dole, *The Theology of Civilization*, 1899, p. 61.

rience? The only satisfactory manner of getting light upon the great problem of the relation between human wills and the divine will is by observation of experience and reasoning from it. We must see what there is in life that throws light upon the relation of the one and the many. The neglect of absolutism to approach the problem in this way is another instance of the dominance of deductive method in its thought. Instead of careful observation and reasoning therefrom we are often given statements that have made a strong impression upon the minds of those making them. Now on every hand actual affairs furnish instances that help to a solution of the problem. A modern business establishment is planned and created mainly by the wisdom and ability of one man, without whom it would never have come into existence. Yet he alone could not have accomplished the result. He furnishes the main outlines of the business, but it is carried into execution by a small army of subordinates. To each of these is given a certain amount of discretion and power of action. Within limits each decides what is to be done, and has the decision carried out. A mistake, carelessness, or dishonesty, on the part of an assistant, injures the business, while continual care and attention, and a wise, timely move, help it. The freedom and independence of the subordinates are real though limited. The head of the house does not attempt to do everything himself, nor does he even closely direct his assistants. A university, a federal union of states or provinces, are other examples of the same thing. More interesting and instructive, because more ancient and familiar, is the family. The parents guide in a general way the family life. The children as they grow are given larger individual liberty, more and more they plan their own lives, until at last the relation between children and parents ceases to be that of governors and governed and becomes a human companionship of affection and interest. A family shows how an indwelling, overruling providence of wisdom and goodness is compatible with great liberty, independence, and initiative on the part of individuals.

These instances help us to understand both the actual and the ideal relation between the One and the Many. They show how baseless is the theory that, if there is one God, there cannot be

creative wills, capable of working with or against the supreme will. If facts of observation are to count for anything, if we are to get light upon the problem of the universe from the conduct of affairs upon earth, there can easily be independent wills capable of originating action in or out of harmony with the purposes of the supreme will.

Into the many considerations that lead us to believe that there are wills with a real though limited independence this article cannot enter. One point only will be mentioned. If men are wholly without power of initiative, if they are mere helpless, passive manifestations of one absolute will, then all the evil and sin of the world is the act of God. A Japanese woman sold her step-daughter to a man for ten yen (five dollars). If there is no human independence and initiative, then God sold the girl—and God bought her. Common sense and moral reverence forbid the thought. No vigor and rigor of logic can make such a conclusion other than odious and blasphemous. Nor can the matter be mended by using the idea of development and saying that this outrage is only a step in a process which is, on the whole, good. For either there is something of supreme worth which gives a standard of value or there is not. If there is not, the process has no moral significance. If there is, then for us it must consist in the dignity of human souls. Any degradation of souls then becomes an evil as long as it lasts. Such evil is not made better by being viewed as a stage in a development. For again, what is the final purpose and meaning of the process? It consists in the promotion of the dignity and nobleness of souls. But here is an insult put upon a soul. While it continues it is evil—evil which cannot rationally be made anything else, and ought not morally to be called anything else. A course of development that needs such wrong, or inevitably produces it, cannot be wholly divine. It is impossible to regard as the unmodified work of a righteous God a process that repeatedly destroys the highest moral values known to us. This conclusion cannot be set aside by an attempt to force a hasty and complete answer to the question, Then what is it that is not divine? The point that calls for emphasis here is that, if God is to be to us a moral being, worthy of reverence and worship, we must believe that, whatever may be the ultimate

explanation of the Japanese woman's act, it is not to be attributed to God. We are sure that truth is not to be found by flat contradictions of plain moral sense and ordinary spiritual insight. Some distinctions we must hold, even though they do not readily fit into our preconceived schemes of the universe.

If now, passing over many intermediate steps of thought, we conclude that men can and do commit wickedness, are we consequently compelled to surrender faith in divine providence? Or what is the relation between the misdeeds of men and the providence of God? It is vain to seek light here simply by working with intellectual conceptions. We must bring our ideas into contact with the realities of observation, and from the interworking of the two we may gain some truth. Instances already given show how an indwelling, overruling purpose may exist along with the freedom, the mistakes, even the wickedness of men. The manager of a department of a great business may blunder, or sell his employer's secrets to a competitor, or steal his employer's money. An injury, trivial or serious, results. The head of the establishment must be ready to repair such injuries. Probably he has at the start so limited the power of his subordinates that none of them can fatally injure the business. Evidently, then, considerable liberty may be given to individuals, and there may be much misuse of it, along with the carrying out of a supreme purpose. It is, then, sheer assumption to say that for theology to recognize the power of initiative in men is to destroy our conception of a universe and leave us with a chaos.

This, however, only establishes the possibility of a universal providence; experience alone can tell us whether there is such a providence. What then do we experience in connection with our mistakes and wrong-doing? We find offered to us opportunities of amendment and recuperation. A man sins carelessly or wilfully. He generally finds at hand some remedy for his degradation. He makes a mistake, and discovers that he can learn the lesson of it and avoid it in the future. Frequently he can do much to repair the damage wrought by his error or misdeed. We can destroy, but we can also build. We hurt and degrade ourselves by evil, but we can receive a cure. No sin seems to be final: recovery is always possible, newness of life is always to be had,



and unexpected currents of vitality continually appear: there are no signs of exhaustion. These helps and remedies, this restoration of our souls, is offered to us. We do not make them: we only receive and apply them. Our life and experience, small as they are, are in close vital connection with the whole of existence, and its inexhaustible life environs and supports us. This is the manifestation in intimate, personal experience of the moral providence of God. It has been working in the past, and it works now. Revealed close at hand for our good, it is yet so vast and deep that we cannot comprehend it. We do apprehend it and are aided by it, because it first apprehends us. This revelation of greatness as well as nearness leads the soul to make the leap of faith and to believe that there is in God a remedy for every possible mistake and misdeed of men. The field of his wisdom and goodness is larger than that of human activity, and includes all its possibilities. We may help or hinder, but we cannot destroy, the purposes of God. A victorious army is none the less triumphant because there have been shirkers and cowards in its ranks; and they are none the less blameworthy and contemptible because the army has triumphed. A man chooses whether he will have his place with the true men who fight well or among the skulkers who only hinder the victory.

When, then, the absolutist asks incredulously if a man can by the exercise of his little will interfere with the working of divine providence, the reply must be, Surely he can. The best conception we can form of such providence is that it is an attempt to gain the voluntary coöperation of individuals in the welfare of a great family. The free assent of men to a divine purpose, their consent to its laws, their willing dedication of themselves to a divine life, are the very heart of the matter. But if men can consent to such a purpose and work with it, they can also refrain from doing so either by mere neglect or deliberate refusal. Probably the vast mass of wrong-doing is at bottom heedlessness rather than intentional choice of evil. Christian theology has greatly exaggerated the element of deliberate wilfulness in sin. Men seldom intentionally choose evil as their good; they are simply careless of their diviner possibilities. But this heedlessness is sinful, and hinders the realization of God's purpose in human life. For the

best cannot be forced upon us even by God; it comes to us only when we voluntarily appropriate it. Paradoxical as it may be, it is true that it is possible for a man to have an excess of faith in God. This is undeniable on the prosaic level of common affairs, for there, if a man merely commits himself to providence and does not proceed to earn a living, providence lets him starve. It is equally true in the highest concerns of our nature. There God is hindered until and unless we work with him.

The absolutist types of thought have done a great work for theology. By going directly to the centre, dealing with the whole of existence at once, and explaining everything finite by relating it to the infinite, they have reached truth of the highest value, that will surely stand. The conception of a world-unity is so firmly established by many concurrent lines of observation and reasoning that assaults upon it are vain. Constructive thought not only may use it but must incorporate it as an essential part of its schemes. But this alone is not enough. The manifold parts and aspects of the world must be studied, and proper attention given to the interests and objects of actual life. The ultimate unity is doubtless more than these, but it certainly is not without them. It is only a dialectic prejudice that leads the absolutist system-makers to insist that we must choose between all-monism and all-pluralism. They are wholly right when they contend that the universe is a rational system, but wrong in concluding that only one kind of system is possible. The systems well known by us in experience are not so closely fitted and minutely dovetailed that variation, contingency, and free play of the parts are impossible. The facts are just the opposite; and there is a multitude of reasons for thinking that it is the same with the universal order. Philosophical theology must regard these things, and use a case method of investigation as well as the dialectical. The revelations of the telescope do not annul those of the microscope, and the latter have the greater value in the practical conduct of life. To find the truth, the short view is as necessary as the long. In a drama the characters are at least as important as the plot. Monism with its conception of the absolute and pluralism with its emphasis upon individuality are equally valuable and significant. In the clash of schools and opinions now one may be uppermost, now the

other; but neither is supreme lord of intelligence. The principle of the plurality of souls must rank with that of unity of origins. The highest unity is an ideal one, and consists not in singleness of substance or power, but in harmony of aim and endeavor. This, so far from being an eternal reality existing independently of men, is constituted by the loyalty and endeavor of individuals, apart from which it exists only as a possibility. This is at least the case with that phase of the world-unity with which we as moral beings are most concerned. A valid theology, working from the far end *and* the near, must make the pluralism of souls, the moral independence of the individual, as central and significant as the thought of God. Its scheme of thought will not be a circle drawn from one centre, but an ellipse with two foci. It will find the most important unity, not in the dominance of one will, but in the coöperation of many in a rich, varied life. Each man will be seen as a centre of activity capable of using the divine energy; God will be thought of as a Father, respecting the individuality of his children, seeking to win them to a nobler, higher life.

## SURVEY OF RECENT LITERATURE

*The Old Testament.*

## I. General.

- Old Testament and Semitic Studies in Memory of William Rainey Harper. 2 vols. 1908.  
 Gilbert, G. H., Interpretation of the Bible; a Short History. 309 pp. 1908.  
 The Programme of Modernism. 1907.  
 Knight, Theodore, Criticism and the Old Testament. 1907.  
 Roman Catholic and Protestant Bibles Compared. (Gould Prize Essays.) 2 ed. 1908.  
 Cornill, C. H., Introduction to the Canonical Books of the Old Testament. 1907.  
 Taylor, R. Bruce, Ancient Hebrew Literature. 4 vols. 1907.  
 Cheyne, T. K., Traditions and Beliefs of Ancient Israel. 1907.  
 Gordon, A. R., Early Traditions of Genesis. 1908.

The two volumes in memory of President Harper contain twenty-six papers contributed by American scholars and covering a considerable part of the Old Testament field—a fitting tribute to President Harper's activity as a teacher of the Old Testament.

*Gilbert's* popular sketch of the history of interpretation contains some good observations on the limitations which an uncritical treatment of the Old Testament puts upon exegesis itself.—The Italian reply to the Encyclical of Pius X, translated into English by Father Tyrrell, and published under the title, *The Programme of Modernism*, has a short but lucid sketch of the recent results of Old Testament criticism.—A calm and well-considered view of the critical situation is given in *Knight's* "Criticism and the Old Testament."—The three *Gould Prize Essays* furnish facts about Roman Catholic translation work not generally known to Protestant readers. The comparison made between the versions is intelligent and fair. The arrangement of the material is not so clear as it might be, and the attitude toward the Apocrypha is to be regretted. An excellent bibliography is appended.

The fifth edition of Professor *Cornill's* "Einleitung" has been translated into English in part and published thus under the title

"Introduction to the Canonical Books of the Old Testament." The English edition, as the title indicates, omits the part of the German work relating to the Apocrypha; this was done at the author's request—the Apocrypha is to be treated in a separate (German) volume by Professor Gunkel. Cornill's work agrees in general in method and results with Driver's well-known Introduction, differing from it partly in being less statistical in form, and partly in taking a more advanced position in regard to the date and origin of certain portions of the Old Testament. It may be recommended as an excellent guide in the study of the Old Hebrew literary history.

Canon *Cheyne*, in his "Traditions and Beliefs," cites a large mass of suggestive material from Babylonian and other records and from folk-lore; but the value of his construction of this material is diminished by the nature of the theories to which he has lately committed himself.—Alongside of this work may be mentioned *Gordon's* "Early Traditions of Genesis," a conservative survey of the field.

A convenient edition of the Bible is *Taylor's* "Ancient Hebrew Literature," which in four volumes gives the Old Testament, the Apocrypha, and the New Testament, the matter being arranged by topics.

## II. Interpretation.

Briggs, C. A., *The Book of Psalms*. (International Critical Commentary.) Vol. II. 572 pp. 1907.

Barton, G. A., *The Book of Ecclesiastes*. (International Critical Commentary.) xiv + 212 pp. 1908.

Streane, A. W., *E Esther*. (Cambridge Bible for Schools and Colleges.) 1907.

The second volume of Professor *Briggs's* "Psalms" completes his work on the Psalter. This volume, like the first (which has been widely noticed in critical journals), contains a wealth of exegetical and critical material with much helpful reflection. Dr. Briggs here reaffirms his position respecting the dates of the psalms, the methods of the editors, and the nature of the metrical forms; the subject is a difficult one, and there is room for difference of opinion on many of the points involved.

In the Introduction to his "Ecclesiastes" Professor *Barton* gives a thoughtful criticism of the various views of this somewhat enigmatical book that have lately been expressed. In general he has avoided the extreme positions of some recent scholars; his own position may be described as liberal conservative. In agreement with Nöldeke and McNeile he assigns the book to about the year 200 B.C., on the ground that it is quoted in Ben Sira (Ecclesiasticus), the date of which is about 180 B.C. He recognizes interpolations by only two editors, the one orthodox, who corrects the author's heresies, the other a sage who is devoted to wisdom. He rejects the view that the book is affected by Greek thought and that it is metrical in form; the alleged Epicureanism of 9 7-9 he finds in a Babylonian fragment of about 2000 B.C. These positions, all of them debatable, are defended with marked ability. The commentary is clear and helpful. It is satisfactory to see that he retains the Masoretic text of the first clause of chap. 12 ("Remember thy creator in the days of thy youth"), which, however, he properly regards as an editorial interpolation.

Dr. A. W. *Streane's* "Esther" has useful annotations; its critical position is unduly conservative.

### III. *History.*

- Grant, Elihu, *Peasantry of Palestine*. 1907.  
 Montgomery, J. A., *The Samaritans*. 1907.  
 Meyer, M. A., *Gaza*. 1907.  
 Gregg, David, *Between the Testaments*. 1907.  
 Toffteen, O. A., *Ancient Chronology, I*. 1907.

In *Anthropological Essays*, a collection of papers presented to Dr. E. B. Tylor in honor of his seventy-fifth birthday, Dr. J. G. Frazer, in a paper entitled "Folk-lore in the Old Testament," discusses a number of passages with great learning and freshness, though his conclusions are not in all cases satisfactory.—Customs and ideas in the Orient are persistent, and the description of manners given by *Grant* in his "Peasantry of Palestine" helps to reconstruct the old Hebrew life.

Professor *Montgomery's* "Samaritans" gives the best account of the history and religious opinions of this people that has yet

been published. The part of the book relating to Old Testament times deals with the facts in accordance with sound methods of historical investigation. The Samaritans are said to have been substantially a Jewish sect; Sanballat is regarded (against Josephus) as a contemporary of Nehemiah; and Isaiah 66 is not interpreted as a reference to the Samaritan temple.

Dr. M. A. *Meyer's* "Gaza" is a valuable contribution to our historical material. It substantially reproduces Stark, and adds the results of recent investigations.—Rev. David *Gregg's* popular sketch of the interbiblical history is useful, though critically vague.

It cannot be said that Professor *Toftteen* has advanced our knowledge of the early Hebrew history by the discussions in his "Chronology"; his bold conjectures are without historical support. The treatment of Old Testament chronology, however, occupies only a small part of the volume.

#### IV. *Religion.*

- Bousset, W., *What is Religion?* 1907.  
 Marti, K., *The Religion of the Old Testament.* 1907.  
 Workman, G. L., *The Servant of Jehovah.* 1907.  
 Kent, C. F., *Israel's Laws and Legal Precedents.* 1907.  
 Terry, M. S., *Biblical Dogmatics.* 1907.

An instructive comparison of the Old Testament religion with other religions is given in Professor Bousset's "What is Religion?" an attractively written book.—"The Religion of the Old Testament" is the translation of Professor K. *Marti's* well-known work on the subject; he is sometimes over-conservative, but always full and suggestive.—Professor *Workman's* "Servant of Jehovah" is a scholarly and helpful study of a question that has perpetual interest for students of the Old Testament.—An admirable guide in the study of Hebrew law is *Kent's* "Israel's Laws and Legal Precedents." The material is arranged in general chronological order, with foot-notes and a critical introduction.

In his "Biblical Dogmatics" Professor *Terry* treats the Old Testament as an independent book and lets it speak for itself, not attempting to import into it New Testament ideas. He dis-

cards the terms "inerrancy" and "infallibility" (for the Bible teaching) as contrary to fact, but maintains the "sufficiency" of the Scriptures as a guide to the knowledge of God. The Old Testament he regards as standing in general on a lower ethical and religious plane than that of the New Testament; it is to be regarded, he holds, as an incomplete revelation, a preparation for the full truth of the Christian Scriptures. He frankly adopts modern critical principles and results in the treatment of the Old Testament. The volume is characterized by a clear arrangement of the material and a refreshing directness in the statement and interpretation of the Biblical texts.

C. H. TOY.

*The New Testament.*

I. *General.*

- Hastings, James, *A Dictionary of Christ and the Gospels*. 2 vols. 1906-1908.
- Sanders, H. A., "Four Newly Discovered Biblical Manuscripts," *Biblical World*, February, 1908, pp. 138-142; E. J. Goodspeed, "The Detroit Manuscripts of the Septuagint and New Testament," *Biblical World*, March, 1908, pp. 218-226.
- Grenfell, B. P., and A. S. Hunt, *Fragment of an Uncanonical Gospel from Oxyrhynchus*. 22 pp. 1908.
- Buchanan, E. S., *The Four Gospels from the Codex Corbeiensis (ff [7a]); together with Fragments of the Catholic Epistles, of the Acts, and of the Apocalypse from the Fleury Palimpsest (h)*. (Old Latin Biblical Texts.)
- Deissmann, Adolf, *New Light on the New Testament, from Records of the Graeco-Roman Period*. x + 128 pp. 1907.
- Gregory, C. R., *Canon and Text of the New Testament*. (International Theological Library.) 559 pp. 1907.
- Ferris, G. H., *The Formation of the New Testament*. 281 pp. Philadelphia. 1907.
- Abbott, E. A., *Notes on New Testament Criticism*. (Diatessarica, Part vii.) xxx + 513 pp. 1907.

*Hastings's Dictionary of Christ and the Gospels* is intended as an aid to preachers, and besides the usual archaeological, critical, and theological articles on subjects connected with the Gospels, "every aspect of modern life, in so far as it touches or is touched by Christ, is described under its proper title," in an enormous number of brief articles, such as "Abiding," "Above and Below," "Accommodation," "Poet," "Fact and Theory." Many of the articles are good and suggestive, and such short discussions of fragmentary topics may prove valuable to many persons. Some of the longer articles also are excellent, but for purposes of serious



study a complete Bible Dictionary and good handbooks to the several departments of New Testament learning are better guides.

The Biblical manuscripts of Mr. *Freer* of Detroit are a valuable addition to the materials of textual criticism. The ms. of the Gospels (uncial and very ancient) contains after Mark 16 14 the Greek of an interesting additional passage already partly known in Latin from a reference by St. Jerome. The text of Matthew is not of the type of  $\aleph$  B.

From the Oxyrhynchus excavations comes a parchment fragment of the fourth century, containing two hundred words from an *apocryphal gospel*, and giving part of a controversial conversation between "the Saviour" and "a certain Pharisee, a chief priest, named Levi," on the subject of outward and inner purification. The matter can have no claim to historical trustworthiness. To what apocryphal gospel it belongs cannot be determined.

English scholars continue their punctiliously accurate publication of texts with the Old Latin version of parts of the New Testament found in *Codex Corbeiensis* and the Fleury Palimpsest.

*Deissmann's* book is a popular and very interesting account of the gain to an understanding of the New Testament from the increasing knowledge of the contemporary language and prevalent ideas of the Greek World. He describes and illustrates how philological and literary interpretation, and also the comprehension of the religion of the New Testament, are all aided by the study of the newly discovered inscriptions, papyri, and inscribed potsherds. The profounder theological and historical lessons of his discussion will not be overlooked by the thoughtful reader.

*Gregory's* thick and instructive book on the Canon and Text of the New Testament is intended for continuous reading rather than merely for reference. It contains an exposition of the history of the use and collection of the New Testament writings, with the evidence from ancient writers translated in full, and will give a good idea of the innumerable problems, as well as of the now well-established conclusions, relating to the general progress

of the history. The latter half of the volume presents a clear and even entertaining statement from a great textual scholar of the facts of textual criticism, and gives the best account available of Westcott and Hort's epoch-making theory of the history of the New Testament text.—*Ferris's* small but vigorous book is admirably adapted to give the general reader a trustworthy idea of the history of the Canon.—*Abbott's* "Notes" are on many topics, and mainly a collection of material for the technical scholar.

## II. *Gospels and Acts.*

Allen, W. C., *A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Gospel according to S. Matthew.* (International Critical Commentary.) xcvi + 338 pp. 1907.

Harnack, Adolf, *Luke the Physician.* (Crown Theological Library.) xii + 231 pp. 1907.

Harnack, Adolf, *The Sayings of Jesus; the Second Source of St. Matthew and St. Luke.* (Crown Theological Library.) xvi + 316 pp. 1908.

Salmon, George, *The Human Element in the Gospels; a Commentary on the Synoptic Narrative.* xxiv + 550 pp. 1907.

Wernle, Paul, *The Sources of our Knowledge of the Life of Jesus.* xii + 163 pp. 1907.

Forbes, H. P., *The Johannine Literature and the Acts of the Apostles.* (International Handbooks to the New Testament.) viii + 375 pp. 1907.

Important are the books by Allen and Harnack. *Allen*, in his *Commentary on Matthew*, has limited himself to the attempt to make clear what is characteristic of and peculiar to that Gospel, and to show how the author used his sources, and what meaning the sayings of Jesus "had in the mind of the Evangelist when he placed them in their present position in his Gospel." This has produced a work of great value to every serious student of the Gospels, but not such a general reference-book on the life and teaching of Christ and on historical criticism as commentaries on Matthew have usually been. This division of the field is a gain both for the quality of the book and for its influence on the reader's point of view. For broader discussion one must go elsewhere; to know the Gospel of Matthew this is one of the best aids in existence.

Allen holds that the sources of the first Gospel were Mark, the "Logia" of Matthew, and other materials; he strongly controverts the view that the common material of the first and third

Gospels came from one common source, and argues that the early documents must have been much more complicated than is often assumed. His introduction is a noteworthy contribution to Synoptic criticism.

*Harnack's* two important monographs are characteristically illuminating, effective, and stimulative to reflection. In "Luke" he urges that the author of the third Gospel and the Acts was Paul's "beloved physician," a view which is rejected by many critical scholars, but seems likely to make gratifying progress through Harnack's new advocacy and skilful presentation of the evidence. If it is adopted, it is, in Harnack's judgment, necessary to admit that Luke, although a contemporary, was sometimes not a perfectly well-informed historian, and sometimes worked up meagre materials into an elaborate narrative, and that, although a physician, he did not stand on the level of modern science. Some critics of Harnack's view would find a study of the great Greek physician Galen instructive.

"The Sayings of Jesus" is an investigation of the "Logia" or "second source" of Matthew and Luke. Harnack believes that there was such a source, originally written perhaps by Matthew in Aramaic, in Palestine, before the destruction of Jerusalem, and somewhat more ancient than Mark. Its contents and form can be approximately determined. "The influence of 'Paulinism,' which is so strong in St. Mark, is entirely wanting." That the conception of the personality of Jesus furnished by this source is homogeneous and characteristic is one of the chief proofs that the analysis is correct. Harnack's book is sure to lead to further inquiry by the same method. If an assured result could be attained here, the foundations of confidence in our knowledge of the life and teachings of Jesus would be distinctly increased; for that confidence must mainly rest on our attitude to the Gospel of Mark and to the body of Sayings discussed by Harnack. Any contribution to our knowledge of either is of vital significance.

*Salmon's* posthumous volume is a detailed commentary on the parallels of the Synoptic Gospels. Its greatest interest lies in the revelation here made of how Salmon's later thought had travelled

from the strongly argued views of his "Introduction" (1885) to an acceptance of current critical views of the Synoptic problem, and even to the tentative belief that the Fourth Gospel is the work only of a disciple of the Apostle John.

In *Wernle's* little book the general reader will find a well executed presentation of the differences between the Synoptics and John, and a simple form of the modern theory of the two sources of the Synoptic Gospels.

*Forbes's* commentary on the Johannine Literature and the Acts completes the "International Handbooks to the New Testament." The English text is the basis of brief, but careful, open-minded, and well-informed notes, from the point of view of thorough-going, but not unsympathetic, criticism.

### III. *Life of Christ.*

Sanday, William, *The Life of Christ in Recent Research.* viii + 328 pp. 1907.

Bennett, W. H., *The Life of Christ according to St. Mark.* xii + 295 pp. 1907.

Robertson, A. T., *Epochs in the Life of Jesus; a Study of Development and Struggle in the Messiah's Work.* xii + 192 pp. 1908.

Garvie, A. E., *Studies in the Inner Life of Jesus.* xii + 545 pp. 1907.

Schmiedel, Paul, *Jesus in Modern Criticism.* 91 pp. 1907.

Orr, James, *The Virgin Birth of Christ.* xiv + 301 pp. 1907.

Swete, H. B., *The Appearances of our Lord after the Passion; a Study in the Earliest Christian Tradition.* xviii + 151 pp. 1907.

Lake, Kirsopp, *The Historical Evidence for the Resurrection of Jesus Christ.* (Crown Theological Library.) viii + 291 pp. 1907.

*Sanday* has collected a number of lectures and essays into a highly suggestive and delightful volume. It is the best source in English for information about recent German study of the apocalyptic element in Jesus' teaching. The book has significance also in showing the tendencies of Dr. Sanday's own later thought.

*Bennett's* and *Robertson's* books on the life of Christ are reverent and thoughtful studies, each with its own method; but are of popular usefulness rather than scientific contributions.—*Garvie's* is a far more substantial piece of work, being an elaborate study of the life, and especially of the thought and character—and so

of the person—of Jesus Christ, from the point of view of a theologian. Garvie has made a significant addition to the literature of the life of Jesus.

*Schmiedel's* address, although from a wholly unorthodox point of view, is positive and constructive, and exhibits in use the rules of criticism which he laid down in his much-discussed article in the *Encyclopaedia Biblica*. He "maintains the truth of much that others reject."

In a series of apologetic lectures written from strong conservative conviction, *Orr* discusses methodically the narratives of the virgin birth, the evidence from the other writings of the New Testament and from the early Church, and the Old Testament prophecies, and treats of its doctrinal bearing on the sinlessness and uniqueness of Jesus and on the incarnation.

*Swete* follows carefully and reverently the various narratives of the resurrection appearances, and considers their relation without formal discussion of objections.—*Lake* examines elaborately the several texts, and has chapters on "the reconstruction of the earliest tradition" and "the facts behind the earliest tradition." His view is that Paul must be the starting-point, and that the appearances were "objective visions."

#### IV. *Epistles and Apostolic Age.*

Milligan, George, *St. Paul's Epistles to the Thessalonians; the Greek Text with Introduction and Notes.* cx + 195 pp. 1908.

Mayor, J. B., *The Epistle of St. Jude and the Second Epistle of St. Peter; Greek Text with Introduction, Notes, and Comments.* ccii + 239 pp. 1907.

Du Bose, W. P., *The Gospel according to St. Paul.* viii + 303 pp. 1907.

The Fifth Gospel, being the Pauline Interpretation of the Christ. By the author of "The Faith of a Christian." xii + 223 pp. 1907.

Wrede, W., *Paul.* xvi + 183 pp. 1907.

Scott, E. F., *The Apologetic of the New Testament.* (Crown Theological Library.) viii + 258 pp. 1907.

*Milligan's* admirable, scholarly, and well-proportioned commentary on Thessalonians worthily fills the empty place in Light-foot's projected series. The author has used the most recent sources, such as the papyri, to illustrate Paul's language and ideas, and one of his long notes is devoted to "St. Paul as a letter-writer,"

with striking parallels from contemporary Greek private correspondence found in Egypt.

*Mayor* has written a full and important commentary on Jude and 2 Peter, similar in method and scale to his exhaustive commentary on James. He holds to the now generally adopted view that 2 Peter is partly drawn from Jude and is not genuine. Jude he thinks to be genuine.

*Du Bose* and the author of *The Fifth Gospel* have both given compact and readable presentations of the Pauline system of Christian thought. The former writes as a theologian, using modern language and aiming to depict Paul's main ideas as theological truth. The latter author tries rather by a sympathetic psychology to understand the working of Paul's mind, to "follow him into his soul's laboratory, and see him at work on his own experiments."

*Wrede's* rapid and effective sketch of the life and ideas of Paul is from a different point of view from either of the two just mentioned. His original and pointed utterances are full of suggestion and stimulus, whether they call out agreement or dissent. He emphasizes the conception that Paul was not the theological expounder and successor of Jesus, but as a second founder of Christianity remoulded the new religion and established it as a religion of redemption.

*Scott* traces in seven lectures the apologetic element in the various books of the New Testament and shows its influence on the forms and development of nascent Christian theology.

J. H. ROPES.

## BOOKS RECEIVED

- THE AGE OF REVOLUTION (1648-1815).** *By W. H. Hutton.* 8vo, pp. 301. New York: The Macmillan Company. 1908. \$1.50 net.
- THE ATONING LIFE.** *By H. S. Nash.* 12mo, pp. 148. New York: The Macmillan Company. 1908. \$1.00 net.
- THE NEARER AND FARTHER EAST.** *By Samuel M. Zwemer and Arthur J. Brown.* 8vo, pp. 325. New York: The Macmillan Company. 1908. .50 net.
- THE PHILOSOPHY OF LOYALTY.** *By Josiah Royce.* 8vo, pp. 12+409. New York: The Macmillan Company. 1908. \$1.50 net.
- FAITH IN MAN.** *By Gustav Spiller.* 8vo, pp. 190. New York: The Macmillan Company. 1908. \$1.75 net.
- ANGLICAN LIBERALISM.** *By Hubert Handley.* 8vo, pp. 312. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons. 1908. \$1.50 net.
- HINTS ON OLD TESTAMENT THEOLOGY.** *By Archibald Duff.* 8vo, pp. 187. London: Adam and Charles Black. 1908.
- WESTERN ASIA IN THE DAYS OF SARGON OF ASSYRIA, 722-705 B.C.** *By A. T. Olmstead.* 8vo, pp. 6+192. New York: Henry Holt & Company. 1908.
- BIBLICAL DOGMATICS; AN EXPOSITION OF THE PRINCIPAL DOCTRINES OF THE HOLY SCRIPTURES.** *By Milton S. Terry.* 8vo, pp. 18+608. New York: Eaton & Mains. 1908. \$3.50 net.
- TALKS ON RELIGION.** *By Henry Bedinger Mitchell.* 8vo, pp. 8+325. New York: Longmans, Green and Co. 1908. \$3.00 net.
- THE JAPANESE NATION IN EVOLUTION.** *By William E. Griffis.* 8vo, pp. 8+408. New York: Thomas Y. Crowell & Co. 1907.
- THE CHRISTIAN FAITH AND THE OLD TESTAMENT.** *By John M. Thomas.* 8vo, pp. 10+133. New York: Thomas Y. Crowell & Co. 1908. \$1.00 net.
- THE CHURCH OF TO-DAY.** *By Joseph Henry Crooker.* 8vo, pp. 177. Boston: American Unitarian Association. 1908. .75 net.

**THE DOCTRINE OF MODERNISM AND ITS REFUTATION.** *By J. Godrycz.* 12mo, pp. 132. Philadelphia: John Joseph McVey. 1908. .75 net.

**THE INFINITE AFFECTION.** *By Charles S. Macfarland.* 12mo, pp. 174. Boston: The Pilgrim Press. 1907.

**THE STORY OF THE REVISED NEW TESTAMENT,** *By Matthew Brown Riddle.* 12mo, pp. 89. Philadelphia: The Sunday School Times Company. 1908. .75 net.

**PAUL THE MYSTIC; A STUDY IN APOSTOLIC EXPERIENCE.** *By James M. Campbell.* 12mo, pp. 6+285. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons. 1908. \$1.50 net.





# HARVARD THEOLOGICAL REVIEW

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## *CALVIN'S PROGRAMME FOR A PURITAN STATE IN GENEVA, 1536-1541*

HERBERT DARLING FOSTER

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In 1559, the little republic of Geneva was menaced by its former viceroy, the Catholic Duke of Savoy, who had been restored to his hereditary domains by the treaty of Cateau Cambrésis and had begun to take steps to recover the rights which he claimed over Geneva. The Duke's ambassador gave fair words, but a Genevan councillor declined his offer in this Puritan response, "For the sovereignty of God and the Word of God we will hazard our lives." The council promptly voted "to recommend themselves to God and to keep good watch."<sup>1</sup> The response of the councillor and the vote of the council reveal the characteristics bred by twenty-three years of Calvin's programme for a Puritan state in Geneva. A sense of a moral obligation to "hazard life for the sovereignty of God and the Word of God," a quiet trust in God, intelligent preparations for a vigorous defence of God-given liberties through practical human means—these are characteristics of the Puritan. Where he was able to organize the state on these principles, he built up a series of Biblical commonwealths, or Puritan states, Geneva under Calvin and Beza, Scotland under Knox and Melville, the England of Cromwell and Milton, and the Puritan colonies of New England.

The Puritan state was not confined to one people, speech, or region. It won its first triumph among the cosmopolitan popula-

<sup>1</sup> A. Roget, *Histoire du peuple de Genève*, VI, 2-3 (Geneva, 6 vols., 1870-1881).

tion of Geneva, and recruited itself there through exiles for conscience' sake from all lands. It dominated for a time the national life of England and Scotland. Successfully transplanted across the Atlantic, the Puritan state exercised an even more comprehensive and permanent control over a great part of the American colonies. Most, if not all, of its essential characteristics found expression in Holland. France extruded her Puritan stock, but it was a Frenchman who made Puritanism possible in other lands; and the exiled Huguenots impregnated still further with Puritanism those states that ultimately triumphed over France. In all these countries a certain kind of people had their innate moral earnestness moulded by a Hebrew hunger and thirst for righteousness and a French love for logical completeness into a new type, the Puritan. This kind of people thus moulded was able to dominate the national life in Geneva, England, Scotland, and New England, and so to found a new type of state. This Puritan state can be best understood, first, by a historical study of its development in each land, and, second, by a comparative study of the common characteristics and the individual peculiarities of the various states. Any comprehensive definition of the Puritan state should follow such a historical and comparative study. A general idea of the new type of state may be suggested through the figure already used. The Puritan state of Geneva or Massachusetts Bay differed from the ordinary Protestant state as the moulded and tempered steel differs from the iron which went into the blasting furnace. The iron is the basis of the steel, but it has received new ingredients and a new temper, and has been moulded into a different shape. Or, again, the Puritan state differs from the Protestant state somewhat as the Jesuit differs from the ordinary Roman Catholic. The Puritan and the Jesuit are examples of a faith carried to its logical limit with marvellous loyalty and enthusiasm; each is the epitome of a church militant acting on the offensive rather than waiting to act on the defensive.

The earliest programme for a Puritan state is to be found in the first edition of the *Institutes of the Christian Religion*, completed by John Calvin in 1535 and printed at Basel in 1536. Within the next five years the essentials of the *Institutes* were restated in four other documents adopted by the Genevan state;

and in 1552 the *Institutes* were declared by the Genevan council "to be well and truly made, and their doctrine to be the holy doctrine of God."<sup>2</sup> In these five documents, from 1536 to 1541, the formative programme of the first Puritan state may be historically traced.

The first edition of Calvin's *Institutes* was a little handbook of 514 pages of small octavo, which could be slipped into the pocket. It was written and printed at a time when Francis I had decided on the policy of forcible repression of the "Lutherans" within the kingdom of France. "The occasion of my publishing the *Institutes*," wrote Calvin, twenty years later, "was this: first, that I might wipe off a foul affront from my brethren, whose death was precious in the sight of the Lord; and, secondly, that, as the same sufferings were impending over many others, at least some interest and sympathy for them might be excited in foreign nations."<sup>3</sup> It was at once an *apologia*, a confession of faith, a handbook of theology, and a programme. It contained the premises, though not all the conclusions, of the later editions. All the later editions are less simple, more controversial in their theology, and less winning than the first, and they omit some of its gentler portions. The first edition is divided into six chapters, on the Commandments, the Apostles' Creed, the Lord's Prayer, the two true and the five false sacraments, with a final chapter "on Christian liberty, ecclesiastical power, and civil government." The striking enlargements in the later editions are in the treatment of such topics as the knowledge of God, the fall of man, predestination, the officers and discipline of the church, and the history of the papacy. The treatment of the church and its function was in-

<sup>2</sup> *Registres du Conseil*, 9 Nov. 1552, fol. 301; quoted by Choisy, *La théocratie à Genève au temps de Calvin*—a luminous discussion of the subject, based on careful study of the documents. The standard edition of Calvin's Works (cited throughout this article as *Opera*) was edited by Baum, Cunitz, and Reus (Brunswick, 1863-1900), in 59 quarto volumes. The *Institutes* are in vols. I-IV. A valuable synopsis, which enables one to compare the matter in the various editions, is in vol. I, pp. l-lviii. The comparison is further aided by the use of different type to illustrate the additions made in the successive editions from 1536 to 1559.

<sup>3</sup> *Opera*, XXXI, 23-24, in the Preface to Psalms. Translation in Beveridge, *Calvin's Institutes*, I, p. ix, and in *Comm. on Psalms*, I, p. xi.

creased eightfold in the definitive edition of 1559, while the whole book was increased but fivefold. The fall of man, original sin, the loss of freedom of the will, are increased from two pages in the first to eighty-two in the final edition; while the treatment of civil government is increased by only six pages, and the prefatory address to Francis I is even less changed.

It was but natural, as the book became less of an *apologia* and more a handbook of theology, that the sections dealing with doctrine should be most largely increased. The things that impress a modern reader in comparing the successive editions are, first, Calvin's growing belief in a more representative form of government in church and state; and, second, the unflinching way in which he deduces startling but entirely logical conclusions from his premises.

In the first edition of the *Institutes* Calvin did not attempt to differentiate between bishop and presbyter, but called them both indifferently ministers.<sup>4</sup> The conception of elders as lay officers and the definition of their function occur first in the edition of 1543, two years after the actual introduction of elders into Geneva.<sup>5</sup> Similarly, it was after seven years of practical experience with the governments of Geneva and Strasburg that Calvin modified his original declaration of 1536 in favor of aristocracy as the most desirable form of government. In the edition of 1543 he advocated as the best form "either aristocracy or aristocracy tempered with democracy."<sup>6</sup>

A striking illustration of his unshrinking deduction of conclusion from premise is his teaching of double predestination. The first edition of the *Institutes* does not contain any mention of predestination or any explicit teaching of double predestination. The doctrine of election as expounded in the first edition was no new thing, but rather an exposition of the teaching of St. John, St. Paul, and St. Augustine. A modern mind familiar with Calvin's later teaching might deduce double predestination from a phrase in the discussion of Providence; but Calvin certainly did not

<sup>4</sup> Opera, I, 186: *Episcopos et presbyter, promiscue voco ecclesiae ministros. Ordo, est ipsa vocatio.*

<sup>5</sup> Ibid. I, 587.

<sup>6</sup> Cf. Opera, I, 232 with I, 1105, and with the French edition, IV, 1134.

give the doctrine explicit expression in his first edition. Bretschneider failed to find predestination there, while Kampschulte and Schaff did find it.<sup>7</sup> No one, however, after reading the first edition would maintain that the idea of double predestination, if held at all, was either a starting-point or a point of essential importance in Calvin's thought in 1536. Whatever the interpretation of a dubious phrase may be, it is quite clear that Calvin started, not with double predestination, but with the twin premises of the absolute sovereignty of God and the authority of the Word of God. But the predestination of the damned as well as the saved was so logical a deduction from his belief in a biblical teaching of damnation and in a God of absolute sovereignty, "without whom nothing comes to pass," that a man of Calvin's logical and unshrinking temper was bound to draw the conclusion. Therefore in the second edition of the *Institutes*, published in 1539, he did not shrink from this startling but logical deduction. "In conformity therefore to the clear doctrine of Scripture we assert that, by an eternal and immutable counsel, God has once for all determined both whom he would admit to salvation and whom he would condemn to destruction."<sup>8</sup> This, it should be remembered, first appeared in 1539, and had not been stated in the first edition of the *Institutes* nor during Calvin's first stay in Geneva. Double predestination later proved a convenient theological earmark by which to recognize Calvinists. It should however be noted that it is a deduction from more essential premises, namely, "the sovereignty of God and the Word of God." That it is a deduction rather than a premise appears when one considers the logic of Calvin's thought. That it is not the historic starting-point is clear from an examination of the documents in their chronological order. Calvin's ultimate contribution lay not so much in the

<sup>7</sup> Bretschneider, *Reformationsalmanach*, 1821, p. 76; Kampschulte, *Calvin*, I, 256, note 1; Schaff, *Creeds of Christendom*, p. 448.

<sup>8</sup> Opera, I, 861 (ed. of 1539): *Hominum alii ad salutem, alii ad damnationem praedestinantur . . . aeterna quoque rerum omnium dispensatio ex Dei ordinatione pendeat. Ibid. 865: Aliis vita aeterna, aliis damnatio aeterna praeordinatur. . . . Quod et scriptura clare ostendit, dicimus Dominum, aeterno ac immutabili consilio semel constituisse quos olim assumeret in salutem, quos rursum exitio devolveret. In this second edition there is an entire new chapter of forty-one pages devoted to "Predestination and the Providence of God."*

new dogma of a double predestination as in the temper of mind which produced the dogma and developed its adherents. The temper of mind has survived the dogma. Calvin's searching examination of premises and his unflinching drawing of conclusions inevitably tended, in religion and education, to develop a spirit of re-examination and eventually a denial of premises. A like spirit in the domain of law led to enforcement, to repeal, or to revolution.

Given in the first place a great leader of men tending toward a more representative form of government in both church and state, second, an unflinching system of re-examining premises and drawing conclusions, and, finally, a type of followers bred to enforce conclusions, and it is not difficult to foresee that such followers of such a leader and system would inevitably tend to develop liberty and self-government far beyond the leader's personal plans for his own generation. "Modern Democracy," as Professor Borgeaud has pointed out, "is the child of the Reformation, not of the reformers."<sup>9</sup> Modern liberty is the resultant of many forces, and may not be attributed solely to any single era or movement; but at least one line of its ancestry has its roots in the Reformation. Democracy and liberty were not the objects of the Reformers, but they are valuable by-products of the Reformation.

The twin premises with which Calvin starts in his *Institutes* in 1536 are the absolute sovereignty of God and the authority of the Word of God. "God is the only sovereign of souls. Whatever befalls us comes from him." "He is deceived who expects lasting prosperity in that kingdom which is not ruled by the sceptre of God, that is, his Holy Word."<sup>10</sup> "God is not idle." "He holds the helm of the world."<sup>11</sup>

Trust in such a God gives moral poise. "If we sanctify the Lord of Hosts we shall not be much afraid," wrote the young author in 1536. Three years later, after his humiliation and exile from Geneva, he could add, "The necessary consequences

<sup>9</sup> C. Borgeaud, *Rise of Modern Democracy in Old and New England*, p. 2.

<sup>10</sup> *Institutes*, in *Opera*, I, 209, 63, 11-12.

<sup>11</sup> *Opera*, I, 63; II, 168, 147, 150 (*Deum mundi gubernacula tenere*).

of this knowledge are gratitude in prosperity, patience in adversity, and a wonderful security respecting the future."<sup>12</sup> Reinforced by the healthy sense of moral obligation so strong in the Puritan, such a trust gives men moral power. "Let us play the man for our people and for the cities of our God, and let the Lord do that which seemeth him good"—this was Calvin's stirring counsel twenty years later in that very year when the Genevan councillor replied to the ambassador of Savoy, "For the sovereignty of God and the Word of God we will hazard our lives." In this same passage, published in the month when Geneva was threatened by Savoy, Calvin taught that sane combination of trust in God with active defence which found expression in the council's vote "to recommend themselves to God and to keep good watch." "Joab," wrote Calvin, "though he acknowledges the event of battle to depend on the will and the power of God, yet surrenders not himself to inactivity, but vigorously executes all the duties of his office, and leaves the event to the divine decision."<sup>13</sup> "If our calling (*vocatio*) is indeed of the Lord, as we firmly believe that it is, the Lord himself will bestow his blessing, although the whole universe may be opposed to us. Let us, therefore, try every remedy, while, if such is not to be found, let us, notwithstanding, persevere to the last gasp" (*ad ultimum usque spiritum*).<sup>14</sup>

It would be easy to multiply examples of the same spirit "wherever the evangelical movement drank of the spring of the *Institutes*."<sup>15</sup> On the receipt of the news of the massacre of St. Bartholomew, the council of Geneva ordered that "everyone should hold his arms in readiness and frequent the sermons."<sup>16</sup> Governor John Winthrop and his companions in the Puritan

<sup>12</sup> Opera, I, 20; II, 895-896.

<sup>13</sup> Ibid. II, 162.

<sup>14</sup> Ibid. X, ii, 331. Calvin to Farel, March, 1539. Translated in Bonnet, Letters, I, 131.

<sup>15</sup> Kampeschulte, J. Calvin, seine Kirche und sein Staat in Genf, I, 447 (Leipzig, 1869). This phrase is applied by Kampeschulte to another aspect of Puritanism. Kampeschulte was a Catholic (later an "Old Catholic"), and did not live to finish his book. A second volume was published in 1899, after his death; it extended only to 1559.

<sup>16</sup> Borgeaud, Histoire de l'Université de Genève, I, 122.



exodus of 1630, on sighting supposedly hostile Spanish vessels, first put up the defences, armed the men, and tried the weapons; then, "all things being thus fitted, we went to prayer upon the upper deck. . . . Our trust was in the Lord of Hosts; and the courage of our captain and his care and diligence did much encourage us."<sup>17</sup> "Trust in God and keep your powder dry" indicates two Puritan actions, but not the order of the acts. The Puritan first tried the weapons and then "trusted the Lord of Hosts." The guns on the meeting-house at Plymouth, the carefully stacked muskets in the New England house of prayer, the men "with powder-horn and bullet pouch slung across their shoulders while their reverend pastor (who is said to have had the best gun in the parish) prayed and preached with his good gun standing in the pulpit"<sup>18</sup>—these are familiar examples of the same spirit of trusting in God and utilizing the wits and weapons he had foreordained. Some Puritans even prayed with their eyes open, possibly in literal fulfilment of the injunction, "Watch and pray." "God made him a heart wherein was left little room for any fear but was due to Him," was the characterization of Oliver Cromwell, by "one who knew him well."<sup>19</sup> The characterization applies well to the Puritan of all lands, bred on the teachings of fear of God and fearless performance of duty. Profoundly convinced that his work in this world and his place in the next were alike marked out for him by the Almighty, the Puritan fearlessly and unflinchingly worked out his other profound conviction, that his daily task was to fulfil his calling however dangerous or however humble. Calvin and the Puritans were saved from fatalism by their practical temper and their sense of moral obligation. Man's obligation to daily fulfilment of God's law was the corollary to the eternal authority of that law. The "Saint's Rest" was to come in the next world; in this world he was to labor at his "calling" and "do all his work." "He who has fixed the limits of our life has also intrusted us with the care of it."<sup>20</sup> "It will be no small alleviation of his cares, labors,

<sup>17</sup> Winthrop, *History of New England*, I, 7.

<sup>18</sup> Nathaniel Bouton, *History of Concord, N.H.*, p. 154.

<sup>19</sup> Gardiner, *Cromwell*, p. 319.

<sup>20</sup> *Opera*, II, 157.

troubles, and other burdens, when a man knows that in all these things he has God for his guide. The magistrate will execute his office with greater pleasure; the father of a family will confine himself to his duty with more satisfaction; and all, in their respective spheres of life, will bear and surmount the inconveniences, cares, disappointments, and anxieties which befall them, when they shall be persuaded that every individual has his burden laid upon him by God. . . . There will be no employment so mean and sordid—provided we follow our calling (*vocation*)—as not to appear truly respectable, and be deemed highly important in the sight of God.”<sup>21</sup>

Calvin's discussion of the church and civil government makes a striking contribution to the development of a Puritan state. The state is distinct from the church, but is bound to co-operate with it. Tyranny on the part of the state is prevented by the Word of God and the constitutions of men, and also by the counterbalancing power of the church. Tyranny on the part of the church is to be prevented through the liberty conferred by Christ. In the conception of the church there is also the profound moral emphasis so characteristic of Calvin and his Puritan followers.

To the ordinary Protestant definition of the church as marked by the preaching of the Word and the administration of the sacraments, Calvin added a third test, “example of life”; the Word of God must be not only preached but “followed.”<sup>22</sup> The business of the church is “edification” rather than salvation, for salvation is in the hands of God, “who alone has the power of saving

<sup>21</sup>Opera, II, 532 (Institutes, Book iii, chap. 10, definitive edition of 1559). The last sentence appeared first in 1539; all the previous portion of the quotation in 1559. The reader who may wish to know something of Calvin's somewhat unpuritanical attitude toward “the right use of present life and its supports” will find this chapter illuminating. Three other passages which will well repay reading are Book i, chaps. 16 and 17 (on Providence and its application), especially section 4; Book iv, chap. 10, “Conscience”; Book ii, chap. 8, sections 28–34, giving his liberal theories as to Sunday. All these may be found in either Allen's translation, published in London, 1813, and by the Presbyterian Board of Publication, Philadelphia, 1841; or in Beveridge's translation, published in Edinburgh, 1845–46, by the Calvin Translation Society; or in the quaint Elizabethan English of Thomas Norton in the nine editions published between 1561 and 1634.

<sup>22</sup>Ibid. I, 71, 75, 76, 77.

and destroying.”<sup>23</sup> The Puritan’s motive was not his own salvation—he “trusted God for that”—but rather “zeal to illustrate the glory of God.”<sup>24</sup> “Christian living” must be maintained not only by preaching and the sacraments but also by the discipline and excommunication prescribed by the Word of God and practised by the early church. Discipline and excommunication have a threefold object: that evil men in the church may not dishonor God, that they may not corrupt others, and that they may themselves be brought to repentance.<sup>25</sup> The church has its own head and its own liberty. “Christ is the sole head of the church and no necessity should be laid upon consciences where Christ has made them free.”<sup>26</sup> The church has its own officers and jurisdiction. “Pastors by the word of the Lord may constrain all the glory and rank of the world to obey his majesty, and by that Word may govern all from the highest to the lowest”—a doctrine effectively used against political tyranny or maladministration.<sup>27</sup>

Church and state are distinct in respect to officers and jurisdiction, in the same sense in which soul and body are distinct; but they must co-operate, for they acknowledge the same sovereignty and have a common object. Civil government has for its objects not only “tranquillity and humanity,” but also “the maintaining of God’s glory unimpaired and the preservation of the honor of divine truth.”<sup>28</sup> “Civil government should provide that the true religion which is contained in the law of God be not violated and polluted by public blasphemy.”<sup>29</sup> The private citizen must be obedient to the civil government, even if laws and rulers are unjust.<sup>30</sup> Here Calvin made his contribution to good order at a time when the Protestant state was in danger of seeing liberty degenerate into license. On the other hand, “princes” are bidden to “hear and fear”; and the doctrine of obedience is safeguarded

<sup>23</sup> Institutes, in Opera, I, 71, 75, 204, 205, 209. Compare these references on edification and salvation with the preface to the Latin catechism of 1538 (Opera, V, 322). The phrase *religionis nostrae puritate* (Opera, V, 318) is one of the many examples of the word whence Puritan is derived.

<sup>24</sup> Calvin to Sadolet, 1539, in Opera, V, 391; translated in Beveridge, Calvin’s Tracts, I, 33.

<sup>25</sup> Opera, I, 76–77.

<sup>26</sup> Ibid. p. 204.

<sup>27</sup> Ibid. pp. 208–209.

<sup>28</sup> Ibid. I, 11–14.

<sup>29</sup> Ibid. p. 230.

<sup>30</sup> Ibid. pp. 245, 248.

by a significant reservation and a constitutional provision. "Obedience to the authority of governors may not lead us away from obeying him to whose will the desires of all kings ought to be subject," for "we ought to obey God rather than men." "If there be in the present day any magistrates appointed for the protection of the people and the moderation of the power of kings, such as the ancient ephors . . . or tribunes . . . or perhaps the three estates now in every kingdom, if they connive at kings in their oppression of the humbler of the people (*humili plebeculae*), they betray the liberty of the people of which they know they have been appointed protectors by the ordinance of God."<sup>21</sup> Many men had repeated Peter's words "we ought to obey God rather than men." Calvin rendered a service to modern liberty, first, by pointing out the modern way in which political tyranny could be constitutionally checked; and, second, by training up a type of men with the moral poise and the moral power necessary for a constitutional revolution and self-government. Men of this Puritan type, bred on Calvin's doctrine and discipline, checked political tyranny in Holland, Scotland, England, and America, and justify the dictum of Gardiner, that, "as a religious belief for individual men, Calvinism was eminently favorable to the progress of liberty."<sup>22</sup>

With this programme marked out in his "little book," Calvin came to Geneva in 1536, at a moment critical not only in the history of the city but of Protestantism. Geneva had just won her independence from bishop and duke, and accepted the authority of the Word of God. Nominally Protestant, it was far from being a Puritan state. Geneva on Calvin's arrival was a little republic of not over 13,000 inhabitants, of whom 1,000 to 1,500 were citizens capable of voting in the primary assembly.<sup>23</sup> In addition to the walled city, there were included under the jurisdiction of the city about twenty-eight villages on both sides of

<sup>21</sup> Opera, I, 248.

<sup>22</sup> Samuel Rawson Gardiner, *History of England, 1603 to 1642*, I, 24.

<sup>23</sup> E. Mallet, *Recherches historiques et statistiques sur la population de Genève, 1549-1833* (Paris, 1837). Mallet concludes that the population never exceeded 13,000 in the 16th century. Mallet gives the above estimate of voting citizens in his *La Suisse historique et pittoresque*, II, 552 (Geneva, 1855-1866).

the Rhone and Lake Geneva. Geneva was practically an independent republic. It was not a member of the Swiss confederation, though it was an ally of Bern. France had also espoused the cause of Geneva in order to check Savoy. The little republic had no intention of allowing either ally to control her. When the chiefs of the Bernese army in 1536 asked for what was practically a suzerainty, the magistrates and councillors replied, "We have endured war against both the Duke of Savoy and the bishops for seventeen to twenty years . . . not because we had the intention of making the city subject to any power, but because we wished the poor city which had so much warred and suffered to have its liberty."<sup>84</sup> All political and religious control was in the hands of four councils: the *Conseil Général*, or primary assembly; the Council of Two Hundred; the comparatively unimportant Council of Sixty; and the Council of Twenty-five. This smallest council, commonly called the Little Council (*Petit Conseil*), was by far the most important body in the state. It included the four syndics, or chief magistrates, the treasurer, and the four syndics of the previous year, all elected by the primary assembly; and also sixteen other councillors elected by the Council of Two Hundred. It possessed large and somewhat undefined executive and judicial, as well as legislative, powers. It was with this Little Council that the Reformers ordinarily had dealings. These councils had introduced the reformation, and they continued to control ecclesiastical property, to hire and dismiss "preachers," to declare parishioners freed from excommunication, and to pass any legislation regarding religious matters which they saw fit. The civil authorities in 1536 did not recognize, and could not have recognized, the church as an organized body; for no such body had any legal or definitely established standing. It is doubtful if the thought of the church as a distinct institution in Protestant Geneva had occurred to the matter-of-fact magistrates and councillors who had just got rid of the claims of a troublesome ecclesiastical prince. The only cases of the use of the word "church" noted in the records of the councils for 1536 refer to the church building, with two exceptions: one the use of "church" by a good Roman Catholic, Balard, who before Calvin's

<sup>84</sup> Registres du Conseil, XXIX, fol. 11<sup>ro</sup> and 12<sup>ro</sup>.

arrival had been threatened with banishment for his views; and the other its use in a statement that Farel proposed "articles concerning the government of the church."<sup>35</sup> Calvin's description is historically correct: "When I first came, there was practically nothing in this church. There was preaching, and that was all. The idols were sought out and burned, but there was no reformation."<sup>36</sup> There was no definition or control of membership; no officers subject to church control; no property in the hands of the church; and no creed adopted by the church. There was simply the general body of citizens maintaining preaching and the sacraments under the control of the councils without any church organization. The records of the council regularly describe Calvin and Farel simply as "preachers" (*predicans, prescheurs*) until the negotiations for Calvin's recall in 1540, when he is addressed as "minister."<sup>37</sup> Calvin recognized the distinction, and complained in a letter to Bullinger, "the common people regard us as preachers rather than pastors."<sup>38</sup>

The religious situation in Geneva before Calvin's reorganization was much like that in other Protestant cities; for the introduction of Lutheran or Zwinglian reforms had not included the establishment of an organic church. A Lutheran or Zwinglian church was in practice largely controlled by the civil power, and was practically regarded as a phase of the state, not as a corporate entity. Luther had rightly found his forte in preaching and writing rather than in organizing. "Luther," a modern German scholar picturesquely writes, "when he had preached and sowed the seed of the Word, left to the Holy Spirit the care of producing the fruit, while with his friend Philip he peacefully drank his glass of Wittenberg beer." As the same German jurist and historian has pointed out, "the independence of the church is a Reformed and not a Lutheran principle."<sup>39</sup> Meanwhile Catholi-

<sup>35</sup> Opera, XXI, 206, Nov. 10, 1536.

<sup>36</sup> Ibid. IX, 891.

<sup>37</sup> Ibid. XI, 94; XXI, 272.

<sup>38</sup> 21 Feb. 1538. Opera, X, ii, 154; in Bonnet, Letters, I, 66: *Vulgus hominum concionatores nos magis agnoscit quam pastores.*

<sup>39</sup> Professor K. Rieker, in the *Historische Vierteljahrschrift* (Leipzig), translated by E. Choisy in *Revue de théologie et de philosophie* (Lausanne,

cism still maintained the mediaeval theory of the supremacy of the church over the state. The way was therefore open in 1536 for a new conception of church and state as two distinct and balanced organisms, each co-operating with the other.

The general situation in Europe in religion and morals needed a greater legislator and organizer than existed among the Lutherans or Zwinglians. The years in which Calvin was endeavoring to reform the church and state constituted a critical period for both Protestant and Catholic. In 1535, when Calvin was writing his *Institutes*, there occurred the collapse of both the fanatical Anabaptists at Münster and the over-ambitious commercial democracy of the Baltic led by Wullenweber. The vicissitudes of Henry VIII's matrimonial and ecclesiastical changes were not adding to the reputation of the Reformation for piety or singleness of motive among its political leaders. The same year in which Calvin published his *Institutes* witnessed in England the dissolution of the smaller monasteries and the transfer of their property to the crown, the death of Henry's first wife, the execution of his second, and his marriage to his third on the following day. Henry VIII., in Calvin's opinion, was "scarcely half-wise."<sup>40</sup> The wives of Philip of Hesse were even more synchronous than Henry's, and his bigamy in 1540, connived at by Luther and Melancthon, proved a severe blow to the political and religious leadership of the German Reformation. France had adopted the policy of persecution of Protestants since their placards of 1534 attacking the Mass. In 1536, the death of the humanistic reformer Lefèvre and the publication of Calvin's *Institutes* mark the transition from the earlier humanistic to the later Calvinistic reform. Erasmus, humanist and satirist rather than reformer, died in the same year at Basel, where only four months earlier Calvin had seen his *Institutes* issue from the press. To none of these earlier leaders was the definitive leadership of the reform to fall. A greater organizing power and moral force, a man of Calvin's

1900), separate reprint, p. 19. See also Rieker, *Grundsätze Reformierter Kirchenverfassung* (Leipzig, 1899), pp. 64-71; see especially p. 70: "sind die Lutherischen Landeskirchen Anstalten des öffentlichen Rechts, nicht Genossenschaften."

<sup>40</sup> Opera, X, ii, 328: Rex ipse vix dimidia ex parte sapit. Translated in Bonnet, Letters, I, 125; Calvin to Farel, Strasburg, March 16, 1539.

"architectonic genius in knowledge and practical life," in the words of Dorner, was needed to take the next step. Such a man was necessary to save Protestantism from becoming the tool of social anarchy and political absolutism, or from remaining a nerveless and unmoral phase of intellectual life.

These were also critical years for the papacy, which was debating an inclusive reform capable of taking in the Lutherans, but which finally turned from Luther and Contarini and Pole to Loyola. In the same year that Calvin arrived at Geneva, Paul III nominated to the cardinalate men of the reform party like Contarini, Pole, and Sadolet, and appointed a commission to report on needed reforms. Their scathing indictment was presented to the Pope the same year in which Farel and Calvin submitted to the Genevan council their "Articles" on the organization of the church. The failure of the attempt at compromise between Catholic and Lutheran at the Ratisbon conference in 1541 was one more proof that the conflict was inevitable. The date is eloquent. It was in that same year 1541 that Calvin, recalled from exile, secured the adoption of his Ecclesiastical Ordinances, the programme for a Puritan state, and that Loyola was elected General of the newly established Society of Jesus. Calvin and Loyola, both at the same college in Paris within the same twelvemonth, each under trial from 1536 to 1538, and both armed with a new organization and new powers in 1541—these were the men to lead the two new forms of organized and militant Christianity, the Reformed Churches and the Society of Jesus, the two new types of men, the Puritan and the Jesuit.

Geneva on Calvin's arrival presented a picture interesting for its apparently contradictory phases and its exuberant vitality. It did not present an inviting field for a Puritan programme. Calvin consented to stay in Geneva only because of Farel's dramatic appeal to the conscience which bade him remain and struggle rather than return to Basel to the peaceful life of a scholar which he craved. Between the Calvin of the *Institutes* and the Geneva of 1536, between his legal mind and Puritan conscience and their thoughtlessness and love of pleasure, there was a profound difference. No one recognized more clearly than Calvin this essential difference of innate characteristics (*ingenium*).



"They will not be tolerable to me, nor I to them," he wrote four years later when the Genevans were seeking to recall him.<sup>41</sup> Conscience, not compatibility, compelled Calvin to remain in Geneva in 1536 and to return to the task in 1541. The Genevans were a cosmopolitan people, of French, Italian, and German descent, and of complex characteristics. Their complex characteristics presented to the reformer grave difficulties. Their cosmopolitan character offered an opportunity for an international and adaptable type of reform radiating from a cosmopolitan centre. At their worst the Genevans of 1536 were loose-tongued, riotous, "thoughtless and devoted to their pleasures," as their own Bonivard confessed. At their best they were keen-witted, shrewd in business, sagacious in city politics, deft in international diplomacy, and mettlesome in defence of their liberties. Their thoughtlessness and love of pleasure made Calvin's task a difficult one. Their keen business sense and administrative power, their political sagacity and their mettlesomeness, made it possible to transform their obstinacy from the plane of politics to that of religion, and to make the next generation as keen in defence of the Ten Commandments and the *Institutes* as their fathers had been in defence of their *franchises* and their political liberty. It was a city where merchants and artisans had been trained to use the sword. In 1461 it had been ordered "that every one should have a sword behind the door in the front of his house, or in the workshop of his house."<sup>42</sup> Genevans had the inborn temper to which Calvin's unflinching teaching could appeal; and they possessed the skill and hardihood to carry out a programme to which they should once devote themselves. They were more skilful politicians than the young author of twenty-seven; and "that Frenchman" (*ille Gallus*) had many hard lessons to learn from grave magistrate and witty populace before he was able to beat them at their own game. On the other hand, Calvin, with his broad and scholarly training in classics theology and law, his profound scholarship, his unwavering devotion to a single purpose, his definite programme and his organizing genius, was the one man

<sup>41</sup> Opera, XI, 91.

<sup>42</sup> Registres du Conseil de Genève, II (1461-1477), 75, Dec. 10, 1461. Société d'Histoire de Genève, 1906.

fitted to mould the mettlesome but plastic republic into a Puritan State.<sup>43</sup>

In January, 1537, "Farel and the other preachers," including Calvin, took the first decisive step in the formulation of the new programme. They presented to the Genevan council articles concerning the organization of the church.<sup>44</sup> These Articles, evidently drawn from the *Institutes*, are Calvin's attempt to apply his fundamental ideas to a specific situation. Starting and ending with the "Word of God," the Articles propose six things as essential: a communion service frequently and reverently celebrated, if possible once a month; "the discipline of excommunication"; a common confession of faith; singing of psalms in public worship; the religious training of children; and marriage laws in conformity to the Word of God.

The first article includes both the communion and "the discipline of excommunication," for to Calvin's mind discipline, "the nerve of the church," was essential to a reverent observance of communion. In this article two points in the Puritan programme are emphasized; the moral obligation resting on the individual, and the moral responsibility for its members resting upon the church as an organization. Calvin's emphasis on the communion was ethical rather than dogmatic. His attitude was practical rather than mystical, and he concerned himself rather with the character of the communicant than with the character of the bread and wine. The essential question was not whether Christ was present in the bread and wine, but whether he was present in the life of the communicant. "The principal point is . . . that those who show by their wicked and iniquitous life that

<sup>43</sup> For a study of "Geneva before Calvin" see an article by the writer in the *American Historical Review* for January, 1903, especially p. 239, and note 2.

<sup>44</sup> The Articles are in Opera, X, 5-14; and in the extremely valuable and scholarly work of A. L. Herminjard, *Correspondance des réformateurs dans les pays de langue française*, IV, 154-166 (9 vols., 1512-1544, Geneva, 1866-1897). See in Herminjard, notes 1, 6, 7, 11, on similarities between *Institutes* and Articles. Calvin had been engaged on a French version of his "little book" after his arrival in Geneva. See his letter in Opera, X, 63, translated in Bonnet, *Calvin's Letters*, I, 45. The document is simply indorsed, "Articles bailles par les prescheurs." Modern authors like Kampschulte, Herminjard, Roget, Walker, and the editors of the Opera confirm the contemporary statement of Beza and Colladon that Calvin was the author of the Articles.

they in no wise belong to Jesus should not come to communicate with him." "All those who wish to have Jesus for their life should participate in the communion," was the statement in the confession of faith adopted a few months later, in accordance with the proposals in the Articles.<sup>45</sup> In order to secure this ethical aim of "Christian living" and to check "iniquitous life unworthy of a Christian," the Articles recommended the following method for enforcing the "discipline of excommunication enjoined by the Lord upon his church in the 18th of St. Matthew." It was a method almost unknown among Protestant churches, and it was put into practice in Geneva only after eighteen years of bitter struggle.<sup>46</sup> It was little less than revolutionary in its implication of the church as a distinct organism with powers of its own. Calvin recommended that the council should appoint "in every quarter of the city certain persons of good life and reputation and a constancy not easy to corrupt." These persons should "have an eye on the life of every one," and report "any notable vice" to a minister for private admonition. If this is unheeded, the offender should be threatened with report to the church. "If he recognizes his fault, then there is great profit from this discipline." If he still refuses to listen, he is to be denounced by the minister in the assembly; and if he still "persists in hardness of heart," he is to be excommunicated. No provision is made as to how or by whom excommunication was to be pronounced; but that the power was vested in the church and not in the state is clear from a succeeding paragraph: "Beyond this correction the church cannot go," but it shall be the duty of the council to prevent "mockery of God and of his gospel" on the part of any "who do nothing but laugh at being excommunicated." The persons to be corrected thus are "those named by St. Paul," "a fornicator, or covetous, or an idolater, or a railer (*maldisans*), or a drunkard, or an extortioner," as the Genevan New Testament

<sup>45</sup> Articles, Opera, X, 8; Confession, Opera, XXII, 92.

<sup>46</sup> For the ideas of Bucer, Oecolampadius, and Melancthon on discipline see Cornelius, *Historische Arbeiten*, pp. 373-4 and 378, and his references to Richter, *Evangelische Kirchenordnungen*, I, 158, and to Melancthon, *Corpus Reformatorum*, IV, 547 (ed. Bretschneider, 1837). Cf. Kampschulte, Calvin, I, 391, and note 2.

and the King James version alike translated the passage quoted by Calvin (1 Cor. 5 11).

Calvin's practical and organizing temper thus led him to urge a system of discipline as a means of training or rejecting members already in the church. Discipline of morals was no new thing in Geneva or other cities.<sup>47</sup> Calvin's new step was in making systematic provision for the enforcement of scriptural morals by a scriptural church re-enforced by the co-operation of the state. He wished to restore to the Protestant church the practice which proved "of singular utility and advancement to Christianity" in the primitive church (*anciennement*), until "wicked bishops, or rather brigands, turned it into tyranny."<sup>48</sup>

In order that the church might be properly instituted, two other steps were necessary. First, "the right beginning of a church" required "that all the inhabitants should make confession of their faith and give reasons for it," in order to show that they were "united in one church." Second, in order that future generations might preserve "purity of doctrine . . . and be able to give reasons for their faith," the children should be instructed at home by their parents in a simple catechism, and then be examined and, if necessary, further taught by the minister until pronounced "sufficiently instructed." Calvin did not in the Articles formally state the doctrine of an independent church which he had already stated in his *Institutes*. That would have been impolitic, had he wished to do so. What he did do was to take certain practicable steps toward a more independent church. The three steps were: determination of present membership by a creed; admission of future members by a catechism; and discipline of morals as a means for both training and pruning membership. Such steps would in time produce an independent church with organic life of its own.

<sup>47</sup> See "Geneva before Calvin," *Amer. Hist. Rev.*, Jan., 1903, pp. 229-231, and notes. Vincent, "European Blue Laws," in *Annual Report Amer. Hist. Assoc.*, 1897, pp. 356-372; and Lindsay, *Reformation*, II, 107-113. Principal Lindsay's characterization of the Genevan excommunication as "not in a way conformable to his [Calvin's] ideas" is applicable to the period before 1555, but hardly to the later period, when the consistory had secured the right of excommunication. See Choisy, *Théocratie à Genève*, pp. 165-166.

<sup>48</sup> Opera, X, 9.

The final article requested that a joint commission of magistrates and ministers be appointed to settle existing marriage causes and to draw up ordinances according to the Word of God for the decision of future cases. The Genevan councils in their reply to the preachers' memorial displayed a characteristic willingness to admit the theoretical authority of the Word of God and an equally characteristic unwillingness to lessen their own authority or to enforce any thorough-going programme. The councils were not accustomed to regard the Word as a means for lessening their power. They therefore reserved to themselves the decision of marriage causes, and declined to associate the preachers with themselves in joint commission. They also declined to increase the frequency of communion. In lieu of the new system vesting discipline in the church, they reaffirmed an old vote charging two councillors with the general supervision of morals in the city. This was merely a vote to continue the ordinary municipal police supervision common to Geneva and other cities of that day. In view of the councils' previous policy, their votes at this time, and their later refusal to allow the preachers to exclude any one from the communion, it is quite clear that a vague vote, "the rest of the articles is passed," meant actually that the councils did not propose to alter their historic and continuous policy of control of religion and morals, or to recognize any new order of things; but simply that there was to be a confession and catechism. If one comes to the councils' vote from a study of their records in the *Registres du Conseil*, it is evident that the magistrates had no intention of sharing jurisdiction with the ministers or of conferring powers on a "church." As we have already seen, the councils did not use the word "church" in their votes at this period, though Calvin used it in his Articles. On the other hand, if one approaches the situation from Calvin's point of view as revealed in the *Institutes*, the Articles, and his letters, it is equally clear that he had in mind the bestowal of certain rights upon the church as an organization. Calvin and the council were approaching the question at issue from such totally different conceptions of a church that they did not understand each other. So modern writers, failing to note the two points of view of Calvin and the council, and failing to scrutinize carefully the somewhat jumbled

votes of the councils, have been apt to attach too much importance to their somewhat vague vote. Calvin knew what he wanted, and was working on long lines; but he did not get the essential thing that he asked for in 1537.<sup>49</sup> A year later he wrote to Bullinger, "It appears to me that we shall have no lasting church unless that ancient apostolic discipline be completely restored, which in many respects is much needed among us."<sup>50</sup> He had to demand the same things in 1538 and again in 1541, and won them all only in 1555.

Quite different from the opportunist policy of the council was the thorough-going Puritan temper of the preachers' closing appeal: "If you see that these warnings and exhortations are truly from the Word of God, consider of what importance and consequence they are for maintaining the honor of God in its proper state and the church in its entirety (*en son entier*) . . . and do not spare yourselves in diligently putting them into execution. . . And do not be moved by any difficulty which any one may find

<sup>49</sup> Even Professor Walker, the author of the latest and the most judicious life of Calvin, does not seem to the writer to take this difference in point of view between Calvin and the council quite sufficiently into account or to scrutinize sufficiently the blanket vote of the council, "the rest of the articles is passed." He says (p. 192), the councils "promptly adopted the Articles with slight reservations" (mentioning the marriage questions and the monthly communion), and then adds, "but the plan which Farel and Calvin had presented became the law of Geneva in its essential features." This seems to neglect the following facts: (1) one of the "essential features," if not the essential feature, "discipline of excommunication," was a part of the article on the communion, and so probably went by the board with the refusal to adopt monthly communion; (2) the vote of the Little Council was modified by the vote of the Council of Two Hundred, which made it clear that it was the magistrates who were still to continue to look after morals and see that the city "lived according to God"; (3) the council had already exercised the right of excommunication, and refused it to the ministers the first time it was suggested; (4) the right of excommunication remained a bone of contention until 1555; (5) the only things actually done were the adoption of creed and catechism; (6) Calvin himself felt the thing essential to a "lasting church" had not been done, and was obliged again in 1538 to insist upon the adoption of the same thing as a condition of his return. The votes of the councils are in Opera, XXI, 206-207. For earlier and later votes see Amer. Hist. Rev., Jan., 1903, p. 227, note 6, and Herminjard, IV, 26, and Opera, XXI, 220. For modern comments see Kampschulte, Calvin, I, 289, 290; Roget, I, 23; Cornelius, Historische Arbeiten, p. 137, who suggests with reason that their votes may not have been quite clear to the councils themselves.

<sup>50</sup> Opera, X, ii, 154; Bonnet, Letters, I, 66.

in these matters. For when we offer ourselves in fulfilment of that which has been ordained (*ordonne*) for us by God we should hope that of his goodness he will cause our enterprise to prosper and will conduct it to a good end."

A catechism and confession of faith were promptly printed by the state.<sup>51</sup> The catechism briefly restated in French the fundamental teachings of the *Institutes*. Like the *Institutes* it closes with the principle, "we ought to obey God rather than men." The confession of faith was an extract from the catechism. It is a document of great simplicity and power, admirably adapted for the creed of a newly reformed community. Like the *Institutes* and the Articles it begins and ends with the twin premises of the sovereignty of God and the Word of God, and the corollary of man's obligation to obey the law of God. "Since his will is the sole rule of all justice, we confess that our whole life ought to be regulated by the commandments of his holy law."<sup>52</sup> The Ten Commandments, which directly follow this declaration, became the moral constitution to which every inhabitant of Geneva had to take public and solemn oath. Sworn allegiance to the moral law as summed up in the Ten Commandments became an official test of good citizenship and social standing as well as of church membership. On the other hand, the moral obligation of "all Christians to obey statutes and ordinances which do not contravene the commandments of God" had its logical converse of Christian liberty. "All laws made to bind men's consciences to things not commanded by God and tending to break Christian liberty are perverse doctrines of Satan."<sup>53</sup> This clause, in what was probably the first Protestant creed to be adopted by a representative body and sworn to and permanently observed by the inhabitants of a republic, contains the same significant political principle already noted in the *Institutes*. This germ of liberty,

<sup>51</sup> In Opera, XXII, 33-96; and in Rilliet et Dufour, *Catéchisme français de Calvin* (Geneva, 1878). For facts regarding the actions of council see Herminjard, IV, 185, notes 8-10; Rilliet et Dufour, xxxii, lx-lxi; *Registres du Conseil* for April 27, 1537, quoted in Opera, XXI, 210-211. Calvin afterwards revised the catechism in the form of question and answer. In this form it became the basis of religious instruction of the Reformed Churches. Fourteen editions were printed in English alone before the Puritan exodus to New England in 1630.

<sup>52</sup> Opera, XXII, 86.

<sup>53</sup> Ibid. XXII, 95, 92.

coupled with that other provision of the *Institutes* for constitutional revolution, was to be used effectively later by Huguenots, Dutch, Scotch, English, and New Englanders in resistance to tyranny. In his provision for means to check religious and political tyranny through the Word of God and the constitutions of men, Calvin made a contribution reaching far beyond his own personal intentions. His services here cannot be gainsaid on account of his failure to provide for freedom of individual consciences, or to avoid all tyranny on the part of the church, or to make thoroughgoing distinction between church and state. His tendency is clear; and the later Puritan movement will be found to have blazed a rough trail in the direction of larger liberty, even though with halting and sometimes wandering steps. It was not possible to have complete liberty in Geneva in 1536, before Calvin or after Calvin. It was not essential that there should be a clear-cut academic distinction between church and state. It was of profound importance that there should be laid down and worked out in the middle of the sixteenth century such a rational, legal, and practicable means of checking the tyranny of either the church or the state as should contribute to the ultimate liberty of both. Men will always differ about so profound a personality as John Calvin, but one is astonished that a scholar of Lord Acton's reputation should so misrepresent both Calvin's words and his deeds as to say of him, "There was nothing in the institutes of men, no authority, no right, no liberty, that he cared to preserve, or towards which he entertained any feeling of reverence or obligation." <sup>44</sup>

The Confession reaffirms the profoundly ethical emphasis already noted in the *Institutes* and Articles. It was more than a creed: it was a religious and social compact. Professedly following the examples of the covenants of the Old Testament, it was the forerunner of the Scottish National Covenant of 1638, the Solemn League and Covenant signed by the English Parliament in 1643, and the covenants entered into by the early New England town churches. As a practical working standard for the special needs of Geneva, the Confession went further than Calvin's earlier documents, and doubled the kinds of "rotten members" who might be disciplined with excommunication. To the "forni-

<sup>44</sup> Acton, *History of Liberty*, I, 178.



cator, idolater, railer, drunkard," are now added "manifest murderers, thieves, false witnesses, seditious persons, brawlers (*noiseulx, jurgatores*), slanderers (*detracteurs*), fighters (*bateurs*), and spendthrifts (*dissipateurs de biens*)." The list in the Articles had been based on the injunction of St. Paul. The list of offences in the confession of faith is based also on the Ten Commandments, and made their acceptance by the inhabitants of Geneva mean something. The list is however even more comprehensive than the Ten Commandments, for it adds the offences of sedition, quarrelling, slander, fighting, wastefulness, and drunkenness. The additions are significant, for they mark the special offences which were felt by Calvin and Farel to need discipline in Geneva. That there was no mention of Sabbath-breaking will not surprise one who is familiar with Calvin's markedly liberal and practical interpretation of this commandment. The later and sometimes superstitious observance of the Sabbath was the work of smaller and more literal minds than Calvin's. He recognized the "abrogation of what was ceremonial in this command," and wished to retain its fundamental and permanent purposes of a day for common worship and "relaxation from labor for servants and workmen and animals." His sound method was to interpret the commandment in the light of the Christian liberty of the gospel; to preserve the kernel and throw away the shell. The social and economic purposes of the day appear in the second edition of the catechism. "This [commandment] conduces to public order (*police*). For every one gets in the habit of working the rest of the time when there is one day of repose." Calvin and the Puritan did not forget the positive portion, the six-sevenths of the commandment, "six days shalt thou labor and do all thy work." Possibly the inclusion of "spendthrifts" among the offenders subject to excommunication was regarded by Calvin as a logical inference from the commandment to work.<sup>55</sup>

<sup>55</sup> The discussion of the commandment in the first edition of the Institutes is in Opera, I, 36-38. The provision for rest for animals here included is, with the provision in the Massachusetts Body of Liberties of 1641 (see articles 92-93, "Off the Bruite Creature"), an interesting example of the Hebrew element in Calvin and the Puritans. The discussion in the Catechism of 1537 is in Opera, XXII, 41-42; that in the Catechism of 1542 is in Opera, VI, 65. The passage in the final edition of the Institutes is not essentially different from that in the first,

In view of this comprehensive list of offences which might subject "the deserter from the army" to such a military conception of discipline, it is not surprising that many of the inhabitants of Geneva were not enthusiastic "to enroll themselves under the banner of Christ."<sup>56</sup> The attempt by the council to enforce upon all inhabitants a public oath to the confession precipitated a crisis. After repeated attempts, the council felt obliged to threaten with the customary Genevan penalty of banishment those who refused the oath. Even then some delayed from July to November before complying. For refusal to swear, coupled with other offences, only two women and one man-servant were actually banished. Yet even then, in response to the summons of the council as late as November 12, not one person came from one of the important streets of the city.<sup>57</sup> The ground of objection to the confession is significant. It was not the doctrine but the discipline that was objected to. The confession was remarkably simple in doctrine. It contained no mention of the Trinity, original sin, predestination, or of eternal punishment; no mention of heaven or hell, save as they occur in the Lord's Prayer and the Apostles' Creed. It was a confession which emphasized the moral obligation of man, his conduct rather than his creed. It was, says the contemporary chronicler, Roset, "the point of excommunication that was a bit troublesome (*un peu facheux*) to the opponents."

and may be found in the English translation in Book ii, chap. 8, sections 28-34. The editor of the sixth American edition of Allen's translation naïvely wrote in his "Advertisement," "It is much to be lamented that so great a mind should have been led astray on so important a point."

<sup>56</sup> These and other military phrases are in Calvin's preface to the Latin edition of the Catechism, 1538, Opera, V, 319, 321; also in French translation in Rilliet et Dufour, Catéchisme, pp. 133, 137. This preface, written during the bitter fight of 1537-38, breathes a strikingly militant spirit and a spirit of liberty. Cf. Opera, V, 322; Rilliet, p. 142.

<sup>57</sup> The various votes of the council are in Registres du Conseil, XXX, fols. 208, 212, 219, 222; XXXI, fols. 32, 61, 81, 90, March 13-Nov. 15, 1537. The votes are reprinted in Opera, XXI, 208-217. For the banishments see also Roset, Hist. du peuple de Genève, I, 42-45. The street from which no one came was the Rue des Allamans. This street had in the Council of Two Hundred twelve representatives in 1535, and at least three in 1538. MS. Rolle du Conseil des CC (Dartmouth College Library); Registres du Conseil, 12 Feb. 1538, XXXI, fol. 191<sup>ro</sup>.

The popular objection went straight to the heart of the matter, and balked at just what the Puritan programme insisted upon—the real enforcement of the moral law by an organization whose business was morals and not politics. “The ten commandments of God are hard to observe,” and “they who swear to observe them are regarded as perjurers”—these were the objections which were heard at table and in the council chamber.<sup>58</sup> The feeling of the populace is shown by the wits who went about the streets and taverns, mocking the preachers, and saluting their supporters with the query, “Art thou one of the brothers in Christ? by God, you will be sorry for it.”<sup>59</sup> Even the council favorable to the preachers and ready to enforce the oath to the confession refused in January 1538 to permit the preachers to exclude any one from the approaching communion.<sup>60</sup>

The annual elections resulted in a complete defeat for the magistrates of 1537, who had been favorable to the preachers. In February 1538 these men were replaced by the most bitter opponents of the preachers and their Puritan programme. The newly elected magistrates speedily secured control of the councils by deposing the remaining partisans of the preachers on accusations of treasonable dealings with France. The Council of Two Hundred then, on March 11—the same day on which it deposed the councillors favorable to the preachers—extended their declaration of war to the ministers themselves by two significant votes. The council voted “that the preachers be notified that they are not to mix up in politics but to preach the gospel of God; and further to live in the Word of God according to the ordinances of Bern.”<sup>61</sup> These votes were two blows directed at two points in the preachers’ programme; namely, liberty of preaching and

<sup>58</sup> Roset, *Chroniques de Genève*, Liv. iv, ch. 9 (ed. Fazy, Geneva, 1894). The objections are recorded in *Registres du Conseil* for 26 Nov. 1537 (printed in Opera, XXI, 217, and in Roget, *Histoire*, I, 43).

<sup>59</sup> *Registres du Conseil* for 26 Nov. 1537 and 16 Jan. 1538, in Opera, XXI, 217, 222; Roset, *Chroniques*, Liv. iv, ch. 10; and Roget, I, 68; Opera, XXI, 217.

<sup>60</sup> Opera, XXI, 220.

<sup>61</sup> The votes of the council are printed in Herminjard, *Correspondance*, IV, 403, note 2, and in Cornelius, *Historische Arbeiten*, 159, note 1. On the deposition of the preachers’ partisans from the Council of Twenty-five see Roget, *Histoire*,

liberty of worship; or, as they expressed it in the confession, freedom from "all laws made to bind men's consciences to things not commanded by God and tending to break Christian liberty."<sup>62</sup> "The ordinances of Bern" were certain regulations prescribing to the churches under its jurisdiction the observance of four ecclesiastical holidays and certain methods of administering communion and baptism. The Genevan ministers had a right to feel that they should have been consulted by the magistrates regarding the adoption of such ordinances, and it was the intention of Bern that they should be.<sup>63</sup> But they were refused even their request that no innovations should be introduced until the question could be discussed by a church synod. The ministers were clearly standing for the rights of the church against a manifestly ill-considered demand for immediate and "servile conformity" to the ordinances of another city. Calvin cared little about ceremonies, but he cared much about "edification" and the rights of the church. "In things where the Lord has granted us liberty for the great end of edification it would be unworthy to introduce a servile conformity which does not edify," he wrote during the conflict.<sup>64</sup> His objections to civil interference with the ministers' liberty of preaching the Word he voiced in a letter to Farel when the subject of his recall was under discussion a year later: "If I shall speak a word which is unpleasant for them to hear, forthwith they will enjoin silence."<sup>65</sup>

The issue of the liberty of the church assumed an acute stage the Friday before Easter, when Coraud, one of the preachers,

I, 75, and note 2. The new magistrates of 1538 were the more bitter as they had themselves been defeated in the election of 1537. The bitter party struggle between the ins and the outs during these two years may be followed in Roget or Cornelius.

<sup>62</sup> Opera, XXII, 92.

<sup>63</sup> The letter of Bern to the Genevan council is in Herminjard, IV, 403; cf. Cornelius, p. 160, and also the later letter of Bern, Herminjard, IV, 416. The four festivals were Christmas, Circumcision (New Year's), Annunciation, and Ascension; see Herminjard, IV, 413, note 17, and V, 137, note 9.

<sup>64</sup> Opera, V, 322.

<sup>65</sup> Ibid. X, ii, 325, Calvin to Farel, Strasburg, 16 March 1539. Translated in Bonnet, Letters, I, 121.

was summoned before the council for criticisms made in his sermon, and threatened with imprisonment if he preached again. On the day after this threat against their fellow-minister, Calvin and Farel gave their first definite refusal to administer the communion according to the Bernese form. Next day Coraud preached and was imprisoned. To the demand for his release the council made a counter-demand that the preachers "obey the said letter of Messrs of Bern." "The said preachers replied they were unwilling to act save as God has commanded them."

Calvin and Farel state that the council was ready to accept their proposal for postponement of the question of ceremonies, provided the preachers would consent to the deposition of Coraud, but that they would not consent to this "against the express prohibition of Scripture."<sup>66</sup> The issue was clearly drawn between the church's newly-demanded liberty in preaching and ceremonies and the customary right of the caesaropapist state to full jurisdiction in religious matters.

Each side preferred to fight it out rather than compromise. On Saturday the sheriff brought to Calvin a renewed request from the council that he "preach and administer the communion next day according to the form in the letter" from Bern. Calvin replied that the council "had not observed the tenor of said letter," having failed to consult with the ministers,<sup>67</sup> and that he was "unwilling to administer the communion as contained in the said letter." He was then warned not to preach. During the night before Easter the populace shot off muskets before the doors of the preachers, threatened to throw them into the Rhone if they refused to give them the communion next day, and with characteristically keen wit and loose tongue made obscene puns on "the Word of God as the Ordure of God."<sup>68</sup> The next day, Easter Sunday, April 21, 1538, both Farel and Calvin preached, in spite of the prohibition; and, in spite of the council's orders,

<sup>66</sup> Opera, X, ii, 188; Herminjard, IV, 424. Farel and Calvin, 27 April 1538, to the Council of Bern.

<sup>67</sup> The council of Bern had written, "avec vous ministres Calvin et Farel amiablement sur ce convenir." Herminjard, IV, 416, and Cornelius, 174, note 1.

<sup>68</sup> Roset, Chroniques, Liv. iv, ch. 17: "Ils crioient la petolle de Dieu, parlans de la parole." Cf. Herminjard, IV, 426.

they refused to administer the communion to a people guilty of such "disorders" and "ridicule of the Word of God."<sup>69</sup> The general council of all the citizens promptly voted on Tuesday, April 23, that "Faret" and Calvin should leave the city within three days. The replies of the preachers to the sheriff are reported to the council and gravely entered in their daily record. "Very well," replied Calvin, "had we served men we should have been ill rewarded, but we serve a great master who will give us our reward." "Good," said Farel, "it is God's will." In marked contrast to the Puritan temper of the preachers was the old-time levity of the Genevese. Farel had been nicknamed by the popular wits "Faret," a burned-out candle-end. After his exile the populace paraded the streets with "farets" in frying-pans to show they had smoked out Farel.<sup>70</sup>

The story of the exile is a significant illustration of how the Puritan programme of enforcement of the Word of God bred in its adherents a spirit of liberty in matters "where Christ has made them free," and a readiness to "hazard all for the sovereignty of God and the Word of God." The precise question at stake is summed up in a document submitted by Calvin and Farel stating the conditions under which they would return. They insisted that the church should have the right to manage its own affairs according to the Word of God, including the right to discipline its membership and ordain its pastors. The statement of the method of excommunication makes plain what Calvin had in mind in the Articles of 1537: "The proper method of excommunication must be restored according to that which we have prescribed, namely, that by the council there should be chosen from each district of the city upright and judicious men upon whom in joint action with us (i.e. the pastors) that duty should rest."<sup>71</sup>

<sup>69</sup> Calvin and Farel to the Council of Bern, 27 April 1538, in Herminjard, IV, 425.

<sup>70</sup> The various votes of the council and replies of Calvin and Farel are in *Registres du Conseil*, quoted in Opera, XXI, 223-227; Herminjard, IV, 416, 423-426; Cornelius, pp. 174-179.

<sup>71</sup> The full conditions submitted by Calvin and Farel, May 1, 1538, to the Synod at Zürich are given in Herminjard, *Correspondance*, V, 2-6. They include the points of discipline, excommunication, more frequent communion, singing of

Calvin's opponents in Geneva proved unable to build up either an orderly state or church. They became discredited through their complaisance toward Bern, were charged with treason, and were unable to prevent riotous outbreaks in the city. In 1540 eight leaders were either executed or forced to flee for their lives. At the same time the ministers who had replaced Calvin and Farel also became discredited through their too great complaisance toward the magistrates and through their own weakness; and, feeling unequal to the task, they withdrew from the city. Through the deposition of his opponents in 1540 and their defeat in the following annual election, Calvin's friends came again into full power in 1541, and endeavored to persuade their exiled pastor to return from Strasburg to Geneva. It proved necessary to have recourse to a long series of persistent attempts on the part of councils, cities, churches, and friends in order to overcome Calvin's strong repugnance to give up his agreeable occupation and quiet home life in Strasburg, and to persuade him to undertake again the hard task at Geneva. Calvin knew he could not change his own character or his programme, and he did not know whether he could change the Genevese. In his private letters to his most trusted friends he speaks frankly of the difficulty of the task, his repugnance for it, and his dread of Geneva. "What, therefore, shall we do? Where shall we begin, if we attempt to rebuild the ruined edifice? If I shall speak a word which is unpleasant for them to hear, forthwith they will enjoin silence."<sup>72</sup> On the 19th of May, 1540, he wrote to Viret: "I could not read without laughing that part of your letter where you show so much solicitude about my health. 'Come to Geneva that I may be better'? Why not say rather 'come straight to the cross'? For it would be far better to perish once for all than to writhe again in that place of torment. Therefore, my dear Viret, if you wish me well, re-

psalms in public worship, already asked for in the Articles of 1537 but not granted. They add a method of adjusting the difficulties about the ordinances of Bern; a division of Geneva into "definite parishes"; a proper increase in the number of ministers; a "legitimate installation of ministers" by ministers; prohibition in both Bern and Geneva of "lascivious and obscene songs and dances composed to the music of the Psalms."

<sup>72</sup> Opera, X, ii, 325. To Farel, 16 March 1539. Translated in Bonnet, Letters, I, 121.

nounce that project."<sup>73</sup> Five months later he wrote to Farel: "Now that by the favor of God I am delivered, who would not excuse me should I be unwilling to plunge myself once more into the gulf and whirlpool which I have already found to be so dangerous and destructive? . . . They will not be tolerable to me nor I to them."<sup>74</sup> On the first of March, 1541, he wrote to Viret: "There is no place under heaven which I could dread more; not because I hate it, but because I see so many difficulties facing me there, which I know I am quite incapable of overcoming. As often as the memory of former times returns, I cannot help shuddering with all my heart at the thought of again entering into those old struggles."<sup>75</sup> With this clear perception of the bitter struggle before him, Calvin showed his Puritan spirit in not shrinking from the task which his conscience persuaded him was laid upon him by God. Three days after he had declared to Farel his unwillingness to plunge again into the whirlpool, and had shown that he clearly recognized the incompatibility of temper (*ingenium*) between himself and the Genevese, he came to this resolve: "When I remember that I am not my own, I offer up my heart slain in sacrifice to God. I have no other desire than that they [the Genevese], setting aside all consideration of me, may look only to what is most for the glory of God and the advantage of the church. . . . I am well aware that it is God with whom I have to do. . . . Therefore I submit my soul (*animus*) bound and fettered to obedience to God."<sup>76</sup> As one reads these phrases concerning "the glory of God and the advantage of the church," a "soul bound and fettered to obedience to God," one is struck with a resemblance to the phrases of the Jesuits, whose order had been founded by papal bull but one month earlier. With all their striking differences in aims and methods, there was a strik-

<sup>73</sup> Opera, XI, 36 (in illa carnificina iterum torqueri).

<sup>74</sup> Ibid. XI, 91, Oct. 21, 1540. Translated in Bonnet, Letters, I, 212.

<sup>75</sup> Ibid. XI, 167. In Bonnet, I, 231.

<sup>76</sup> Cor meum velut mactatum Domino in sacrificium offero—mihi esse negotium cum Deo qui huiusmodi astutias deprehendit. Ergo animum meum vinctum et constrictum subigo in obedientiam Dei. To Farel, 24 Oct. 1540. Opera, XI, 100, and Herminjard, Correspondance, VI, 339, give the date correctly as 24 Oct. 1540 rather than Aug. 1531, assumed in Bonnet, Letters, I, 230.



ing resemblance between Loyola and Calvin in their unflinching devotion to what they believed to be for the glory of God.

With such a spirit Calvin returned to the task of a lifetime, the moulding of the mobile, demonstrative, self-assertive Genevese into the sturdy, self-contained Puritan type which he himself represented.<sup>77</sup> The points in his programme proposed by Calvin in the Articles of 1537 and submitted by him in 1538 as requisite for his return were tacitly granted by Geneva on his recall in 1541. They were included in the systematic "ecclesiastical ordinances" drawn up by Calvin, and amended and adopted by the Genevan council in November, 1541. The Ordinances enacted into law the general features of the Puritan Programme, although the amendments and interpretations by the council interfered with Calvin's more thorough-going provision for the distinct rights of the church.<sup>78</sup> The Ordinances defined the functions of the four officers of the church (pastors, teachers, elders, and deacons) and prescribed the method of their election and correction. This ecclesiastical constitution divided the city into parishes, and provided for systematic worship, discipline, sacraments, religious and intellectual training of children, and the singing of psalms "by all the church." The Ordinances also included regulations for the marriage ceremony, for burials, and for visitation of the sick, poor, and prisoners; prohibition of begging; and provisions for a later and more explicit set of marriage ordinances. The chief additions to the points already noted in the earlier documents are the definition of the rights and duties of the four officers of the church. "The upright and judicious men" whom Calvin had asked for in 1537 and 1538 he recognized in 1541 for the first

<sup>77</sup> When Calvin preached his first sermon after his recall in 1541, he began at the same place in the Scriptures where he had left off in his last sermon three and a half years before.

<sup>78</sup> Calvin's "Projet d'Ordonnances Ecclésiastiques," with the emendations of the council, are given in Opera, X, 15-30. The amended ordinances were adopted by the primary assembly, 20 Nov. 1541; Registres du Conseil, XXXV, fol. 406<sup>ro</sup>. Calvin's draft with emendations still exists in the archives of Geneva, Pièces Historiques, No. 1384. The oath for the ministers is in Opera, X, 31-32. The revised Ordinances of 1561, *ibid.* 91-124. For the changes which Calvin urged in 1560 in order to secure a sharper distinction between "temporal and spiritual jurisdiction," see 120-123, and note.

time as a distinct order of church officers with the name of elders. The council struck out the name elders (*anciens*) in each of the nine cases where it occurred in Calvin's draft, and substituted for it the title "deputies of the council" (*commis par la seigneurie*). It continued to call them "deputies" and to treat them as such for fourteen years. The twelve elders, or deputies, together with the pastors (six, at first), formed the consistory charged with discipline and, nominally, with excommunication. Calvin won for the consistory the right of excommunication only in 1555, after fourteen years of bitter struggle against the council's refusal to recognize the spiritual rights of the church. Yet the Ordinances indicate a growing emphasis on the distinction between church and state at two points; in the treatment of the distinction between civil and ecclesiastical penalties, and in the oath of the minister.<sup>79</sup> The minister swore allegiance first to God and his Word, second to the Ordinances, third to the *Seigneurie* (i.e. the Little Council), and fourth to the statutes of the city, "but without prejudice to the liberty which we ought to have of teaching according as God commands us." Here once more we find the sane combination of liberty and law which characterizes Calvin and the Puritan states where Calvinism took root and bore fruit.

In spite of certain personally aristocratic traits in Calvin, his logic and his practical experience led to increasing emphasis of the rights of the people. It has already been pointed out, in the discussion of the editions of the *Institutes*, that in 1543 he modified his opinion in favor of an aristocratic state to an approval (from which he never afterward varied) of "either aristocracy or a mixture of aristocracy and democracy." This system of "a mixed aristocracy" was that advocated by John Winthrop and practised by the Puritans of Massachusetts Bay a century later.<sup>80</sup> The later years of Calvin's career in Geneva show him fighting to enlarge the number of those entitled to the civil franchise, and to bring about a more representative government in the church. From the time of his triumph in 1555, the policy of

<sup>79</sup> This oath called for in the Ordinances was passed by the council, 17 July 1542. See Opera, X, 31-32.

<sup>80</sup> See Winthrop's "Arbitrary Government Described," etc. (1544), in appendix to R. C. Winthrop's *Life of Winthrop*, II, 440-458 (ed. 1869).

freer admission to burgher rights prevailed, and the numbers increased by leaps and bounds—sixty for example in less than four weeks in May 1555.<sup>81</sup> He also tried to enlarge representative government in the church, and to mark out more sharply the distinction between church and state. In 1560 he urged the council to allow the elders to be chosen from the whole membership of the church and not simply from the citizens (*citoiens*); he requested the council to consult with the whole body of the ministers and not simply with himself in the election of elders, and to discriminate between ecclesiastical discipline and civil penalty; and he suggested a definite opportunity for any one to offer objections to candidates for the ministry.

The council proved ready to accept the last two proposals. In regard to the first, the opening of the eldership to the whole membership of the church, the magistrates frankly acknowledged the logic of Calvin's proposition as following the "Word of God," but even in the days of Calvin's ascendancy they were not prepared to go as far as Calvin wished. Before Calvin came to Geneva, there had been a natural tendency in time of war to centralize authority in the hands of the small and somewhat aristocratic council. On the whole, Calvin's influence tended to prevent this somewhat dangerous development of a political oligarchy and aided a gradual development of representative government. This influence was continued under his successor, so that the aristocratic elements only succeeded in developing unhindered after the ministry grew weak in the later period succeeding Beza.<sup>82</sup>

The political constitution of Geneva had been fixed before the coming of Calvin. He shared, however, in a codification of its civil law drawn up in 1543. Of this feature of his work Rousseau, by no means a Puritan or Calvinist, but nevertheless a by-product of Geneva, wrote thus in his *Social Contract*: "Those who consider Calvin only as a theologian fail to recognize the breadth of his genius. The editing of our wise laws, in which he had a large

<sup>81</sup> See Choisy, *Théocratie*, pp. 175, 185.

<sup>82</sup> See "Geneva before Calvin," *Amer. Hist. Rev.*, Jan. 1903, pp. 221, 237-238, and notes. For Calvin's proposals and the council's votes in 1560 regarding sharper distinction between church and state see Opera X, 120-123.

share, does him as much honor as his *Institutes*. Whatever revolution time may bring in our religion, so long as the love of country and liberty is not extinct among us, the memory of this great man will be held in reverence."<sup>83</sup> Calvin's contribution to the administration and public law of Geneva, and the marvellous political sagacity and effectiveness which he continued to develop until he became one of the shrewdest practical politicians and most effective statesmen of Europe, foreshadow the keen interest which the Puritan, whether minister or layman, took in the affairs of state. An active interest in politics on the part of every citizen was one of the articles of Puritan faith, one of the axioms of the Puritan state.

Several features of the economic programme of the Puritan state had developed in Geneva by 1541. In the "Liberties, franchises, immunities, usages and customs" granted to Geneva by her prince bishop in 1387, the taking of interest had been recognized and protected.<sup>84</sup> Possibly this existing custom may have aided Calvin to see the justice of interest-taking. His attitude toward it illustrates his attitude toward the Scripture; it also illustrates the economic advantage resulting to Protestantism through a more rational use of the Bible and a revision of the canon law. Calvin took the general ground that both reason and equity were to be used in the interpretation of Scripture. The essential aim, and not the form, of a scriptural injunction should be preserved, as was the case in his interpretation of the commandment regarding the Sabbath. "God gave not that law by the hand of Moses to be promulgated among all nations, and to be universally binding; but in all the laws which he gave them he had a special regard to their circumstances."<sup>85</sup> Calvin, moreover, was not a literalist, but was ready to recognize and publicly point out such "errors" of fact in the Bible as the use of Jeremiah for Zechariah in Matthew 27 9;<sup>86</sup> the use of twenty for twenty-five (Acts 7 14,

<sup>83</sup> Rousseau, *Du contrat social*, Liv. ii, ch. 7, note.

<sup>84</sup> The Latin text of the *franchises* of 1387 with the French translations of 1455 was published by E. Mallet in *Mémoires et documents de la Société d'Histoire et d'Archéologie de Genève*, II, 271-399. For interest-taking, see Arts. 34, 35, 39, 77.

<sup>85</sup> *Institutes*, Opera, I, 239.

<sup>86</sup> Opera, XLV, 749.

—*ex errore librariorum*); or of Abraham in Acts 7 16, where he frankly says that Luke drew upon tradition rather than upon Moses, and adds, "there is plainly a mistake, and this place should be corrected."<sup>87</sup> Calvin therefore found no "absolute condemnation" of interest-taking in the Scriptures; for "the law of Moses (Deut. 23 19) is political, and it constrains us no further than equity and human reason demand."<sup>88</sup> In accordance therefore with his general appeal to reason and equity, and his sound interpretation that the essential thing in the law was the prevention of oppression and not the prohibition of earning money through the use of money, Calvin declared that interest-taking was right and not unscriptural, provided only the interest was not unreasonable. Calvin pointed out effectively the fallacy of the barrenness of money, and showed that it was no more sinful to take interest on money than to invest the money in a house and take rent. "Calvin's teaching," says Professor Ashley, "was, in a very real sense, a turning-point in the history of European thought."<sup>89</sup> The effect of such an interpretation was of great economic importance, for it gave Calvinists who accepted it, including the two great commercial nations, the Dutch and the English, a decisive economic advantage over Catholics or Lutherans, who still clung to the canon law prohibition of interest-taking. Incidentally Calvin's interpretation illustrated his tendency toward a re-examination and a freer interpretation of Scripture and toward greater intellectual and economic freedom.

The productive power of the Puritan was increased by his attitude toward labor. The attitude of Calvin and the Puritan was like that of St. Paul, "He who will not work shall not eat."<sup>90</sup> Energetic and tireless himself, Calvin had no sympathy for "idle bellies who chirp sweetly in the shade."<sup>91</sup> Work in Geneva was

<sup>87</sup> Opera, XLVIII, 137, 138.

<sup>88</sup> Ibid. X, 246, De usuris.

<sup>89</sup> Calvin's letter on usury is in Opera, X, 245-249. Ashley, *Economic History*, II, 458-460. See also R. H. Dana, Jr., in Mass. House of Rep., Feb. 14, 1867. Reprinted in *Economic Tracts No. IV*, published by the Amer. Soc. for Political Education, 1881. See pp. 32-36, 43.

<sup>90</sup> See Kampschulte, Calvin, I, 429.

<sup>91</sup> Letter to Daniel, Geneva, Oct. 13, 1536, in Opera, X, ii, 64 : *otiosis illis ventribus, qui apud vos suaviter in umbra garriunt*. Translated in Bonnet, *Letters*, I, 46.

obligatory six days in the week. On the 4th of June, 1537, the council took action to enforce the working part of the Fourth Commandment which they had just approved and printed in their city creed. "There was a discussion regarding the people who observe holidays, and it was voted that every one must work as already proclaimed, without observing holidays save on Sunday. This shall be proclaimed ward by ward (*dizenne*) and under penalty of fine. In case of poor people, the men shall pay three sous, the women six liards; the rich shall be fined amounts to be levied in the Little Council. The tithing-men (*dizenniers*) who deal with a man shall share in the fine."<sup>92</sup> In March, 1538, the councillors, as a part of their anti-clerical and anti-French policy, had insisted on the observance of the four ecclesiastical holidays desired by Bern. Calvin and Farel were ready to agree to this, "provided the somewhat imperious form of the imposition be done away with, and liberty be granted to those who wish to betake themselves to work after the sermon."<sup>93</sup> Here is a striking form of economic liberty—liberty to work six days in the week. Some of the extremists left behind in Geneva after Calvin's exile in April, 1538, were ready to go further than Calvin. They illustrate a later Puritan tendency to a very literal interpretation of Scripture which would regard any holiday save Sunday as unscriptural.<sup>94</sup> This was to out-Calvin Calvin. True to their convictions, however, these extremists refused to go to the communion on Christmas day in 1538. When summoned before the council, they justified themselves for their refusal on the ground that "it says in the commandment of God six days shalt thou labor, whereas Christmas day has been made a holiday."<sup>95</sup> This is

<sup>92</sup> *Registres du Conseil*, XXX, fol. 248, printed in *Opera*, XXI, 211.

<sup>93</sup> Herminjard, *Correspondance*, V, 4; also in Cornelius, *Arbeiten*, p. 182, note 3. This liberty was one of the conditions which Calvin and Farel presented to the synod at Zürich as essential before they would return to Geneva.

<sup>94</sup> This attitude was protested against by the Bernese and Genevan ministers after Calvin's exile. See Herminjard, *Correspondance*, V, 137, and note 9; *ibid.* pp. 137-138, for the criticism of the extremists by the Bernese and Genevan ministers.

<sup>95</sup> "Pource quil dist aut commandement de dieu six jour tu travailieras et que lon avoyt fayct le jour de noel feste," is the quaint entry in the Genevan *Registres du Conseil*, XXXII, fol. 255, for 27th Dec. 1538.

probably the first example of the Puritan layman objecting to the observance of Christmas or to the imposing of a religious holiday by the action of the state. More sane and practical was the interpretation which Calvin added to his second edition of the catechism, published the year after his return to Geneva. "In what way," asks the minister, "do you understand that this commandment is given likewise for the relief of servants?" The child replies: "To give some relaxation (*relasche*) to those who are in the power of others. And this also contributes to public order. For each one gets used to working the rest of the time when there is a day of rest."<sup>66</sup> Spendthrifts (*dissipateurs de biens*) were one class of offenders subject to excommunication in the Confession of 1537. In the Ordinances of 1541 the tithing-men and other officers were charged with enforcement of laws against begging. The requirement of labor was again insisted on in 1560, in proclamations made throughout the city. Under the head of "Dissoluteness" it was ordered, "that no one be so bold or impudent as to commit fornication, get drunk, play the vagabond, or even lose his time, or lead others into dissipation; but that each one must work according to his station, under penalty of being punished by the law according to the nature of the case."<sup>67</sup> The Puritan state, by making the idler suffer both ecclesiastical and civil penalties, and by insisting upon labor by every one, contributed not only to its public order but to its economic efficiency. As Weber has pointed out, the Calvinist had a "calling" not merely in a religious but also in an economic sense.<sup>68</sup>

A study of the measures taken in Geneva would reveal a very sane and efficient care for the social welfare of the people and for sounder economic conditions. In his first edition of the *Institutes* Calvin had laid down the necessity of equitable taxation. "Taxes are not so much private revenues as the treasury of the whole people, or rather the blood of the people and aids of public necessity;

<sup>66</sup> Opera, V, 65.

<sup>67</sup> Proclamation of 1560, reprinted by Cazenove (Montpellier, 1879). Quoted in Borgeaud, *Histoire de l'Université de Genève*, I, 166.

<sup>68</sup> M. Weber, "Die Protestantische Ethik und der Geist des Kapitalismus," in *Archiv für Socialwissenschaft und Socialpolitik*, XX; for effect of "Beruf," "calling," see p. 38 and following, and Part ii, *ibid.* XXI, 1-110 (Tübingen, 1905).

to burden the people with which without cause would be tyrannical rapacity." <sup>99</sup> In the Ecclesiastical Ordinances of 1541 discriminating provision was made for the care of the poor and sick. The hospital was to be better maintained, and the sick were to be separated from the children and old people. Special hospitals were to be established for transients and "for those who shall seem to be worthy of special charity"; and a separate hospital was to be maintained for the pest. Provision was made for a quarterly inspection of the hospitals, and for a physician and a surgeon, in the pay of the city, charged with the care of the hospital and the visitation of the other sick poor throughout the city.<sup>100</sup> Calvin, usually at the request of the magistrates but sometimes at his own suggestion, concerned himself with the sewers of the city; the re-establishment of weaving industries, and the investigation of new methods of heating; with matrimonial questions; and with protection against fire.<sup>101</sup>

An appeal to sincere and deep religious feeling had a large place in the development of the profound devotion and the militant temper of the Puritan state. In recommending the training of children to lead the singing in public worship until gradually all should learn to lift their hearts to God, Calvin was working on long lines. This recommendation in the Articles of 1537 was renewed in 1538 as one of the conditions essential to his return. During the next three years, spent at Strasburg, Calvin drew up for the church of French refugees of which he was pastor an order of worship based on Bucer's modification of Schwarz' translation of the Roman Mass. After his return to Geneva Calvin modified his Strasburg liturgy, making it less Roman; omitting, for example, the promise of absolution, though retaining

<sup>99</sup> Opera, I, 206.

<sup>100</sup> Ibid. X, 23-25. A careful study of medical conditions in Geneva to the end of the 18th century has been published by Dr. Leon Gautier in the *Mém. et doc. de la Soc. d'Hist. et d'Arch. de Genève*, 2nd series, Tome X.

<sup>101</sup> See Opera, X, under the various "Ordonnances" and "Consilia," especially 125-146, 203-210, 231-266. For the new method of heating see Opera, XVI, 496, with sketch of furnace; see comments in Roget, *Histoire*, V, 58. See also references in Kampschulte, Calvin, I, 423-430; and in H. Wiskemann, *Darstellung der in Deutschland zur Zeit der Reformation herrschenden national-ökonomischen Ansichten* (Leipzig, 1861), pp. 79-87.



the striking confession of sins at the opening of the service. His other changes gave an increased importance to the singing of Psalms. The singing of a Psalm was substituted for the Commandments; and another Psalm replaced the Apostles' Creed. The Genevan liturgy was also made more adaptable by giving a place for extempore as well as prescribed form of prayer. In this Genevan liturgy of 1542 four elements of the Reformed or Puritan worship are worth noting. First, the confession of sins at the beginning of the service, drawn upon by both Reformed and Anglican churches; second, the adaptability of worship to different times and places, through diplomatic omissions and through combination of free and fixed prayer; third, the provision for a deeper emotional element through music; and, fourth, the swinging militant lilt that runs through psalm and prayer. The Psalms translated by Marot, Calvin, and Beza were to prove the consolation of the persecuted, while the Psalm of Battle became the Protestant Marseillaise (as Doumergue has called it) of the victorious Huguenots. Sung in the mother tongue by all worshippers, these psalms introduced both a democratic and an emotional element greatly needed in the Protestant service as Calvin found it. In the noble prayers, there is the same militant Puritan ring that appears in the introduction to the Latin catechism of 1538 and in the psalms. The prayer after the sermon closes with a paragraph which summed up the Puritan purpose, sought the Divine aid to accomplish it, and sent out the citizens fired with a zeal to "win a complete victory." As translated by Knox in Scotland it ran thus:

And forasmuch as of ourselves we are so weak, that we are not able to stand upright one minute of an hour, and also that we are so belaid and assaulted evermore with such a multitude of so dangerous enemies, that the devil, the world, sin, and our own concupiscences, do never leave off to fight against us: let it be Thy good pleasure to strengthen us with Thy Holy Spirit, and to arm us with Thy grace, that thereby we may be able constantly to withstand all temptations, and to persevere in this spiritual battle against sin, until such time as we shall obtain the full victory, and so at length may triumphantly rejoice in Thy Kingdom, with our Captain and Governor Jesus Christ our Lord.<sup>102</sup>

<sup>102</sup> Sprott and Leishman, *Book of Common Order*, pp. 96-97. The editors followed the edition of 1611, but modernized the spelling.

The Genevan liturgy was marked by a felicitous combination of simplicity and dignity, giving it a power and flexibility which led to its adoption by the Reformed churches in Geneva, Holland, France, Scotland, and by the Early Puritans in England.<sup>103</sup> There is much in both its spirit and its form which would still be of service to many churches unaware of the richness of their own Puritan liturgical inheritance.

One other feature of the Puritan programme of worship indicates the practical attitude of mind of the Puritan in all lands and his keen interest in social welfare. To "psalms and hymns of praise, the reading of the gospel, the confession of faith," Calvin added in the communion service "holy oblations and offerings." The contribution was a part of worship. "As children of God who seek his kingdom and his justice, . . . we offer and submit ourselves entirely to God the Father and to our Lord Jesus Christ, in recognition of so many and so great benefits. And we testify this by offerings and holy gifts (as Christian charity requires) which are given to Jesus Christ through his little ones, those who hunger or thirst, or are naked, or are strangers, or sick or in prison."<sup>104</sup> The Puritan was a thrifty man of business, but he was also a generous benefactor. It was thoroughly characteristic of the Puritan that the University of Geneva should have been founded not only upon a public grant by a representative assembly, but also upon gifts by citizens of all classes, even by Jénon the baker woman who gave five sous.<sup>105</sup>

One of the fundamental characteristics of Puritan states was their care for education. In the turmoil of 1538, a few months

<sup>103</sup> Strype, *Life of Grindal*, ch. xii, p. 114; *Life of Parker*, Bk. iv, ch. v, p. 325. Cf. Procter and Frere, *Hist. of Bk. of Common Prayer*, pp. 86 ff., 131-133. Calvin's Liturgy, or "Form of Prayers," for Geneva of 1542 is in Opera, VI, 173-184. Knox's translation is in various editions, most conveniently in Sprott and Leishman, *Book of Common Order of Church of Scotland* (Edinburgh, 1868). It is also in Knox's Works (ed. Laing), VI, ii, pp. 293 ff.; "The Form of Prayers, etc., used in the English Church of Geneva," *ibid.* IV, 141-214. The English Puritan's use of the "Genevan form" is commented upon by Strype in his *Life of Grindal* p. 169, and *Life of Parker*, p. 65.

<sup>104</sup> The subject of Calvin's liturgy is discussed in Doumergue, *Calvin*, II, 479-524, with bibliography; and is briefly summed up in Walker's *Calvin*, pp. 222-226.

<sup>105</sup> Borgeaud, *Histoire de l'Université de Genève*, I, 35.

before the exile of the preachers, there was published in Latin and French the programme of the College, or Gymnasium, in Geneva. It was probably drawn up by Antoine Saunier, the prefect, and reviewed by Calvin and Maturin Cordier. In general it followed the two leading ideas of Sturm, the development of knowledge conducive to piety and the gradation of the school into classes. But the object of the school was not simply the preservation of the church but also "political administration and the maintenance of humanity among men." There is a modern and practical tendency noticeable in the provision for a living language, French, "which is by no means to be despised," and for the "art of arithmetic, that is, numbering, figuring, and calculating." Exercises began at five, stopped at ten for dinner, and continued in the afternoon. Place was found in the daily programme for the repetition of the three documents on which the *Institutes*, the Confession, and the Catechism were based (the Ten Commandments, the Lord's Prayer, and the Apostles' Creed), and for a chapter in the Bible, all in French. As especial inducements at Geneva, the circular pointed out the frequent disputations on the Christian religion, five sermons on the pure Word of God on Sunday and two on each week-day, with "the hours so distributed that one may easily attend all the sermons one after the other"—a Puritan total of seventeen possible sermons a week! The logical necessity for education in a Biblical commonwealth is recognized in the closing paragraphs of the circular: "Although we defer primarily to the Word of God, we do not reject good training (*bonas disciplinas*), which rightly occupies second place. For these two things work together best when united in this order, so that the Word of God is the foundation of all knowledge, and the liberal arts are props and aids to the full knowledge of the Word, and not to be despised."<sup>106</sup>

On his recall to Geneva, Calvin included in the Ecclesiastical Ordinances of 1541 a definition of the work of the "teachers" (*docteurs*), who were to form the second order of church officers.

<sup>106</sup> The Latin text of the "Programme" of Jan. 12, 1538, is printed in Herminjard, *Correspondance*, IV, 455-460. It was printed in French at the same time, and reprinted by Bétant in 1866. See also Buisson, *Castellion*, I, 145-149; Borgeaud, *Histoire de l'Université de Genève*, I, 16-18.

That part of their function which was related most closely to the government of the church consisted in lecturing on theology based on both the Old and New Testaments. "But since one cannot profit by such studies unless he be first instructed in languages and human sciences, and since also there is need of preserving the seed for the future in order that the church may not be left naked to our children, it will be necessary to organize a college for instructing the children in order to prepare them for both the ministry and the civil government." This paragraph is instinct with the thought, and almost the phraseology, which later found expression in the words of the author of *New England's First Fruits* and in the New England statutes regarding education. The Ordinances went on to indicate the steps which should be taken. There should be a place suitable for instruction and for the residence of children and others who may wish to profit by it; a man fit to manage both the house and the teaching; lectures in languages and dialectic; and bachelors for teaching the small children. There should be no other school for the children, save that the girls should have their school apart as heretofore. "All those who shall be there shall be subject to the ecclesiastical discipline as the ministers are." This subjected teachers as well as pastors to a very severe system of discipline, either at the hands of the consistory, with final report to the council, or directly at the hands of the council if the crime were punishable by the civil law. The ministers were to meet weekly for conference on the Scripture to preserve purity of doctrine, and quarterly to remedy any other offences among them. A formidable list of some thirty-four offences was included for which a minister might be tried, eighteen "utterly intolerable crimes," and sixteen vices which could be met through "fraternal admonitions." To all these provisions the teaching force was to be subjected. To this the council made no objection, though it had already so modified Calvin's proposals for discipline of all ministers (including the teachers) as to reserve to itself the final decision in all cases. On one point, however, the council modified Calvin's statement regarding the teachers. This was as to their election. The council was unwilling to leave this to the ministers, but provided for the council's co-operation before, after, and during the examination of candidates.

To the development of the college thus outlined in 1541 Calvin gave much thought and time. The culmination of the Puritan intellectual programme for Geneva, the establishment of a university with fully organized higher instruction, was delayed until 1559, when Geneva, in the words of the scholarly historian of its University, became "a church, a school, and a fortress."<sup>107</sup>

These early years of the work of Calvin and Geneva, from 1536 to 1541, cover only the beginning of the programme for a Puritan state; not its realization, nor all its phases, nor its limitations. Another generation was to witness the victorious outcome of the long and bitter fight to carry out the plan of campaign of the church and state militant. Yet the beginning of the struggle reveals the tendencies which ultimately worked out those by-products of the Puritan state which the modern world regards among its dearest possessions, civil and religious liberty, economic efficiency, and sound learning.

Even in its own day, the early Puritan programme, by its insistent emphasis on moral obligation and moral training, economic efficiency, sound learning, the freedom of the church, and the preservation of liberty through law, bred a militant temper, ready to "hazard life for the sovereignty of God and the Word of God," and a moral vigor and political insight fit to cope with the moral indifference and the political absolutism which threatened the age of Machiavelli, Rabelais, and Philip II.

<sup>107</sup> Borgeaud, *Histoire de l'Université de Genève*, I, 83.

*THE PSYCHOLOGY OF RELIGION*

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As every one knows, psychology is a word to conjure with. We have today the Psychology of Art, the Psychology of Business, the Psychology of Advertising, the Psychology of Childhood, of Adolescence, and of Old Age, the Psychology of various great men and of various centuries and epochs, until one stands quite aghast at the psychological insight of our times, and feels that the key to everything and anything worth knowing must surely be in the hands of the omniscient psychologist. In fact, psychology would seem to have enlarged her bounds at the expense of every other subject, and to have chosen all knowledge to be her province; so that he who desires his book or treatise on any subject whatever to be regarded as strictly "modern" and "scientific" must needs endow it with a psychological title. This is indeed a short and easy method of becoming a psychologist; and the result is—as one might expect—that all the psychology contained in many of these works is spread, usually in large letters, upon the title-page. All is not gold that glitters; neither is every treatise psychological which bears that mystic word upon its cover.

In no field of serious inquiry are these remarks more pertinent than in that of religion. Our book-shelves and our periodicals are laden with works on "religious psychology," most of which prove on examination to be hardly more psychological than anatomical or geographical. Treatises on theology and statistics, on Church history and Sunday-school methods, as well as that large and amorphous class of writings which twenty years ago would have appeared under the title "Philosophy of Religion"—all these are now pressing themselves upon our attention by the use of that potent shibboleth, "Psychology." And yet, though one-half the works with titles of this nature have not much more to do with genuine psychology than with the weather, there is,

I believe, a young branch of scientific inquiry which rightly deserves the name Psychology of Religion.

The attempt to treat the religious consciousness psychologically did not come altogether out of the blue: like other branches of science, it had its precursors of various sorts. The most important of these were anthropology and the history of religion, on the one hand, and the philosophy of religion, on the other. Since the days of Kant it had been customary for writers on the latter subject to take up incidentally the question of the psychological nature of religion, especially in their attempts at defining their subject-matter. These discussions brought out a good many psychological distinctions and descriptions of more or less value; but no attempt was made to collect data and study them inductively in modern scientific fashion. This lack of an empirical basis makes it impossible to accept the results of the various philosophies of religion as genuine psychology; though as the expressions of religious men, and therefore as data bearing on the religious consciousness, they are often of considerable indirect value. The work of the anthropologists, on the other hand, though thoroughly empirical, is from the objective or external point of view, and therefore, while furnishing valuable material to the psychologist, is not itself psychology.

The psychology of religion is therefore, as I have said, a very young branch of inquiry, being in fact hardly more than a dozen years old. I shall not attempt to say who started it. Perhaps no one can justly claim that honor; but, if it can be given to any one man, it must be awarded to President G. Stanley Hall, of Clark University. This I say both because of his own pioneer work in this field and still more because of his guiding influence over a number of young psychologists doing graduate work under him on subjects chosen at his suggestion. Thus was formed what one may very properly call the Clark school of religious psychology.

The work seems to have taken its start in some investigations concerning the various phenomena of adolescence. In 1882 Dr. Hall published an article in the *Princeton Review*<sup>1</sup> entitled "The Moral and Religious Training of Children," in which he empha-

<sup>1</sup> New Series, IX, 26-45.

sized the importance of the years between twelve and sixteen, the sudden changes in both mind and body and the new birth of energy and feeling that take place during that period. This subject was taken up again a number of years later by two graduate students of Clark University, Mr. William H. Burnham and Mr. Arthur H. Daniels, whose investigations,<sup>2</sup> based on empirical data gathered in part from responses to questionnaires, in part from the facts of anthropology, lie well within the field of the psychology of religion.<sup>3</sup>

The investigations thus far referred to, though valuable, owe their chief importance to their pioneer character. It was not until the year 1896 that the first article of great intrinsic value appeared; namely, the first of a long series of important papers by Mr. James H. Leuba (also, at that time, of Clark University), entitled "The Psychology of Religious Phenomena."<sup>4</sup> The subject of the work, as was natural for a pioneer attempt, was that most striking of religious phenomena, conversion. Mr. Leuba went at his task in thoroughly scientific fashion. He collected materials for his study from various sources, especially from the published accounts of the conversions of distinguished leaders, and also by means of a questionnaire. Basing his conclusions on these empirical data, he analyzed the psychological conditions leading up to conversion, the crisis itself, and the state following it; he described the mental condition of the enthusiastic believer (the "faith state"), showed the necessity of self-surrender as a precondition of conversion, and the sudden and passive nature of the transition when it finally came; and thus displayed the psychological basis for the Christian doctrines of faith, justification, pardon, etc. The whole process was treated from the naturalistic point of view, the causal sequences traced, and the idea of supernatural intervention ruled out. "We must conceive

<sup>2</sup> "A Study of Adolescence," by William H. Burnham, *Pedagogical Seminary* I (1891), 174-195.

"The New Life; a Study in Regeneration," by Arthur H. Daniels, *American Journal of Psychology*, VI (1895), 61-108.

<sup>3</sup> If space permitted, mention should here be made of the investigations in the religion of childhood by Hall, Barnes, Brown, and others, carried on at this same time.

<sup>4</sup> *American Journal of Psychology*, VII, 309-385.



of faith," says Leuba, "as supervening upon specific and always identical psychological phenomena."

This naturalistic attitude dominates in a general way all the writers in this field, but no others have carried it through so consistently and emphasized it so strongly and, I may add, so dogmatically, as has Leuba. It is the key-note of nearly all the papers from his pen which have appeared in rather quick succession since 1896. These contributions of his are of varying degrees of excellence; they often repeat each other, and at times attempt too great simplification; yet in their consistent scientific point of view and their keen psychological analysis they form a body of writings of very great value and importance. Professor Leuba is a genuine and able psychologist, and his contributions have a right to the name "psychology of religion." They deserve a much wider reading than they have yet enjoyed.<sup>6</sup>

The year after Leuba's first article appeared, two other graduate students of Clark University, under the influence and guidance

<sup>6</sup> Professor Leuba's rather limited reputation and influence among the reading public may be due in part to the fact that he has never put his contributions in book form. I am glad to be able to add, however, that he is now engaged in the preparation of two books, one a small volume to be entitled *The Psychological Origin and the Nature of Religion* (Constable & Company, London), the other a much larger work, whose title and publisher are not yet determined upon. I give herewith a list of his more important articles in the order in which they appeared:

"Psychology of Religious Phenomena," *American Journal of Psychology*, VII (1906), 309-385.

"Introduction to a Psychological Study of Religion," *Monist*, XI (1901), 195-255.

"The Contents of Religious Consciousness," *Monist*, XI (1901), 535-573.

"Religion: Its Impulses and its Ends," *Bibliotheca Sacra*, LVIII (1901), 757-769.

"Tendances fondamentales des mystiques Chrétiens," *Revue Philosophique*, LIV (1902), 1-36; 441-487.

"The State of Death," *American Journal of Psychology*, XIV (1903), 397-409.

"Faith," *American Journal of Religious Psychology and Education*, I (1904), 65-112.

"The Field and Problems of the Psychology of Religion," *American Journal of Religious Psychology and Education*, I (1904), 155-167.

"On the Psychology of a Group of Christian Mystics," *Mind*, XIV (1905), 15-27.

"Fear, Awe, and the Sublime in Religion," *American Journal of Religious Psychology and Education*, II (1906), 1-23.

"Religion as a Factor in the Struggle for Life," *American Journal of Religious Psychology and Education*, II (1907), 307-343.

of Dr. Hall, entered the field, Mr. Edwin D. Starbuck and Mr. E. G. Lancaster. The interest of the latter was chiefly in the adolescent period as such,<sup>6</sup> while the work of the former<sup>7</sup> was wholly upon the religious questions connected with adolescence, dealing in great detail with conversion and religious awakening in its various phases. Like some of its predecessors, it is based on the answers to several questionnaires, and is divided into two parts, first, conversion, and, second, lines of religious growth not involving conversion. One may perhaps fairly question the wisdom of Dr. Starbuck's almost implicit confidence in the questionnaire method; for the responses seem at times to have been accepted and used uncritically, and rather too much is made of figures and statistical tables. Yet it would be ungracious and unjust to throw any doubt upon the genuine value of this admirable work. It presents a mass of valuable data fairly well digested and interpreted, and is of great importance for practical as well as theoretical purposes as a careful and scholarly study of the growth of the religious consciousness. The book deserves the wide reading which it has received, and is one of the two or three most important contributions to the psychology of religion that have yet been made.<sup>8</sup>

Before turning from what I have called the Clark school, I should mention the foundation in May, 1904, by Dr. Hall, of a periodical for the exclusive study of the psychology of religion, the *Journal of Religious Psychology and Education*. Thus far the articles that have appeared in it have been, it must be confessed, rather disappointing. A few of them have been excellent, but very many have had but little genuinely psychological value. The issues of the *Journal*, moreover, have been but few and very far between, and it might rightly be described as being published "every little while." Although it was founded four

<sup>6</sup> "The Psychology and Pedagogy of Adolescence," by E. G. Lancaster, Pedagogical Seminary, V, 61-128.

<sup>7</sup> The Psychology of Religion, London, 1903. (First appeared in the American Journal of Psychology.)

<sup>8</sup> In connection with the Clark school reference should be made to three other contributions: Hylan's Public Worship (Chicago, 1901); Dr. Hall's Adolescence (New York, 1904); and Moses's Pathological Aspects of Religions (Worcester, 1906).

years and a half ago, only seven numbers have thus far appeared. Between March, 1906, and September, 1907, nothing was heard of it, and in the latter month two numbers were issued in one, in the praiseworthy attempt to make up for lost time. Its chief value thus far consists in its reviews of the literature of the subject, and, most of all, in forming a centre for the encouragement of work in this new field.<sup>9</sup>

It may justly be said that the Clark school has contributed almost half the work of any value that has yet been done in this country on the psychology of religion. It was the first to apply empirical methods thoroughly to the study of the religious consciousness. It has collected an immense amount of data, and its chief merit, as well as its chief characteristic, is the emphasis which it has always put upon the value of facts as such. As might be expected, moreover, it has the defects of its qualities. Its fondness for facts seems at times almost a blind craving. Meaning and perspective are often disregarded and forgotten in the worship of the naked fact. The apocryphal tale concerning the *Report on Child Study*, that out of eleven children who were pinched five said, "Ouch!" and six said, "Ou!" seems quite credible to one who has read some of the writings of the Clark School. Thus from one of these (itself in many ways a valuable piece of work) I cull the following: "Stained glass windows were preferred by 149 of 175 who answered the question. Of these, 19 wished pictures in them." Yet it must be said that love of facts is a good fault, especially in a young science. The psychology of religion will not be beyond the early empirical stage for some time to come, and it is a fortunate thing that in its youthful years it has been so largely formed and guided by a body of thorough-going empiricists.

But the men of the Clark school have not been the only workers in this field. Even on the subject of conversion, which has been so exhaustively studied at Worcester, some of the best work has

<sup>9</sup> In this connection I should mention the foundation in May, 1907, of another journal in the same field and with the same object, the *Zeitschrift für Religionspsychologie*, edited by Dr. Johannes Bresler, in Halle, and appearing monthly. The articles that have thus far appeared in it pay especial attention to pathological religious phenomena. A large part of each number is devoted to excellent reviews of the literature of the subject.

been done by men in other parts of the country. Prominent among these are Professor George A. Coe and Mr. Luther Gulick.<sup>10</sup> Professor Coe's book, *The Spiritual Life*, has been widely read, and has exerted a considerable influence upon the ministry, especially in the Methodist Church. It follows lines similar to those of Starbuck's *Psychology of Religion*, dealing chiefly with conversion and religious feeling; and, though without so broad an empirical basis as the latter book has, its facts are critically and safely interpreted. Like Starbuck's book, also, it is of practical as well as theoretical value, and is a useful guide to those dealing with religious problems at first hand. It is encouraging to note that these two investigators, though working quite independently of each other, have reached almost identical conclusions.

The most important single contribution to the psychology of religion is, of course, Professor James's *Varieties of Religious Experience*, first given as the Gifford Lectures at Edinburgh in 1901-1902, and later published in book form (London, 1903). Unlike most of its predecessors of which I have made mention, it is not limited to a single topic such as adolescence or conversion, but covers a great number of religious phenomena. The book is so widely read and has been so frequently reviewed that I need not comment upon it here. Like the works of the Clark school, it is thoroughly empirical in its point of view, being based chiefly, not indeed upon responses to a questionnaire, but upon biographies of religious leaders and other individuals whose religious nature has been marked and developed beyond the ordinary. Possibly it is in part the result of this that, on the one hand, the book is entirely without any of those meaningless and ill-digested accumulations of facts which sometimes mar the work of the Clark school, and that, on the other hand, a slightly distorted view of the religious consciousness has been given, much stress being laid on extreme and often abnormal cases, while the average and commonplace is neglected as being uninteresting and uninteresting. Much, however, may be said for Professor James's choice of cases, as it is a well-known fact that any phenomenon can be at least more clearly made out when accentuated, and not overlaid by, nor confused with, a mass of irrelevant material. And certainly,

<sup>10</sup> "Sex and Religion," *Association Outlook*, 1897-98.

without the assistance of his somewhat extreme types, Professor James would have had some difficulty in building up so good a case for his final thesis as he has done. For his book is not, like most of its predecessors, merely a psychological study of certain varieties of religious experience; it is, in addition to that, an attempt to see whether the facts studied may not be regarded as having some ultimate significance, and as bearing one way or the other on the deeper philosophical questions of religion. As everyone knows, Professor James's conclusion is that these facts are genuinely and deeply significant; that the religious view of the universe is nearer the truth than the limited view of natural science; and that we may accept it as a demonstrable truth of psychology that "the conscious person is continuous with a wider self through which saving experiences come."<sup>11</sup>

Professor James's emphasis upon the importance of the marginal region of the mind is criticised in Dr. Irving King's admirable monograph, *The Differentiation of the Religious Consciousness*.<sup>12</sup> This work deals with religion as a social rather than as an individual product, and especially as a tribal reaction among primitive peoples.

Two more books, each dealing with a limited portion only of the general field, should perhaps be mentioned before turning from America to France; I refer to Professor Davenport's *Primitive Traits in Religious Revivals* and my own *Psychology of Religious Belief*. The former is a study of the revival from the psychological and sociological points of view; the latter an attempt to analyze religious belief and to discover its psychological bases or elements and its present strength.

The psychology of religion was born and has flourished best in America; and for the very good reason that there is so much religion here to be studied. In this country religion has not been compressed into a formal and uniform mould, as is likely to be the case in Catholic lands, nor has its emotional expression, so interesting to the psychologist, been suppressed by the proprieties and conventions of a self-conscious culture. Something, however, has been done in other countries, particularly in France, on the

<sup>11</sup> Page 515.

<sup>12</sup> *Psychological Review*, Monograph Supplement, January, 1905.

psychology of religion.<sup>13</sup> But the French psychologists, not having the advantages of the American community with its innumerable and varied living specimens close at hand, have turned to the records of the past for their material. By this I do not mean to imply that France is not a religious country, nor that it cannot furnish a great deal of valuable data for the psychologist. Some excellent work has in fact been done, particularly by M. Arréat,<sup>14</sup> on material gathered at first hand and largely by means of questionnaires, dealing with the religious consciousness in France today. But the expressions of religion in France are so stamped and colored by the forms of an ancient and firmly established ecclesiasticism that they lack the spontaneity and naturalness so prominent in the American type. Hence, as I have said, most of the French psychologists who have interested themselves in religion have sought their material in biographies rather than from questionnaires; and it is therefore in France that we find the best psychological work upon that very important phenomenon, mysticism. Innumerable treatises upon the mystics had, of course, long been compiled—treatises theological, historical, physiological—but no serious study had been made upon them from the strictly psychological point of view until the new school of psychologists of religion entered upon their work.<sup>15</sup> The first of these to take the field was Professor Ernest Murisier, of the Académie de Neuchâtel in Paris. In 1901 he published a book entitled *Les maladies du sentiment religieux*, which formed the starting-point for a considerable amount of genuine psychological work on the mystics. The book is devoted to a study of two kinds of *maladie*, namely, an extreme type of mysticism, and fanaticism. Murisier shows that each of these abnormal phe-

<sup>13</sup> I have already referred to the German periodical of religious psychology, and if space permitted mention should here be made of the work of Vorbrodt, Kinast, Vierkandt, Braasch, and others, as well as of two or three English investigators. In neither of these countries, however, has the psychology of religion been so clearly differentiated from the philosophy of religion as is the case in America and France.

<sup>14</sup> *Le sentiment religieux en France*, Paris, 1903.

<sup>15</sup> Mention should, however, be made of Charbonnier's *Maladies des mystiques* (1874), and Lejeune's *Introduction à la vie mystique* (1899), which, though not chiefly psychological in aim, contain much genuine psychology.

nomena is an exaggeration of a normal tendency: one, of the tendency to unify one's own personality; the other, of the impulse to social usefulness. The title of the book (together with its implications) is unfortunate, being at once too narrow and too broad, implying, as it does, that mysticism and fanaticism are the only forms of religious pathology, and, on the other hand, that all forms of mysticism are pathological. Of course there have been abnormal mystics, and Murisier's study of these is admirable; but to write down mysticism as such, at the very start, as a "*mala-die du sentiment religieux*" is dogmatic and unempirical. If one makes allowance for these defects, however, and reads Murisier's book merely as an analysis of certain admittedly pathological phenomena, he will find it extremely illuminating. Its influence has already been very considerable, and its value as a contribution to this branch of psychology is, I believe, not merely that of a pioneer but intrinsic and permanent. It was a great misfortune to the psychology of religion that Professor Murisier, who gave such brilliant promise, died only two years after the publication of his book.

The unfortunate one-sidedness of Murisier's work on mysticism has in large part been avoided by subsequent writers on this subject—prominent among whom should be mentioned Delacroix, Godfernaux, Boutroux, Leuba, and de Montmorand.<sup>16</sup> The best single article that has yet appeared on mysticism is probably that of Professor Leuba, "*Tendances fondamentales des mystiques Chrétiens*," which was published in the *Revue Philosophique* in 1902.<sup>17</sup> The same emphasis on the naturalistic point of view that was seen in Leuba's other writings is here especially manifest, and great pains are taken to show that every detail of the mystic's experience can be fully accounted for in terms of physiological psychology. Yet while he resolutely rules

<sup>16</sup> Delacroix's book is entitled *Études d'histoire et de psychologie du mysticisme* (Paris, 1908). It is not only the latest, but the most elaborate and exhaustive, treatment of the subject yet made.

Boutroux's work appeared in the *Bulletin de l'Institut Psychol. Int.*, that of the others in the *Revue Philosophique*, between 1902 and 1905.—I make no mention here of the work of Binet-Sanglé, as it deals almost exclusively with the pathological side of religion.

<sup>17</sup> LIV, 1-36; 441-487.

out the transcendental, and refuses to attribute any ultimate or metaphysical significance to mysticism, Leuba is quite willing to admit its moral value, and does much greater justice to the mystics than did Murisier.

No one could put the naturalistic view of mysticism, and of religion in general, more clearly or more persuasively than Leuba has done. Yet that another point of view is possible, and that even psychologists may take it, is shown not only by Professor James's *Varieties* but by some of the writers of the French school, notably Boutroux and Flournoy.<sup>18</sup> These men admit all the facts as described by the physiological psychologist, yet maintain that the facts may bear, and that some of them do bear, a philosophical significance which goes beyond the province of physiological psychology.

The psychology of religion of course does not wish to be metaphysics. It would be merely a science, descriptive and empirical, dealing frankly with phenomena, and ranking merely as a branch of general psychology. As such it collects data, compiles statistics, makes comparisons, and seeks to pass from the level of mere facts to classifications, generalizations, and laws. It is with this aim in view that it has made use of purely empirical methods and has sought to formulate its results in purely psychological and physiological terms. Whether it has always been successful in these efforts is indeed somewhat dubious. Its use of the questionnaire method has frequently been uncritical, and its physiological phraseology and fanciful explanations of complex states by diagrams of nerve-paths seem often an attempt at too great simplification; sometimes they impress one as positively ridiculous. Yet, though it has not fully learned the use of its tools, it has maintained with fair consistency a just notion of its proper aim—namely, to discover the facts, and to describe, classify, and explain them.

While all this is true, however, and while every reference to anything "supernatural" is rightly barred out from psychology as a natural science, it might conceivably be found that the facts

<sup>18</sup> Professor Flournoy's most important contributions are the following: "Les principes de la psychologie religieuse," *Archives de Psychologie*, II, 33-57; and "Observations de psychologie religieuse," *ibid.* II, 323-366.



as collected and described could best be explained and accounted for on some hypothesis other than the somewhat naïve naturalism adopted by the majority of scientists. It might, for example, turn out that the data in hand pointed toward some such hypothesis as that of Professor James—a “wider self” or psychic “beyond,” in touch with the subconscious portion of our lives. If further investigations continued to point more and more in this direction, and new evidence for the existence of such a “beyond” were forthcoming, new facts which seemed best explicable on such a supposition, this hypothesis would have to be regarded as a perfectly scientific one, and the “beyond” would not be something supernatural but just one of the regular facts of nature, like the western hemisphere or the process of digestion or the state of hypnosis. The scientist sees nothing supernatural in the luminiferous ether, and he believes in its existence because of certain facts, which indeed might conceivably be otherwise explained, but which seem most simply and fully explicable on that hypothesis. So it might very well be with the psychological hypothesis in question. To maintain that such an hypothesis is “*grundsätzlich ausgeschlossen*,” that it is impossible because “unscientific,” is dogmatic and unempirical, and is an utterly unwarranted playing into the hands of a crude and shallow materialism. It is often forgotten that naturalism of this kind involves a metaphysic quite as truly as does idealism.

And much indeed may be said for such a non-naturalistic explanation. There are certain facts connected with mysticism and the religious consciousness which seem to point in that general direction. The naturalistic school has still a great deal to do before it can prove its hypothesis the only tenable one. In a sense, to be sure, it can explain all the facts of the religious consciousness, just as the Ptolemaic theory can be made to explain all the movements of the heavenly bodies. The question still remains, Is it the best explanation? Until more data have come in, the naturalistic and what I may call the religious hypotheses must run along parallel with each other as rival alternatives. And so long as science looks to experience as its guide and remains genuinely empirical, the truly scientific man will keep an open mind, and though he may believe one of the alternatives to be

false, will remember that further experience may show him to be mistaken, and hence that it behooves him, in the present state of our ignorance, to avoid dogmatism on either side of the controversy.

The question, then, is still an open one. But, on the other hand, we must not forget that the naturalistic hypothesis has proved itself most useful and fruitful in results in all fields in which it has been consistently applied—something which can hardly be said for its rival, which has only too often, in the hands of over-enthusiastic and uncritical supporters, proved a stumbling-block to genuine scientific progress. And it must be admitted, moreover, that while the religious hypothesis has by no means been disproved, it is still far from showing itself indisputably and clearly the best explanation. It is still, like its rival, merely one of two possible alternatives. So long as this is the case, it would seem best for the psychologist, *as psychologist*, to work along the lines laid down by the naturalistic hypothesis, and to seek to explain all the facts so far as possible by means of the laws already clearly established by physiological psychology. If he doubts their sufficiency to explain everything, let him subject them to the test of universal application; for, if they are really inadequate and in need of supplementation, their insufficiency can be shown in no better way. This he should do, I say, as a psychologist; but this in no wise hinders him from holding to whatever transcendental explanation he may, as a religious man or as a philosopher, deem most satisfactory. An idealistic universe may be large enough to embrace a naturalistic science. And while we are still uncertain as to the proper explanation of our facts, the many data of psychology which seem to point toward a religious interpretation of the world, even though they fit in with a naturalistic description, may very properly combine with one's otherwise grounded religious outlook or idealistic philosophy to justify one, *as a man*, in holding to such a belief.

There is, therefore, nothing to hinder the psychology of religion from furnishing philosophy with material which it can use in support of a religious view of reality; and there is much in the recent investigations of the religious consciousness which may well strengthen the faith of the religious man. But it is not

merely on the theoretical side that the new science can be of use to religion. In fact the practical religious worker will gain quite as much assistance from this branch of investigation as will the philosopher or the theologian. The recent elaborate and exact studies in the religion of childhood, the phenomena of adolescence, the nature of conversion and the age at which it is to be expected, and in several other related subjects, cannot fail to be of value to the intelligent pastor, teacher, and parent. And in a more general sense the psychology of religion should be of considerable practical assistance to all those who are seriously studying the larger tendencies of the times and earnestly seeking to contribute their share toward the wise guidance of the community in its religious life.

There is a growing feeling, shared by most close students of the times, that we are in the midst of a serious religious crisis. The almost universal acceptance of biological evolution, the higher criticism of the Scriptures, the naturalistic trend of modern science, and the general increasing demand for independence of thought, are bringing about their inevitable results. The old authorities and the old arguments for the religious view of the world are yearly, even daily, losing their hold over the community. Views which would have been considered downright heresy twenty-five years ago are taught in most of our colleges and theological seminaries and openly preached from our pulpits. Side by side with this intellectual change has come a falling off in church attendance and a loss of prestige on the part of the church in general. And so the question inevitably forces itself upon every serious observer who has the interests of the community and the race at heart, whether religion, if it is to last, must not give up her time-honored trust in the old authorities and seek to draw most or all of her strength from some other quarter.

In trying to answer this vitally serious question we must avail ourselves of every means in our power to see the situation exactly as it is. What, in short, is the real strength of religion in the community? And here we have a right to look for assistance to the psychology of religion. As yet, indeed, but little has been done toward answering this question; but the task of feeling the pulse of the religious community and investigating the real nature

and strength of its religious belief naturally belongs to religious psychology, and, though vast, is well worth its while. An interesting investigation with a somewhat similar aim has just been concluded by the *Mercure de France*,<sup>19</sup> which, though hardly belonging to psychology in the stricter sense of the word, furnishes rich material to the psychologist, and possibly throws some light upon the problem just referred to. The following question was sent out to a number of the leaders of thought throughout Europe: "Are we passing through a dissolution, or an evolution, of religious ideas and of the religious sentiment?" To this question over one hundred and twenty-five answers were received, of which about twenty maintained that religion is destined to dissolution, while a hundred or more insisted that it is imperishable. Of course a mere collection of opinions such as this touches only the surface of the problem. A more thorough going investigation and one more psychological in its nature is that of M. Arréat in the book referred to a few pages back, *Le sentiment religieux en France*. After a careful consideration of the facts at hand, Arréat reaches the conclusion that "France has ceased to be passionately Catholic," and that there is no reason to believe it will ever become Protestant. "The Frenchman gives up the religion of his fathers to turn to scepticism or some philosophy." But, as the writer points out, this philosophy, and even this scepticism, may be, if not essentially Christian, at least thoroughly religious. For the man who is naturally religious will remain so, no matter what his creed; and religious belief is not confined to what we call either Catholicism or Protestantism. For all who desire to inform themselves on the religious condition of France today Arréat's book is invaluable; and investigations of a similar nature in England, Germany, and this country are a decided desideratum.<sup>20</sup> If the study were seriously undertaken by a number

<sup>19</sup> See the numbers for April 15, May 1 and 15, June 1 and 15, and July 1, 1907. Professor Goblet d'Alviella has published a brief summary of the investigation in the *Revue de Belgique*, which was reproduced in translation in the *Open Court* for January, 1908.

<sup>20</sup> Something of the sort has of course been done by a number of writers: cf. Shailer Mathews's *The Church and the Changing Order*, and Dr. Broda's review of the religious situation the world over in the *International* for March, 1908.

of capable investigators and a much greater body of data collected than Arréat was able to gather, it would furnish us with some very serviceable information as to the real status of religious belief and feeling. We can hardly steer our course wisely and successfully unless we know with some approximate degree of exactness just where we are.

There is, however, something of vastly greater importance and usefulness in this matter than statistics, and that is a knowledge of the real nature of religion and of the religious consciousness in general. From what region of man's nature does religion chiefly spring? Where are its strongest intrenchments? If the old authoritative foundations be shaken, is there really any other base to which religion may safely turn? These are, after all, the important questions, and upon them the psychology of religion can speak with authority and with no uncertain voice.

For with almost complete unanimity the workers in this field maintain that religion is a matter of temperament and attitude and demand rather than one of creed and intellectual belief. With this temperament as a basis of division, it may be said that every community is roughly divisible into two classes of people, the religious and the non-religious. The former is probably the larger of the two—in fact, it seems probable that, in this country at least, more people are naturally religious than is generally supposed; we Anglo-Saxons are, on the whole, more likely to hide our deeper feelings than to parade them. Yet it must be confessed that we cannot tell with any exactness the relative size of the two classes. Church statistics certainly throw very little light upon it. For while some of the non-religious class call themselves "sceptics," the majority of them are to be found within the churches. These people have never been religious, and perhaps never can be. Religion has never taken any real hold upon them, and if they believe in God, it is in the same abstract way in which they believe in the Czar of Russia or the binomial theorem. The loss of this belief would indeed result in their ceasing to class themselves as Christians, and might even for a time decrease their respect for morality by removing from them certain traditional restraints and sanctions. We ought therefore to hesitate indeed before shaking their faith in the old authori-

ties. And yet even should this be done—gradually and after a time—we should have no reason to anticipate any very serious results. New abstract beliefs would soon replace the old ones; new moral sanctions would take up the functions of those laid aside; and the individuals themselves, never having known the spiritual life, would suffer no great loss, being quite as religious after the change of creed as before it.

The class of people who are religious, like those who are not, are also found both within the church and without it, among the believers and among the sceptics. They are, of course, of various types, differing both in the kind and in the intensity of their feelings and beliefs. With some the "mystic germ" has been but slightly developed, being a demand or yearning rather than an intuition or an emotional certainty. With some the question of creed is of considerably more importance than with others, and in their case the overthrow of an old doctrine may work serious loss. But for the great majority a creed is but an external thing; and the rejection of one or the adoption of another, though it may mean temporary pain and struggle, is in the long run but an incidental matter. For, as I have said, nearly all the students of this subject in our day as well as in the past agree that religion in its genuine form grows out of the emotional rather than the intellectual nature, or, better still, from the man as a whole, and that the overthrow of an authority or the refutation of an argument has but little permanent effect upon the really religious spirit. In the case of the great majority of what I have called the religious class, underneath the externals of creed and cult, deep down in the hidden recesses of the conscious life, there flows a stream of religious intuitions and demands which are vital and almost instinctive in their nature, and which refuse to be utterly abolished or destroyed by anything that science or criticism can do. Religion is a more vital thing than science; it goes down deeper into life than does any intellectual doctrine: hence its forms and expressions, its creeds and its liturgies, may indeed be altered and destroyed; but through all these changes the essential part of the religious nature remains itself unchanged, serenely defying the power of successive scientific dogmas and shifting "psychological atmospheres." It is an easy thing to

pick a few leaves from an ancient oak—a child may do it, and when he has done so new leaves will grow again; but to pluck up the oak with all its deep-lying and branching roots—that would be a task that might well prove too much for the strength even of a giant.

An illustration of the vitality of religion after most of its usual modes of expression have been given up is seen in that not uncommon phenomenon, the religious agnostic. It happens not infrequently that men of culture and intellectual power, well versed in the science and criticism of our day, feel themselves unable to subscribe to any creed or to worship with any church, yet find springing up within them a stream of inarticulate but genuine religious experience and intuition which is to them the very water of life. At the risk of proving tedious, let me quote from one such instance, the confession of a French agnostic:

“I seem to feel within the depths of my being an action, a presence; in short, I seem to be the object, even prior to being the subject, of an action that is spiritual. This is in part a rudimentary, half-conscious belief, in part it is simply the expression of a fact, the testimony to a sort of profound and vague sensation. I tell myself that this sensation itself may be an illusion, that there may be nothing real about it apart from my subjectivity; but it *is*, and that is enough for me to live by. . . . It is a part of my being, and has for the rest of my being an importance and a value that are supreme—that suffices me. And for the rest, I tell myself that the very fact that I possess this experience called ‘religious’ is a witness in me to the existence of the inaccessible reality; of the union, within my consciousness, of the me and the not-me; that in it I have in some measure an immediate knowledge of the roots of my being, of a bond between me and something else, this ‘something else’ being necessarily self-conscious since it passes within my self-consciousness. . . . And just because I have become agnostic, and because every intellectual formulation of the inaccessible is for me simply a representation of the Reality, without any value in itself, I feel myself on solid ground. I have the experience there within that I have not to act but to receive; that I have not the initiative but the duty of

waiting and listening; that the source of life is beyond the conscious self, for me, for all men."<sup>21</sup>

This man is perfectly capable of taking the naturalistic point of view, of looking at his religious experience objectively and seeing that it might be classified as hallucinatory. And yet the experience loses none of its authority, none of its certainty, for him. The naturalistic interpretation he deems quite consistent and tenable; yet for his own part he is convinced that the religious explanation is the true one, and his agnosticism on all points of creed and theology in no wise interferes. He remains a religious man spite of his agnosticism, because this religious experience of his is his very own, and because it has for his life a value that is supreme. And this suggests two important considerations which deserve brief mention here.

The authority of the religious intuition, the "mystic germ," is seldom or never questioned. As in the case just quoted, this inner experience of the man himself seems inevitably, and in spite of rival and plausible interpretations, to claim for itself an unfaltering credence which no intellectual belief, gained by painstaking induction or labored reasoning or external authority, can ever enjoy. And, secondly, if it ever comes to a matter of argumentation at all—which in fact is seldom the case—there is one argument in favor of the acceptance of this inner experience at its face value which, to him who has known it, is usually quite decisive; namely, *its value for life*. In the words of our agnostic friend, it is "enough to live by," "it is a part of my being, and has for the rest of my being an importance and a value that are supreme, and that suffices me." We outsiders may classify it learnedly as "*phénomène hallucinatoire*"; but the man himself knows that it is good to live by, life-giving—and "*cela me suffit*." This fact of the value of religion for life is attested alike by the psychology and the history of religion and by the experience of the common man. And until human nature gets radically changed, it would seem that man will remain a religious creature, quite irrespective of the rise and fall of any dogmas, be they theological or scientific.

<sup>21</sup> Quoted from Flournoy, who reports the case at length. See his "Observations de psychologie religieuse," in *Archives de Psychologie*, II, 327-366.



Of course there is nothing essentially new in all this. Yet it will hardly seem superfluous to have a belief long held on the authority of the intuition of a few confirmed by a painstaking and systematic study of a large body of facts carefully and critically collected and sifted. And in throwing more light upon the essential nature of the religious consciousness, the psychology of religion has contributed something of genuine value for the guidance of all who are trying to deal with the present crisis wisely and well.

*THE TASK OF THE SYSTEMATIC RELIGIOUS  
THINKER OF TODAY*

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Theology was once the great intellectual interest of thoughtful men. It explained their religious experience, justified their faith, and gave them intellectual satisfaction. It earned and deserved the title of "the queen of the sciences." It has now fallen upon evil days. It is depreciated and neglected. Its foes are many; and its friends, even in the Church, are not numerous. The explanation for this situation of theology may be found in the immediate practical interests of life, the new thought-world in which men now live, and also in the inadequacy of the theology once current to meet the intellectual and moral demands of modern men.

Explanation, however, is not justification. There is the same reason for theology today as yesterday. The facts of religious experience remain essentially the same, and they still demand interpretation. The faith of the soul must be maintained in a world which challenges its right to be, and against hostile systems of thought. The interpretation and vindication of religion are more needed today than ever before. The incompetence of old theologies is no reason for doing without theology. If we are true to the demands of religion, we shall be constrained to provide some theology. The new attempts at securing an adequate theology must, however, be thorough and courageous. The great need now is the discovery of some principle by which we can interpret the facts of religious experience and arrive at a reasoned insight into the meaning of man, the world, and God. It is the conviction of the writer that the religious thinker has given him in Christ this interpretative principle, and that his great tasks can be achieved by the use of this principle.

The question is seriously raised by some thinkers, when they

look upon the ruins of old theologies, whether a systematic theology is now possible. Is it not one of the ideals of the mind which must be abandoned? They ask, "Must we not be satisfied simply with the scientific presentation of the facts of religion, without the attempt at a philosophical appreciation of their ultimate significance? or, Is not the most we can do and also the best simply to show the values of religion?" Affirmative answers to these questions are accepted, strange to say, by many persons in the church.

It is of course necessary to discover the facts of religious experience and the reflection of men upon them in the past; but this scientific presentation is only preparatory to the deeper appreciation of their truth in the nature of things and, consequently, of their importance to men everywhere today. After science has done its work in any department, comes the greater work of philosophy; and after criticism and history have done their work in the sphere of religion, and on its products in the lives of men, in the institutions of society, and in its sacred literature, comes the greater task of theology in estimating these in the terms of their ultimate significance.

It is also a necessary and important task of the religious thinker to show the values of religion for modern men; but it is not his whole task. It is true that not all the facts of religion are equally significant, nor all past historic events necessarily of much value to men of today; and equally true that, since we live in a different thought-world from the men of the past, not all their explanations of religious experience are of equal validity for us. We need concern ourselves only with the moral and spiritual values of revelation which serve us in these later days.

We cannot however regard the task of the theologian as finished when he has given us his estimate of the values of religion. There are more needs of the mind than can be satisfied with values. There is the need to be assured of facts, and this need begets the spirit of investigation and gives rise to science and history. There is also the need for truth, and this gives rise to the scientific description of the fact and to the philosophic appreciation of it.

Religion too is profoundly concerned with facts. The events in the history of Israel and the facts of the life of Jesus are of the

first importance to the Christian religion. It has a fact basis in history, on which it builds its thought. It is also deeply interested in truth. It bears witness to the truth of its great facts and mighty principles. It endeavors to bring men into intimate relation with eternal realities. It grounds its values in the verities of a truthful universe. Values will not hold the mind of man long unless he is convinced of their ultimate validity. It is inevitable that religion should become theological, and that theology should become philosophical.

The religious thinker who sets about the construction of an adequate theology must find his starting-point in the religious experiences of men. The new theology must have this experiential basis. In this respect it will be as empirical as the other philosophical disciplines. However far-reaching its conclusions, its premise must be the fact of religious experience.

Religious experience takes its rise in the soul today just as spontaneously and inevitably as other kinds of experience. Man finds himself on this earth, with powers of mind which make it possible for him to be acted upon by the forces of the world, and in turn to react upon them. This action and reaction give him his experiences on the various levels of consciousness, from the lowest sensuous to the highest spiritual plane. The highest experience arises, like the lowest, from the sense of the action of forces upon him and his reaction upon them in feeling, thought, and conduct. He feels himself in relation with supersensible reality. There is another presence than the world and human beings which disturbs his soul with deep feeling, high thought, and great projects. He has the sense of dependence upon this great reality for his existence and for his larger and deeper life. He feels himself held in moral subjection to a higher authority than his own will or the wills of his fellow-beings. He is bound in obedience to a moral authority that searches his very soul, and has the august right to command him to live for the best. He realizes that he is not here for his own private interests, but in the interests of the Divine Being in whom he lives and before whom he stands. He must use his powers in furthering the interests of God. Again, and greatest of all, he finds that he may have fellowship with this divine presence; that there may be an interchange

of thought, and a communion in which he finds the joy of living and the inspiration for his high endeavor. These religious experiences take their rise here and now in the hearts of men. They are the profoundest experiences of the soul. They are the ultimate facts in our religious life.

But observe further that these religious experiences, taken in their general features, are not peculiar to one man, nor to a group of men, nor to one nation, nor one period in the history of the world. They are, on the contrary, human, universal, and persistent. The history of religions thus comes to the aid of the systematic religious thinker and helps him to make convincing the fact that religious experience is an essential characteristic of man. Religion is a constituent element in the life of the race. The human nature out of which it emerges is the same in all men, and the relation of men to the divine reality is essentially the same.

There are of course differences in religion. There are varieties of religious experiences, as there are of other experiences. The history of religion shows the same phenomena of development, arrest, and even retrogression, as other great human interests. All these facts, however, but serve to show how profoundly human a phenomenon religion is, how much involved it is with the career of the race, and how closely related it is with other aspects of the total experience of men. It is rooted in human nature. This racial aspect of religion deepens the foundation and broadens the base for the new structure which the systematic religious thinker must build.

The experience of the Christian man in this modern world has, however, a distinctive character. He is born and reborn in a Christian community. He enjoys a rich Christian heritage of thought and a great fund of religious feeling. The Christian consciousness is therefore the greatest fact in the religions of the world. It is the typical religious experience. In it religion reaches its highest meaning; it comes to its own; it is primarily moral and spiritual. This experience is deeper in its reach in the soul, greater in its power over man's life, richer in its cultivation of his nature, and clearer in its meaning for the interpretation of his life than any other.

The man with the distinctively Christian experience has a deeper sense of God, a truer understanding of his nature and character, and a stronger faith in his goodness. He has the sense that he is ever in the presence of the Father, and the conviction that love is at the heart of the universe, that righteousness rules in all things, and that the moral welfare of man is the supreme divine concern.

There is also a profound sense of moral unworthiness. The vision of the divine perfection reveals, by contrast, how great is man's imperfection. The vision of the divine holiness produces the consciousness of moral uncleanness. This sense of sin is not the primary fact in the Christian religion, but secondary; it is not original, but derivative. While it is one element in the Christian experience, and has a darker hue than is found in other religions, it is not the deepest element. For the very vision of God that produces in the Christian the sense of sin also produces the experience of redemptive grace. The Christian realizes that he is not left alone to work out his salvation. His redemption is the chief interest of God; and in this truth he finds his hope for the achievement of a noble character and his inspiration for high endeavor in bringing in the Kingdom of Heaven.

The deepest thing in Christian experience, in which it takes its rise and reaches its culmination, is the filial consciousness. The Christian soul cries in times of joy and sorrow, of success and failure, on earth, and forevermore in heaven, "Abba, Father!"

This Christian experience, which has produced the distinctive type of Christian consciousness, is due ultimately to Christ. It is true that these great truths are mediated through individual Christians, and the church, and other agencies which embody more or less the contents and the spirit of the Christian faith. There is a great Christian succession, which reaches back from Christian parents in the home to the apostles and martyrs of the New Testament; and all have had some part in the creation of this type of religious experience. But the primary source for this type of religious experience is found in the life and teaching of Christ. He is the author and finisher of our faith. It is his consciousness of the Father that creates our distinctive sense

of God. His conviction of the great spiritual realities creates our religious assurance. His moral earnestness makes us take a serious view of life. His hopefulness of man and the world awakens in us great expectations. When we are experiencing the deep and great realities of religion, we are reproducing his experiences. When we think of God as Father, interpret our relation to him as filial, and believe in the redemption of the world as at present in progress and in the future as realized, we are thinking in Christ's terms, and living in his spirit, and believing with him. When we are at our best, we are making his life our own. When we take the Christian attitude towards God and man and the world, we have the mind of Christ. Christ, therefore, is the creator of this Christian consciousness.

More than this, he is the norm for the determination of this consciousness. He is the type of the Christian experience which is to be reproduced in all souls. What is congruent with the type, or what can be assimilated to it, may have its place and part in the consciousness of other Christians. This is the principle which we must use in our estimation of the worth of experiences, ideas, and ideals in the modern world, and in the Scriptures as well. We must endeavor to enrich our experiences with the world-life; but we should be selective in our attitude towards this life and take only what can be transmuted into the Christian type of experience. There is no source of enrichment so great as the Scriptures; but even here we must be selective, and appraise everything by its Christian affinities.

The systematic thinker, in dealing with religion, is engaged not only with a genuine and profound aspect of human life but with the most significant experience of man. The mind functions at its best in religion. All its powers are in highest activity. The heart feels most deeply and intensely; the mind thinks most profoundly and comprehensively; the will goes forth in a mighty way to do the behests of God. There is nothing that makes such a strenuous demand upon the total nature of man as religion. The more soul, the more religion; the greater the activity, the deeper the experience. It is in religion that we have the transcendent activity of the mind. President Eliot has given noble expression to this thought in an address on the *Future of*

*the New England Churches.* "Does any one ask," he says, "why universities, which must inevitably be occupied chiefly with secular knowledge, should feel any great concern for the permanence of religious institutions? I answer, that universities exist to advance science, to keep alive philosophy and poetry, and to draw out and cultivate the highest powers of the human mind. Now science is always face to face with God, philosophy brings all its issues into the one word duty, poetry has its culmination in a hymn of praise, and prayer is the transcendent effort of intelligence." Religion is thus the greatest possible activity of the soul. It is man at his best. It is religion, as Hegel said, that constitutes the true dignity of man.

As man comes to his best in religion, so religion comes to its best in Christ. Religion may be regarded from a point of view which includes within it all religious phenomena. The general features of religion are the main interest. The effort is made to give an inclusive definition. Religion may also be regarded from another and higher point of view, which seeks for the typical features, and takes account only of the essential elements of the highest achievement of the religious consciousness. The religious thinker possesses in the Christian gospel the typical features of religion. It is not the general features of religions, but the typical features of the Christian religion, that reveal to him the true meaning of religion. For him religion culminates in Christ's religious experience. The prophetic hopes and longings of the hearts of men in all lands and in the long-past ages find their fulfilment in his life. His conception of God as the loving Father makes clear the object of their search. His fellowship with God on all the great concerns of the soul and of the world realizes their yearnings for full communion with the divine. His thought of all men as the children of God, his interpretation of human life as a moral relation, and his ideal of the brotherhood of man as the social end of every man's endeavor, satisfy the moral seriousness of all the great souls whose passion has been to make religion a thing, not of ritual nor of dogma, but of life. Jesus is himself the greatest thing in the Christian religion. In him we see what religious experience is in all its depth and breadth and height. He is the glorious illustration of the relig-



ious life. Religion realizes its great possibilities in his personality. He is the greatest soul at its best in the highest sphere of human life.

It is an essential and distinguishing feature of the religious experience, at its lowest racial level and at its highest Christian summit, that it has an objective reference. While it is a profoundly emotional experience, it is not wholly so, nor does its emotion terminate in the self. The religious feelings are outgoing feelings. They imply an objective reality from whose stimulus they take their rise and to which they go out in search as their proper object. While religion is the profoundest subjective experience possible to man, it is also the most objective. If it were not due to a direct relation with a divine reality, it could not hold or win the attention of serious men. When we are profoundly religious, we are compelled to become philosophical and theological. We must seek to know the objective reality with which our religion links us. There is the same reason for believing in the divine reality into relation with which we are brought by our religious experience as there is for belief in any other objective reality which comes into our experience. The venture of faith here is the same the soul makes in practical conduct, science, and philosophy. The soul is not great enough for itself, and it is too great for ultimate scepticism at this point. It seeks to know the eternal reality.

The great problem, however, has been to find some principle by which the nature and meaning of the eternal reality might be known. As long as men had recourse to something less significant than themselves, there could be no true interpretation of God or the world. It was only when they took the best in their own lives as the principle of interpretation that they began to read aright the meaning of the life of God.

Now the systematic religious thinker takes the best soul in the history of the race as the key to the meaning of God and all things. He finds in Christ the man who is the measure of all things. While he is indebted primarily to Greek philosophy for the humanistic principle, he is indebted to the Christian religion for the person who is great enough to serve as the principle. Protagoras was the first to assert the principle that "man

is the measure of all things." He evidently intended it to be a sceptical principle. He meant by it that in our interpretation of life we cannot get beyond the human point of view, and, indeed, each man is shut up to his own point of view. It is impossible to get an objective criterion. There is therefore no use in wasting time and strength in this futile endeavor.

The first attempt at a deeper reading of life through a constructive use of this humanistic principle was made by Socrates. Renouncing the attempt to interpret the natural world, he gave himself the more strenuously to the interpretation of the inner nature of man. He held that there is a real science of human nature. If man is the measure of all things, then the measure is at least a being with moral ends which can be brought into the light of consciousness by reflection and fashioned into beautiful ideals.

While Socrates did much in giving a nobler interpretation of the moral nature of the man who is the measure of all things, he did little or nothing in the larger interpretation of the world through man. He did his work so well, however, in making man fully intelligible, that his followers, from Plato to the modern idealists, have been free to make the larger use of the principle. They have all seen that "man's life furnishes us with a key which opens up to us the secrets of the universe more adequately than any other that can be used."<sup>1</sup>

This is the principle by which the theistic interpretations of the universe are made. There is no other way open to us to the heart of the universe except our own human personalities. If this way is blocked for us, then there is no other highway or path. The greatest minds have refused to believe that the way is blocked. They have made the great venture of interpreting the universe through the highest in their own lives. The systematic religious thinker finds himself here in the company of the great idealists of all lands and of many centuries.

While, however, these thinkers have used man in general as their principle of interpretation, the Christian thinker makes use of Christ as his final principle for the interpretation of reality. In the life of Christ there are certain elements which are of the

<sup>1</sup> Mackenzie's Humanism.

first importance for our interpretation of man, the world, and God. The first is his consciousness of God. This was vivid, intense, and continuous. It was the deepest experience of his life. He moved about in the world of the spirit in the fullest conscious realization of it. He had fellowship with God in a more real sense, and with greater satisfaction, and with a clearer understanding, than he had with men. This fellowship attained to a sense of oneness with God. There was harmony between his will and the will of God and correspondence between his mind and the mind of God. Thus the life of Christ became the perfect organ for the full expression of the life of God. The eternal thought in the divine mind came to and through his mind; the deepest love in the heart of God found expression in and through his heart; the purpose of God for the world was realized in his life. Jesus was thus the very incarnation of the life of God. His soul was grounded in the being of God, and God's life was embodied in his life.

This is the great truth which the Christian church has ever striven to express and to conserve in its doctrine of the divinity of Christ. It has felt assured of the nature, character, and purpose of God when it has seen him revealed and incarnated in Christ. The deepest longing of the soul to be certified as to the character of God and his purpose with reference to its life and the life of the world has been met by the doctrine of the divinity of Christ. The church has been sure of this one instance of incarnation. It has clung to this with great tenacity, and has served all after-ages by its fidelity. If the church had been robbed of this precious truth, humanity as well as the church would have been infinitely the poorer.

While the church was sure of this one incarnation, it had no such firm hold of the other great fundamental truth of the universal incarnation. The ideal incarnation is, however, but a special and perfect instance of the universal fact. It makes clear to us that the human as human is the medium of the divine. All lives are grounded in the being of God and partake of his nature, and in proportion to the development of their humanity they are capable of incarnating the life of God. The doctrine of the incarnation, when it is carried to its legitimate conclusion, makes

clear to us the twofold fact that all souls are grounded in God and that God is incarnated in all souls. This conserves for us in the very being of God all our great and precious values of personality and character.

The Christian thinker of today must make the largest use of the truth of the incarnation of God in Christ. He must be true to his principle and go all the way with it. He must not hesitate in applying it in interpreting God nor in interpreting man. He must read the character of God in the terms of the character of Christ. What men would not ascribe to the purpose or motive or conduct of Christ they must not ascribe to God. This will give us a new and the true reading of the life of God. The historic theology of the church has been morally defective since it has not used the total consciousness of Christ in its reading of the character of God.

In like manner the Christian thinker of today must apply the principle of the incarnation to the interpretation of the lives of all men. He will hold firmly to the ideal incarnation in Christ for its own sake, but also for the sake of the discovery and interpretation it enables him to make of the fact of the incarnation in all men. They stand in essentially the same fundamental relation to God as Christ, since they partake of his nature, and work out his purposes, and realize his ideals for them. They must be finally interpreted by the intention of God in their creation and by the possibilities of their nature.

Another fact in the life of Christ of fundamental significance in our interpretation of his life and, through his life, of God and man, is his great ethical principle. We may best express this by the term ethical personalism. The depth and breadth and height of the life that Christ lived gave him the profoundest possible personal experience and the clearest insight into the reality and worth of personality. The greatest fact in his inner world was his own soul. He had a deep sense of its moral dignity and a strong and great conviction of its infinite value. He discovered in other men the same moral personalities. If they did not realize their worth, it did not make their personalities of no worth. Even if they sinned against their souls, that did not rob them of all moral worth. It only made their sin the more deplorable.

Jesus realized the moral worth of men in spite of their sin, and consequently had a profound respect and love for them, and gave himself in service to make them achieve character and to bring them all into right personal relations with one another. The infinite worth of the personality of every man and the right personal relations of all men were his fundamental ethical principles. He dealt primarily with persons, not institutions; with men rather than movements. If men lived the life of the soul and were in right moral social relations, then the Kingdom would be established.

It is this recognition of ethical personalism that has made his ideal such a power in history and gives it such influence today. It is true that the forms of his thought are largely set aside, and that his precepts had special reference to local and contemporary conditions, and that many modern problems did not come within the field of his vision. Yet, after making all these deductions from his ethical teaching, the fact remains that he has given us the great ethical principles by which we interpret the moral worth of each man and the moral mission of all men. The fundamental ethical facts of life are the same yesterday, today, and forever. Each man has a moral personality of infinite worth; all men must come into the deepest and broadest possible social relations; the attitude of love upon the part of each and all, under all circumstances, and in all places, is their moral duty. We must still go to him for the ethical principle for the right interpretation of man's moral nature and his moral relations in the world. The more men do this, the deeper is their insight into their own souls, the higher their ideal, and the greater their devotion to the moral interests of man. The progress of the world is made by the realization of his principles. Christ's ethical ideal is the highway to the City of God.

Since Christ, then, is our key for the interpretation of God and man, and his moral experience and ethical ideal are thus summed up, we get a clearer insight into the purpose and the nature of God. We read the purposes of individual existence and of the moral movement of history as the realization of the moral personality of each and of all. The nature of each is interpreted by the realized personality of Jesus, as the oak inter-

prets the nature and the purpose of the acorn, and the relation in which Jesus stood to all the men and women and children with whom he came into contact gives us the moral goal of the ethical process through the centuries. What he was, each must strive to be; what his personal social relations were, we must work for in our day and generation.

These great ethical interests are true not only in the human sphere of the soul and of history but also in God's own life. They have their value for us, and they have their validity in God. They are real in God while only ideal in us; and their reality in him will secure their realization in us. We must therefore have a conception of God great enough for the eternal foundation of these moral interests. We must have a conception of God which will account for, and at the same time safeguard, all our moral values and social interests. He must include within his own life the outcome of all human life and love. Our idea of God must be adequate for our moral universe. Ethical personalism, here and now, must have its ground and richer counterpart in the being of God.

Self-sacrifice is another fact of fundamental significance in the life of Christ. As he stood at the centre of the moral and religious life and looked out upon the world with its multitudes of men, he realized that he could not do for them what he wanted to do without going to the uttermost limit of self-sacrificing love. The very greatness of his ideal for men and the vast possibilities of their nature would require the dedication of his whole soul in their service. The necessity for the sacrificial life lies in the need of help for the realization of this great ideal and the unfolding of these vast possibilities. The necessity is not caused by the fact of sin, though sin increases the necessity and makes the task infinitely more difficult. The law of sacrifice is the law of the universe prior to the sin of man, and will be its law after his sin is but the pale memory of his earthly career. Yet the fact of sin makes the sacrificial life a greater necessity, and fills it with poignant experiences. Jesus realized as no one else that the sin of man was the great hindrance to the realization of his ideal purpose for them. Their sin made them blind to what they were; it sunk them into the depths of animalism; it set

them in moral isolation from one another or in antagonism to one another; it made impossible the coming of the Kingdom in which all would be brothers; it kept them apart from their heavenly Father.

When he thought of what men were by nature and what they could be in character, there came to him the sense of the tragedy of man's sinful life. The conviction was born in him that the thing that must be done, and the greatest thing he could do, was to save men from their sin that they might live the life for which they were created. It was this greatest and deepest of moral problems with which Christ grappled. He interpreted his mission in life in the terms of the salvation of men. He gave his great soul to this task. His soul felt the woe and misery of sin. He suffered the utmost moral cost of a sacrificial love. His soul travailed in pain for the salvation of men. It was through this travail of soul on behalf of men that he won them from their sin and bound them in love to God and one another. The process of atonement, or reconciliation, went on in the souls of men when they were in his presence; and the same process goes on, century after century the world over, when men come under the power of his life, as they reproduce his thought in their minds, his love in their hearts, and his purpose in their wills.

This great experience of Jesus is the key by which we open the door into the inner life of God. Jesus interpreted the life of God through the deep and holy love in his own heart. Before this love had its upwelling in his heart, it had its eternal fountain in the heart of God; before it called him to his high vocation, it had given God his eternal vocation; before it had involved so much moral suffering on his part, it had involved the same for the heavenly Father. The love which compelled him to live and die for men was the same kind of love which determined the attitude of God towards men. Christ's attitude towards men in time is the same as the eternal attitude of God towards all his children. The sacrificial love that had its highest expression in the life of Christ is the deepest thing in the life of God. It flowers in the world, and comes to fruitage in the life of Christ and all good souls, because it is rooted in the very being of God. The law of sacrifice through which men realize their moral ideals,

and spend themselves in the service of others, and establish the Kingdom on the earth, is grounded in the divine nature. This law of sacrifice thus yields us the deepest insight into the character of God. It is one of the most precious and potent truths of the Christian gospel; and the religious thinker must show that it has its reality in God, that it is the law of life, and that Christ was its truest exponent and best example.

Once more, there is the fact of Christ's certainty of the eternal preservation of his soul and of all souls by God. The faith of Christ in the loving care of God deepened with the years, and grew in power as the end of his life drew near. He based the immortality of the soul in the nature of God, and had the profound conviction, which amounted in his consciousness to a certainty, that death would not end his career nor defeat his cause in the world. He looked into the immediate future and saw the black clouds of men's hate and murderous designs; but he looked beyond this into the greater future, and contemplated himself as living with God and in the hearts of men. The last words on the cross show his absolute assurance of God's care and keeping of his life in the very moment of death itself—"Father, into thy hands I commend my spirit." There could be no greater conviction of the continuance of his life beyond this earthly scene. And there can be no more secure basis for that conviction than the moral character of God. Here is the fundamental ground of immortality. Here is our primary datum for thought on the eternal life. If God is not trustworthy, if his hands do not hold the soul, then there is no hope.

Whatever use we may make of Christ's resurrection, it can only be confirmatory of this fundamental thought of Christ. It is not an independent ground: it can only be at most a confirmation of his deeper thought. Scholarship may make it impossible for us to use the records of the resurrection as we once did; it may point out their discrepancies, indicate the legendary accretions, show the crass materialism of the later accounts, and even argue that resuscitation is not resurrection. We may be forced to admit all this. Yet the great fact of Christ's consciousness of the living God as the ground of our hope now and of our life hereafter remains untouched.



The great fact in Christ's experience, accessible to our thought and possible to our experience, is his faith in the character of God as conserving all souls in the eternal world. The resurrection faith is confirmatory of this. The conviction of the souls of men in the early Christian days and in our time that such a personality as Christ's is conserved in the universe forevermore is the thing that grips the heart. The annihilation of Jesus would be the destruction of the greatest personal value of the race. The moral character of God is at stake in the preservation of Jesus. The conservation of Jesus' life makes the universe a wholly different thing from what it would be if he no longer lived in God, and with him, and for him. The universe takes on a new moral character when the greatest personal value of humanity is forever conserved in it.

The same consciousness that yields us this insight and conviction tells us that his faith concerns not himself alone, but all souls as well. God is not the God of the dead, but of the living, for all live unto God. We too can commend and commit the souls of our dear ones and of ourselves, and indeed humanity also, into the hands of God, and be assured by Christ and by our hearts that they are safe in him. The conservation of the ideal human life realized is the pledge of the conservation of all human life for the realization of the ideal.

These four facts of Christ's consciousness constitute his right to be taken as the principle by which the systematic religious thinker interprets the being of God and the meaning of the world. The highest reality in human life is taken to assure the soul of its deepest convictions and to enlighten its thought of the eternal reality. The interpretation of the being of God in the terms of Christ's life and thought makes him supremely personal in nature, profoundly moral in character, and eternally altruistic in purpose. The meaning of the world is read in this thought of God; and the character and career of man, in time and eternity, are regarded as determined in ideal and purpose, and as fashioned and guided, by the loving Father.

The constructive religious thinker has the still further task of showing the relation of man's religious experience to his other experiences, and of vindicating its truth in relation to the other

realities of the world. It is required of him that he have a philosophy of religion. He must add to his faith knowledge. He must not follow the example of some who abandon this task.

The Ritschelian theology has served us well in fixing attention on the great ethical and religious value of the revelation of God in Christ. It has emphasized the central thing in the Christian religion and in Christian theology. It has freed theology from the charge of being a dry and devitalized interest. It has also liberated us from many things which men formerly thought more essential to the gospel. There is nothing but praise and gratitude for this high service. The whole Christian world is greatly indebted to this theological movement. It has, however, proved weak where a modern theology must be strong. It has divorced philosophy from religion. It has discarded metaphysic from theology. It has depreciated all theoretical interests in matters of religion. It has abandoned the attempt to add philosophical knowledge to religious faith. Practically the only place where God may be found is in Christ. All other ways to God are barred by the warning, "No thoroughfare, dangerous passing." It would save religion by isolating it from the serious philosophical pursuits of men. It would keep it in an inaccessible citadel; and has called in sceptical allies to aid in defending it. The worst enemy of this theology is its own fundamental scepticism. More than once in the history of religion men have tried this method of safeguarding its sacred interests, and always with disastrous results. There is no safeguard and defence for the sacred interests of religion like truth. This is the great ally of religion—"Thy truth is my shield and buckler." Whatever the truth, and wherever its source, it is the great safeguard of religion. The faith that has knowledge added to it will multiply its power.

We are forced to relate our religious experience to other experiences and our religious knowledge to other knowledge by two necessities. There is, first, the inner need for it. All the experiences of life have their rise and place in one and the same mind. It is the same mind that comes into contact with the world on the level of its material forces, and with men on the level of daily life, and with God on the heights in spiritual fellowship. The modern man has a variety of experiences and a multiplicity

of interests, and his first intellectual task is to bring order and coherence and unity into his own mind. He cannot allow disorder there. His mind must not be a junk-shop of various scraps of knowledge. Nor must it satisfy him to arrange his experiences and order his knowledge into separate compartments. This may serve very well as a convenience in the office or in the study, but it will not do for the mind itself. A man's experience and knowledge of various things must be an organic whole. They must have a vital connection. There must be dependence and interdependence of the parts and the whole. The mind's own life must be a living and systematic whole. A man must be religious with all his powers. He must love God with his whole soul. He must live his life in unity if he would have power and enjoy peace. The intellectual tragedy of divided interests we witness today in the lives of many men. Their religious experience and theological knowledge are at war with the new and rich knowledge of the modern world. There is no peace for the earnest and thorough-going mind except in the inner systematization of all its experience and knowledge.

There is also the objective necessity. The very fact that we live our lives in a universe is itself a demand upon us that we understand it. We must have knowledge of all our interests and experiences in their objective reality. Our various interests and the several branches of our knowledge have their place in the woven texture of things, which, like the robe of Jesus, is without seam. Every part of our knowledge and every one of our experiences have their threads inwoven in this seamless garment of truth. Or, to change the figure, everything we know or experience is in a context of meaning; it is never truly known apart from the context; and it can only be finally known when its whole context is read and understood.

We are impelled to try to secure a subjective and an objective systematization of the universe of truth accessible to us. We cannot, of course, secure this completely; our inner world is too incoherent, and the outer world is at once too complex and too fragmentary as it reports itself to us; but this is the sublime ideal which the great thinkers have ever cherished. It is a flying ideal they pursue, but the pursuit itself is inspiring.

We are thus at once compelled and encouraged to recognize the mutual relations and aids which our religious experience and our secular experience, our theology and the various sciences sustain and give to one another. Religion and theology may have the most to give, but the service is not altogether one-sided. It is like St. Paul's gracious conception of his relation to the Roman Christians when he wrote, "I long to see you, that I with you may be comforted in you, each of us by the other's faith, both yours and mine."

The sciences throw much light upon the world in which we live and in the face of which we must maintain our faith. They reveal to us the sublimity of our world in its extent in space and its duration in time. They give us an infinite and an eternal world in which to live. They trace for us the protean manifestation of the one infinite and eternal energy that is the source of all things. They discover for us the marvellous laws which describe the career of the sun and also of the mote that floats in the sunbeam. They make clear to us the mighty movement of evolution from the star-mist to the coming of man, who stands "God-conquered with face to heaven upturned." They make us realize that however wonderful the mechanism of nature is, the teleological end reached in the ascent of man is still more wonderful. They enter into his soul, learn the secret processes of all his powers, and the intimate connection of the whole organism, and the significance of religion in his experience. They open to our gaze the long, difficult way the race has trodden to our days. They study our contemporary life with its vast complexity, tremendous powers, grave problems, and they prophesy greater things in store for our forward-moving humanity. They endeavor to give an interpretation of nature, man, and God in terms satisfactory to the reason.

The systematic religious thinker receives all this knowledge from the hands of these fellow-workers in the world of truth, and gives it a deeper meaning through the application of his great interpretative principle. For a philosophic appreciation of the deeper meaning of scientific facts and principles and their place in a universe of truth, it is absolutely necessary to have recourse to the humanistic principle of interpretation; and for

the systematic religious thinker, as we have seen, Christ is the highest principle of interpretation. The naturalistic interpretation of nature is made through the natural objects as they are presented to us, while the humanistic interpretation is made through the thinking subject. The fundamental fact, then, in our interpretation of nature, when we take into consideration its qualitative differences and teleological movement, is mind. Nature is the revelation of spirit. All its forces are the manifestation of will; all its laws reveal the methodical working of mind; all its advancing forms of life make evident the realization of purpose; the coming of man and the advent of Christ show us the kind of will and mind and purpose that lie behind and within nature. "We baptize," as Dr. Gordon says, "the creative Being behind nature and behind human history and life into the name of Christ."<sup>1</sup>

In like manner the systematic religious thinker gives a deeper interpretation of the life of man. He gladly takes from the hands of the scientist, psychologist, and historian all his facts concerning man's origin, his psychological functioning, and his career on the earth to this day; but he reads his life in the light of the incarnation. He therefore finds a deeper moral nature in him, a more sublime goal of all his endeavor, and an infinite significance in his character and career. The movement of history is towards an ever greater realization of the Kingdom of God. The whole process and the goal of civilization are read in terms of the Kingdom of God. In a word, the whole world of man's interests is the subject of redemption.

The theologian receives from the philosopher, his nearest fellow-worker—indeed, his colleague in the department of deepest truth—his significant principles and results. He finds himself nearer to the philosopher than to any other worker. They have much in common, and this common possession is becoming more every day. They are profoundly interested in ultimate realities; they are impelled to seek an interpretation of the meaning of the world, man, and God; they cannot rest until they find "the good of the intellect." The philosopher endeavors to find this good in moving from the world and man to God, and the theologian accompanies

<sup>1</sup> Gordon, *The Christ of Today*, p. 91.

him on his way. The philosopher is satisfied when he finds the ultimate reality; but the theologian desires a clearer understanding of this ultimate reality, and is profoundly concerned with its personal nature, high moral character, and everlasting interest in the lives of men. Theology seeks a clearer understanding of God for a deeper fellowship with him and a greater co-operation with his mighty purposes. With philosophy it would know all that can be known; but this knowledge is for life—"If ye know these things, blessed are ye if ye do them." The contrast between philosophy and theology may be illustrated by two scriptural texts. Philosophy loves the text, "The spirit of man is the candle of the Lord": theology the text, "In thy light shall we see light."

Finally, the systematic religious thinker has the practical task of making his truth serve his day and generation. He owes a duty to his truth and to his age. He must endeavor to rescue theology from its threatened oblivion and recover it to the exalted place it once held. He must try to relate it to the throbbing life of the world, and guide the thought of his age on the deepest subjects of human thinking. This work must be done primarily in our schools of theology. It is of the utmost importance that these schools turn out men who have a profound interest in theology; who can think through the great theological truths, and have reasoned convictions on all the mighty themes of the Christian religion. The pulpits of the land will have more power when the preachers have a reasoned and vital theology.

The religious thinker owes a duty to the church also. He must strive to help it give more attention to the great contents of the Christian faith. The church sorely needs a better understanding of its faith and a deeper interest in it. Its attention is too largely taken up with secondary matters, and it lives too much for the immediate interests which serve to give it the semblance of power in the lives of men. The church needs to return to the central things of its faith, to the ruling conceptions of the consciousness of Christ and their mighty implications; and it is the duty of the religious thinker to help the church make this return. The more the great reasoned truths of religion take possession of the mind

of the church, the more will it be recalled to its primary tasks and fundamental interests.

Finally, there is the serious task of ministering to the men who are no longer in intellectual sympathy with the church nor with the Christian religion. This is one of the ominous facts of our day. It is a grave question whether the church has not lost its intellectual leadership. There is no doubt of this as respects the Catholic Church, for it is dead set against the whole modern movement of thought. Unless the religious thinkers in the Protestant churches win the place of leadership, grave consequences will be inevitable. We can still count upon the moral sentiment of the community, which is largely Christian, and still more upon the Christian ethical ideal. But both the sentiment and the ideal are due to the fundamental truths of the Christian religion. We cannot expect that men will long feel the power of the moral sentiment and hold to the Christian ethical ideal when they are perplexed, or in grave doubt, about the fundamental truths of the gospel. Our only hope of keeping the sentiment of the age Christian and of maintaining the Christian ideal in its rightful place lies in making these fundamental truths the dominant ideas in the minds of men. This is the urgent duty of the systematic religious thinker.

*MONISM, PLURALISM, AND PERSONALISM*

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Two philosophical conceptions of God are now contesting the field with the theology of Christianity—Monism and Pluralism. It will be the endeavor of this paper to show that neither of them offers so rational, adequate, and comprehensive a conception of God as does Christianity, for the reason that neither is so true to that category which is coming to be more and more clearly recognized as the supreme interpretation of deity, namely, personality.

## I.

Monism, if it is to successfully differentiate itself from pantheism, must show its consonance with personality. That has long been its recognized and accepted task. The history of philosophy since Kant has been largely occupied with a prolonged and varied attempt to bring personality into harmony with a monistic interpretation of the universe. Fichte attempted it, and reached a universal will or life, spiritual, and inclusive of other finite realities, but which could hardly be called personal.<sup>1</sup> Schelling tried it, and came out with an impersonal absolute. Then came Hegel, and, advancing to a new and vital conception, endeavored to demonstrate the personality of the absolute by showing that the whole process of cosmic and human development is a consciousness process, and that this consciousness must be one and personal.

The crucial and much disputed question concerning Hegel's philosophy is whether his all-embracing, all-enfolding absolute is personal or impersonal. Professor Seth emphatically denies

<sup>1</sup> "I abhor all religious conceptions which personify God, and regard them as unworthy of a reasonable being," said Fichte, although by this he probably meant personify in the sense of anthropomorphize.



personality to Hegel's Absolute.<sup>3</sup> Dr. McTaggart takes the same view; basing his definition of personality upon self-consciousness—the ability to say “I am”—he affirms his belief that “Hegel did not himself regard the Absolute as personal.”<sup>3</sup> On the other hand, Professor Calkins seems to regard Hegel as teaching the personality of the Self: “The absolute self, differentiated, Hegel teaches, into the rich variety of the world of nature and of limited spirit, is no lifeless or abstract thought, but concrete self. ‘The highest, extremest, summit,’ as he says, ‘is pure Personality, which alone—through that absolute dialectic which is its nature—encloses and holds all within itself.’”<sup>4</sup> But although Hegel thus expressly attaches the term personality to the absolute, it will not do, in view of his habitual freedom in the use of terms, to take his own word for it. His system as a whole makes it impossible to conceive of the absolute as in any true sense personal.

Aside from Dr. McTaggart's contention that Hegel's absolute is not personal because it is not completely self-conscious, the decisive issue lies not so much at that point as in the ethical incompetency for personality of a being who confounds good and evil. Hegel's absolute is not personal, because it is not moral. A pure personality might possibly be conceived as adventuring into unconsciousness in order to attain to a higher consciousness, but not as adventuring into evil in search of a higher good. Of this, our own pursuit of personality assures us incontestably. It is true that in his personal development a man may, through his very sin, his very self-apostasy, come in the end circuitously to that point in spiritual progress which he might have reached in the straight line of moral integrity, yet it is not because of his sin but in spite of it.

It is very easy to confuse condition and cause. A man's sin may be the condition of his salvation; it is never the cause of it. *O beata culpa!* is a natural cry from a redeemed self, but it means only that in the joy of redemption the light of the new life shines backward, and suffuses even the sinister act of apostasy, which

<sup>3</sup> Hegelianism and Personality.

<sup>3</sup> Studies in Hegelian Cosmology, p. 59.

<sup>4</sup> The Persistent Problems of Philosophy, p. 388.

the soul nevertheless knows to have been, in itself, wholly and solely injurious and bad. Because the self can, with the aid of the higher self, recover its lost birthright, let us not suppose that the selling of the birthright was the means of its recovery.

There is only one way to explain moral evil adequately, and that is as the act of finite freedom—a freedom so essential to personality that without it a human being could not be a person. But although sin is a free act, each act of evil, instead of being a step forward in the progress of personality, is a step backward. If, in exerting itself sufficiently to recover this lost ground, the self attains new strength of selfhood, shall we attribute the gain to the backward step, or to the act of self-recovery? If it be replied that it was the backward step that made possible the self-recovery, the answer is that it simply determined the form of the self-exertion which, better directed, might have resulted in still greater advance.

We do not rightly estimate moral evil except when we perceive it as, in itself, purely, wholly hateful, hostile, and destructive. It may be so involved with other motives and with conditions that make for good that, confused with its accompaniments, it seems good, but *per se* it is not mere absence of good, much less good in disguise, but the implacable foe of good. Only as we recognize it as such can we overcome it, and get good by overcoming. Itself can never be changed into good; its overcoming works us inexpressible good.

It is of course conceivable that God may be one like ourselves, pressing on stumblingly, haltingly, toward self-realization; committing not simply mistakes but sins; knowing good yet doing evil; self-directive yet self-defeating. Such a God, containing within himself all human persons, might be a person in the making, as we are, but he could not be a complete person. He would need an infinite person to account for him. For imperfect personality requires perfect personality. There can be in the realm of the moral, the personal, no imperfect except as there is a perfect. In the realm of the impersonal this principle does not hold, because the impersonal gets its ideal element only from the personal realm. There may be imperfect islands, yet no perfect island; imperfect houses, yet no perfect

house; but there cannot be imperfect persons and no perfect person. I may have the idea of a perfect island without its actually existing; but I cannot have the idea of a perfect person without his existence, because he exists, not in the realm of the actual, that is the physical, at all, but only in the realm of the ideal, the eternal.<sup>5</sup> In so far as I, as a person, belong to that ideal order, I am in direct relation to him, the perfect person, just as, as a physical being, I am in direct relation to the race.

Not only does Hegel's monism thus contradict divine personality, it takes away much of the meaning and reality from human personality. It is indeed a high prerogative to be a part of the absolute self, a moment in the universal process of the divine self-realization; but if one has no choice in the matter, no power to the contrary, is there after all much significance in the part he plays? What is left of human personality, with autonomy gone and responsibility shattered? Hegel was too much absorbed in the great areas and wide inclusions of a comprehensive system to be much concerned with the interest of the separate self. Lost in a vast movement, subordinated to a mighty process, the individual human self was left to take such inventory of its diminished greatness as it might.

This indifference to human personality on the part of Hegelianism could not continue. Neo-Hegelianism awoke to the necessity of finding a worthier and better defined place for the human self, and this has been its most distinctive task. Most noteworthy in this direction is the philosophy of Professor Royce, who has gone further in his study of human selfhood, in the attempt to reconcile personality and monism, than any other writer. In *The Conception of God, The World and the Individual*, and *Studies of Good and Evil*, Professor Royce has attacked this problem from every angle, and pursued it with remarkable penetration and perseverance. The result is a contribution to philosophy of the greatest wealth and value.

The human self, Professor Royce defines as "a meaning embodied in a conscious life, present as a relative whole within

<sup>5</sup>The ontological argument, that is, in the true form is valid; but we are not dependent upon it for our knowledge of the existence of God. That comes through personal recognition.

the unity of the Absolute life."<sup>6</sup> To this relative whole within the absolute Professor Royce attributes what he regards as a real freedom, namely the freedom of expressing a unique and worthful meaning: "What we see, however, is that every distinguishable portion of the divine life, in addition to all the universal ties which link it to the whole, expresses its own meaning."<sup>7</sup> Again: "I alone, amongst all the different beings of the universe, will this act. That it is true that God here also wills in me, is indeed the unquestionable result of the unity of the divine consciousness. But it is equally true that this divine unity is here and now realized by me, and by me only, through my unique act. My act, too, is a part of the divine life that, however fragmentary, is not elsewhere repeated in the divine consciousness. When I thus consciously and uniquely will, it is I then who just here *am* God's will, or who just here consciously act for the whole. I then *am* so far free."<sup>8</sup>

Little exception need be taken to this description of the human will in its moral activity, when acting harmoniously with the divine will; but what of its immoral activity, its resistance of the Good Will? Here also is uniqueness of meaning, but a bad uniqueness, the uniqueness of opposition that implies another sort of freedom, a freedom of choice and self-direction. And indeed, with a super-Hegelian sensitiveness to moral distinctions, Professor Royce distinctly recognizes the reality of moral evil, and virtually admits the real freedom from which it issues: "There is the possibility and the fact of a finite and conscious resistance of the will of the World by the will of the Individual. The consequences of this resistance are real evils—evils that all finite beings and the whole world suffer."<sup>9</sup> But with this recognition of the freedom of opposition, what becomes of the theory? With each finite self thus made a centre of free choices and self-direction, the possibility of a God consisting of the totality of finite selves vanishes. The further Professor Royce goes in his analysis of the self, the clearer it becomes that his monism is out of keeping with his ethics. "A Self whose eternal perfection is attained through the totality of these ethically significant tempo-

<sup>6</sup> The World and the Individual, II, 268.

<sup>7</sup> Ibid. I, 466.

<sup>8</sup> Ibid. I, 468.

<sup>9</sup> Ibid. II, 398.

ral strivings, these processes of evolution, these linked activities of finite Selves,"<sup>10</sup> cannot be reconciled with a human freedom sufficient to account for the active opposition and potency of existing evil. The temporal strivings of finite selves gain their ethical significance only in relation to a perfect will with which they strive to come into harmony, even as he strives to have them do.

God must be a distinct person, above as well as within the selves, perfect where they are imperfect, whole while they are fragmentary, true while they are erring, in order to be a completely personal God. If he attains his perfection only through their strivings—strivings in which they manifest not only imperfection but anti-perfection—perfection is no longer an eternal existence, but an empirical process, and thereby loses its very reality. Perfection as it pertains to finite selves is an empirical process, but as it pertains to the infinite self an eternal, inexhaustible fulness. It is a striking evidence of the extravagant application of the category of development that the divine author of it should himself be made subject to it. The incongruity is especially marked, in that development has no meaning in the ethical realm except as there is an ideal of perfection toward which the development moves. How can "development," "becoming," have any meaning except as there is a Perfect One above the process, transcending it, explaining it? Such an One there cannot be, if monism be true.

## II.

If monism is an inadequate account of personality, are we then driven to pluralism, as a necessary alternative? If by pluralism is meant its current form the answer is, No. Current pluralism breaks up the absolute of monism into a fixed number of distinct though intimately related persons or selves, whose unity either itself constitutes the only deity, or of which God is a constituent member.

Strictly speaking, there are three types of present-day pluralism, which may be characterized as Theistic Pluralism, Atheistic Pluralism, and Pragmatistic Pluralism. Passing the first for the

<sup>10</sup> *The World and the Individual*, II, 419.

moment, we find in the atheistic pluralism of Dr. McTaggart an interesting instance of Hegelian monism passing over completely into its logical outcome. 'If,' reasons Dr. McTaggart as a consistent Hegelian, 'we have only an absolute composed of finite selves, then the plurality of these selves is quite as distinct a fact as their unity; and their unity is at best an impersonal unity in which there is no place for a personal God, or indeed for any God at all, in the proper sense of the term.' The second type, pragmatistic pluralism, is an individualistic pluralism. It will have a God or gods, if such are useful; but it is not quite certain as yet whether it is worth while to keep one or more of these beings in existence or not.

The theistic pluralism, or personal idealism, of Professor Howison stands by itself in its pronounced theism, and presents the clearest, strongest, and most convincing argument for the existence of God advanced by modern philosophy. Based on the nature of personality itself, it shows that the existence of God is inseparably bound up with that of the community of finite persons, each of whom, "though indeed defining himself against each of his fellows, must define himself primarily against the Supreme Instance, and so in terms of God. Thus each of them, in the very act of defining his own reality, defines and posits God as real—as the one Unchangeable Ideal who is the indispensable standard upon which the reality of each is measured. The price at which alone his reality as self-defining can be had is the self-defining reality of God. If he is real, then God is real; if God is not real then neither can he be real."<sup>11</sup>

This is a most satisfactory statement of the rational principle involved in that immediate recognition of God which is the basis of religion. But unfortunately Professor Howison stops short of the full implications of his theism. Instead of going forward to the rational inference which the religious consciousness has universally drawn, that human, imperfect personality finds its ground and source in this Perfect Person, Professor Howison, in his laudable effort to discredit the theory of mechanical creation, ignores the ontological dependence of the finite and imperfect upon the infinite and perfect, and places the human selves upon

<sup>11</sup> *The Limits of Evolution*, second edition, p. 355.

the same level, as respects self-existence and self-origination, with God.

Thus every form of pluralism, including Professor Howison's personal idealism, fails to meet the full requirements of personality. The source of this deficiency is in the failure of pluralism to recognize immanence, just as monism fails to recognize transcendence. Pluralism is so taken up with plurality, it is so sensitive to the distinctness and autonomy of each separate self, that it fails to take due note of that intimacy of relationship by which finite selves enter into each other (each preserving still his own centre of self-hood) and dwell in each other, while the Supreme Self enters and dwells in all.

Since we are obliged to use spatial terms of spiritual relations, it is truer to say that we are within than without one another, so intimately are we related to each other. Especially is it true—and the only adequate truth—to say of the Perfect Person that he is in us, and we in him. Otherwise we have, in our relations with one another, an isolation that cannot possibly constitute a society (except after the fashion of a "social contract"), and in our relations with God a remoteness that cannot possibly constitute a unity.

### III.

The failure of monism to co-ordinate with personality is due to its recognition of immanence only; that of pluralism to its recognition of transcendence only.<sup>12</sup> Finality can never be reached until these two truths—transcendence and immanence—are seen to be complementary, until the circle of a true inclusiveness sweeps about them both and holds them in polar unity. This Christianity, rightly understood, does, and does by means of the fulfilling and correcting truth of personality. That which fulfils also corrects. God is neither the sum of all existence, nor a separate unitary individual, but an immanent yet transcendent person.

Personality is the only reality that can be both immanent and

<sup>12</sup> Transcendence and immanence are here used in the common, if not altogether appropriate, sense of "the doctrine that God in his proper and essential nature is prior to and above the world, or that he has reality in himself apart from his works," and "the indwelling or inworking of the Deity in nature and man." See Baldwin, *Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology*.

transcendent. As force, God could be immanent only. As unitary, unrelated being, he could be transcendent only. But as person he is both immanent and transcendent.

To perceive how transcendence and immanence both belong to personality, we have but to turn to our own selves and our activities and relations. Imperfect though we may be as persons, as respects time and space we are both immanent and transcendent. I am immanent in my body, informing it and directing it, yet I also transcend it, and though I am limited by it, yet am I lord of it. Far indeed are we from being bound by space, although we cannot wholly escape it. We are at the same time spatial and non-spatial, dwelling in the two worlds like a bird between sky and tree-top. As a physical being I occupy space; am near or far from others; must move swiftly or slowly to get from place to place. But as person, as soul, I occupy no space whatever, no not so much as a pin-point. I think, move, feel, superspatially. My moral life, which is my truest life, is lived not in space at all.

So, too, as respects time. On one side of our being we are time-creatures, hindered and circumscribed by time limitations; able to do "but one thing at a time"; having a fixed place in a time-series; serving as a hireling our day. But in another sphere of our being, as persons, we are above time, look down upon it, transcend it. *In* time we are, but not *of* time. In the momentous decisions and experiences of the soul, slow years of ordinary living are swept into swift seconds. Time loses significance in the life of the spirit. Our association, as persons, with time is only part of that complication of ours with the empirical order which constitutes the tragedy of our present existence. The first thing for the Ego to learn is that it does not belong to this empirical order. Then it may go on to discover how to master and use it.

When one has once grasped the truth that as persons we are supertemporal and superspatial, he has the key to many of the most closely-locked problems of existence. Because as persons we are thus supertemporal and superspatial we cannot be mortal. Death, which shatters all our temporal relations and all our spatial relations, cannot shatter ourselves. And for the same



reason our relations to one another cannot be comprised in, or defined by, time and space. As supertemporal we are not, as persons, limited to today or tomorrow in our relations with one another. And as superspatial we are not, strictly speaking, external to one another, impenetrable, impervious, apart. No, our personal uniqueness consists not in the impenetrability of each person, as if he were an objective existence, a thing; but in that personal unity and self-consciousness by which he remains forever a distinguishable, inconfusable self. The personal monads, if we use Leibnitz' symbol, are not windowless. We are indivisible, not because of any peculiar adhesiveness, but because, as selves, we are not material beings at all. In whatever relations he may be, a self is always a whole by virtue of his selfhood.

In the very freedom and transcendence of personal relations, then, lies the possibility of immanence. The term itself is, of course, but a symbolism. The truth for which it stands is that the relations of persons to one another are too intimate to be expressed in terms of externality. We are—to repeat—rather within than without one another in our most vital personal relations.<sup>18</sup> And yet this immanence does not impair our personal integrity and unity; these can suffer impairment only by our own free act. The very word by which we most commonly designate our mutual personal relations, "influence," bears the same implication. Indeed no term that falls short of this suffices. We flow into one another, we dwell in one another—not in any material sense, but in the vital activities of our personal relationships.

The doctrine of the immanence of God is but a larger interpretation and application of the limited immanence which we know in our human relationships. If my friend can be, as it were, *in* me by virtue of the reality and power of his personality in my life, and yet without impairing my personality, then surely God, by virtue of whose personality my personality exists, can be *in* me without such impairment. I am not less real that he is *in*

<sup>18</sup> "There is nothing that can come closer, nothing that can penetrate a person more than another person. Bodies and objects are insuperably exterior to one another; not so persons." Gaston Frommel, *Études morales et religieuses*, p. 358 (quoted in *The Expository Times*, December, 1907, p. 111).

me, but more real; not less free, but more free. For it is only as a social self, in the most intimate and active relations with other persons, that my personality can develop. And no intimacy can be so purifying and liberating and fructifying as that with the Supreme Person. There is no difficulty in the idea of immanence if it be personally and not spatially conceived. "If the fact of God's omnipresence is conceded, this immanence of the Perfect within the imperfect as the Soul of the soul is *eo ipso* implied." <sup>14</sup>

God is immanent in universal humanity. Without him no one could be, even potentially, a person. And yet he is not immanent in all in the same manner and degree. That depends upon the capacity, receptiveness, and response of each separate person; and that in turn upon many factors, some of which lie quite beyond our vision. Enough that each human person shares in that universal divine immanence. Not as though God were divisible, and so much of him, less or more, inserted in each human soul. Rather, as the all-penetrating light radiates from the one quenchless sun, flooding the spacious chamber with splendor and stealing subtly into the narrow and shadowed room, so the Eternal Light richly illumines the great soul that lies open and expansive to his beams, nor fails also to suffuse with all possible radiance the enclosed and ill-advantaged soul whose walls may yet expand to admit more light.

#### IV.

Nature offers to the divine indwelling a medium far less capacious than humanity, yet far more open and plastic. Love, truth, and grace, nature cannot embody; only beauty, power, and harmony. Yet these are personal, not impersonal, attributes. They are in sky and mountain and flower, not because of mere form and proportion and color, but because in form and proportion and color hides the mind of a personal God.

Here, again, we gain our best understanding of the divine immanence by the analogy of our own immanence. A person paints a picture, or composes a sonata, or writes a poem, or builds a house, and in the very process inevitably puts himself

<sup>14</sup> W. R. Boyce Gibson, *Hibbert Journal*, January, 1907, p. 44.

into it. In some subtle way the quality and flavor of his personality pervades it. It is his, whether he own it or not. One knows instantly an angel of Angelico or a sketch of Rembrandt or a statue of Michael Angelo or a line of Shakespeare. More marvellous than the fabled touch of Midas is this touch of personality upon the outward world. Yet not *completely* plastic is the material, for the very reason that it is something less than spiritual. Pigment, marble, language—how each at once serves personality, and at the same time thwarts it; invites and denies; expresses and limits! The artist now soars, now chafes; now seizes, now fails. Here, see his meaning gleam pure and splendid through line or stone or syllable; there, hide and halt beneath that very medium which but now embodied it.

Is not such the relation of what we call nature to the Supreme Personality? With a wealth of variety and adaptation it responds to his informing Spirit. And yet nature cannot be a perfect medium of the Divine Spirit, simply because it is nature and not spirit. It will not do to identify the two. It is very true that nature has no meaning, no existence even, without mind; but that does not make it identical with mind. There is a natural and there is a spiritual; there is matter and there is spirit. To break down the distinction between them is to bring confusion and disaster into thought and into life. Not all, but *in* all, is God. And not in all in the same way and the same degree. It is part of our great human training to find him in the outer world, to detect, to perceive, to understand. Verily our God is a God who hides himself; yet hides himself only that he may more graciously reveal himself. For where there is no concealing there is no search, and where there is no search there is no finding. To get at the kernel within the husk, the meaning within the symbol, the essence within the embodiment—that is to find God in nature. There is a fine suggestion of the true nature of the divine immanence in the Bhagavadgita:<sup>15</sup>—

There is nothing else, O Danangaya! higher than myself; all this is woven upon me, like numbers of pearls upon a thread. I am the taste in water, O son of Kunti! I am the light of the sun and moon. I am "Om" in all the Vedas, sound in space, and manliness in human beings; I am the

<sup>15</sup> Sacred Books of the East, VIII, 74.

fragrant smell in the earth, refulgence in the fire; I am life in all beings and penance in those who perform penance. Know me, O son of Pritha! to be the eternal seed of all beings, I am the discernment of the discerning ones, and I the glory of the glorious.

If the pantheism of India had gone no farther than this, the results would not have been so serious. Not to lose bearings in this great sea of truth, but to sail it in the light of the stars that shine above—that is the difficult task in which India so dismally failed, and in which Christianity has thus far succeeded. If Paul describes God as “in all,” he couples it with “over all.” If the author of the Fourth Gospel teaches as the very substratum of his gospel the divine indwelling in creation, it is as the Logos, not as the complete Godhead. If Justin Martyr and Clement of Alexandria find the very essence of Christianity in the immanence of God in man, their Christology saves them from pantheism. If Athanasius, with his training in Platonism, finds the universe full of God, he never identifies him with it. “For not even by being in the universe does he share in its nature, but all things, on the contrary, are quickened and sustained by him.”<sup>16</sup> Saint Augustine, whose conceptions closely border upon pantheism, escapes it by his doctrine of creation *de nihilo*.<sup>17</sup> Mysticism dwelt close to the lotus-land of pantheism, but seldom ventured too far within. John Smith, the Cambridge Platonist, declares that “those scattered rays of beauty and loveliness which we behold spread up and down over all the world, are only the emanations of that *inexhaustible light which is above*.”<sup>18</sup> And Wordsworth, in the most familiar and endeared expression in literature of the divine immanence in nature, clearly and completely differentiates himself from pantheism by describing God as the being, *not* who *is* the light of setting suns, but *whose dwelling* is the light of setting suns

And the round ocean, and the living air,  
And the blue sky, and in the mind of man.

Thus does the Christian conception exult in the divine immanence without thereby losing the transcendence.

<sup>16</sup> De incarnatione, § 17.

<sup>17</sup> Weber, *History of Philosophy*, p. 189.

<sup>18</sup> See Caldecott, *The Philosophy of Religion*, p. 189.

## V.

The endeavor on the part of Christianity to harmonize and unify immanence and transcendence finds its historical expression in the doctrine of the Trinity. In spite of its controversial and ecclesiastical character, the Nicene formula was an earnest and profound effort to define the nature of divine personality. And the most significant fact regarding it is that both the problem and its solution grew inevitably and naturally out of the problem of the personality of Christ. It seems a far cry from the simplicity and sincerity of Jesus Christ—the most real, and in a sense the best understood, man who ever lived—to the fathomless speculations of the Athanasian controversy; and yet the whole process lay enwrapped in the answer of Peter to the question of his Lord, “Whom say ye that I, the Son of Man, am?” From the personality of Jesus to the personality of God is a straight and unavoidable path.

When men undertook thus, for the first time, to define God in the light of personality, it became clear that in some way he must needs be conceived both as transcendent and as immanent. Retaining, therefore, the well-established Hebrew conception of transcendence—“God, the Father Almighty”—they complemented and fulfilled it with the Christian form of the conception of immanence—“and in Jesus Christ the Son of God, only-begotten of the Father, that is, of the substance of the Father, God of God, light of light, very God of very God.” Here is the nucleus of the doctrine of a personal God who is at once transcendent and immanent, absolute and revealing, perfect and imparting. Not that the Nicene doctrine was complete and final, either in statement or in conception. It was but a germinal and inadequate, yet inestimably important, grasping of a truth whose larger significance is only now opening before us. The Nicene doctrine itself suffered serious deterioration and distortion in the barren interpretation of Augustinianism and Calvinism, and is only now coming to true appreciation and development in the New Athanasianism of modern theology. The immanent Logos, which Athanasius found in the only-begotten Son alone, has now come to be recognized in all men, yet without lessening, but rather heighten-

ing, the unparalleled significance of him who alone can rightly be called *the* Incarnate One, the only-begotten of the Father, full of grace and truth.

There is another way in which the doctrine of the Trinity stands for, and helps to maintain, the truth of the divine personality. That is by setting personality, as applied to God, over against individuality. Perhaps three men out of four confuse personality with individuality. For this reason, when God is spoken of as a person, many a thoughtful man or woman will reply, 'I cannot think of God as a person; to me he is far too great, too universal, to be a person, like ourselves.' And all the time the speaker is thinking of a person simply as an individual. Of course God is not an individual; that is just what perfect personality makes it impossible for him to be. The qualities of pure personality, such as in ourselves, as imperfect persons, are associated with individuality, in a perfect person must transcend individuality. Moreover, it is that very perfection of personality that, so to speak, individualizes God, that distinguishes him from everything and everyone else.

The trinitarian doctrine endeavors to represent this perfection of personality, this fulness of being, by refusing to God stark numerical unity, standing as that does for individuality, and substituting for it a threefold unity, far more adequate to express the richness, the love, the glory, the inexhaustible fulness, of the Perfect Person.

Thus does Christianity conserve and defend the reality of a perfect person. All the reality, the intensity, the pervasiveness, of a God who is through all and in all is retained, without the extravagances and moral blindnesses of pantheism. Immanence, personally conceived, finds its true interpretation in relation to that transcendence by means of which moral relationships and values are preserved and the universe is seen as one in which God dwells but is not absorbed.

*THE MORAL CRISIS WITHIN THE CHURCH*

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When Pope Pius X, standing upon the traditional rock of papal authority, issues a decree upon matters of faith, his words carry the weight not only of his sacred office but also of his immense social influence. We may perhaps share Tertullian's amazed indignation, when Pope Calixtus first assumed the right to speak for the whole church—"Audio edictum esse praepositum et quidem peremptorium"—and yet we listen. We listen, because, in this modern world, no interest which concerns the well-being of any part can be of indifference to the whole social structure; and more especially we listen because the movement which in Roman Catholic circles is known as Modernism is a vital and pressing problem in every organized body of Christian believers.

Within the great historic church this utterance of the Pope is of supreme human interest. The elements of a thrilling drama are all present. There, in the person of Pius X, stands the transcendent authority and wisdom of the ancient church. He speaks, not as the Holy Father to his children, but as the unerring guide and teacher of the faithful. The very audacity of his words appeals to the imagination. They are a call to battle. The church is the citadel of truth. The enemy, who are attacking it from within, must be beaten back, hewn down, and utterly destroyed. Here is a will that would stem the current of the world's life; would hold the thoughts and emotions of all the faithful in bondage. The passage of time, the achievements of knowledge, the rise of a new order which has revolutionized social values, are as nothing. Philosophy, science, historical criticism, are but ministers to the supreme dictatorship of truth which is reposed in the papal chair. The reader rubs his eyes. It seems as if the Pope had taken from their resting-places in a museum of antiquities weapons of ancient warfare with which to meet the destructive machinery of modern inventions.

The voice is there, but it sounds like an echo of a far-away past. The will is there, but where now is the authority which it once exercised over every channel of human intelligence and endeavor? The demand is there, but where shall we look for those awful resources of censure and discipline? Will the world, which once trembled at the rebuke of the imperial bishop, now heed the words which demand of the faithful a fearful and unthinking obedience?

The appearance of this papal decree shows that the importance of the intellectual revival among Christian thinkers is not misunderstood or undervalued at the Vatican. The modern spirit is not standing without and knocking as a suppliant at the doors of the church. It is intrenched within, and is claiming its rights of inheritance as the loyal child of the great Mother. The enemies of the church are her adoring and devoted sons. That is the pathos of the situation: the anathemas of the Holy Mother fall upon her own offspring.

The Modernist is in a sorry plight indeed. He is begotten of two great loves. Blood of his blood, flesh of his flesh, and bone of his bone is the church of his devotion and obedience. He is no Ishmaelite, but the true child of promise. The faith of the church he holds with all the passion of his soul. Its doctrines, its sacraments, its vigils and its fasts, are his by inheritance and by the appropriation of his heart. More than that, his prophetic eye sees in the historic faith and organization the spiritual hope of generations yet unborn. Nevertheless he owes allegiance to another authority. He is the child of another intellectual world. From his earliest conscious moments he has been trained and disciplined in an atmosphere of exact science which knows no final authority save in established truth. To him each new achievement in knowledge is a new revelation of God. To deny this revelation is to deny God. However much he holds in reverence the Doctors of other days, he cannot accept their teaching when it conflicts with the known facts of this present time. He believes that, while the doctrines of the Christian faith were born of the culture of the ancient world, they are not, in the nature of things, forever chained to it; but that it is the mission and genius of the Catholic Church, through its accumulated wisdom and experience of centuries, to



give a spiritual interpretation to every new discovery of knowledge and to every new development of human understanding. He would make the church, not an intellectual dungeon, but the radiant and spacious home of those who walk in the light of God.

He is the citizen of two worlds. Between the love of his heart for the church of his devotion and the loyalty of his soul to the revelation of truth he must tread his bitter way. On the one hand are the joys, the satisfactions, the rewards, of life; on the other the humiliations and sorrows of those who suffer for very truth's sake.

This great moral crisis, which is so acute within the Church of Rome, is present in some degree within all bodies of organized evangelical Christianity. To enter a gathering of one of their councils is to pass into an unfamiliar atmosphere. The observer becomes aware of a certain preoccupation of mind which gives an indirectness to all its proceedings. It seems not to meet face to face the existing conditions of life. It seems to be apart from the real world and to be busily concerned in measuring its thoughts or its actions with a remote, but sacred, standard of truth or government. Its real religious zeal is somewhat deflected from its course by the requirements of conformity to a tradition which is manifestly the creation of another age and other surroundings. There appears to be something almost like a fear that the religion of Jesus may escape from the established system and become a free gift to all men. This is but an extension of the spirit of the Vatican. There is also a Protestant Modernism, and between this and the Mediaevalism which — unavowed and often unconscious — pervades the Protestant churches, lies a wide and unbridged chasm. The tyranny of a traditional interpretation of the Scriptures, the arrogance of an ecclesiastical caste, are the unrelenting foes of the spirit of religious freedom which appeals to this age with a divine insistence.

The Pope has but reasserted the claim of Cyprian, that only by obedience to, and dependence upon, the bishops is union with the church and with Christ possible, for within the church founded by the Apostles is the whole and uncorrupted truth of God—*extra ecclesiam nulla salus!* He turns the minds of the faithful

to that momentous time which Harnack calls "the most fatal turning-point in the history of Christianity"; but even Pius X, with all his power, is not able to bring back again the conditions of social and intellectual life out of which sprang the authoritative and monarchical church.

Looking backwards, we see how essential to the well-being of the Christian communities, and even to the existence of the church, was the individual's obedience to its laws and conformity to its teaching. Submission to outward control is not necessarily a form of slavery, but may be of the essence of true liberty, or a high and noble choice of the individual will. It may well be that the body which exercises authority over each member (as in a great university) is the one efficient source of intellectual and moral life, and is animated by the highest spirit of the age. It may be an army of defence against the attacks of ignorance and sin upon the social body. It may be the champion of justice and righteousness. It may be the teacher of wisdom, and lead the hearts of men to the love of truth. It may hold up a standard of devotion and self-sacrifice and heroism in the pursuit of a noble cause. It may, in short, gather together into a living and powerful organism the hopes, the aspirations, the moral sentiments, of the age.

If the church cherishes this high ideal of its mission and destiny, then it may indeed be the home of all ardent and generous souls. However glorious its past, its divine opportunity is in the present. Whatever its sacred possessions, they must serve to interpret the will of God to the minds of men. No true disciple of the living Master can be wholly moral by conformity to the standards or requirements of any other age. It has been said of the Pharisee that he was a moralist a generation behind his time.

It is this ecclesiastical preoccupation with the mental and moral attitude of another age which keeps the church apart from the actual life of today. Men see this sacred institution stirred with activity, eager in propagandism, compassing sea and land, and zealous in a hundred forms of good work. Its immense services to the welfare of humanity are justly valued; yet its power of moral leadership is steadily slipping from its grasp. The voice which speaks in the name of God and proclaims the ancient authority of truth is no longer heeded in the great centres of

learning. The church still appeals to the faithful; but the mighty stream of human activity passes it by.

It must nevertheless be recognized by any observer of social conditions today that the church holds the strategic position of moral opportunity. With its venerated past, its sacred traditions, its divine commission, it reaches, as no other institution can, the deepest sentiments and the noblest impulses of our generation. To it therefore is committed the opportunity and responsibility of leadership; and it is at this point that we meet face to face the great moral crisis which confronts every form of organized Christian faith.

For moral leadership is a high and mysterious quality of soul in the individual or institution. Its appeal is to the imagination, for it must invest with a glowing sentiment the unrealized aspirations and unfulfilled purposes towards which a generation is struggling. In these it must see the most radiant, the most enduring, realities of the age—those commanding objects of desire which appeal to the ardor and devotion of generous souls.

That, surely, was the romance of the early church. The humblest believer leaped from his obscurity into the arena of life. He became endowed with the dignity of an ambassador, and set forth on his astounding mission to win the world to Christ. In his passion for righteousness and in his fearless zeal for the revealed truth lay his power over the wills of men. The Jewish faith had drawn many worshippers into its cult by its pure monotheistic teaching and by its noble ethical standard, but the followers of Jesus sought for nothing less than the establishment of a world-wide Kingdom. The church incorporated into its body religions, philosophies, social customs, politics, secret societies—all the interests, activities, longings of men—and glorified them with an enthralling faith.

It is just this quality to fulfil and justify every high and out-reaching human passion, to uplift it with faith in a divine moral order, that gives to the church its moral opportunity. The church will be heard so long as it proclaims in the name of God the reality of those spiritual premonitions which are known, not through the eye of sense nor by the outward experiences of life, but are the soul's inward witness to the eternal good.

Thus the authority of the church cannot be a power once bestowed, nor a grace which trickles in a narrow channel through the ages; nor can it rest upon a norm of truth or conduct once established: its authority is rather in its divine commission to lead every development in human understanding and in social betterment on towards the supreme ideal of life which is secure in its faith in God.

If the church is powerless to reproduce the conditions of life and thought—the ambitions, the sentiments, the limitations—of the period out of which came the sacred symbols of its faith, its real commission still remains, which is to lead towards God the uplifted life of devotion and enthusiasm of every age. To-day, in a thousand pulpits, the church is rebuking the spirit of selfishness, of materialism, of lawless passion for gain or power. Yet this is not enough, for its great mission is to manifest a purpose so detached from self-interest, so free from mental preoccupation, so ready to surrender privileges and possessions, so full of understanding towards every ray of light which makes clearer the path to God, so zealous and devoted to every cause which reveals the love and care of God for his children, that all men can turn to it for fellowship and guidance.

Nothing less than this is the price of true and universal moral leadership today. We are a people of high enthusiasms and spiritual adventures. But the most significant quality of our age is its originality—its readiness to break away from accustomed forms, from familiar and conventional channels of expression. There is unquestionably a change of intellectual attitude, and a temper of investigation towards all authority, so deep and far-reaching that even the most conservative observer is startled. And it is this which is surely forcing Christian leaders to a reconsideration of the place and worth of the church as a social institution.

Even the casual reader knows that the authority of the church in the past has been based upon intellectual leadership. The church was never a mere eleemosynary society. It never limited its work to the function of worship. It was the teacher of the truth. Sainthood and scholarship went hand in hand; the great Doctors of earlier days were the intellectual giants of their

times. Now it is a distinguishing feature of our age that the sense of the sacredness of truth, of its supreme and compelling authority, of its divine source and of its infinite variety of revelations, makes one of the great moral passions within the souls of men. If the moral value of conformity has lost its place, there has arisen among the common people a feeling for intellectual integrity which calls out the devotion of a religious faith.

The children of democracy have been fed on the food of liberty; and liberty has meant that there shall be no obstruction in the path of development nor hindrance to the fullest attainment of personal right. It has meant, in the higher sphere of intelligence, that the pursuit of knowledge and understanding shall break through all barriers of tradition in its way towards the goal. It is chained to no method; it accepts no results as final; but it is animated by a high enthusiasm for the ultimate victory of truth over error. A generation ago the scientific world was arrayed for attack upon the great and inert mass of tradition with which religion was identified. It had one mighty weapon. The leaders of the scientific method had the ears of the young. They sat, too often, in the seat of the scornful, but always in the seats of learning. They appealed to the ardor and the generous impulses of youth. They taught a wonderful new knowledge of which the ancients never dreamed, based, not upon the traditions of the past, but on the new understanding of nature's laws.

A great many foolish things have been said of what is called the "scientific spirit," and many enormities have been committed in its name; but no words can over-magnify the immensity of the revolution which was brought about when the young scholar was trained day after day in the ways of exact knowledge, and when little by little his soul was filled with the inspiration of intellectual integrity—and by integrity was meant, not conformity to any past tradition or law, but the full acceptance of each new revelation of truth which was discovered and classified through the study of man and nature. In this great principle of the authority of truth, and of the moral quality in every form of study and investigation, a new and wonderful moral motive was given to the common man as well as to the scholar. If it

led him away from accepted norms, from familiar traditions, it yet awakened within his soul those qualities of devotion, of sacrifice, of consecration and enthusiasm, which are the fruit of a true religious faith. He saw in the orderliness of law, in the tracings of development, and in the varieties of form, a vision of the mind of God. He found in these a basis of a moral world. He discovered the ground upon which to rest his assurance and confidence that "all things work together for good."

No institution can today hold the authority of moral leadership which does not to the fullest degree appeal to this great moral passion for the enlightenment of truth. The schools and the universities are truly leading towards a high and noble faith; for it is a marked characteristic of all our great institutions of learning that freedom of investigation and study, freedom from all outward restraint or control, has been lifted up into the realm of moral law. The day of the sectarian college has passed. It is out of step with the march of the age. The teacher of a system is discredited. It has become recognized now that a teacher is commissioned to obey but one authority, and that that authority is the truth.

How much this means to the church of Christ is the grave question which meets us on every hand. It must be acknowledged that the whole mechanism of the church was adjusted to a scheme of things that has passed away. No Father or Doctor who labored and strove for the truth of God in other days could have dreamed of this surging spiritual tide which has swept the minds of men out of the chartered course—not Irenaeus, who saw a basis for immortality in the legends of Jonah and the three men in the fiery furnace; not the great Origen, with his extravagant allegorical interpretation of the Old Testament; only Jesus, the great Modernist, revealed the law which reaches to the very core of our life today: He that willeth to do the will of God shall know the truth. Is the church of Christ then anchored to the teachings of the past? Or is the church fully and utterly committed to teach the faith that the law of God is the law of life?

The seriousness of this question cannot be overstated. The formularies and rites of every religious body are the sacred vessels in which have been handed down from generation to generation

the revelations committed to its keeping. Through the mist of centuries the part which human passion or the limitation of human understanding played in the structure of these hallowed symbols can be but dimly seen. To most disciples of any particular form of faith or polity it seems as if its "deposit" of truth were a divine gift. This possession is in no sense conditioned by the development of human knowledge. It is from above and is absolute. It is therefore definitely declared that the church of God is not commissioned to proclaim the truth—as men understand truth—but to preserve the tradition which has been handed down through the centuries. Between a world which exalts intellectual integrity into a high moral ideal and an institution which demands of its disciples either indirectness or limitation of thought there can be no abiding union. It would not be strange if a mind preoccupied with the church of Cyprian should lose somewhat of its fine sensitiveness to the moral spirit of today.

But the aim of all true religious faith is illumination of mind and heart. To this great purpose the church of Christ is committed. It enshrines the ideal life. It bears witness to the reality of spiritual experience. Therefore on its ideal side it is bound to no past; it is fettered to no system; it has no inherent authority. Its high commission is to proclaim the faith—the faith which has fired the saints of every generation—in the supreme relationship of human souls to a loving and righteous God.

Never was a greater opportunity afforded to the church than now to give the richness of its experience, the sacredness of its traditions, the full flavor of its religious life, to sweeten and inspire and direct the lives of men. The scientific mind without the glow of religious feeling cannot finally satisfy the cravings of the soul. The achievements of the laboratory or the discoveries of the telescope may add greatly to human knowledge and widen the horizon of human minds. But the true leadership for which this hour calls is that of religious faith—it is the assurance of the value of life interpreted in the terms of religion. It is to gather up the results of modern knowledge into a divine synthesis which will illuminate the teachings of the past and give to the present a noble and inspiring purpose. The age of the prophet is upon us—the prophet who shall understand the aspirations, the hopes, the discontents of the time

—and whose clear and spiritual eyes shall see the revealed purpose of God in this seething and flowing life. Society is crying aloud for moral leadership. It is creating new ideals. This is an age of reverence. It hungers after God.

It can hardly be questioned that the roots, not only of the historic church but of every body of Christian believers, were planted deep in a social soil which was inimical to democratic ideals. The spirit of the churches is the selective spirit. By their structure and by their doctrines they are, when literally interpreted, out of tune with the master music of our age. It is true that even the monarchical church, within its organization, opens the opportunities of a democratic society to its members; and yet as a social institution it represents to the masses of men those special privileges of selection and class against which the best life of this generation is in deadly warfare.

To these masses it seems that the church is outside of, and apart from, the great moral struggle to make all men free men within the City of God. What else is the literal interpretation of the historic rite of baptism? We are told that "all men are conceived and born in sin," and that "none can enter into the Kingdom of God except he be regenerate and born anew of water and the Holy Ghost." Did not the Fathers rightly interpret this conception when they declared that there was no salvation without the church? Was not Calvin right in proclaiming that church-membership was the essential condition of enfranchisement in a righteous city? It may seem to us that the long debate about post-baptismal sin was a strange misconception of the spirit of Jesus; but through the smoke of intellectual battle we can discern the clear and strong purpose of those who were building into a mighty order of caste and privilege the spiritual truths which were revealed for the larger liberty of all mankind.

Perhaps in no other doctrine can the immense change in religious understanding and sentiment be more clearly seen than in the attitude of believers towards this mystical and touching rite. The social and parental feeling has issued its decree of love and hope, and nailed it on the door of the universal church. We may philosophize about evil, but no loving parent can ever again



accept the monstrous doctrine that the child of love is "conceived and born in sin." Against the authority of the church human consciousness has raised up a higher authority, and dictates in the voice of a diviner truth to the souls of men. What is this higher authority? To the answer of this question the great social movements of our time are directed. The long-established relationships of life are bending to the pressure of a new and irresistible power. The old order which enshrined reverence and authority in parenthood, in office, in social caste, in education, is giving place before the demand that every claim of right or privilege shall be valued by its inherent worth and by its service to mankind. From this upheaval of settled customs, this ruthless examination of long accepted authorities, the church cannot be exempt. The severe process of readjustment of relations through which society is passing is most surely awakening among all classes a universal and sensitive motive of social responsibility. What Wiclif saw in vision seven centuries ago is working itself out, through the throes of social struggle, into the society and government of today. "The law of social obligation is based upon the law of God," and there resides in no institution or office, however sacred, any authority which can contradict the enlightened conscience of the people.

We hear much, and rightly enough, of the service of the church to other generations—of its zeal for souls, of its protection of learning, of its struggles for righteousness. But today we are in the midst of undreamed of conditions; of a situation for which the church has made no provision. Organized Christianity grew into its full strength with the growth of the institution of feudalism; and feudalism was not only a form of social structure but was also a temper of mind: its genius was force. In the close and dependent relationship of overlord and vassal two great social principles were evolved—authority and obedience. If the church began by relieving the individual of his personal responsibility, it ended by taking from him every attribute which makes life important in itself.

Now it is just this consciousness of the importance and value of life to the individual that has seeped down through the strata of caste divisions into the souls of the masses of toilers. We are met

therefore not so much by a readjustment of social relations as by a violent upheaval of an established order. The rise of industrial democracy is the phenomenon of supreme human interest in our generation. Its huge body has lifted itself through the crust of settled traditions and forms and institutions—dividing, breaking down, scattering, overwhelming, with little enough concern about the past or the future. It is a great, brutal, material giant. It demands rights, claims privileges, and compels the attention of the world. It does not appeal: it strikes. It does not ask a hearing: it roars its commands. Yet it is not a drunken giant. On the contrary, it is singularly firm and persistent and determined. It fills its own world. Its attitude is that of attack. It is alert, watchful, self-contained; and its bitter antagonist is the social structure of class and privilege. It hopes for no heaven, and it fears no hell. Yet it is tender towards its own. It is inspired with the passion of brotherhood; and its protecting arm, which is so ready and strong to strike its foe, is gentle and loving when it enfolds the weak and poor.

In itself this uprising of the toiler is a startling departure from the old, simple relationship of protection and dependence between the overlord and vassal in society or church. It is creating new and perplexing problems in the industrial world. It is changing constitutions and affecting governments. It is uplifting new social standards and making new social values. But the full significance of this revolution cannot be grasped until it is interpreted in the terms of a vast moral awakening, for behind all its good and evil lies the great vision of the worth and importance of the individual life.

It has been often pointed out that the official ministry of the church grows less and less attractive to the generous-minded youth of today. Even its unique opportunities for human service and its noble passion for the salvation of mankind fail to appeal to the imagination. As a whole, the church remains strangely detached from the vital interests of the masses, as well as from the controlling spirit of the intellectual world. The questions of government or doctrine with which it is so largely occupied imply a different condition of life and thought. They are lingering memories of a world that has passed away. The divisions of Protestantism have

become temperamental rather than doctrinal. Even when the church deals with the problems of social change, its way of approach is unfamiliar to the modern mind. It is still concerned with its endowment of rights and privileges, its traditions and forms, which it holds to be essential elements of its life and authority. It has still something to preserve which is alien to the social spirit of our time, in place of its authoritative utterance that the prophetic message of the compelling law of God is forever modern.

Yet in the moral awakening which underlies the rise of industrial democracy there has developed an unattached ministry in which the joy and the hope of the early church seem to be born again. Here we find the renaissance of the romantic spirit which is forever associated with a passionate loyalty to Jesus. In this dawn of the new age of human brotherhood, the lives of the social worker and the civic reformer alike are striving, with divine conviction, toward the supreme sacrifice of the Son of Man. The new ministry of the justice and righteousness of God sees with a new intensity and clearness, from the Mount of Vision of this twentieth century, the one figure which inspired the disciples of an earlier dawn. "It was the image of a young man giving up voluntarily, one by one, for the greatest of ends, the greatest gifts; actually parting with himself, above all, with the serenity, the divine serenity, of his own soul; yet from the midst of his desolation crying out upon the greatness of his success, as if foreseeing this very worship. As centre of the supposed facts which for these people were become so constraining a motive of hopefulness, of activity, that image seemed to display itself with an overwhelming claim on human gratitude. What Saint Lewis of France discerned, and found so irresistibly touching, across the dimness of many centuries, as a painful thing done for love of him by one he had never seen, was to them almost as a thing of yesterday; and their hearts were whole with it."

It is this spirit which breaks away from the classic forms and restraints of institutional life, and flings itself, in the abandonment of love, into the very heart of the human tragedy. This spirit bestows no charities, and makes no sacrifices; but it fills with the wine of life those privileged souls who can share in the hopes, the discontents, the struggles and the aspirations, of the masses

for whom are opening the gates of a new life. The prophetic eye may see again the inspired vision of the Messiah who is a man of sorrows and acquainted with grief, who bears the burdens of his people and leads them out of captivity into spiritual liberty. If the moral fire has died out of those old basic words, authority and obedience, it has lit up with a new radiance the watchwords of our time, co-operation and fraternity.

Can the church, into whose keeping is committed the religious welfare not only of a selected few but of all mankind, stand apart from this deepest and most far-reaching of the human interests of today, isolated by the very glory of its history, and dehumanized by the sacredness of its possessions? Is it not just because it is the accepted custodian of religion that there is given to it the inspiring opportunity of gathering into a divine synthesis all the vast and divided interests of social life and charging them with a moral dynamic? While the fear and jealousy of sectarianism are driving all religious teaching from the public schools, where shall we look for the spiritual guide who shall teach and train these wild and wayward human wills into the larger faith? Who shall teach this individual of the new social order to add to his own personal interests the interests of the whole social body; teach him that his soul can be lost in no deeper hell than that of absorption in his own business or pleasure; teach him personal responsibility for the wrongs of society or government; teach him that the outcast and forsaken, the ignorant and degraded, are members of the social family; teach him, amid his fierce struggles for personal rights, that the highest value of life lies in personal responsibility.

These are the vital and insistent questions which a democratic society may ask of the church today. In a civilization in which industry is divorced from religion, religion from the state, and the state from the most vital problems which threaten its existence, the cry for moral leadership arises from the very heart of a bewildered people. To the church has been intrusted the stewardship of great possessions which are the gifts of God to all mankind. The faith it holds, when set free for human needs, is not only the driving power of moral endeavor but the controlling power of moral restraint.

With so great riches, yet one thing more is needful—that painful thing done for the love of Christ—the surrender of its own, that it

may give back to the hungry world the spiritual faith in the Son of God. The preconceptions of the feudal church must yield before the rising tide of the ideals of a social democracy. The dream of a material empire, the lust of power, the isolation of exclusive doctrinal systems, must be absorbed in the passion of a loyal discipleship which would be as its Master, for where the Christ stands there must his church stand also. "He stands at the gates of the twentieth century, waiting till the lagging people overtake him. Then he will lead the tired and famishing into his city of love."

*THE MEDIATORIAL OFFICE OF THE VEDIC FIRE-GOD*

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The mediatorial office of Agni (Latin *ignis*), the Vedic Fire-god, has never been explained; nor has there ever been an attempt to clarify the relation between Agni as mediator and as avenger, or to show whether either of these functions is extraordinary. Usually the office is taken for granted, as if it were the regular business of Agni to act as a mediator between gods and men. It depends on what is called a mediator whether this is true or not; and the loose use of language has surprising results when non-Sanskrit scholars take up a word used by Sanskrit scholars in a literal sense and employ it in the theological sense. 'Mediator' means literally a go-between, or messenger, and Chaucerian English so uses the word; but the common theological connotation adds to this the idea that the messenger or go-between goes as an intercessor or reconciler between two opposed parties.

Now when the author of *Ethnic Trinities* (and even Tiele) undertakes to show the universality of Christian ideas in religious phenomena, he instances the Hindu Fire-god as a 'mediator,' using the word as applied in Christian theology. As a matter of fact, this gives a very incorrect view of Agni, who does not intercede with other gods for the sake of men. The idea that the fire of the sacrifice helps to appease the wrath of other gods is not wholly absent; but it is worth while to see when and where this idea is found, and especially to learn how it is reached and what it implies.

Usener, in his *Götternamen*, speaks of some gods being 'opaque' and some being 'transparent.' Agni is a transparent god. He is fire, the mighty power that burns the forest, that is lighted on the hearth and on the altar, that is three-fold, born first in the sky, then on the earth, and thirdly in the waters of the cloud. As in Zoroastrianism, fire is also the heat, or life-warmth, the productive

and generating power in plants and animals. He is the son of sky and earth, or, as elsewhere said, he is brought down from the sky.

Agni's normal function is to serve as a messenger of meals to the other gods. He is first fed himself, and then he calls the other divinities to feast. Morning, noon, and eve, meals are prepared for the gods. The fire ascending signals afar, an *ἀγγαρον πῦρ*, to tell the hungry host that all is ready. Agni, in short, is an animated dinner-bell to summon the gods to breakfast, dinner, and supper. As such he is the "friendly messenger" (*passim*), but *qua* messenger he is not mediator, only a "fargoer," *dūtá*, just as Saramā is the messenger of Indra and rain is the messenger of the Rain-god. Nevertheless, as messenger, he tells the gods about men if men desire, and he is occasionally asked to assure the other gods that the sacrificer is pure and sinless. But this does not imply that he asks the gods to forgive the sins of men, or that he does anything to influence the gods in their action, save to bring the message with the announcement that the men who sent it have prepared a feast for the gods. The striking proof of this is that Agni himself is given the same sort of message when another god acts as postman. Thus, in Rig-Veda 7, 62, 2, the sun is invoked to "proclaim us (the worshippers) sinless to Mitra, Varuna, Aryaman, and Agni." What Agni does is to make the sacrificer pure through the sacrifice by carrying to the gods the offering that mollifies them if they are angry. Only thus is he said to free from sin and from the 'bonds' (sickness) which serve to indicate the existence of the divine wrath. In several passages Agni frees from sin directly, as do other gods. Compare Rig-Veda 4, 12, 4, "Make us sinless before Aditi (Earth-goddess); loosen our wrongs (sins), O Agni"; and *ib.* 54, 3, "O Savitar (Sun), render us sinless before gods and men." Another phase of his character also leads to misconception. Agni is called *upa-vaktár* (*vac*, Latin *voco*, cf. *advocatus*), which might suggest (and has suggested) that he is an 'advocate' of men before the gods. Nothing is farther from the poet's mind. As *upavaktár*, Agni is merely 'helper' or, as he is also called, 'arranger' in the business of sacrifice. To be 'messenger and arranger' he is sent down by the gods (8, 19, 21), and *upavaktár*,

applied to him in 4, 9, 5, means merely that he encourages men in sacrificial work, as Soma or Savitar is an *upavaktár* and Indra is an *adhivaktár* (*advocatus* as encourager) in battle.

Agni, still transparent, helps man both by burning with heat the demons of darkness and by giving various things to the worshipper. He gives rain by slaying the dragon that keeps back rain, for Agni is lightning as well as altar-fire. He is begged to keep afar his own injurious dart, for lightning can injure men as well as slay demons (10, 142, 1-3). But chiefly he helps by strengthening the good-will of the gods in his capacity of food-bringer. He is thus, in averting the wrath due to neglect, the saviour (*paraspás*, *trātár*), just as he is a saviour in protecting men from demons by means of his "flaming tooth, like a club." So is Indra a 'saviour'; and in fact, in words which one might well think were originally addressed not to Indra but to Agni, Indra too is in 7, 20, 1, the "strong, active saver from great sin." Not only is Agni *like* the other gods, in relation to men, but he *is* the other gods. Thus he is "like Varuna" in wisdom, and again he is identified with Varuna; he makes the worlds; he guards earth; protects the sky; becomes through his ability the "father of the gods"; and has the standing epithet "son of power," not because, as has lately been suggested, it requires some strength to twirl the fire-sticks, but because, like Indra, who has the same epithet, he is typical of strength, as the gods are called the "sons of immortality." The term for his fresh, abounding strength is *yúvan*, not *juvenis* in the sense of young, immature, but 'fresh' and 'vigorous.'<sup>1</sup>

To understand exactly how the conception of Agni approaches that of a mediator, one must start with the wrath of the gods. What is meant by the prayer to Agni, "Keep from us the sin that makes us fall," in RV. 1, 189, 1? This is so little moral that it might be paraphrased with "keep from us the hurt that injures us." The following words show that what is rendered 'sin' is really 'hurt.' So when Aditi, the Earth-goddess, "makes sinless,"

<sup>1</sup> Compare in RV. 1, 155, 6, *yúvákumāras*, 'vigorous, not weak,' where *yúvan* is directly opposed to *kumārā*, weak, youthful. This is also the idea in Agni's epithet *Yahú* and *Yahvá*, in regard to which see a paper by the writer in the forthcoming Journal of the Oriental Society.



it means "keeps scathless." Agni is begged to cast the sickness which one man deserves upon someone else. Compare 10, 37, 12, "Whatever verbal or mental act of ours has angered the god, may ye set that wrong down on him who is maliciously opposed to us," where the 'wrong' is the same word rendered 'hurt' above ('sin'). The wrath of the gods is objectified in illness, fever, drought, hurt of any kind, which appears among men and may be cast out. Thus in 1, 114, 4, "Rudra's wrath be cast far from us." In 6, 62, 8, this wrath is cast out (as disease) upon demons. But there is here no appeal to Agni.

The worshipper has no need of a mediator. As he appeals to another god to announce him sinless to Agni, and as he appeals to Agni to announce him sinless to other gods, he appears to demand a herald of his virtue; but this is not his constant attitude. Usually he makes his cry direct to the god whom he worships. Thus in 1, 24, 14: "We make depart thy wrath (*áva te hédo īmahe*) by means of obeisance and sacrifice, O Varuna. Loosen the sins (wrongs) we have done; make loose thy bonds (of sickness) from us." And in 7, 58, 5, "We make depart the wrong (sin, *áva tád éna īmahe*) of the mighty gods." Here the 'wrath' of one passage is the 'wrong' of the other. In both, the worshipper entreats in his own name, not through a mediator, for the removal of the wrath of the gods, which is the hurt incarnate in the victim, the 'wrong' which is sin because it is the visible sign of sin. There is no wrath without sin; hence hurt, the sign of wrath, is, as it were, the very sin itself. Compare the prayer for relief from suffering in 7, 84, 2, "Ye (gods) bind with bonds which are not straps (not literally bonds); may I turn aside your wrath."

But though Agni is too great (not to say synonymous with the greatest gods) to be thought of as if he were a Mithra to an Ormazd or a Marduk to an Ea, and though the normal tone of the sacrificer is one of direct address to his gods in begging him to avert sin (that is, avert the effect of wrath due to neglect), yet Agni has his part to do. Some one must present to the gods the *quid pro quo*. No one supposes that a wrathful god will show mercy without reason. A certain amount of proof of repentance is necessary. And this proof is furnished by renewed zeal in making offerings.

Hence, as Agni is "the priest divine of sacrifice," he is sometimes said to make men sinless himself, and sometimes in the same way to make the gods merciful. On the whole, however, this last is a rare attitude for the worshipper to assume; nor does it imply intercession. In 1, 94, which, from the fact that it mentions a fuller list of priests than is known elsewhere, may be assumed to be rather late, Agni is thus asked to avert the wrath of the Maruts (but the passage is not very clear); and, again, in the opening hymn of the fourth book of the Rig-Veda he is asked to "make go away the wrath of the god." He does this, however, not by interceding for men, but mechanically, as presenter of sacrifice. In 1, 128, 7, another idea is brought out. Here Varuna is no better than a devil, and Agni is begged to save man "from the trickery of Varuna," but this is just as he saves from the trickery of other devils (1, 99, etc.). Hence the tricks and wrath of the spiritual beings go together in one petition of deprecation: "O Agni, do thou keep off divine anger and ungodly tricks" (6, 48, 10). But there is in this office no mediatorial function. Agni drives away evils of this sort as he drives away other evils, for example, curses (Agni "drives curses off"), kills the old dragon, and generally "leads man to the better."<sup>2</sup>

There are passages in which Agni is entreated to protect man, but in these the gods are rather co-equal workers. Thus, in 3, 1, 15, Agni is besought "with the gods to do the singer a favor and protect." He is the brother of Varuna, the god with whom he is elsewhere identified, and the gods serve him because he serves them, upholding their laws (especially the "laws of Varuna"), so that, if he chooses, he may "blame men to the gods" for neglect of law or sacrifice, as, conversely, he may "sacrifice away" not only the blemishes of the altar but the god himself, the expression, "sacrifice the god away," being identical with "sacrifice the gods' wrath away" and "sacrifice the blemishes away by means of oblations."<sup>3</sup>

The expression "by oblations" gives the key to this whole series of acts. It makes it clear that there is no more mediatorial idea

<sup>2</sup> RV. 2, 9, 2; 3, 3, 6; 3, 20, 4.

<sup>3</sup> RV. 4, 1, 5; 7, 60, 9; AV. 19, 3, 4.

in any of these passages than there is, for example, in 1, 171, 1, where the worshipper, without addressing Agni at all, says directly to the Maruts (Rain-gods), "By means of this obeisance and hymn I beg for the Maruts' good-will."

Instead of being a mediator, Agni may follow up the faults of the sinner (4, 3, 13), and so appear as a possible avenger of the wrong done against the gods. But there is only one passage where this idea is fully carried out, that is, where Agni is represented as burning with his sharp tooth of flame those who injure the laws of the great gods, Varuna and Mitra, so that "those who are wicked and untrue go to the deep place." This passage represents these gods in a different light from that of the early hymns, where they are their own avengers, and, as Ludwig has observed, shows a later touch. It is perhaps the first adumbration of the later theory of the hell-fire which punishes the wicked according to the scheme of post-Vedic theology. But what is most interesting in it is that it puts the top stone on the edifice of the fire-cult morality of the Rig-Veda, in which Agni as messenger becomes helper of men, punishing the hurtful demons and evading demoniac anger, and at last punishes men themselves, if they do wrong. Yet it must not be forgotten that Agni helps only as the agent of the worshipper. He acts only as a bearer of reconciliation, not as the reconciler. What reconciles the gods is the sacrifice offered by man. Agni is not himself the sacrifice; he merely sees that it is well made and that it reaches the gods. This is a service for which he is duly paid, in that he gets the best part of the oblation himself. There is, however, a Vedic legend to the effect that he once got so tired of this work that he ran away and hid himself, and had to be routed out by the gods and bribed to go to work again.

## SOME RECENT BOOKS ON THEOLOGY

- Illingworth, J. R., The Doctrine of the Trinity.  
 Hall, F. J., Introduction to Dogmatic Theology.  
 Ritchie, W. B., Revelation and Religious Certitude.  
 Bowne, B. P., Personalism.  
 Rogers, A. K., The Religious Conception of the World.  
 Lloyd, A. H., The Will to Doubt.  
 Drummond, James, Studies in Christian Doctrine.  
 Peile, J. H. F., The Reproach of the Gospel.  
 Nash, H. S., The Atoning Life.  
     The Christ that is to Be.  
 Worcester, McComb, Coriat, Religion and Medicine.  
 Powell, L. P., Christian Science, its Faith and its Founder.  
 Campbell, J. M., Paul the Mystic.  
 Scott, W. M., Aspects of Christian Mysticism.  
 Inge, W. R., Personal Idealism and Mysticism.

Among the many tendencies discernible in current theology, two are well illustrated by *Illingworth*. The first is to regard Christianity as a distinct intellectual entity, having premises and methods of its own, with doctrines derived from revelation and contained in a tradition the substance of which is unalterable, although its statement becomes increasingly explicit as an expression of deepening experience and in response to varying needs. The second is to emphasize value judgments, and, in harmony with the pragmatic principle, to argue to the truth of a general attitude or a specific doctrine from its practical efficiency. Standing firmly upon the tradition, *Illingworth* urges also the practical results of belief in the Trinity as evidence for its truth. The same book illustrates also the dangers of both tendencies. As a "Catholic" thinker, the author is inclined to read into the Scriptures and early Patristic writings the full results of dogmatic development, and declares that he has no hope of convincing those who, standing without the Church, do not already accept its fundamental premises and traditional doctrines. As a pragmatic thinker he slips easily into the fallacy of *post hoc ergo propter hoc*. The book itself makes no contribution to the literature of the subject, and although certain well-known arguments for the doctrine of the Trinity are admirably put, the methodological errors referred to impair the worth of the book as a whole.

—*Hall's* "Introduction," which is the first of a projected series of ten volumes by the same author, is an example of the Catholic tendency. As a Churchman the author accepts as final and authoritative the Catholic faith, and in this volume treats of the importance of theology, its relation to other sciences, its sources, data, presuppositions, and the qualifications for its successful study.—A quite different view of revelation is held by *Ritchie*, who deems it a continuous and individual process, by which souls through obedience to the Spirit become personalities receptive of truth—a process manifest in the record of the Bible and consummate in Christ. Hence revelation, so conceived, is a means of knowledge, and because it involves immediate contact with reality gives the certitude which ratiocination lacks.—A philosophical basis for *Ritchie's* argument is furnished by *Bowne*, who argues in characteristically clear and tart style that the world considered as the object of knowledge and the residence of causality can be conceived only in terms of personality. The position is that of critical monism; unity is affirmed, and experience is invoked to attest both the dependence and the independence of human personalities. In this respect the book falls in with the growing opposition to a monistic absolutism in which human personality is submerged and the individual becomes merely a function of the Absolute. But the difficulty of critical monism is the old one of preserving in thought, and not merely by dogmatic assertion, the reality of the individual in an inclusive unity.—*Rogers* offers an interesting suggestion by insisting that, while reality must be interpreted in terms of consciousness and regarded as one, its unity is not that of self-consciousness, but rather the teleological unity of a social whole, a society of selves each of which is as ultimate as God himself. To interpret the unity of reality by the category of purpose is congenial with modern habits of thinking and opens a promising path.—The organic relation between the individual and the universal is the fundamental principle of *Lloyd's* book, the title of which, however, is infelicitous, as it seems to suggest an opposition to James's "The Will to Believe," although the two books are in essential harmony. *Lloyd's* thesis is that since reality attaches to nothing in its individuality, but only in the complex wherein all things are impli-

cated, and since our apprehensions must necessarily be partial, the sense of contradiction inherent both in ordinary consciousness and in the more refined differentiating consciousness of science, with the doubt which it inevitably produces, is a perpetual warning of incompleteness, inspiring further activity and keeping man in fellowship with man and in communion with God. In this very sense of uncertainty, then, is fundamental witness to reality as a whole, and hence it is in the felt paradoxes of experience that one is in immediate relation to reality.

Such fundamental philosophical discussions as these, however, are lacking in *Drummond's* clear and calm statement, pervaded by sweet reasonableness, of his own theological beliefs as contrasted with traditional dogmas. One characteristic of the book, in fact, is the paucity of its references to the more strictly philosophical writers. Indeed, the book falls short of a treatise on systematic theology only by the absence of a constructive philosophical principle. Another marked characteristic of the book is the constant reference to established creeds and confessions rather than to the works of individual theologians. This method, deliberately adopted, results in presentations of various doctrines which none of their modern defenders will acknowledge as just, but it gives a capital background for the clear exhibition of the author's own contrasted thought.—The engaging modesty and gentle reserve of Drummond's book appear also in *Peile*, who discusses the question why the kingdoms of this world have not yet become the kingdoms of our God and his Christ. The description given of existing social and economic conditions impresses one familiar with similar descriptions in books on sociological Christianity as singularly mild and colorless, although the author deprecates its harshness. The answer to the question proposed is that the moral teachings of Jesus have never yet been taken in full seriousness; but the emphasis is upon the general spirit of unselfishness rather than upon particular precepts, and upon individual regeneration in preference to social reformation.—The problem which Peile discusses arises from the conviction that the purpose of Christianity is to establish a kingdom of God in the world. If this be true, it is plain that the idea of the kingdom ought to be a constructive principle in Christian theology.

This is accepted by *Nash* in his contribution to the doctrine of the atonement. Holding that the central distinctive idea of Christianity is the Kingdom of God, the author finds its present symbol and most accurate representative in the family life, from which, therefore, rather than from the inferior life of the state, the principles of Christianity are to be deduced. The application of this method to the doctrine of the atonement is made with the writer's well-known suggestiveness of thought and felicity of phrase. If one member of a family sin, all the members suffer, and the corporate will of the family reasserts in forgiving love the violated relation. So God in Christ reaffirms against the sin of the world the reality of the kingdom and its law of love.

An interesting point in present conceptions of the kingdom is the emphasis upon its physical as well as its moral aspect. The anonymous author of "The Christ that is to Be" maintains that both sin and suffering are evil in nature and origin; and hence that the salvation which Christ offers is deliverance from bodily as well as from moral ill. As the faith of an individual needs the support of a corporate confidence—whence the necessity of the church—the author urges the church to accept the ministry of healing in order that the belief of all may strengthen the faith of each and so progress be accelerated. The discussion is loose and rambling, and there are some amusingly fantastic pages in which the writer soberly invokes bacteriology in support of demonology.—Superior to this somewhat vague and rhetorical presentation of the subject, however, is Dr. Worcester's book, which has had wide circulation because of popular interest in the Emmanuel Church movement, and which aims to justify the practice of mental healing by reference to psychological principles, especially as found in the subliminal realm. It is to be hoped that other clergymen proposing to follow the example of Dr. Worcester will imitate him also in the strict limitation of the field of operation to functional nervous diseases and in his constant reliance upon the guidance of trained and competent physicians.—Manifestly the outstanding form of this therapeutic Christianity is in Christian Science, to which *Powell* devotes a book of investigation and criticism. Accepting the principle of mental healing, and ascribing to it the cures wrought by Christian

Science, the writer criticizes the organized movement because of its crude metaphysics, its attitude towards the Christian church, the pretensions of its founder, and its practical consequences especially with reference to marriage and the family life.

It is due in part to the mystical side of Christian Science, as well to the wider acquaintance with phases of Eastern speculation, that there has been of late a notable revival of interest in mysticism. Attention has been called to the possibility of a mystical side in the character of Jesus, and the subject naturally receives consideration in books on the Fourth Gospel. *Campbell* endeavors to prove from an exhaustive study of the Epistles that Paul was a mystic at once Christian, evangelical, rational, and practical. Notwithstanding a frequent over-straining of passages cited, the book is valuable and repays thoughtful study.—Materials for the study of mysticism are rapidly accumulating. *Scott*, for example, supplies an abundance of quotations from the principal Christian mystics, but unfortunately has failed to give exact references, so that his book is of more value to the devotional reader than to the serious student. He has rendered one worthy service, however, by recalling attention to Peter Sterry, an English mystic whose work has been almost wholly ignored by writers on the subject.—There is urgent need of a thorough systematic study of the worth of the mystical experience, especially from the point of view of philosophy. The writer who promises most in this direction is *Inge*, whose latest book is devoted to a criticism of personal idealism, with its supposed teachings as to the impervious self and the inferiority of reason to will, which is pronounced alien to Christianity as represented by the Logos doctrine, and by all the mystics who teach the unity of life, as against pluralism, in reason and not in will.

W. W. FENN.



*EXCAVATIONS AT SAMARIA*

The first season's work of the Harvard Expedition to Samaria closed in the latter part of August. In consequence of various delays and interruptions incident to the beginning of the undertaking, the actual digging covered only nine or ten weeks in all. Doctor Gottlieb Schumacher, who has had the direction of the work, surveyed the ground, tracing the remains of the city wall, the circuit of which is about two miles and a half, and made a plan of the site.

After conference between Professor Reisner and Dr. Schumacher, exploratory trenches were opened at two places: one a short distance southwest of the modern village of Sebastiyeh, where some standing columns indicated the presence of a temple in Roman times; the other about three hundred yards farther to the southwest, on the highest part of the mound and the terraces immediately to the west of it. At the former, the lines and dimensions of the temple have been partially determined, more complete exploration being deferred to another year.

On the summit, where most of the digging has been done, a great stone stairway was uncovered, ascending from north to south. Nineteen steps, which must originally have been more than seventy feet in length, remain. They lead up to a rectangular paved area, now extending between fifty and sixty feet from east to west and twenty-five feet from north to south, and lying but a few inches beneath the present surface of the ground. Massive substructure walls, scattered drums of columns, and fragments of carved mouldings, show that the summit was once crowned by a large edifice, which has, however, been so completely destroyed as to leave nothing standing above ground. At the bottom of the stairway was found the torso and base of a marble statue of heroic proportions and fine workmanship. The type recalls Roman imperial statues, and Professor Lyon ventures the conjecture that it may be a statue of Augustus, in whose honor Herod, when he rebuilt the city, renamed it Sebaste. It is to be hoped

that this question may be settled by the recovery of the missing head of the figure. A few feet from the statue stood an altar, and not far from it two altar *stelae* with Latin inscriptions.

A detailed account of the work of the Expedition will be given in the January number of the REVIEW.

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